Ukraine War, 25 August 2024: Q & A

Hello everybody!

My discussion of the ‘latest in air warfare’ from yesterday, has prompted few highly interesting questions. Thus, today I’ll ‘interrupt myself’ and address some of these, before returning to ‘the original story’. Or at least try to do so: mind, I do not know all the answers. Or at least I do not know them precisely.

For example:

1.)    What about those two Swedish ‘AWACS’ donated to Ukraine? Are they making/having an impact?

Thank you very much for this question. I mean this seriously – and that because this is the principal reason why I’ve introduced the strict policy of never repeating ‘pledges’ and related announcements for delivery of arms, ammo, or other equipment from any of Western ‘allies’ to Ukraine, regardless of their importance.

For example: some Western government there – in this case the Swedish – announces the donation of, say, two Saab 340 AEW&C aircraft. Or IRIS-T SAMs. Or AMX-10RC armoured cars. Or this or that… Without much thinking but always horny for sensations that are prompting clicks (and clicks are earning bucks) the mainstream media then ‘fills report’. This is then repeated and buzzed around so often that ‘it’s becoming a matter of fact’, indeed ‘the truth and the only truth: that the eventual result is the creation of the wrong impression that ‘the aircraft in question are already delivered’.

….which is simply not the case.

….and it’s not the case for the very same set of reasons for which it took so long for the PSU to get its first F-16s, which is:

-          A) between 50 and 80% of what have different Western nations pledged to deliver to Ukraine – is never delivered;

-          B) if it wants to introduce Saab 340s to service, the first PSU has got to find suitable crews (see: a mix of people with experience on types like Antonov An-26s and An-32s, plus radar specialists, plus the ground crew….), then

-          C) these have to undergo one, two, or three English-language courses (depending on their current skills, of course), before

-          D) starting their conversion training – and that ‘from the scratch’. I.e. with ‘flight procedures’ (‘Swedish/NATO-style’), because the PSU has systematically failed to teach its personnel English, while

-          E) the (quote) ‘competent authorities’ (unquote) of the General Directorate of State Aviation in Ukraine took until AFTER the delivery of F-16s to adapt the flight procedures of the PSU to modern-day (and ‘NATO-like’) requirements.

With other words: regardless what impression was created by (mis)reporting in the media, nobody knows when is Sweden really going to hand over these two Saab 340s.

Foremost, the PSU crews are going to take at least 12-14 months of ‘re-education’ to become capable of operating the two Saab 340s AEW aircraft (and that’s already a very optimistic assessment).

Lets hope that, in the meantime, the (quote) ‘competent authorities’ (unquote) of the General Directorate of State Aviation in Ukraine might react quicker, and take care for the Order No. 147 to be seriously applied, service-wide in the PSU. One can never know, of course, and I’m nobody to say, but: that itch in my small toe is telling me that it might make plenty of things much easier in the case of similar deals in the future…

….except, of course, everybody in Ukraine is happy with the PSU being ‘re-armed’ with 40-years-old F-16s, and is convinced that’s making the entire PSU a ‘NATO-member’, plus is automatically re-arming and converting all of the ZSU’s Army Aviation, and the Navy Aviation, and the Ukrainian civilian aviation to Western-standards? – and, that this is then also enough for the air force’s, and for the country’s security requirements, and that for another 40 years, too?

…’blessed’ whoever thinks that way…

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2.)    Why has NATO the habit of ‘re-naming’ all the Soviet/Russian equipment instead of calling it by its original names?

Simple answer: because these names (or designations) are anything else than ‘known for sure’.

….or at least because, at earlier times they used to be entirely unknown – and that for decades.

Complex answer: during the Second World War, the USA, UK, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand established a body initially called the ‘Five Eyes Air Force Interoperability Council’, then – from around 1948 – the ‘Allied-‘ or the ‘Air Standardisation Coordinating Committee’ (ASCC). One of tasks of this body was to assign reporting names to foreign aircraft the exact designations of which were unknown. 

Take Japan as example. The country was notoriously secretive in the 1930s and 1940s. Therefore, nobody in the USA knew that its Mitsubishi A6M (or ‘Navy Type 0 Carrier Fighter’, i.e. ‘Zero’ in the parlance of the Imperial Japanese Navy) was designated that way.

Therefore, the (predecessor-organisation of the) ASCC named it the ‘Zeke’.

And so, whenever somebody encountered that type of a Japanese aircraft in the air, it called on the radio to report ‘Zeke/s!’

