Ukraine War, 24 March 2024

Hello everybody!

While having my usual cup of cappuccino and a smoke, early this morning, caught myself reading some of the Ukrainian social media: always find it fascinating (and ironic, too) that Ukrainians seem still to have the time, the patience, and the presence of mind to care about ‘the West’. Well, ladies and gentlemen: don’t worry, we’re going to be fine, here in the West. You see: people here are rather concerned about their debts, or where to spend their summer vacation this year, than about you in Ukraine.

And for those still hoping for an ‘additional aid package from the USA’: from what I’m getting to hear from different ‘corners’ there… sorry, I doubt anything serious should be expected before December this year. And that in ‘best case’. So, if the Europeans (read: European administrators) continue behaving like little kids trying to run for the first time, yes: you’re in deep trouble. At least in regards of supply of artillery ammunition.

Where one can hope for significant improvements is the Ukrainian IT-sector. But, more about this at some other occasion. I’m also not going into any further discussion about this terror attack on the Crocus City Hall in Moscow, regardless how many victims it caused: as much as disgusting (like any other intentional attacks on civilians, no matter where), from my point of view, that one reeks of a false-flag operation, and it wouldn’t be the first time that the Pudding-FSB massacred hundreds of innocent Russian civilians for their own interests.

Finally: sorry, I’m not that much into ‘terrorism’ (except for its ‘motivation’) as into ‘military affairs’. And there are a few I would like to discuss some more, today.

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For the start, here a good X-thread on Ukrainian refinery strikes and their results (so far) – by Morten Bjorn (to whom one can only express special thanks, for this surely took a while to prepare, while it’s resulting in some very useful data).

Correspondingly:
- total number of refineries identified in Russia: 37 (see table below)
- then there's a list of strikes (plus accidents for four years before the war, so to create a baseline; because it seems there's one fire in a major Russian refinery something like every 200 days)
- Ukrainian attacks on refineries are coming in waves/phases, each lasting two weeks, followed by about 20 days before another two weeks (though, lately, there was only a 6-7 days operational pause between two phases).

Meanwhile, some began claiming that this campaign does not really target fuels, but the Russian production of explosives. Sort of: Ukrainians are seeking to cut down the production of by-product nitrogen, ammonia, and methanol in the Russian refineries, so to cut off the production of crucial ingredients for explosives used in production of artillery shells and rocket motors.

However...
Well… Ammonia is mostly made using natural gas (Steam Methane Reforming from nitrogen and hydrogen by Haber-Bosch process), not from crude oil. Hydrogen is made from natural gas. Methanol is hydrogenated carbon monoxide, processed from natural gas and coked coal. ...and most of methane is coming straight from the ground. At most, the share of relevant refinery co-products used for ammunition production is minimal. Thus, sorry but: nope, Budanov’s UAV-strikes on the Russian refineries stand in no relation to the Russian ammunition production. They foremost have economic effects, no effects upon the Russian ammunition production.

In similar fashion, it turned out that the 'US request Ukraine to stop bombing Russian refineries' as published in the Financial Times - was based on fake information. Nobody in Washington requested anything of that kind, and official Kyiv strongly denied there was anything like such a request.

***

AIR WAR

After a break of few days, Budanov’s campaign of UAV-strikes on oil refineries in Russia was re-launched with two attacks: a refinery in Novokuybyshevsk (Samara Oblast), and an oil storage depot in Gvardeyskoye, outside Simferopol, on the occupied Crimea. Up to 20 detonations from that area alone have been reported, meanwhile.

Probably more useful for immediate purpose: yesterday evening the PSU flew a Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG (or even an air-launched Neptune-) strike on Sevastopol. Target was a communication centre of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in the Nikolay Musyki Street. The compound was hit at least two, possibly three times, in quick succession:

Additional missiles have targeted something else, nearby (one of them was shot down, though):

Other reports cited a series of detonations in the Dzhankoi area (major road- and railroad crossing n north-eastern Crimea, but also a major concentration of Russian SAM-sites), and then three detonations at Balbek AB (UPDATE: meanwhile, it became known that 1 Su-27 was destroyed, and 2 Su-27s damaged in this attack; also hit were the local communications centre, where up to 60 have been killed or wounded). Given Storm Shadows, SCALP-EGs, and Neptunes are operated by the Ukrainian armed forces (i.e. the air and air defence force), and not the Ukrainian intelligence services, ‘it could be’ that ‘somebody there’ understands a bit more about warfare in general…

The Russian ‘revenge campaign’ went on, too. This morning, the PSU claimed to have shot down:

-          18 Kh-101/555 cruise missiles

-          25 Shaheds

Haven’t seen reports on how many of Russian missiles got through - yet.

