Ukraine War, 30 August 2024 (UPDATED)

Hello everybody!

Sadly, didn’t manage to finish my ‘ground warfare’ update, yesterday afternoon… indeed, due to different interruptions, it took me much of today to finish it. However, the action is continuing at high pace, so have to start this one in usual fashion…

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STRATEGIC

In regards of ‘out of area affairs’: the GRU is in the process of withdrawing the ‘Bear Brigade’ – a Perevalne- (Crimea) based PMC presently deployed in Burkina Faso, back to Russia. When contacted by Le Monde on 22 August, its commander, Viktor Yermolaev, confirmed this is ‘because of the Ukrainian offensive into the Kursk Oblast’, and the Bear Brigade also announced this in its Telegram post on 27 August.

At least the Burkinabe authorities didn’t arrest any additional Westerners… instead, the Venezuelan authorities did so: they have arrested a group of Colombian volunteers serving with the ZSU in Ukraine while the airliner carrying them made a refuelling stop in Caracas…

….and over Syria, a fighter of the US Air Force should have shot down a MiG of the Assadist air force: the pilot ejected and came down under a parachute… AFAIK, official Washington didn’t even comment this, so far. Why should anybody care..

The parachute of the downed SyAAF pilot entangled in high-power lines… Latest RUMINT is that this wasn’t a ‘Syrian MiG’, but an ‘Iranian UAV’.

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AIR/MISSILE WAR

In the air… well, the two Russian federal POL-dumps hit by Ukrainian UAVs are still fiercely burning (for 8-9 and 2 days now, respectively). In turn, yesterday (29 August) the Russians run another big stream of Shahed-attacks on Ukraine: total of 60 were claimed shot down, and 14 as jammed into crashing, out of 74 detected by the PSU. In addition to two Kh-59/69s out of four that were detected. The Russians were then back this morning, when they released 16 Shaheds: the PSU claimed 12 as shot down and 4 jammed…

…with which the Oleschuk’s service is back to the pre-8-July-practice of claiming to have shot down – or jammed – everything that was detected…

Quite surprisingly then, yesterday afternoon it became known that back on 26 August, during the biggest Russian missile attack on Ukraine in this war, the Ukrainian air force suffered its first combat loss of an F-16. Lieutenant-Colonel Oleksiy ‘Moonfish’ Mes is said to have shot down three Shaheds that morning, then ‘communications were lost’, and (quote) ‘the aircraft suffered a disaster’ (unquote)…

…but, his body was quickly found and buried in an official funeral accompanied by a farewell flight by a pair of MiG-29s…?

I mean… by all respect and heart-felt sympathies for the family of the downed pilot… sorry, but I’m not buying this any more.

1.) As first, the PSU kept zip-lip about this affair until it was revealed by the Western press.

2.) Meanwhile, the (quote) ‘competent’ (unquote) authorities have quickly found and recovered the body? How comes if they’ve lost radio contact and thus didn’t know exactly where did he come down?

3.) And then, the (quote) ‘competent’ (unquote) authorities quickly decorated the fallen pilot and organised a (decent, no doubt) funeral for him – including the fly-over by MiG-29s….?

….and that while Oleschuk was running a PRBS-show with ‘Juice’s’ mother in the cockpit of an F-16…?

…and that’s not to talk about earlier experience with the PSU fabricating all sorts of mythology about specific of its pilots (especially certain brigade-commanders and/or those shot down in blue-on-blue incidents)…

Then add the fact that somebody as well-informed as Mariana Bezuhla openly stated Mes’ F-16 was shot down by a Patriot SAM-system in a ‘blue-on-blue’.  

CinC PSU, General Oleschuk, didn’t even try to deny.

With other words: PSU is caught lying in the public?

Move on: that’s nothing new…

Fact is: such mistakes happen. And not seldom. That’s tragic. Not only because every single death at war is tragic. However, even more tragic is if – once again (i.e. just like in the case of all the earlier mistakes of this kind, resulting in Ukrainians shooting down jets of their own air force) – the PSU once again comes away with hushing up the entire affair, and continues lying, lying, lying, and lying – both to the relatives and the public – instead of objectively investigating own mistakes, and de-briefing both its SAM-operators and jet-operating units so they know how not to repeat these.

