Yup. Boeing's fly-by-wire systems are separating from reality, and emergency exit doors are spontaneously separating from Boeing's airliners, too... so: why the heck don't the boosters separate from SDBs....?
By JOINT (joke intelligence) sources, the separation mechanism was falling apart too early. That's what has caused delays in delivery. So, CEO of Boeing said to engineers: just glue it, stupid! And here we are.
Ty for the updates. Appreciate the information as always. I’m glad the operational commander seems to have been working overtime in trying to stabilize the area.
From your reports it is clear that there is nothing for it, and the glide bombing of the ZSU positions must be stopped at all costs (easy to say I know, but still ...) .
Glad to hear the GPS isn't the problem. That figures really, new weapon (sort of, its been around awhile but not really used other than testing) so yeah, sometimes you get issues. Interesting trick by the RU, I wonder if other areas of the front will try it or if it will be just here until some units rotated out to new areas.
UFOR was definitely lazy in building fortifications, including going by Clement Molin, who is providing almost all our concrete information on UFOR fortifications currently, including AFAICT for this post.
(Red pre-war, Green 2023, Blue 2024, Yellow 2024 ongoing)
One problem with a lot of the newer fortification systems is that in many parts they're still really more like long shallow ditches around which to develop ad hoc positions rather than hardened networks. This is a limitation that the RuFOR flanking effort (such as UFOR was hardly able to begin around Verbove last year) will exacerbate, but there should still be plenty of time to anticipate and block the looming double envelopment of the Toretsk sector this year.
TBF, Tom did predict that such an envelopment would be the most natural strategic objective for RuFOR this year.
Thanks for the update I also found the GPS issue suspect considering GMLRS rounds use GPS as well. This makes more sense. But even more importantly, integrating targeting data from cheap drones that can visually track the targets would make these weapons even more deadly. I'm sure this is being looked at. It can be done securely without compromising the overall battlefield information system.
"However, there is a lack of mines (so much so the ZSU hasn’t got enough mines even if using dozens of thousands of Russian mines recovered from Kherson and eastern Kharkiv, just for example"
It's possible to disarm, recover, and redeploy mines laid by an opposing force? I'm especially surprised that Russian mines would have anything approximating a passivating feature built in. Are you referring to mines recovered from captured stockpiles, or is the collection and redeploment of enemy mines in situ a standard activity (especially in any kind of meaningful volume)? And what is the cost (in terms of risk to personnel) of such reuse?
It's a 'standard' to de-mine Russian anti-tank mines from Kherson and eastern Kharkiv (where over 100,000 were removed, the last time I've checked), then check them and deploy them where necessary.
The manufacturer responsible for the GLSDB's separation mechanism couldn't possibly be Boeing, could it?
Of course it's the Boeing Integrated Defense Systems.
....why do you ask... 🙃🙄
This doesn't make any sense. Boeing components separate from everything all the time.
Yup. Boeing's fly-by-wire systems are separating from reality, and emergency exit doors are spontaneously separating from Boeing's airliners, too... so: why the heck don't the boosters separate from SDBs....?
By JOINT (joke intelligence) sources, the separation mechanism was falling apart too early. That's what has caused delays in delivery. So, CEO of Boeing said to engineers: just glue it, stupid! And here we are.
How interesting.
Pure, distilled accident, of course... 🙄
That is the risk of being the first to use a new weapon on the battlefield.
Pity, the GLSDB has a good range so would be useful despite the small explosive load of 16kg.
Thank you very much. Thank you for the last paragraphs which are close to something like"good" news at last from this part of the front.
Ty for the updates. Appreciate the information as always. I’m glad the operational commander seems to have been working overtime in trying to stabilize the area.
Thanks a lot Tom for the update.
From your reports it is clear that there is nothing for it, and the glide bombing of the ZSU positions must be stopped at all costs (easy to say I know, but still ...) .
Glad to hear the GPS isn't the problem. That figures really, new weapon (sort of, its been around awhile but not really used other than testing) so yeah, sometimes you get issues. Interesting trick by the RU, I wonder if other areas of the front will try it or if it will be just here until some units rotated out to new areas.
Report on delivery of non lethal hw for PSU
https://zpravy.aktualne.cz/zahranici/jak-jsem-dovezl-sanitky-elite-ukrajinske-armady/r~8ee12724062a11efbb77ac1f6b220ee8/?sid=f0ae22ca4559403daaa1c221080d9eb7&t=n
An interesting read. Thanks for your help!
Cool effort, worth supporting. Thanks.
UFOR was definitely lazy in building fortifications, including going by Clement Molin, who is providing almost all our concrete information on UFOR fortifications currently, including AFAICT for this post.
Here's a good sketch.
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GML8d9gX0AEHaR3?format=jpg&name=large
(Red pre-war, Green 2023, Blue 2024, Yellow 2024 ongoing)
One problem with a lot of the newer fortification systems is that in many parts they're still really more like long shallow ditches around which to develop ad hoc positions rather than hardened networks. This is a limitation that the RuFOR flanking effort (such as UFOR was hardly able to begin around Verbove last year) will exacerbate, but there should still be plenty of time to anticipate and block the looming double envelopment of the Toretsk sector this year.
TBF, Tom did predict that such an envelopment would be the most natural strategic objective for RuFOR this year.
Thanks for the update I also found the GPS issue suspect considering GMLRS rounds use GPS as well. This makes more sense. But even more importantly, integrating targeting data from cheap drones that can visually track the targets would make these weapons even more deadly. I'm sure this is being looked at. It can be done securely without compromising the overall battlefield information system.
Thanks. Another very useful and interesting update. I deeply appreciate the research and work you put into your posts!
Tom: are you actually trying to convince your ever faithful reader acolytes that your MAPS are not indeed parts of the GOSPEL of SAINT THOMAS??????
"However, there is a lack of mines (so much so the ZSU hasn’t got enough mines even if using dozens of thousands of Russian mines recovered from Kherson and eastern Kharkiv, just for example"
It's possible to disarm, recover, and redeploy mines laid by an opposing force? I'm especially surprised that Russian mines would have anything approximating a passivating feature built in. Are you referring to mines recovered from captured stockpiles, or is the collection and redeploment of enemy mines in situ a standard activity (especially in any kind of meaningful volume)? And what is the cost (in terms of risk to personnel) of such reuse?
It's a 'standard' to de-mine Russian anti-tank mines from Kherson and eastern Kharkiv (where over 100,000 were removed, the last time I've checked), then check them and deploy them where necessary.
Thanks again Tom finally got to read these