Ukraine War, 25 April 2024

Hello everybody!

Once again, cannot but start this one in exactly the same fashion like two days ago. It remains nothing but ridiculous to see all the US self-congratulations, nor all the possible mainstream- and social media outlets celebrating the US ‘aid package’ for Ukraine. Interestingly, its ‘value’ is also increasing by the day. Some are meanwhile babbling about US$ 90 billion… Thus, time to put few things within their relations.

This aid package is at least seven (in digits: 7) months too late. In reality, and at best, it is securing arms and ammunition for a limited segment of the ZSU for the rest of this year. And even that only if combined with the artillery ammunition that was announced as acquired by the EU but is still not in Ukraine.

Mind: it is unlikely to be followed by anything of similar size, at least not in 2024. What’s going to happen in 2025: nobody knows. There is absolutely no guarantee even Biden – should he win re-elections in November – might continue supporting Ukraine in 2025 (and/or beyond). And should he lose, i.e. if the US-Americans let somebody like Dumpf win the elections (and that despite clearly violating the US Constitution)…

As next: the mass of equipment that’s going to be delivered is old, stored for decades. In fashion typical for modern-day economies, the value of the aid package is calculated in terms of new equipment that’s going to be purchased for the US armed forces, to replace stored equipment sent to Ukraine. Or to manufacture additional ammunition (that, at most, might help the ZSU reach temporary parity with the VSRF)….not in terms of the actual value of the equipment that’s going to be shipped to Ukraine. (For ‘at least the basics’ of the entire system of the US military aid, see the Twitter/X-thread here.)

With other words: the mass of the money in question is going to be spent in the USA, too. So much so, lots of US-Americans are already complaining if it’s not spent in their federal state.

….and if the EU – which seems to be tying a lots of aid it is providing to the use of ‘frozen’ Russian assets – continues screwing up with its own ‘aid packages’, this means even this US aid package is not going to be capable to supply enough for at least the parity. Finally: mind that ‘even’ the sources of frozen Russian assets aren’t endless: they are going to run dry, sooner or later.  

….and then mind the following: the number of ZSU units ‘profiting’ from this aid package can be counted on fingers of one hand. That’s going to be units like the 47^th Mech, perhaps the 3^rd Assault, plus one or another or artillery- and air defence brigades already operating US-made equipment. Units with relatively competent (at least ‘proven in combat’) officers, most of whom are seriously taking care about their troops, too.

Thus, and actually: this is creating a completely wrong impression of the ZSU – as a force ‘equipped with M1 Abrams and Leopard 2 tanks, with Bradley and Marder infantry fighting vehicles, with latest Western artillery pieces, ATACMS and HIMARS, F-16s’, and led by popular commanders proven for their merits and skills, and other nonsense…

Cold fact is that the mass of the ZSU continues looking like this unlucky 115^th Mech. These are units where officers are not only incompetent, but can’t care less about troops for whom they’re responsible. Call them ‘Soviet-style officers’ if that’s making things anything easier for you: I do not, because I know there are bunch of such officers in nearly all of NATO-forces (not to talk about certain other armed forces), too. These are officers, staging useless PR-shows at the same time an entire company of their troops was overrun by the Russians. Where even the logistics department is so corrupt and incompetent, that families have to collect online to buy winter clothing and body armour for their serving members, not to talk about utility vehicles, sniper rifles, drones, night vision sights, or anything else.

I call them ‘anonymous’ units, because next to nobody involved is speaking English and thus present in the English-language social media. …and yet: their troops are still fighting, regardless the odds.

….even when blamed – and that by the incompetent Western media, or misinformed social media appearances – for ‘blundering’ and/or ‘abandoning their positions’…

Thus, the next time you come to the idea to celebrate glorious US aid packages, belittle the Russians for using obsolete vehicles, laugh about in what fashion and how many of them get killed by what of Ukrainian FPVs: first think about ZSU units like the 115^th. Then add the 28^th Mech, the 59^th Motorised, the 66^th Mech, the 81st Airborne, the 128th Mountain Assault… the mass of them is fighting this war with 0 Western support. They’re largely funded by donations collected by families of their troops, and not a few of them: despite their incompetent commanders.