Therefore, the actually tragic fact here is that we all can be sure: on basis of earlier experiences with Oleschuk’s command, it is 1000% guaranteed that the PSU is not going to de-brief the involved people, nor seriously investigate and apply ‘lessons learned’ throughout its units. In Oleschuk’s PSU ‘everybody knows’ what happened…

… just like ‘everybody knows’ what happened to the PSU on 24 February 2022, too…

…which in turn means: this is guaranteed to happen again…

***

UPDATE: what a surprise then, just in is the ‘news’ that Zelensky sacked Oleschuk, earlier today…

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KURSK

In the Glushkovsky District, the Russians say that Tetkovo is cut off by advancing Ukrainians, and that they have not only lost all the six pontoon bridges constructed earlier, but another four constructed the last weekend (these were including one near Karyzh, one near Zvannoe, and two between Zvannoe and Glushkovo). Don’t worry: the VSRF has still got enough pontoon bridges – and the VKS is reinforcing its SAM-units deployed to protect these. Between others, the last few days, these have shot down a number of GLMRS deployed by the ZSU to strike the pontoons, including this one (which, in turn, means that, yes, the GLMRS is back to operations):

While this week the ZSU was busy overpowering remaining Russian pockets in the rear of its forward units - especially in the Korenevo-Sheptukhovka area (for example: there’s a VSRF contingent cut off in Kremyanoe, in addition to one of Sheptukhovka) - and has secured Aleksandrovka despite several Russian counterattacks, early on 27 August, there were reports in the Russian social media that the Ukrainians have breached the VSRF’s defences in Korenevo. Such were followed by reports about ‘chaos’ along the road from Korenevo to Rylsk, and then the E38 highway and the railway line from Rylsk via Lgov to Kursk were closed for traffic. One can bet, the Russians have meanwhile repaired the railway. However, the ZSU’s UAVs are now continuously striking their supply trucks.

A BMP-2 and two MT-LBs of the VSRF knocked out by ZSU’s FPVs on the road from Rylsk to Korenevo…

On the eastern side of the bulge, the Russian attempts to push from Boslshoe Soldatskoe in western direction have ‘revealed’ that Nizhnaya Parovaya is under the ZSU control – which is the case for at least a week (see my earlier updates): actually, yesterday, the Russian counterattack was stopped cold while trying to reach that place.

Finally, the south: yes, the Russians were attacking the ZSU in Borki ‘like crazy’, but - as of the last evening - didn’t manage to seize the place.

(Ah yes, and what the Chiefs of the US Joints Chiefs of Staff are explaining about the Ukrainian operation into Kursk: well, sorry, have seen all too much of their own expertise, the last 22 years, but especially the last 10-11 months - but to expect any other kind of ‘quality comments’ from the People in Need of Fresh Air.)

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Russian Reinforcements for Kursk

Yes, several of readers were right when complaining that it’s hard to qualify the number of Russian units and troops, regardless how much am I listing those known or reported as being re-deployed from within Ukraine, to the Kursk Oblast. OK, here another try – where I must warn: I do not know even one unit of the VDV or VSRF that is present and up to its nominal full strength. Mind that at war there are next to never units that are 100% at their nominal strength. For a host of reasons, most of the time, even the ‘most complete’ units are going to be at around 80%, perhaps up to 90%. In the case of the Russians, this is even more valid considering the mass of units sent to counter the ZSU in the Kursk Oblast was in the process of being re-built in the Kursk-Voronezh areas, or was hurriedly withdrawn from the frontlines inside Ukraine, then quickly re-organised before going to the battle again. My guestimate  is that, at best, the mass of units is anywhere between 20% and 60% complete.

‘Major’ units are those present in form of headquarters, i.e. the headquarter company, plus one or another battalion. Like other units, these are between 20% and 60% complete:

Spetsnaz, VDV & VSRF Brigade-HQs

-          24^th Spetsnaz Brigade:  nominally brigade HQ (1 battalion+) and 3 battalions; probably brigade HQ and 1 battalion are present, plus battalion each from the 2^nd and 10^th Spetsnaz;

-          11^th VDV Brigade: nominally 6-7 battalions; probably brigade HQ and 1-2 battalions (pisslby: one battalion from the 83^rd VDV Brigade);

-          56^th VDV Regiment: nominally 6-7 battalions; probably 2-3 battalions;

-          217^th VDV Regiment: nominally 6-7 battalions; probably 1-2 battalions

-          810^th NIB: nominally 6.000 troops+; 5 battalions are present (1^st, 3^rd, 5^th, 382^nd, unk. and Tiger; two battalions already decimated; 1,800-2,000 troops?);

-          155^th NIB: nominally 6,000 troops+; 2 battalions are present (1,500 troops?), 1 battalion still in the Kharkiv area;

-          15^th MRB: nominally 7 battalions; battered already when withdrawn from Kharkiv; probably 2 battalions with 800-1,000 troops (1 battalion remains in the Kharkiv area; was replaced by battalion-sized 1427^th MRR);

