Ukraine War, 21 August 2024

Hello everybody!

Contrary to the last four days, there’s a lots of news as of this morning and thus let me get straight to these.

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AIR/MISSILE WAR

17 August

The PSU claimed to have shot down all 14 out of 14 Shahed attack UAVs released by the Russians the previous night.

18 August

The Ukrainians have targeted and hit a main oil depot outside Rostov-na-Donu, causing a major conflagration that went out of control. As of yesterday morning, 11 tanks were afire and the local fire brigade – which lost about 20 wounded firemen – abandoned its efforts at bringing the fire under control. By this morning, there are around 600 Russian firemen deployed there, but the conflagration widened to 22 tanks: there are some 50+ to go…

One of videos showing ‘early’ results on the POL-depot in Proletarsk, on 18 August…

….meanwhile, the fire is out of control and gulping one tank after the other…

The PSU claimed to have shot down 2 KN-23 ballistic missiles, three Russian Kh-101s (reportedly: equipped with cluster warheads), and 8 Shaheds.

The Russians have released several videos purportedly showing their successful UMPK-strikes on moving columns of the ZSU in the Korenevo area. If I’m to ask, these are showing air strikes on their own troops. For example, this was one of their own UAZ-452 Bushanka buses (popularly known as ‘loaf’)….which is no surprise considering:

a)       Most of the time, the FSB headquarters of the ‘anti-terror operation in Kursk’ has no trace of clue where (and when) are the Ukrainians;

b)      Yes, Su-34s are equipped to re-target their UMPKs in flight. However, these still can only target fix geographic coordinates. Moreover, to re-target in flight, they would need to receive new target coordinates on time (instead ‘hours before take-off’), and

c)       for this to happen, the VSRF and VDV troops in Kursk would have to have forward air controllers (or joint air controllers) with them, and at least one of the Russian automatic tactical management systems would have to work in the Kursk Oblast (to enable the transfer of target coordinates from the ground to the airborne Su-34s). Right now, not one is working. Indeed, not one of all the re-built units rushed to the zone in reaction to the Ukrainian attack is accompanied by such troops or equipped with such systems (actually: many are lacking even in regards of their usual complement of radio equipment).

Alternatively, the VKS could seek for ways to deploy its ‘SRDLO-triade’: A-50s, Il-20s and Il-22s. These could then guide Su-34s into air strikes on demand from ground headquarters, like they did for much of 2022. However, the number of fully mission capable aircraft of all three types is meanwhile less than 10; and to operate effectively, they would have to enter the zone probably covered by the sole S-200 (ASCC/NATO-reporting name ‘SA-5 Gammon’) SAM-site of the 138^th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, PSU. With other words: they would have to face the threat of being shot down by a weapon from which they cannot defend themselves. This is something the VKS simply can’t afford any more.

…which, however, should not mean that the UMPK-strikes of its Su-34s against fix targets have lost anything of their effectiveness. On the contrary. It is ‘only’ so that their total number decreased to around 90-100 per day and that they are targeting ‘something else’. Usually well behind the frontline (in the Kursk area) or fix Ukrainian positions in the Donbas.

19 August

The Ukrainians flew another UAV-strike on targets in the Moscow area. According to the Russians, three were shot down about 38km south of Kremlin, and another 15 in the Bryansk area.

The PSU claimed 11 (out of 11) Shahed attack UAVs as shot down over Ukraine. Su-34s of the VKS deployed UMPK glide bombs to strike what the Russians claim to be the main base of the 47^th Mechanised Brigade in Hlukhiv, a border town in the northern Sumy Oblast.

The UMPK-strike on ‘main base of the 47th Mechanised’ in Hlukhiv, on 19 (?) August.

Another UMPK-strike targeted a communication tower in the southern outskirts of Bilopillia, about 70km north of Sumy. The Russians also began targeting Sudzha – including their own civilians there - both with UMPKs and with attack drones, and they continued striking what I guess they are assessing as ‘suspected concentrations of ZSU troops’ north of Kremanoe and in the Ruskoe Porechnoe area.

A still from a Zvezda-released video showing a truck towing trolleys with FAB-500M-62 bombs, that are going to be converted into UMPK glide bombs once installed on Su-34s.

