Ukraine War, 28 April 2024

Hello everybody!

A bit of a ‘review’ for the end of this week, to catch with several developments ‘outside’ the Avdiivka area.

For example, and between others, it turned out that the Dobrotvir TPP, in Stary Dobrotvir, in the Lviv Oblast, was hit by two Russian missiles during the big strike of yesterday, early in the morning. Most likely, the facility is out of service.

Then, it might be worth mention that the PSU is not only trying to defend the skies of Ukraine with its depleted stocks of surface-to-air missiles, but that its fliers remain very active over the frontline, too. Indeed, Su-24s have flown enough Storm-Shadow/SCALP-strikes the last week for the Russians to claim six of these as ‘shot down’ (ho-hum)… Moreover, one could monitor not only Ukrainian Su-27s flying regular HARM-strikes on the Russian air defences along the frontline, but the type is now equipped with French-made HAMMER precision guided munition…

….Ukrainian MiG-29s are striking forward Russian headquarters with HAMMERs, too; and Su-25s flying their ‘spray & pray’ (or ‘hill’, in pilot-jargon) strikes with Zuni unguided rockets (of US origin) – especially in reaction to every additional Russian advance in the Ocheretyne sector.

As mentioned yesterday, further behind the frontline, and having no other means to effectively counter the Russian Orlan reconnaissance UAVs that are roaming the skies over places like Dnipro and Odesa (and that at altitudes outside the reach of heavy machine guns and light anti-aircraft guns), the PSU began deploying Yak-52 training aircraft armed with machine guns (installed in the rear cockpit).

Finally, MiG-29s can be also be seen regularly intercepting Russian UAVs and Shahed attack drones…

So, if anybody is curious to hear it: yes, the PSU – claimed as ‘completely destroyed’ by the Russians some 5-6 times already back in March-April 2022 – is continuing to try its best.

BTW, the same is valid for one branch of the ZSU about which next to nobody is talking about: the Army Aviation. This is equipped with a miscellany of Mi-8s, Mi-17s, Mi-24s, and other stuff, is flying its 40-50 sorties a day - every single day since the start of the war - has taken heavy losses as result, and yet: next to nobody ever came to the idea to point out it might need some modern attack helicopters. Guess, they’re not sexy enough to mention…

***

On the ground…

Sometimes in the last 24-36 hours, the VSRF Group Tsentr has initiated the ‘next phase’ of its breakthrough operation in the Ocheretyne area. That is: it not only secured that town and Novobakhmutivka, but also Berdichy, and Semenivka. Then it brought forward additional ‘territorial motor-rifle regiments’ – i.e. reservist/mobik units – and resumed the assault. Correspondingly,

-          the 30^th MRB is already pushing along the highway/railway berm in western direction on Prohres;

-          15^th MRB (bolstered/re-filled by Arbat and Cedar Battalions) is pushing on Sokil and Yevhenivka;

-          114^th MRB helped the 74^th MRB force the 3^rd Assault and 61^st Mech out of western Berdychi.

Moreover, no idea what Russian units exactly (I suspect the 90^th TD)….but they have forced the 115^th Mech to withdraw from Novokalynove; probably from Keramik too – by pushing some 2000 metres in northern direction, east of the latter village. Obviously, they’ve driven a wedge between the 115^th and the 23^rd Mech.

As mentioned yesterday, the ZSU Group Tavrya has brought the 100^th Mech into positions north of Ocheretyne, but then also had to deploy the 110^th to the Prohres area, in attempt to stop the Russian drive further West.

… and now it’s going to have to find some brigade to rush to the position between the 115^th and the 23^rd, too…

….which begs for explanation: and how are the Russians managing this?

Obviously, they continue striking ZSU positions with UMPK glide-bombs without respite. The last statistics I’ve heard in this regards was ‘150 UMPKs per day on average’, but that was about a week ago. Meanwhile, the VKS is more likely to be releasing up to 200. Indeed, some of Russian sources are talking about 500 a day, and the VKS trying to reach a rate of 1000 a day.

If so… well, then the Ukrainians can consider themselves lucky they’re recording only some 150+, because that means that the mass is still missing (and then by a wide margin).