***

Which is bringing me to the next topic, prompted by a question I’ve received from Ukraine, a few days ago: specifically, it was about corruption within the ZSU.

Nope. I do not know this or that corrupt officer by his or her name. I do happen to be in touch with a number of arms dealers around the world, though. How comes? No idea. It simply happened over the time that this or that reader of my books turned out to be dealing with arms and ammunition.

And so, and over the last two or three months, not only one, or two, but at least three of them have told me exactly the same story. There are (still) enough arms and ammo on the international market to resupply the ZSU. Not in the EU and/or the USA: somewhere else.

Most importantly; the people in question could supply the stuff. But: after all the negative experiences of the last two years, not one of them is even thinking about contacting Kyiv and/or any kind of Ukrainian authorities again.

Why?

Because their experience is that it’s pointless. As soon as they do so, the first thing they hear in response is: what is the ‘receiver’s cut’ going to be? I.e. how much are they ready to pay to the Ukrainian official and/or the ZSU officer responsible for concluding the deal with them.

Worst of all: even if they deliver, they never know if they’re going to get paid.

Consequence?

They’re dealing with contacts in the EU instead. This is a slow, endlessly tedious process: it regularly takes them 3-6 months to conclude a single deal for ‘another 1000 or so AKMs, 2 million of bullets calibre 7.62mm, or 5000 mortar bombs’. But, it works and they can always be sure: they’re going to get paid for their goods and services.

(…while I’m getting questions like, ‘why does it take three months to bring shells found by the Czechs and Latvians abroad to Ukraine…?’)

In this regards: nothing at all has changed in the last two years. This sort of corruption remains dominant within the ZSU.

And… well, beg your pardon but: this is at the same level with officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps of Iran dealing with commodities like food, cooking oil, even car tires at the time Iran was neck-deep into defending itself from the Iraqi invasion, back in 1980-1988. These would be purchased at 3-10 times their usual price abroad, then brought to Iran and – instead of being sold or distributed on the market as meant to be – stored in depots controlled by this or that of IRGC’s cliques, who were then enriching themselves while re-selling the stuff at 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 times the usual price.

Of course, this shouldn’t mean there are misappropriations of the US- and/or EU-supplied military aid in Ukraine: these are tightly controlled and everybody involved knows it’s better not to mess around with them. But, all other sorts of initiatives on this plan…

Guys and gals (whether in Ukraine or abroad): sorry but, get your feet back on the ground. No: the timing of the US aid package is not ‘beneficial’ for Ukraine. Especially not for hundreds of its troops killed and thousands wounded over the last seven months, while buying time for the Zombie Idiots in Washington to show themselves often enough on the TV, and for the Zombie Idiots in the EU to get at least some of their stuff together. Actually, it’s just another ‘too little, too late’-story. And its total effects are going to be similar to those related to all the babbling about the Lend-Lease from back in 2022: temporary bolstering of the public- and troops-morale. At best.

The only way forward for Ukraine is independence from foreign arms supplies - and fighting corruption: unless Ukrainians start seriously cleaning up all sorts of trash from the backyards of the ZSU, the overall combat performance of their armed forces is not going to increase by a notch.

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BATTLE OF DONBAS

The US decision to deliver at least something to Ukraine seems to have spurred Putin into kicking backsides of his own commanders. Correspondingly, the VSRF is in a mad rush to grab as much land as it still can, and thus attacking wherever it only can. The only ‘good’ thing about this is: yes, it turns out the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation might have been bolstered by ‘millions’ of troops, and these might be receiving better training than one year ago, but, they’re still led by incompetents that can’t organise nor coordinate their units well-enough for any kind of major offensive operations. Read: nowadays, the mass of their officers does not know how to use their quantitative superiority in troops, nor their superiority in artillery and air power. And they have no solutions even for whatever is left of the Ukrainian firepower – which is resulting in incredible losses whenever they try again. This is why even once they find a weak spot in ZSU’s lines, and even when receiving plentiful of air support (see UMPK glide bombs), they can’t organise more than a drive of 3-5km.