20 August

The Russians deployed 25 Shahed attack-UAVs, 1 Iskander, and 2 Kh-59s to attack Kyiv. The PSU claimed to have shot down all of these – or at least that none hit its target. Considering reactions of several readers living in Ukraine, this is as valid as similar explanations of Russian authorities about results of Ukrainian UAV-strikes. See: ‘nothing was hit and there are no damages’… Certain of traditions from the Soviet era are hard to get rid of: Maskirovka and lies are just two of these…

Also yesterday, the ZSU HIMARS-ed a major Russian ammunition depot in the Kakhovka area. That one did make a nice boom: I’ve just lost the link to the video…

According to the Russians, the last night up to 45 Ukrainian UAVs have attacked targets in Belgorod, Podolsk and Rostov Oblasts. All 45 were claimed shot down. Interestingly: the Keystone Cops actually claimed only 10 shot down… guess, they’ll leave it to the civilian authorities to report about ‘parts of downed Ukrainian UAVs falling on this or that important object, setting it on fire’… or to act like the governor of Rostov, who announced that ‘everything was shot down, and there are no damages’.

Finally, yesterday afternoon, the Commander-in-Chief ZSU, General Syrskyi, appeared to report to the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Ukraine. Between others, he described the ZSU’s achievements in the Kursk Oblast, and then provided lots of statistics about the Russian air and missile strikes on Ukraine. Because I’m usually covering air- and missile warfare first, I’ll address the latter portion of his statistics as first, too.

According to Syrskyi:

-          since 24 February 2022, the Russians deployed 9,590 missiles and 13,997 UAVs to attack Ukraine.

-          These have hit a total of 4,293 targets, of which 3,196 were civilian and 1,097 military.

-          The Ukrainians claimed shot down 2,429 missiles and 5,972 UAVs.

-          Overall, the Ukrainians shot down around 67% of detected Kalibr, Kh-101 and Kh-555, and other cruise missiles. Also about 22% of detected Kh-31, Kh-35, Kh-59 and Kh-69 missiles. Ukrainian effectiveness in regards of intercepting Shaheds was slightly better: out of 13,315 released, 8,836 were claimed as shot down. That’s 63%.

-          Atop of this, the Russians have deployed a total of 1,388 Iskander-, Tochka, and KN-23 ballistic missiles. Only 4,5% of these were shot down.

-          The Russians deployed 3,008 S-300 and S-400 SAMs in ground attack mode (i.e. as ballistic missiles): only 0.63% of these were shot down.

-          The Russians deployed a total of 362 Kh-22 and Kh-32 missiles: 2 were shot down so far.

-          The Russians deployed a total of 211 Oniks missiles: 12 were shot down.

-          The Russians deployed a total of 111 Kinzhal missiles: 23 were shot down (25%). These have targeted 83 targets, of which only 15 were military.

-          The Russians deployed 6 Zircon missiles: 2 were shot down. The other 4 all hit civilian objects.

With other words, and once again: dear Western ‘allies of Ukraine’, if you want to help protect Ukrainian civilians – get your fat backsides moving and deliver the fucking SAMs in bigger numbers.

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SOUTH-WESTERN KURSK

The map Syrski has shown yesterday (see attachment below) was meant to denote the ZSU’s control over the Russian turf as of around 48 hours earlier, and was indicative of this being at least ‘seriously’ wider than assessed by the ‘video, or it didn’t happen’-crowd in the social media. I am herewith offering my most sincere sympathies to the latter: really unfair from these pesky Ukrainians to drive into Russia, conquer and secure areas without informing the social media first…

For example, another detail obvious from that map is something mentioned already 2-3 times: just like the FSB is deploying VSRF- and VDV-units ‘in bits and pieces’, the ZSU appears to have ‘lots of brigades’ involved. Actually, in most of cases these are ‘brigade groups’ consisting of companies and battaliions from very diverse units. Essentially, there are 4-5 brigade-headquarters, each with 2-4 – perhaps a battalion – of own troops, and then ‘completed’ by a similar number of troops from other brigades. With other words: not a single ‘complete’ ZSU brigade is there: rather ‘battalions from’ the 80^th, 82^nd, and 95^th Airborne, 22^nd, 61^st, 88^th and 116^th Mech, and 101^st and 103^rd Territorial Defence Brigades… and then a few independent battalions (like the 225^th).

