30 Comments

«‘Strategic Plan N’ (because the mass of Strategic Plans A to M has failed over the last two years)» — excellent!

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Як Ви оцінюєте шанси росіян дійти до Поковська (я живу в цьому місті)?

Дякую за Вашу роботу.

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That's one of things I am about to discuss (and thus think about) as next.

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Really, I don't understand why some people called some military units of the AFU like independent units. The Russian Volunteer Corps, the Freedom of Russia Legion, and the Siberian Batallion are part of the AFU. They receive a salary from the AFU, they receive equipment and ammunition from the logistics units of the AFU. If they got wounded or killed in action they or their relatives will receive insurance from Ukraine.

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Well, Ukraine is pulling off the same trick like Russia in 2015 with it's "green men", when Russia sent regular army units and pretended that they are independent soldiers on vacation helping their Russian speaking brothers in Ukraine. Ukraine also has to deny any responsibility for those units, because otherwise the hysteric wailing of pro-Putin fractions in Western countries about Ukraine no longer being victim, but also aggressor would be deafening.

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There is no ZSU or whatever kind of UA troops in Ru. Weapons and military vehicles "could be bought in every Voyentorg" (c) Pu (kind of military shop) in Ru. So, better to ask FSB, CIA, Mi6, Mossad or starship troopers commandment - how did these man come to Ru. And according to Pu - it is all quiet there, no need even for counterterror local OP.

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Even though the Russians may think they are trying to liberate certain areas this year, I would prefer your use of the word capture instead. Thanks for the info.

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That's why I put 'liberate' under apostrophes....

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VSFR is loosing more APC compared to IFV https://twitter.com/verekerrichard1/status/1770170648884867236 - may be just some short aberration, but interesting to watch it, if it would last.

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Ru want also "historically russian" Kharkiv back, so they would capture-"liberate" Kharkiv, but they have far too few troops to run this OP.

If to prioritize their goals - than really Donetsk-Luhansk oblast, then Zaporizhzhia, then Kherson, then Kharkov. They would prefer Odessa before Kharkiv, but as long as their underwater Black sea fleet is growing and "surface" fleet is melting like snow in late March, so they are more concentrated on ground OP

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Do you think, that Ukraine will have enough artillery shells (secured by the Czech initiative) in time and quality to prevent that?

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I would guess that it depends on logistics and artillery concentration.

If you have enough artillery rounds, but at the wrong sector of the front, these are as good as non-existent. You have to anticipate correctly the place where the attacker will push and be prepared (it's not possible to cover all the front uniformly).

And mines.

Don't forget mines, if you want to buy time in order to be able to rush reinforcements at the suitable place. You want to set your own pace on the attackers, not let them dictate their own.

And 120mm mortar rounds for close combat. And anti-air cover, if you don't want your defense demolished by these damned gliding bombs.

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Thanks Tom!

Do you see any solutions against the glide bombs? Since ZSU lost two-three of its Patriot batteries (or whatever vehicles) it seems that they are not even trying anymore

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too obvious. the russians will do something else, like attacking Sumy. It seems to me that at this point WAR is the purpose in itself for putin. He cannot transition to a peace time president anymore. So, it makes sense to spark it in other places. Just speculating..

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He cannot transit back to a peace president. But he still has to wage the war. So he needs to find objective N for plan N.

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Need a solution for glide bombs now

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Until more ground-based air defense starts covering the front (not very probable) and F-16s entering the fray (not before the summer), I don't see how these heavy glide bombs can be countered...

Maybe if USA starts delivering many more ATACMS (subject to the whims of MAGA Republicans) and lifts the restrictions on territory to be used (so Ukraine would be able to hit airports and airplanes) massively?

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It seems that the Russians have enough of anti-ballistic missiles. At least they report that they intercept Grad/Vampire missiles shot towards Belgorod on daily basis.

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It's not possible to cover every place in Russia against ballistic missiles.

The vast size of Russia makes it impossible to cover everything. See the difficulties of covering Kiev against ballistic missiles, for example.

An anti-ballistic Patriot battery has a range of 35 km or so. How many Patriot batteries you would want in order to cover every medium to major city in Ukraine? Every airbase? Every military camp?

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How many airbases are there in the range of ATACMS?