…which is why I was so ‘happy’ when seeing that video showing a smashed UMPK-dump at the Kushchevskaya AB, yesterday: because this meant there are going to be some 15-20 less UMPKs to deploy…

On the ground, and generally, Ukrainians do try to hold their positions but, whenever it is obvious that the Russians are about to smash these, they withdraw to avoid getting hit by the Russian fire-power. This is particularly valid for any cases where the ZSU’s reconnaissance detects the Russians preparing barrages of their multiple rocket launchers.

Once these hit, there’s a race who’s going to get there as first: Ukrainians returning to their demolished positions, or the Russians rushing to capture demolished Ukrainian positions… (Donald has explained this in a well-illustrated fashion already back in February or so, while the Battle of Avdiivka was still going on.)

Now, this, plus the Russians flooding the social media with photos of their troops and flags in another captured village, or with this or that piece of destroyed and/or captured Ukrainian vehicle is creating the impression of a ‘happy army on advance’. And, certainly enough: spirits of all the possible Pudding-fans in the West are high, while Ukrainians are under incredible pressure, and mourning losses, these days.

However, it’s not like the Russians are having it easy, and it’s all fun and a big party. Quite on the contrary: they’re suffering such losses that they are forced to constantly ‘feed’ ever more of reservist/mobik-regiments into the line, just to remain capable of continuing their advance. And the number of these is such that it’s near-impossible to keep track with their coming and ‘going’…

For example: the 15^th Motor-Rifle Brigade (MRB), one of two units that led the break-through to Ocheretyne, meanwhile had to be refilled by the Arabat Assault Battalion (ex-Wagner) and then the Cedar Assault Battalion (ex-Wagner). Another example: the 30^th MRB received the 1195^th MRR with the Vyatka Battalion, which lost its deputy CO to an FPV on 23 April.

Mind: this is not only the case with the Russians in the Avdiivka sector: they are suffering massive losses even in ‘quiet’ sectors, like Kupyansk-Svatove, not to talk about the Terny-Kremina. Perhaps the worst example is the 42^nd Motor-Rifle Division, fighting in the Robotyne sector (southern Zaporizhzhya). Its original complement (71^st, 70^th, 78^th and 291^st MRRs), has been re-filled by the 429^th, 430^th, 1152^nd, 1154^th, 1251^st, 1429^th, 1430^th, and 1434^th MRRs. Nearly all of these are meanwhile down to 10-25% of their nominal strength.

Mind: If all these regiments would be at their nominal strength, the 42^nd MRD would be a ‘super division’ with three times its nominal complement – and as such could ‘overrun Robotyne with ease’. This even more so considering over the last few weeks it was also assigned elements of the 7^th VDV and the 76^th VDV Divisions, and the 162^nd Recce Battalion – though on temporary basis.

Yet another example – and then from the western side of the same sector – would be the 76^th VDV. I haven’t seen this division driving BMDs nor other, ‘typical VDV vehicles’ in months. Instead, it’s equipped with T-80s and BMPs collected from storage. I.e. troops might be recalled VDV reservists, but their equipment is that of a motor-rifle division. And ‘still’: all its assaults failed.

With other words: the Keystone Cops do not care about the ‘actual’ purpose of the unit in question: only to put people under uniform, organise them into units, equip them with whatever arms are available, and send them into the next assault. Once ‘spent’, company-sized remnants of regiments are then filled into the defence lines. No surprise then, some are refusing orders to return to assaulting…

…and then I could go into discussing their artillery units, which meanwhile do not dare lining up their pieces and then firing ‘like there’s no tomorrow’, as they used to do back in April-May 2022: on the contrary, average VSRF artillery unit of these days has lost all of its self-propelled pieces. I.e. it is equipped with towed pieces only, the crews of which do not dare firing more than 4-5 shells in succession, before either re-mounting their gun/howitzer and moving away, or taking shelter because they know they’re going to get hit in return.

(That’s at least according to Russian accounts: no idea why is the ZSU releasing next to no videos showing such attacks.)

A Russian 2S3 Akatsiya self-propelled howitzer calibre 152mm, blown up by 2-3 FPV-hits, back on 10 April.