-          43^rd Railway Brigade: including up to 15 (attached) PMP-battalions, plus 5^th Ranger and 88^th Engineering Regiments;

-          136^th MRB (from Robotyne): nominally 7 battalions+, battered already when withdrawn from Robotyne;

-          200^th MRB: nominally 9 battalions, plus artillery group; probably 3 battalions with 1,000 troops;

-          5^th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade: 3-4 battalions Buk M3s

VKS, BARS & PMCs

-          Veterans PMC: ‘brigade’ by name, probably 2 or 3 battalions;

-          81^st BARS: status unclear;

-          VKS Rifle Regiment: nominally 4 battalions+; status unclear

Additional Motor-Rifle Regiments (elements)

-          9^th and 1009^th MRRs; nominally 4 battalions+ each; probably 1 battalion each; perhaps 400 in total; over 70% losses in Malaya Loknya area

-          83^rd MRR (from 69^th MRD): nominally 4 battalions+; in Kursk perhaps 2 batalions (500-600 troops);

-          22^nd MRR (72^nd MRD): perhaps a battalion of troops, probably attached to the 488^th MRR;

-          30^th MRR (72^nd MRD): perhaps a battalion of troops, probably attached to the 488^th MRR;

-          114^th MRR: perhaps a battalion of troops, probably attached to the 15^th MRB;

-          143^rd MRR: reported as in Kursk, status unclear

-          245^th MRR (47^th GTD); perhaps a battalion of troops; probably attached to the 488^th MRR;

-          252^nd MRR; perhaps a battalion of troops, probably attached to the 15^th MRB;

-          272^nd MRR (47^th GTD): perhaps a battalion of troops; probably attached to the 488^th MRR;

-          346^th MRR: status unclear

-          361^st and 362^nd MRRs: both sent to Kursk, probably assigned to the 488^th MRR (see below); might have 400 troops in total;

-          380^th MRR (from 47^th GTD); perhaps a battalion of troops, probably attached to the 488^th MRR;

-          488^th MRR  (from 144^th MRD): nominally 4 battalions+; in Kursk it’s including battalions from the 4^th and 47^th GTD, 20^th and 144^th Motor-Rifle Divisions;

-          1427^th MRR: status unclear

-          1428^th MRR: status unclear

-          17^th Border Guards Battalion (largely destroyed)

-          18^th Border Guards Battalion (largely destroyed)

Rosgvardia

-          116th Spetsnaz Brigade: nominally 9 battalions; battered already when withdrawn from northern Kharkiv

-          204^th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment: 3 battalions

-          1434^th Akhmat MRR: 4-5 battalions

So, that’s something like ‘the best’ I can guestimate about this issue right now. As said: should be a total of around 30,000 troops. With additional certain to follow.

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BATTLE OF DONBAS

Essentially, it’s ‘all the same old story, all over again’: the Russians are running only meek attacks elsewhere, but pushing with all powers in the Toretsk and Pokrovsk-Avdiivka sectors, plus ‘trying it seriously’ in the Mariinka-Vuhledar sector. Which is why I’m going to start with the Russian side.

Here I think that the mass of ‘war-monitors’ commenting this war – especially in the West, but in Ukraine too (I have given up all hope for Pudding’s PRBS-industrialists; they’re not even half as crazed as far more serious people in Russia) – should, FINALLY, accept the new reality. Nope, the Russian army of 2024 is no ‘Soviet-style massive mechanised juggernaut’ that can punch through a frontline with help of massed air- and artillery strikes and then drive 50-100-150-200+ kilometres into the enemy rear. Even the best of the VSRF proved unable of doing that in organised fashion back in February-March 2022; it has proven unable of running such operations even when actually breaching the ZSU frontline in Popasna of April-May 2022, and then again south-east of Lysychansk, in June-July of the same year. Two-and-a-half years later, after all the massive losses in troops and equipment, the VDV and the VSRF (plus all of its quasi-PMCs actually run by the GRU) are unable of more than ‘rolling’ attacks by infantry groups. At most, they can achieve limited advances like at Ocheretyne, back in March-April. And that’s exactly what they’re doing ever since.

The reason is that the Russian ability to wage manoeuvre warfare was destroyed in cooperation between Pudding and the ZSU of 2022.

What am I talking about?

Seeking to cause a quick collapse of Ukraine, Pudding was micromanaging the VDV and VSRF into one idiotically-conceived attack after the other, regardless the circumstances, and the ZSU was happy to exploit the opportunity. This resulted in the destruction of the pre-war VDV and the VSRF, together with most of their best equipment and whatever was still there in terms of know-how. 