(By accident, in that case, the aircraft’s nick-name in the Imperial Japanese Navy and the reporting name issued by the FEAFIC, later ASCC, were similar… I do not know of any other, similar case…)

After the Second World War, the ASCC began applying the same practice to Soviet and Chinese-made aircraft, rockets and missiles, to warships and different other classes of weapons systems. Correspondingly, and just for example, the MiG-15 was a fighter: therefore it received a reporting-name starting with ‘f’, and that was ‘Fagot’. On the contrary, Myasichev M-4 was a bomber. Therefore, it received a reporting name starting with ‘b’: ‘Bison’….

In similar fashion, Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) have received a set of designations denoting them as such. For example,

• S-25 Berkut SAM-system became the ‘SA-1 Guild’;

• S-75 Dvina/Desna/Volkhov-family became the ‘SA-2 Guideline’;

• S-125 Neva became the ‘SA-3 Goa’ etc..

…where ‘S’ stood (and still stands) for ‘surface’, (to) ‘a’ stands for ‘air’, and this is followed by unique numerical sufix and a reporting name easy to memorise and distinguish (for example in radio chatter).

Along the same line, the Ukraine-operated S-300PM is ‘SA-10B Grumble Mod.2’, S-300V1 is ‘SA-12A Gladiator’, 9K37M1 Buk-M1 is ‘SA-11 Gadfly’, and 9K33M3 Osa-AKM is ‘SA-8 Gecko’… while, the Russian operated S-400 Triumf is ‘SA-21 Growler’, Buk M3 is ‘SA-17 Grizzly’, 9K330 Tor-family is ‘SA-15 Gauntlet’ etc.

(After reading quite some of NATO-documentation, and some of the Soviet/Russian documentation, can say that ASCC’s standards have been applied widely, and then in a more stringent fashion within 20+ members of NATO than this was done with original Soviet designations in the Soviet documentation… which is why, just for example, until today there are still uncertainties about official designation of specific of Soviet-made rockets and missiles.)

Anyway…

Already back in the 1950s, the ASCC’s system of designating Soviet and Chinese weapons systems was adopted by NATO: indeed, in the mainstream media it’s generally known as ‘NATO reporting names’.

BTW, the ‘topic ASCC’ should actually be of some relevance for the GenStab-U in Kyiv, because although re-organised and re-named the AFIC in 2005, it remains the body that is, between others, developing Air Standards valid for entire NATO… and, thus, potentially, for Ukraine and the PSU…

…all provided Ukraine might want to join NATO in serious, of course..

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3.)    What about those metal hangars at Russian air bases? Why are their walls so thin? And how and where are the Russians assembling their UMPK glide bombs?

This requires some ‘introduction’…

Generally, it was the experiences from the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War that prompted both NATO and Warsaw Pact into constructing hardened aircraft shelters at their air bases (certain other countries went much further in this regards, constructing entire underground air bases; see here for one example). At the time, the combined air forces of the two pacts had a total of around 25,000 tactical combat aircraft deployed at bases between Rota (Spain), Edinburgh, and Kyiv. Neither had the money to protect all of these with hardened aircraft shelters that could survive a direct hit by a bomb of 500kg (not to talk the blast of a thermonuclear bomb).

Instead, both sides began constructing a large number of relatively simple, pre-fabricated shelters, usually made of concrete, sometimes additionally covered by earth, and deemed sufficient to protect the aircraft parked inside from a direct hit by bombs calibre 100-250kg, or – in other cases – ‘just’ from bombs exploding nearby.

In the USSR, the Soviet Air Force was constructing such shelters at its bases in East Germany, in Czechoslovakia, and Poland, plus on some of air bases in western Ukraine: essentially, places that could be reached by such of NATO’s tactical fighter-bombers like General Dynamics F-111 or MRCA Tornado.

However, roughly, ‘east of Kyiv’… there was no such practice.

Alternatively, some of air bases in (what is nowadays) southern Ukraine and south-western Russia have received so-called ‘revetments’, or ‘blast pens’: essentially, earthen walls (sometimes reinforced by bricks or stones, like the one visible below) surrounding ‘hardstands’ (‘parking spots’ for aircraft). This is what the Soviets constructed on some of air bases in the Crimea, or at Bagram and few other of air bases in Afghanistan in the 1980s, too.

As a result, when the USSR fell apart, the ex-Soviet-cum-Russian Air Force had to withdraw to air bases the mass of which had no hardened aircraft facilities whatsoever.