I’m emphasising this because I’m still receiving 2-3 questions a day in style of, ‘and, Tom, what do you think about the threat of a giant Russian offensive on Kharkiv, Kyiv etc.’

Bakhmut-Chasiv Yar… the VKS is glide-bombing Kalynivka and Chasiv Yar, and the Russian assault groups assaulting Kalynivka, Canal District of Chasiv Yar (from two direction), and through Ivanivske towards the Siversky-Donets – Donbas Canal.

Avdiivka-Shakhtarsk… the ZSU has established new frontlines north and south of the Russian penetration to Ocheretyne, but the Russians are already pushing west and south from there. The VKS is trying to ‘seal the battlefield’ by glide-bombing Prophres, Yeherivka, Kalynove, and Arkhankelske. The Russian ground troops are still assaulting from Ocheretyne in western direction along the railway berm (seems to have pushed Ukrainian reinforcements by around 1000m west from Ocheretyne); on Soloviove (they’ve reached the ‘outskirts’ of that village), and on Berdychi from the north and east (actually: in the light of sustained glide-bomb strikes, more than half of Berdychi is already in the Russian hands). The Russian Group Tsentr has meanwhile pumped at least two brigades into Ocheretyne, and another two into the area south-east of the place: these are attacking what’s left of the 47th Mech, and the 23rd Mech.

East of there, the Russians have managed to enter the eastern side of Novokalynove. Once again: the 115th Mech did not ‘run away’ or ‘abandon its positions’. It’s there and fighting with everything it has. But, what it has is not enough to enable it to stop the onslaught of at least two Russian brigades.

Further south, the Russians have another, second bridgehead over the Durna River (as obvious from ZSU-released videos showing UAV-strikes on the Russians there, see the still attached below). This time inside (completely destroyed) Semenivka (and I do not want to know what kind of losses has the 3rd Assault must’ve suffered to ‘permit’ this).

Mariinka…In Krasnohorivka, the 80th Airborne is still holding out, although subjected to murderous glide-bomb attacks and relentless Russian assaults from the south. The 31st and 33rd have withdrawn to new positions, stretching from Heorhivka southwards, while the 79th Airborne is ‘controlling’ the battle from few shallow elevations south of the ruined Mariinka and Pobieda – which is why there is an impression like if the brigade might be threatened by envelopment from three sides.

Vuhledar… amid rumours about the Russians preparing a new attack in this area, positions of the 72nd Airborne in Vuhledar are under almost-continuous air strikes with glide bombs, and barrages from the Russian multiple rocket launchers.

SOUTHERN ZAPORIZHZHYA & KHERSON

In Robotyne, the 141st Infantry has (already two weeks ago) withdrawn into the northern part of the completely ruined village: might sound bad, but this is enabling it to let the Russians expose themselves while approaching from the south. As a result, the Russian 42nd Motor-Rifle Division had to be re-filled by another six regiments of mobiks (1152nd, 1154th, 1429th, 1430th, 1434th, and 430th…) - the third or fourth ‘re-fil’ of that kind in as many months. Further east, the Russians have pushed the 14th Brigade NG away from the Hill 110 (the conquest of which was paid in so much blood of the 118th Mech, last year in August). The rest of the Robotyne salient is (still) holding.

….and along the Dnipro: well, the recently-established 30th Naval Infantry Corps of the ZSU is holding out. That is: Ukrainian naval infantry is holding out in the wasteland nowadays known as the Krymky bridgehead. Despite trickling French ‘military aid’ and continuous assaults by at least four Russian brigades.

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That’s it for my ranting of this morning. As next, I’ve got to ready an update on our collection for the 3rd SSO’s Shark UAV, and then some other stuff.