Thus, please everybody (including all the NATO-generals still in panic about ‘Putin ante Portas in three years’): stop daydreaming and forget, finally, about this kind of a Russian threat.

Even under most favourable circumstances the VSRF can’t advance at a higher pace than infantry can. At war, that’s about 5-7km a week. … always provided the enemy (in this case: ZSU) permits it do so. As long as Pudding is in power, this is never going to change (because the System Putin is unable to reform).

For this reason, and just for example, expecting the VSRF to now, since it turned south at Selydove, drive to Kurakhove in a matter of 1-2 days… only people with serious preference for illusions and day-dreaming might still expect something of that kind.  

However, if – for whatever reason, entirely inexplainable to me – the GenStab-U ‘suddenly’ decides to let the VSRF advance at such a pace (5-7km a week), then pumps newly-established, inexperienced ZSU units into the sector in question, then orders or lets them to fall back (regardless for what reason), and then repeats that exercise until everybody is demoralised to the level where ZSU troops are giving up without much trying, while single brigade commanders start acting on their own, then… well, then… can only paraphrase Shakespeare: something is rotten in the GenStab-U.

To make sure: I know that some say… or, shall I write: some are hoping – the GenStab-U is doing this in order to let the VSRF’s Group Tsentr overstretch itself: quasi, they’re letting the Russians drive deeper into western Donetsk before counterattacking into its flank. Considering even many of Pudding’s own PRBS-industrialists have realised the ZSU is far from collapsing (don’t worry: only the most professional Austrian and NATO-war monitors still think in that fashion), but actually has a serious – even if poorly-trained and inexperienced – reserve (and, atop of that, is in the process of establishing another 8-9-10 new brigades), I can understand such expectations. However, for reasons I’m going to ‘list’ below, I’m not sure anybody is able of offering serious predictions about GenStab-U’s actual intentions. Actually, the only thing coming to my mind is bitter critique of institutionalised incompetence and wrong decisions.

1.)    Lets start with GenStab-U’s insistence on creating new units instead of refilling the existent ones.

I am completely undereducated in military affairs. That is a matter of fact confirmed by the best example coming to my mind for how idiotically wrong are GenStab-U’s practices in this regards, being that of the Wehrmacht in the Second World War. There, the OKW (Oberkommando Wehrmacht) was all the while establishing ever additional new units, while letting old ones bleed to death – and that right until the end of the war. AFAIK, the OKW ended the war with some 50+ Panzerdivisionen, just for example: of which hardly any had more than a dozen of operational tanks as of April 1945. Now, my lack of knowledge is certainly showing, and this happened before I was born, too, but: that itch in my small toe is telling me that the war in question didn’t end with some sort of a glorious victory for the Wehrmacht.

….who can say…

2.)    The majority of Sirsky’s branch- and sub-branch commanders are still selected on basis of ‘my son’s father-in-law’ or ‘my best friend’s uncle’, instead on basis of their merits and qualifications.

Yup. Thousands of years of warfare have provided plentiful of experience that commanders who are related to one are the best commanders ever. Certain to follow every order to the last dot and comma. Why should anybody care about their qualifications, or themselves proving their mettle in action?

Absolutely irrelevant…

3.)    The next of GenStab-U’s brilliant ideas is never to rotate existing, worn-out units out of the line, then re-fill them with new, properly trained troops. Nor even to properly train newly-established units, complete their training before sending them to the battle (preferably: on some less-critical sector of the frontline).

Why should one take care the troops to be properly prepared before being sent to a war? Who has ever cared about such issues? Ever since September 2022, the GenStab in Moscow is proudly demonstrating that one can not only fight a war, but command a force into highly successful operations by throwing hundreds of thousands of poorly-trained ‘volunteers’ into the grind.

Let the war sort them out…

….and so, newly-established, but incomplete-, and poorly-trained ZSU brigades, staffed by recently-recruited- and hurriedly trained troops are sent into the battle again, and again, and again, and again… at least since spring of 2023. While highly experienced brigades that have proven their mettle are deployed on sectors of secondary importance – at least until the roof is afire, and then one or another of their battalions has to suffer losses while serving as a fire-brigade….

The GenStab-U simply knows better.

The rest is hard to gauge. That’s also why I’m – ‘intentionally’ – not commenting a lot about this area, the last few weeks: simply because my impression is that I do not understand it. Or at least I’ve got a feeling that, although being ‘fed some good info’ by a reliable contact, I still do not feel informed well enough to understand what exactly is going on there. Or why. The reason is that the information I’ve got is extremely contradictive.