….and then nobody cared about this issue for 30 years…

In 2018, insurgents of Hayat Tahrir ash-Sham (HTS) began deploying mini-UAVs to target the Russia-controlled Hmeimim AB, south of Latakia, in Syria. Because of this, and because – in the aftermath of Pudding declaring the war in Syria for ‘over’, three times - the GenStab in Moscow found it opportune to hide the actual number of its aircraft deployed at Hmeimim from the view of Western reconnaissance satellites, the VKS constructed a row of protective shelters at that base. The essence of these were simple concrete walls, covered by a roof of metal sheets. That proved sufficient to counter the mass of HTS’s UAV-strikes, too. The rest, so the Keystone Cops in Moscow, was shot down by air defences and thus no problem…

….and then, nobody cared about this issue for the next few years, before…

…so also not when Pudding launched his ‘special military operation’, then this was actually meant to be a ‘coup, big-style’, and overrun Ukraine without any kind of a bigger war. Things began to change only since Ukrainians began targeting VKS’ air bases with their UAVs. The GenStab in Moscow then allotted funding for construction of protective shelters at all the air bases within about 400-500km from Ukraine. The shelters in question were not meant to be ‘hardened’ against impacts by bombs calibre 100-, 250- or more kilogram, because that was not necessary. After all, the mass of Ukrainian UAVs are carrying much smaller warheads (20-50kg).

Correspondingly, the mass of resulting shelters were constructed of relatively thin metal sheets. However, and at least along what one can hear from the Russian social media: due to endemic- and traditional- corruption within the Russian armed forces, no serious commander is ‘as crazy’ as to ‘waste’ all the funding allotted for specific purposes. If one can get a ‘roof over the aircraft by other means’, why not divert a ‘cut’ of 10-20-30- or more percent into own pocket?

Therefore, the mass of metal sheets used to construct such hangars is only ‘thick’ enough to protect the aircraft and ground crews from Sun and rain – but: not from a well-aimed UAV…

I guess, you can imagine the rest of the story… where, BTW, I should add that: when the enemy – in this case Ukrainians – then also start using tungsten balls as ‘shrapnel’ in warheads of their UAVs, even much thicker metal roofs would be of no help. Depending on angle of impact, tungsten balls are going through 15-20mm of steel armour, too.

As for how are the UMPKs assembled, and essentially:

-          General purpose bombs like FAB-250M-54 or FAB-250M-62, FAB-500M-54 or FAB-600M-62, or whatever else, are stored inside ammunition dumps, usually constructed underground, somewhere at the edge of the air base.

-          From there, they are brought (per truck-towed trolley-trains) to the storage- and assembly facility for UMPK-kits. There, the ground crews are attaching their fins:

-          Then the entire trolley-train is towed the aircraft, where bombs are attached to hardpoints.

-          Only then is the rest of the UMPK-kit attached to the bomb.

This is why, for example, the 2-3 cases so far where Ukrainian UAVs have hit the ‘storage- and assembly facility for UMPK-kits’, such strikes were highly effective, even if otherwise causing no, or only relatively light damage to the rest of the base.

Reason: they’ve hit and destroyed or damaged a lots of UMPK-kits at once. As result, the bases in question are unable of launching additional air strikes with glide bombs for up to a week after.

***

4.)    Could you explain the IFF-situation? What systems both sides use and how much do they rely on them? How do Western SAMs and the F-16s fit into the PSU’s IFF-system?

IFF stands for ‘identification friend or foe’. Essentially, the IFF is ranging from simple visual identification to means termed with ‘non-cooperative target recognition’ (NCTR, which is one of… well, ‘most complex thingies’ around [i.e. a system of suitably developed hard- and software, based upon an extensive data-base create with help of incredible volumes of ultra-sensitive intelligence work]).

That said, most of what is nowadays understood under IFF is relatively simple:

-          De-facto every aircraft – civilian or military – is equipped with an IFF-transponder. Essentially a ‘black box with an antenna’. When turned on, it’s telling everybody who needs to know the identity of that aircraft. Essentially, it’s the same style of technology like used by online appearances like Flightradar24.com.

Type 4283 IFF-transponder of the Su-35.

-          Correspondingly, the mass of radars (civilian or military) is including IFF-systems: an antenna and other hardware, plus software, enabling them to interrogate signals from IFF-transponders carried by aircraft.

One of typical IFF-interrogators as installed into early warning/surveillance radars.

Of course, at war, one is not really keen to let the enemy know what is one’s own aircraft (what type etc.). Even less so does one want to let the enemy know where is that aircraft, how fast or how high is it flying. Therefore, the entire issue of IFF is ‘touchy’, to put it mildly. ‘Well beyond top secret’. This goes so far that before going to combat, the mass of combat pilots are – depending on circumstances – either turning their IFF-transponders off, or setting them on ‘passive’. In former cases, transponders are not emitting at all; in latter, they only ‘respond’ if ‘triggered’ by an IFF-interrogator to do so. And that’s just the start…