***

Belgorod (Russia)

The raids by Ukrainian-controlled Russian combatants into the Belgorod Oblast in Russia seem to be over. I.e. after all, they seem not to have really tried to hold any ground: they’ve hit some 6-7 places, caused the Russians to re-deploy some of units from Ukraine to this oblast, and then withdrew. That said, Ukrainians continue striking targets in Belgorod (city) with UAVs, and – and even more so – the VKS continues bombing different ZSU positions along the border (for example: Seredyna-Buda, Vorozhba, Zemlyanki, Ptykhonov, Beloghivka etc.). Something in the Slobid District of Kharki was also hit by a Kh-35, air-launched guided missile, while an unknown object in the Osnovyansky District received a direct hit by up to three Shahids.

***

BATTLE OF DONBAS

Generally, while the Russians continue moving yet additional forces from the Svatove-Kremina area to Belgorod, and to the Bakhmut and Avdiivka area, Ukrainians seem to be in the process of streamlining their command and control structure, even withdrawing some of units out of the line to restore their combat capabilities.

Kremina… whatever the Russians might have secured in their arduous grinding towards Terny, the last week or so, was lost to a counterattack of (reportedly) Ukrainian armour (supported by FPVs), two days ago. That happens when the Group West has too few troops to defend Belgorod… That said, the Russians continue running lots of ‘mini-attacks’ in this area, and thus the ZSU remains on guard.

Siversk… The VKS has continued targeting the road from Siversk to Bilohorivka (the one on Siversky Donets) with UMPKs. The same is also frequently shelled by the Russian artillery. Attacks on positions of the 81^st Airborne in Bilohorivka seem to have petered out, though.

Bakhmut… The VKS continued pounding Chasiv Yar with UMPKs, while the VSRF and VDV continued trying to push into central Ivanivske. Except for the battered 98^th VDV Division and 11^th VDV Brigade, they meanwhile have the entire 150^th MRD there, plus the 7^th Veterans Brigade.

The area further south (see: Toretsk sector) is ‘unsurprisingly quiet’ – because that’s the actual aim – and the same remains valid at least all the way down to the southern prong of the ‘Russian effort for 2024’: the one run by the Group Tsentr in the Avdiivka area.

Avdiivka-Shakhtarsk… the Russians continue assaulting Berdychi, regardless what losses are they suffering there. From Orlivka, they’re also attacking in northern direction, into the southern flank of the 47^th Mech in the Semenivka area. Orlivka, as mentioned, is under their control: curiously, haven’t found any indications for them attempting to cross the Durna River and the chain of related lakes (towards the new defence line of the ZSU), though. Probably, they want to complete the conquest further south before doing that. Thus, they continue pushing from Tonenke in direction of the Durna River and the village of Umanske, further west. A possible confirmation for this are reports about continuous Russian bombardment and assaults into Pervomaiske, further south. Think, the ZSU is finding this ‘OK’: it can continue its ‘delaying’ battle, thus buying time to improve that new defence line. Behind this sector of the frontline, VKS continues to pound Umanske and Semenivka with UMPKs.

Marinka… the Russians have continued to push on Heorhivka and Novomykhailivka, but seem not to have managed any new gains.

SOUTHERN ZAPORIZHZHYA

Robotyne… well, the Russians (42^nd MRD, quickly re-built by few regiments of mobiks) have been cleared and pushed outside the village (or what was left of the same), once again.

As reported earlier, the 247^th VDV Regiment (7^th VDV Division) did manage to push back the Presidential Brigade by some 200-300 metres (from its positions north-west of Verbove), but suffered such losses that it run out of steam, too.

….and that’s about that in regards of what I have to report about ‘updates’ for this… erm… ‘morning’. I’ll get back shortly with an analysis of something else.