Ukraine War, 27 September 2024: Part 2

….and now a review of latest developments on the battlefield.

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Kursk… (Russian Federation)

….generally, it’s ‘quiet’, the last 4-5 days. The last week, the Ukrainians smashed the Russian counter-offensive, but in turn failed to seize Glushkovo. The Russians are not really ‘exhausted’: they’re all the time trying to patch up the chaos created by the GenStab rushing elements from 30+ different regiments, brigades, and divisions to the Kursk Oblast, and Putin then subjecting these to the FSB-control, and the FSB then successfully losing up to 20,000 out of 40,000 troops it’s got assigned for this purpose. Of course, minor Russian attacks are run all the time, especially in the area between Snegost, LIubimovka and Obukhovka. Foremost by the 51st and 56th VDV Regiments, and a battalion of the 200th Motor-Rifle Brigade.

The Ukrainians are busy rotating tired battalions out and fresh in.

That said, it’s actually so that the Russians are simply too busy for fighting: the last few days glorious defenders of the Group Sever were systematically looting local business and private homes – and that all over south-western Kursk. Yes, they’re looting Russian possessions from Russians. The Group Sever’s chain of command is still in tatters, and it hasn’t got enough military police to bring the situation under control. Therefore, better be sure than sorry….

And so, the only ‘major action’ of the last 4-5 days were counterattacks of the 155^th NIB Novy Put and Veseloe, both of which were repelled. But, don’t worry: the FSB is keen to continue fighting – to the last ‘naval infantryman’ of that unit.

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Northern Kharkiv… at least there are better news from Vovchansk: since around 20 September, the ZSU - which is including the Russian Free Legion - is advancing into northern parts of the town. Meanwhile, they’re actually trying to push the Russians out of their remaining positions in northern Vovchanks (or the ruins of what was once Vovchansk). The Russians have withdrawn so many of their troops to Kursk, that they can’t stand the pressure. Sure, the VSRF is, time and again, running some small counterattacks in the Hlyboke area, but these are quickly dealt with.

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BATTLE OF DONBAS

Kupyansk-Svatove…minor Russian attacks, like all the time.

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Kremina… The Russians have widened their penetration of the ZSU frontline in the Pishchane area, and are only about 1000 metres outside Kruhliakivka and thus the Oskil River. The 110^th and the 115^th Mech are fighting back with everything they’ve got, but that’s simply not enough. As mentioned in one of my last updates: the GenStab-U can be expected to send reinforcements in January or so…

Must admit, I didn’t pay attention at the southern sector of this part of the frontline, the least a month. Thus, it surprised me to find out the Russians have entered Makiivka and Nevske, north of Terny. It also surprised me that it’s once again on the 66^th Mech to play a fire-brigade in this area. Never mind: it’s yet another of ZSU units fighting for years without respite (the last I recall the 66^th was ‘free’, was back in August 2022). The only difference to certain other cases is that the 66^th was reinforced, few months ago, when receiving a battalion of Latin American volunteers: hope its command has meanwhile learned to appreciate the presence of these highly experienced and though fighters.

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Bakhmut… at least there are no bad news from Chasiv Yar. Rather the usual story: the Russians are assaulting over the Donbas-Siversky Donets Canal, get smashed to pieces, then send another gang to assault again…

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Toretsk... the last week, the Russians were assaulting like crazy. Sure, they’re certainly attacking – down the Lisna Street, for example, and from Niu-York towards north. But, my impression is that this week their operations are not as intensive as the last one.

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Pokrovsk…the town is largely evacuated, but there are still around 16,000 civilians inside. Some of these can’t evacuate on their own. Others are busy uninstalling the town’s infrastructure. Problem: two out of three bridges leading out of Pokrovsk have been destroyed by the Russian air strikes and artillery, meanwhile. I.e. if somebody is still inside, cannot but recommend: get out of there.

Pokrovsk…north… to my surprise, the Russians have changed direction of their attacks: instead towards West, from Novohrodivka to Lysivka, they attacked from Mykolaivka in northern direction, on Myrnohrad. Perhaps they’re in the rush to overcome the outer ZSU perimeter around Pokrovsk before the mud of October?

We’ll see.

Certain is that it was once again on the 425^th ‘Skala’ Battalion to play the fire-brigade and stop them.

Why?