For why is this issue so sensitive… and to keep a long story short: back during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the NSA discovered that it can not only track Soviet IFF-transponders (and thus the aircraft carrying them), but also that these were not encrypted. Hesitantly, it released this intelligence to the US Air Force, and this began using it over North Vietnam, in 1970-1972: as soon as the necessary technology was miniaturised sufficiently enough, it installed ‘enemy IFF-interrogators’ on F-4D Phantom II interceptors. Oversimplified, thanks to enemy IFF-interrogator AN/APX-80 Combat Tree, these proved capable of detecting North Vietnamese MiG-21s from 80+ kilometres away. Well outside the usual range of their radars – and even if these were still on the ground, too. (Gosh… am I going to receive ‘some severe flak’ from few wiseacres for oversimplifying their favourite topic this much…)

….and the Soviets were very slow into realising this mistake, which is what multiple export clients for their MiGs and Sukhois paid in lots of blood: i.e. this is one of principal reasons for heavy losses of, say, Egyptian, Iraqi, Syrian ‘MiGs’ at wars with Israel and Iran of the 1970s and 1980s (the other were vastly superior US-made AIM-9D/G/H/L Sidewinder and AIM-54A Phoenix air-to-air missiles, but that’s now ‘off topic’).

‘But’, once the Soviets did realise this mistake… well, sure, it wasn’t really the ‘Soviets’ that did their utmost to correct it, but the Russians. And so, the last I’ve heard of this topic, almost 10 or so years ago, the VKS was still using ‘quite the same’ IFF-transponders like at earlier times, BUT, these were digitalised and included 128-bit-encrypted software. This software was so super-secret that I’ve heard its designation only once… indeed, so rarely, its designation is escaping me right now. Sufficient to say: they didn’t share it with anybody, none of their export customers… not even with Assadists in Syria (which is why the latter then shot down a Russian Il-20M reconnaissance aircraft, killing a crew of 18, back in 2018). If anybody bought a Russian-made combat aircraft or helicopter, or a radar system, or SAMs, and asked about IFF, the answer from Moscow was: make your own IFF.

That’s about what I know regarding what are the Russians using for IFF. Where one should keep in mind:

-          the VKS, which is operating not only MiGs and Sukhois, but also S-300s, S-400s, S-500s, Buk M3s etc., etc., etc. - is using its own ATMS (automated tactical management system) to network and coordinate its air defences; but

-          the VSRF – i.e. the air defence units of the Russian Army – is using its own ATMS.

….and the coordination between the two is… shall I say… ‘not always the best’. Indeed, because of the sheer size of the country, and insufficiencies in its military communication systems, even the VKS has major problems with keeping all of its units up-to-date regarding the IFF. Not to talk about air defence units of the VSRF. And then there are tactical situations where ‘gloves are off’ and the commander of one or another unit finds his subordinates must act ‘all out’…. Which is why, time and again, both the VKS and the VSRF are mis-identifying own aircraft and helicopters as ‘Ukrainian’, but also opening fire and shooting them down.

At least in theory, Ukrainians have ‘solved a lots of related problems’ in 2004, through the merger of their air force and the air defence force. Moreover, at war, even ‘heavy SAMs’ of the ZSU (ground forces) are operationally subordinated to the PSU. That’s making things with IFF slightly easier. That said, I’ve got no trace of clue what kind of IFF-systems is the PSU using: can only guess, or hope that – based on the state of the Ukrainian IT-industry… this is ‘more sophisticated’ than the Russian.

Even then… well, tragically, the MANPAD-operators of the ZSU were the last to get ‘at least reasonably well integrated’ into the ZSU’s ATMS, and thus the IADS. Result: they’ve had no other ‘IFF’ but ‘Mk. 1 eyeball’ on hand. And, well, visually identifying the nationality of an aircraft from 4,000+ metres away…. Which is why they’ve shot down a number of their own jets and helicopters, too – which is why lots of surviving PSU jets and helicopters are nowadays having large parts of their undersufaces painted yellow and blue.

Ah yes…for the end, here a funny related story from a certain export customer for both the Western and Russian stuff, also from around 10 years ago… well, the military service in question was simultaneously, and between others, using Western- radars and aircraft, and the Russian-made SAMs. Each equipped with different IFF-systems. And so, the service in question ended having a ‘double console’ at its main headquarter: essentially, an officer sat there in front of two displays, one showing positions of aircraft with… let’s describe them as ‘Western-made IFF-systems’, the other the radar picture created by early warning and fire-control radars of ‘Russian SAMs’….and his job was to coordinate all of that, and tell both the air force and ground-based air defences of the army what to do and when… it took some bitter complaining and some 5-6 years longer for his superiors to let a commercial company develop new software… so, before anybody comes to the idea to complain about ‘fagot Generals’ in Ukraine, or in Russia… keep that… ‘stateless’ example in your mind…

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Hope, you’ve read this far, and this was of some help.