How many losses has each side suffered so far?

AFAIK, the ‘video, or it didn’t happen’-crowd counted some 60 destroyed or captured ZSU armoured fighting vehicles, and around 30 Russian. Visually confirmed number of Russian POWs is at around 470, while the reported number is well above 2,000 (actually: going in direction of 3,000). That alone would mean a loss of an equivalent of three regiments of the VSRF and Rosgvardia. How many Russians have been killed so far remains unknown. Ukrainian losses in troops are described as ‘heavy’, but I’ve seen exactly zilch evidence for this (except for videos released by the Russian PRBS-industrialists, including ‘corpses’ that are moving, and holding their heads upwards while ‘dragged to the pile’): indeed, Ukrainian contacts are, de-facto, laughing about such questions.

<cap>ZSU troops working themselves through the memorabilia of k… erm… kuddled and captured Russian troops of the… ‘5^th Ranger’? No idea what is that unit, but its troops seem to be uncertain if they’re fighting for the USSR or Russia..

There is constant activity along the Seym, with the Russians trying to construct new-, or re-deploy existing PMP pontoon bridges, and the Ukrainians interdicting this effort by their FPVs. For example, here a clear ‘first person view’ (that’s what FPV stands for) of an attack drone in the process of striking a truck carrying a PMP-section – and then directly the driver’s position in the cabin:

The ‘Seym Front’… from west towards east… the ZSU secured Otruba (north of Tetkino) and is heavily FPV-ing the Russians south of the Seym River. In turn, the Russians are heavily shelling the area west of Seym which they’ve evacuated the last week.

As I think to have reported during the weekend, the Ukrainians have secured Apanasovka, 10-I Oktyabr, and are meanwhile mopping up Komarovka and Vishnevka. I do not like to make predictions, but it’s obvious that the FSB will have to withdraw the southern flank of the 155^th NIB from Kulbaki as next, or risk them being cut off. Alternatively, they can move elements of the 98^th VDV Division south of Seym and then hope these might stop the Ukrainian advance – with help of supplies that have to cross one or two of their PMP pontoon bridges that are constantly targeted by Ukrainian UAVs.

But, that’s all unimportant. What is important – and, indeed: tragic - is that above-mentioned cases are no exceptions, but meanwhile the rule for all the unfairness with which the Ukrainians are fighting this war. As if the aggressive and endlessly huge NATO-support for Nazi terrorists in Kyiv wouldn’t be enough…? Look at the following…

Three or four days since the events in question, it became obvious why has the VKS bombed the area east of Sheptukhovka so heavily, the last week. And why are there so many tears about ‘many 200 and 300’ of the 810^th Naval Infantry Brigade in the Russian social media ever since. It turned out that this has not only lost a better part of its I Battalion in that counterattack at Korenevo, but (at least) better parts of two additional battalions, too. The latter have attempted a pincer attack the ZSU units in the area between Sheptukhovka, Kauchuk and Anastasyevka. And that worked so well that this counterattack was smashed with heavy loss. As a cup on cake, a part of the 810^th was surrounded somewhere in that area and its fate is unclear. While wiping away my tears with a handkerchief, I cannot but express my gratitude to the FSB generals for their supreme conduct of this operation…

At this point in time, I think it might be opportune to add my own map - for your easier orientation:

Another FSB success were the Russian defence operations along the northern sector of the (nameless?) road connecting Sudzha with Lgov. Yes, that’s ‘immediately east’ of Kauchuk. Because the pesky ZSU not only demolished the 810^th NIB, but then – and contrary to the Russian expectation – also immediately continued its own operation, it turned east and cut off this road somewhere in the Shaposhnikovo area. Thus driving right into the flank of VSRF-units attempting to drive down that road and lift the siege of at least a company of troops from the 9^th MRR (18^th MRD) encircled in Malaya Loknya since around 8 August. I simply can’t believe how unfair and non-cooperative with superior planning by FSB generals can the Ukrainians get any more. First they smash two major counterattacks, then drive into the flank of yet another Russian counterattack? And so, all of the social media are full of videos showing Marder 2 IFVs of the 95^th Airborne continuing to decimate the encircled part of the 9^th MRR…