For example, on one side, I know the GenStab-U and the HQ Tavriya Operational Group took months to finally figure out the Russian aims for this summer – although, as explained several times already, these were perfectly obvious as early as of March this year. Then, suddenly, they improved by a margin: more recently, they (finally) figured these out and, for several weeks already, are precisely predicting the next moves of the VSRF’s Group Tsentr. For example: they were right with expecting the Russians to continue pushing along the railway line from Ocheretyne to Pokrovsk, but then to turn south on Selydove, before continuing for Pokrovsk.

However, why are the GenStab-U and the HQ Tavriya ‘doing nothing’ (or, at most: ordering a withdrawal) when the Russians assaulted Mykhalivka and Kalynove? Why were these places left to fall ‘just like that’ when, it was obvious (and the GenStab-U and the HQ Tavriya knew this) that this would endanger the northern flank of ZSU units holding the line between Selydove-Kalynove-Netaliove-Nevelske and then down to Krasnohorivka (25^th and 46^th Airborne, 59^th Infantry, and 39^th Mech)? And, are they really as disinterested in the defence of the Kurakhivka-Kurakhove agglomeration, as some say?

I do not know the answers – or at least: those coming to my mind are ranging from

-          ‘that’s intentional, for some secret reason’, via

-          ‘the GenStab-U is simply letting ZSU do what it can the best, like back during the Kupyansk-Izyum campaign of 2022’ (see: ‘fighting manoeuvre warfare where it can, which is in Kursk, while trading space for time in Donbas’), to

-          ‘it’s really nothing else but incompetence and/or a series of poor decisions’ that have led to this situation.

…and, the more I think of this all, the more confusing it gets. Between others, for following reasons.

For example, the GenStab-U and the HQ Tavriya seem to have ordered certain units to do their best and resist – as long as this can be done without unnecessary losses (i.e. to withdraw when the pressure gets too much). Arguably, the GenStab-U was months-late into deploying the (inexperienced, but well-commanded) 32^nd Mech to Toretsk. But, once it did: voilà! Together with the Skala Battalion, this has stabilised the situation. Sure, the last 4-5 days, the Russians continued assaulting into eastern Toretsk from Pivnichne, Khytryy Rynok, and from Zalizne. But, they’ve captured only a few ruined houses.

On the contrary, further south… on 25-27 August, the Russian Group Tsentr has secured both Krasnyi Yar and Novohrodivka, then advanced into Mykhailivka, secured Memryk and Kalynove, in turn starting the battle for Selydove. Except into Novohrodivka, the Group Tsentr pushed into Hrodivka, too. The battered 47^th Mech (I wonder if anybody in the GenStab-U is ready to explain how much more should that unit suffer? …and how many years should it continue to fight in the first line?), and the inexperienced 78^th Airborne have given the ground. However, the commander of the 151^st Mechanised did his utmost to defend Hrodivka: reportedly, has even sent his UAV-pilots into the trenches – which, apparently, was contrary to what his superiors have ordered him to do. Indeed: word is that there is a standing order not to send FPV-pilots into the trenches and deploy them as infantry. But, he did so and…well, the net result is that an elaborate system of field fortifications for protection of Novohrodivka was abandoned and the place fell into Russian hands, de facto, without fighting,. while the 151st is still holding Hrodivka (or did so the last two days; didn’t check the situation as of this morning).

…and all of that although Zelensky announced reinforcements for the Pokrovsk sector, and official Kyiv proudly reported Syrsky spending four days at the HQ Tavriya, checking that everything is OK?

And then look further south: the ‘Vuhledar corner’ – i.e. the area from Mariinka south to Vuhledar, held by just three ZSU brigades (79^th Airborne, 31^st and 72^nd Mech)… ‘crickets’: seemingly, nobody in Kyiv cares about them.

Why do I say that?

About a week ago, about a company of troops from the 72^nd was cut off by the Russian advance on Vodyane and across the Road 00532 in western direction… One would expect the involved people to at least get ‘mention in dispatches’… or any other kind of attention. Instead: nobody in Kyiv found their efforts worth mention. The 72^nd – the unit that saved Kiyv by defending Moshchun, and is defending Vuhledar for two years meanwhile – had to punch them out on its own. To their luck, all the troops came out: all were wounded, but they all were saved, too… though without any help from the (quote) ‘competent’ (unquote) authorities in Kyiv, i.e. the GenStab-U.

What a wonder the troops there feel ‘forgotten’...

For me, this is all nothing else than confusing. So much so, I wonder if I’m free to conclude that, for example, the GenStab-U (and/or the HQ Tavriya?) wanted the 151^st to withdraw, but its commander screwed up their plan…?

Or, did I miss something?

No idea. Can only confirm: yes, this ‘Pokrovsk affair’ remains a major crisis.