Because the super-brains of the GenStab-U have deployed the inexperienced 71^st Jäger and 152^nd Mech, plus two battalions of the Territorial Defence to ‘defend’ the sector.

Really: must write myself a note to keep an eye on this sector all the time, otherwise the GenStab-U is promptly going to withdraw even the last of elite brigades of the National Guard…

Pokrovsk…south… The 15^th NG Kara-Dag is holding nicely in Selydove, which is why the Russians are meanwhile trying it around the southern side of that town: from Ukrainsk in western direction. A sector defended by the troops of the lonesome 14^th Motorised Regiment. Moreover, the Russians are pushing from Ukrainsk in southern direction, trying to enter Hirnyk, defended by the 59^th Motorised and parts of the 118^th Mechanised. The latter two have successfully held out until the bridgehead east of the Vovcha River was almost completely evacuated (the 59^th Motorised is still holding a perimeter on the eastern side of the river). South of there, the Russians continued losing dozens of armoured fighting vehicles and hundreds of troops a day while trying to reach Kurakhove by advances run north of Maksymilianivka.

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Vuhledar… a lot of readers are asking what’s up there.

Have, briefly, covered this sector on 17 and 20 September. Essentially, the town is completely demolished: it’s so utterly destroyed and mined that even if the war would be over right now, it would take at least 5-6 years to de-mine and remove all the unexploded ordnance, just in order to enable the start of reconstruction. And the two ZSU units holding it – the mauled, dead-tired, and shamefully forgotten 72^nd Mech, and a battalion of the 58^th Motorised (the latter, actually, seems to be holding the way out of Vuhledar open, so the 72^nd can withdraw) – are in the process of withdrawing out of what was once Vuhledar for more than a week.

Why so slowly?

When done properly – and the 72^nd Mech is a good unit, regardless how exhausted – a withdrawal is run in a step-by-step fashion, with cool heads and good organisation. So that nobody is left behind, and all the abandoned positions tiddly mined.

The Russian shelling of Vuhledar on 22 September…

…and the Russian shelling of Vuhledar by incendiary ammunition, on 24-25 September: is a ‘usual scene’ in battles of this kind ever since the failures of early Russian assaults on Izyum, back in March 2022…

As for why is the 72^nd withdrawing: well, what would be the point of trying to hold positions if Kyiv is persistently ignoring it, and neither sending replacements, nor reinforcements, or artillery and mortar ammunition?

When there is nothing of that, there’s no point in trying to hold out.

Unsurprisingly, the Russians have meanwhile secured the fields west and east of the ruined town, and as of 25 September, began assaulting into the ruins.

Of course, all the possible Experten are already declaring the ruins of Vuhledar for ‘unimportant’. Well, yes: a completely ruined town is unimportant. There’s no use of it.

In peace.

However, at war, mind that even in ruined condition, Vuhledar was offering an excellent defence position. Probably the best such position in this part of Ukraine – and for the next 30 or more kilometres further north and west. So much so, the 72^nd Mech held out there even when Bakhmut fell (where Bakhmut fell despite deployment of 25+ battalions from almost as many brigades…just like Avdiivka fell although being defended by multiple brigades).

So, now, perhaps Vuhledar is unimportant. And yes, it’s always better to withdraw and save troops from a position they can’t hold. But, please, somebody from the GenStab-U: be so kind, go there, meet and talk soldiers of the 72^nd and 58^th, and explain them how they should be proud and in high spirits, and by no means demoralised, for holding out although the top of the ZSU did its best to ignore them for longer than two years, eventually leaving them no other choice but to lose this battle. And then explain them what super-turbo defence positions have not been constructed further west and north-west, so that as next the troops that have survived and won at Moshchun (thus saving Kyiv, back in March 2022), plus two years of Vuhledar, have to spend the coming winter fighting and dying in the open steppe.

With other words: this was… ah sorry: is not yet, but is going to be yet another, entirely unnecessary loss for Ukraine.

And as a ‘consequences first’-guy, I cannot but wonder: in few years, when the Russians are kicked (in high loop, that’s sure) out of the country: what a mess are Ukrainians going to find in this area…? Alone because of 15-20km deep Russian minefields south of Vuhledar, and then another 10 or so kilometres of Ukrainian minefields around and north of it… Can only hope, by then somebody is going to tear off Sodol’s- and epaulettes of few other generals, and assign them to mine-clearing duties (following appropriate training, of course).