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No idea. If we postulate 150 km radius for the M39 Block I variant, and these batteries can be within 50 km of the front line, these should be able to destroy lots of parked airplanes and helicopters with their cluster munitions within Ukraine territories (Crimea is out of reach, even if your launchers shoot from within Kherson). From Tokmak you can reach as far out as Mariupol.

If you want to cover Crimea as well, you need the second version: M39A1 Block I , with a range of 300 km. This covers nearly all of Crimea, so you can assure that VKS cannot use Crimea air bases (nearly a dozen bases, I think). And from Tokmak you can reach as far as Rostov-on-Don with the 300 km radius. That's almost a dozen military airports, if the map in this link is accurate (and if you launch from Kharhiv, you can reach up to Kursh or Voronezh)

https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=12K1wklSw5RA4iFNU4Rx8-4k1N7M&hl=en_US&ll=47.4733740784119%2C36.007067937500025&z=8

Note that I am speaking only about cluster munitions, because the unitary warheads are unsuitable for hitting dispersed aircraft - you would use the unitary warheard to hit buildings like the A-50 factory etc.

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I think your analysis of Moscow's plans is pretty solid.

I do see the Kramatorsk-Sloviansk area as the primary target instead of Pokrovsk, but orc plans are always too ambitious by about 93% so the Toretsk zone looks set to be the next major operational focus.

The direct route to Pokrovsk is much too easy for Ukraine to defend. And Moscow needs built up areas to hide troop concentrations. Unless they shift to advance down the major railway through Ocheretyne, the Durna is going to pose a serious challenge considering how bad they are at crossing anything larger than a stream in force. That's why I see the recent operations west of Avdiivka as mainly intended to secure the left flank for a grouping that will push north from Avdiivka west of Niu-York.

I also agree that the concentration of forces near Kupiansk is mainly a diversion. Both sides use this area as an apprenticeship zone of sorts. The attacks towards Lyman feel a bit more real, though. Moscow dearly wants to collapse the Siversk bulge if it can.

The orcs are terrified of having their flank turned in a repeat of the Kharkiv counteroffensive. They don't trust their troops to hold the line. And the obsession with Robotyne is getting pathetic. Thank goodness the ruscists fight like an AI from the 1990s.

I hope Putin's plan Y involves asking why he's continuing this stupid bloodbath at all. Just invade Alaska, my dude - cut straight to the heart of the matter and see if the USA will even risk nuclear war to defend its own territory. Alaska wasn't even a state when today's political leaders were born, after all...

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Thank you very much, Tom. I do not know whether this is good news or bad news though ? Does one need 400 000 or 600 000 soldiers to achieve these objectives ? Sorry if this sounds idiotic.

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Depends on weapons, ammunition and equipment.

You can "spend" more soldiers if your equipment isn't adequate, or do a heavy bombardment which pulverizes every defender position and waltz into the target area with low casualties.

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i dont think the point is whether these News are good or not, Toms aim is to describe the situation and analyse it.

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Mine is a rhetoric question :)

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Thanks for the update. An intersting analysis. I get the point about Putin trying to «liberate» these oblasts. We small see what happens.

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Спасибо, Том.

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Many thanks for another interesting update, with a big dish of “food for thought”. In short time (me thinks) Putler may start Plan N, or go straight to Plan Z (Putler jumping -or throw- from a High Rise balcony). Hope he bid for Plan Z…

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Yes, the growing salient around Toretsk was discernible at least one year ago, and IIRC Wagner and VS basically stopped all combat activity in that sector above platoon-level sometime in that winter, making the sector a contender for the quietest in the theater since then.

But it's all military common sense, not any unique national doctrine. Even the allegedly non-strategic Prigozhin campaign for Bakhmut had a pretty obvious aim of reaching the Siversky Donets Canal opposite Slovyansk/Kramatorsk, which would lead to the abandonment of the Siversk-Bilohorivka salient due to threat of envelopment, which in turn could cause UFOR to retreat north of the river all the way to Lyman to protect their flanks (thus also relieving any pressure on the Kreminna-Svatove line).

(For my personal projection though, I suspect they will be at least as interested as rolling up the fortified Ukrainian line north and south of the center as in converging on Pokrovsk in Western Donetsk.)

Anyway, an interesting fact is that according to UK MoD (I assume cribbing from GSUA daily reporting), between mid-February and mid-March, 60% of all Russian attacks came along the Marinka and Avdiivka axes. How's that for a main effort?

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