Even Russian air defences deployed along the frontline have had few bad days, lately:

A video taken by the (Polish-made) Warmate PGM, showing a Russian Podlet K1 radar about to receive a hit.

Direct HIMARS-hit on a Russian Buk launcher (thanks to reconnaissance by the 3rd SSO).

What works better are the Russian BM-27 (220mm) and BM-30 (300mm) multiple rocket launchers. With ranges of around 35- and 120km, respectively, and good mobility, they can fire from positions further behind the frontline. That’s, usually, keeping them safe from Ukrainian FPVs and such long-range howitzers like the French-made Caesar (a weapon the Russians fear the most, because with its 42km range it is easily outranging nearly everything in their arsenal).

Russian BM-30

That all said, where there is a growing problem with the ‘qualification’ of that with ‘Russian losses’.

What are ‘heavy’, ‘massive’, or even ‘catastrophic’ losses?

If I’m to ask, every single human loss is a tragedy. However, politicians and generals think differently. Even more so when it comes to Russian generals and politicians - which, of course, neither they, nor any of their fans in the social media are ever going to admit. As long as the Russian population remains lethargic, and there is something to celebrate in the social media, this war is ‘progressing according to plan’ and everything’s fine. ‘Russia is going to win’…

And, it’s not like if Shoygu is keenly letting Konashenko report Russian losses to the press, every single morning. On the contrary. Actually, I am quite convinced Shoygu couldn’t say what kind of losses is the VSRF suffering even at a gun point. I guess, he’s stopped paying attention about this issue already back around 25-28 February 2022, when the 35^th CAA lost 4-5 BTGs because of Pudding’s personal calls and orders to their commanders to advance into Kyiv, no matter what. …at latest around the time Pudding ordered the ‘1^st wave’ of mobilisation, back in October of the same year.

Sure, for months already, official Kyiv is reporting some 800-900 Russians ‘killed in action’ (KIA), on average, every single morning. It’s ‘total score’ for the VSRF is meanwhile moving in direction of ‘500,000’. The British BBC has a team with a big data-sheet on some 80,000 Russian killed in this war so far, another team collected names and other data for 4,000+ Russian military officers killed so far. And then, few weeks ago, somebody published that statistics from one of the Russian ministries quoting an increase in the number of invalids by some 500,000 over the last year or two….

I’ve got no trace of clue about the totals, but my ‘best guess’, if you like, is that the actual situation is ‘somewhere in between of all of this’, though also, ‘more likely to be closer to the lower spectrum of usually published figures’. Yes, the VSRF is suffering losses that would be characterised as ‘irresponsible’, ‘unsustainable’, even ‘crazy’ – in the West. But, these are ‘nothing special’ for a number of conflicts somewhere else, the last 50 or so years. Foremost, mind that everybody – really everybody (including US-Americans) – tends to (wildly) exaggerate enemy losses.

Mind one thingy, please: yes, we usually hear that the VSRF has no CASEVAC/MEDEVAC, and – just like entire Russia – very poor medical care for its troops. But, actually, they do have their own medics, they have field hospitals, and they have large military hospitals in the rear, and these are doing whatever they can. So much so, the VSRF is still experiencing critical shortages of medical equipment.

So, my impression is that medical services of the VSRF are actually working better than usually reported (even if still at far lower standards that would be considered ‘acceptable’ even in Ukraine, not to talk about ‘further west’) – with the result that a lots of ‘KIA’ are actually ‘WIA’: ‘wounded in action’. At least I’ve ‘caught’ a lots of reports about the Russian WIA being taken care of, recovering, and then being sent back to the frontline again, over the last two years.

This doesn’t mean they are not suffering losses: they do, and massively, too. Otherwise they would not have dozens of badly depleted battalions along the frontline, wouldn’t have to re-fill their battered brigades and divisions with ever additional mobik-regiments and -battalions, and wouldn’t be limited to offensive operations on ‘just’ three sectors of the battlefield, but would be attacking ‘everywhere’. Because the Russians, essentially, do not know any other kind of war but ‘all-out’.

It merely means that their ratio of killed-vs-wounded is likely to be much higher than usually assessed in Ukraine and the West.