How could this only happen to Russia…

At least the FSB had an entirely new idea for the Martynovka area! It counterattacked there… for 6^th or 7^th time. Unusually, the ‘video, or it didn’t happen’-crowd promptly reacted with declaring the village for something like ‘finally secured’ by the ZSU. Like it was not under the Ukrainian control since around Thursday-Friday the last week, but it is now, when the Russians claim they’ve counterattacked? Actually, it’s only now that videos confirming the ZSU presence in Martynovka have surfaced, and that because the ZSU units inside Russia have all turned off their smartphones and nothing is uploaded on the social media. At least not until they’ve been rotated out of the combat zone….

And so it happens that the ZSU has meanwhile widened its penetration in that area via Agronom and Kolmakov towards Pushkarnoe and Ruskaya Konopelka, but this was not captured on currently available videos. BTW, the latter is under almost sustained Ukrainian artillery fire for the last 48-72 hours, and – thanks to FSB’s military geniuses  - probably already surrounded and cut off.

Yet additional evidence for how unfair are Ukrainians fighting this war…

BTW, the latest Russian reports are talking about some sort of VSRF’s counterattack from Belitsa on Spalnoe, and then a ‘wholesale’ Ukrainian advance from Suzha via Ruskya Konopelka, Ulanok, to Kamyshnoe etc. i.e. from Sudzha in south-eastern direction. Which, to quote from another heroic appearance of Akhmat’s commander Alaudinov in the Russian media, ‘is no problem, everything’s OK’. Because the Russians have all of this area under their fire control… Good to hear that, because the ZSU has the entire area under the control of its ground troops and that for over a week now. Thus, it’s on hand that the Pudding’s PRBS-industrialists are ‘cautiously preparing the public’, or admitting, terrain losses of the last week. Actually, the ZSU is well-entrenched in Belitsa and Giri, and appears not interested in pushing further east.

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BATTLE OF DONBAS

It’s frustrating, but a matter of fact: the Russians are relentlessly assaulting in two sectors. The ZSU is killing their motor-cycle-mounted assault groups in droves, causing them incredible losses. Similarly, the PSU is bombing any Russian strongholds it can reach by its PGMs. The reported VSRF casualties (the mass is meanwhile confirmed by videos taken by Ukrainian UAVs) are ‘breaking all the known records’, but: the Russians continue assaulting in literal ‘hordes’. Additionally, their UMPK glide bombs are pulverising one Ukrainian position after the other: and that right at the time multiple NATO-members are, in best traditions of their usual failures, failing to deliver air defence systems and missiles they’ve pledged to deliver. And with the GenStab-U assigning priority for ammunition-supply to the Kursk Operation… and somebody blowing up an entire convoy of trucks hauling ammo from Poland in direction of Ukraine (good ‘NATO’ is protecting such convoys that well) - well, there’s a shortage of both artillery- and mortar ammunition.

This is how they have completed the conquest of Niu York and continued grinding in direction of Pokrovsk. Now, in the Niu York area, they pushed in northern direction and entered Nelipivka. In the Toretsk area (the town which, back in March, I’ve assessed as one of primary Russian targets for this summer, together with Pokrovsk), they have managed to secure two or three streets of the eastern outskirts.

In the Pokrovsk sector (evacuation of civilians from the Pokrovsk area is in the process), the Russians assaulted in similar fashion, the last two days, but their advance was slowed down a bit. As far as I know, they have ‘only’ managed to approach Krasny Yar and Novohrodivka.

SOUTHERN ZAPORIZHZHYA

The last week, I’ve mentioned claims by Russian PRBS-industrialists about a ‘biiiiiig’ concentration of ZSU’s armoured units in the Orikhiv area. Meanwhile, the same are reporting a ‘biiiiig’ Ukrainian ‘offensive’ in the Polohe District. No idea what are they talking about, though…