Ukraine War, 2 August 2024: Air/Missile War Update

Hello everybody!

As mentioned a few days ago, this month is characterised by a particularly intensive air- and missile warfare. Not only because of the arrival of the first four (ex-Dutch) F-16AMs in Ukraine: foremost because of high-intensity operations by attack-UAVs of both sides. Thus, have prepared a list of something like ‘most important reported operations’, with few links to additional information.

Before I go on to that let me offer you my ‘best guess-reconstruction’ regarding the look of these first few Ukrainian F-16s (and sorry for the ‘watermark’: have been plagiarised far too often by far too many over the years):

Essentially, the jets retained their standard camo pattern (‘in service’ already since the type is in operational service, back in 1979 or so) in three or four grey colours (from the lightest to the darkest: FS35375, FS36270, FS36320, and FS36118). My colour profile is showing an example armed with AIM-120Bs and AIM-9Ms.

Why that?

Was something like ‘standard, back in the late 1990s’. Gauging by what is the West usually delivering to Ukraine, it’s most likely that this is what it delivered for PSU’s F-16s, too.

Sure, that’s just another guess: it’s perfectly possible they’re actually armed with AIM-120C (‘very nice’ would be AIM-120C-7s), AIM-9X….perhaps even with IRIS-Ts. But, right now, there’s no evidence for this. Thus, we’ve got to wait and see…

Note: something like the ‘biggest question mark’ about the looks of Ukrainian F-16s is the position of the national marking (the ‘roundel’, apparently applied in the so-called ‘low-visibility’ style, in greys instead in yellow). Some say this is applied directly behind the cockpit (like, for example, on Danish F-16AMs), others as shown on my profile above (in same position like on the Dutch, US etc. F-16s). The longer they remain in Ukraine, the more likely is it that they’re going to start receiving ‘methods of quick (visual) identification’, too. See: drop tanks painted in yellow, for example…

This camo pattern might not look particularly ‘inspiring’, but:

a) NATO-instructors for PSU-pilots and -ground crews meant business, and thus there was no time for applying some kind of fancy camo patterns; and

b) these are standardised colours, and thus widely available (always important for maintenance purposes). Finally,

c) F-16AMs of different NATO air forces wearing this camo pattern have leading edges of their intakes, wings and fins painted in radar-absorbent colours. These are available in only one (grey) shade, and decreasing their radar cross section - and thus the range from which they can be detected by Russian radars (at least as seen from the front). I, strongly, doubt anybody in NATO or Ukraine might come to such a stupid idea like to ruin these colours by overpainting them.

***

Regarding air warfare… think, the ‘particularly interesting period’ began back on 12 July, and then developed something like follows:

12 July:
- Ukrainian ATACMS strike a VSRF S-300V-1 SAM-site at the Mariupol Airport.

18 July:
- Ukrainian ATACMS strike on the Russian naval base in Donuzlav, in the Crimea.

19 July:
- PSU claimed to have shot down an Iskander-M ballistic missiles in the Odesa area.
- Ukrainians hit a dump in Luhansk and set it on fire (not sure what weapon was used).
- 110th Mech ZSU shot down a Su-25 using a Mistral SHORAD. Pilot ejected safely and was recovered (that’s the video showing two low-flying Su-25s, passing from right to left, and the second then gets hit).
- The Russians hit a base of the National Guard in the Kharkiv area by an Iskander-M...somebody there in the ZSU was super-clever and lined-up the troops just 35-40km behind the frontline: there were dozens of casualties…

20 July:
- Ukrainian UAV strike hit the Millerovo AB. The MOD in Moscow claimed 26 UAVs as shot down. Unofficial Russian sources reported that a maintenance hangar was destroyed and the POL-dump damaged.
- Ukrainians knocked out a Russian Buk SAM-system (probably by M142 HIMARS).

21 July:
- GUR sabotage group reportedly destroyed a Mi-28 and Ka-226 at 'an aviation construction enterprise in Moscow' (see: National Helicopter Centre Mil and Kamov' at Tomlino AB). Two other helicopters were damaged.
- Around 19.00hrs local time, Ukrainians hit the Morozovsk AB by 4-8 ATACMs: as first they hit the S-300/400 SAM-site, then the apron with parked aircraft, then a POL dump and then the runway.
- Another volley of Ukrainian UAVs hit an oil refinery in the Tuapse area. Caused a big fire.
- Russian Buk M2 destroyed by HIMARS-strike.

22 July:
- The Russians claimed an Ukrainian attack by 80 UAVs. Claim to have shot down 47 UAVs over the Rostov region, 5 over the Astrakhan Oblast, 1 each over the Belgorod, Voronezh, and Smolensk regions, 5 over Krasnodar, and 17 over the Azov Sea. 8 UAVs are known to have targeted the Morozovsk AB around 04.00hrs in the morning (yes, there was a follow-up strike): one hit the local ammo dump. Another hit a POL-dump in Tuapse.
- Heavy Russian strikes with UMPK glide bombs on Kharkiv.
- Russian 1K148 Yastreb AV radar knocked out by Ukrainian M142 HIMARS.
- Russian Tor M1 SAM-system knocked out by the 79th Airborne Assault Brigade, outside Olenivka.

23 July:
- PSU claimed 7 Shaheds as shot down.
- The last Russia-operated train-ferry Slavyanin was severely damaged (for third time in total), by Ukrainian missile strikes on the port of Kavkaz. According to the Russians, it was a 'low-flying missile from the Berdyansk area’ that hit the vessel. If so, then this was probably one of Ukrainian-made Neptune anti-ship missiles.
- 110th Mech shot down a Su-25 using a Mistral SHORAD. Pilot ejected safely and was recovered.
- Russian Buk M1 knocked out by HIMARS of the 15th Missile Brigade ZSU.

Fire aboard the train-ferry Slovyanin, after this was hit in the Port of Kavkaz, on 23 July. The vessel was hit already three times, but so far avoided destruction. Still, it’s the last of only three such ferries available, and unless the Russians can repair it, they’ve got to use the Kerch Bridge for their railway traffic to the occupied Crimea.

A UAV-look at the shoot-down of the VKS Su-25 on 23 July. Pilot’s parachute can be seen to the right, the fireball caused by the aircraft hitting the ground in the centre. The jet was felled by a French-made Mistral SHORAD: while the mass of Ukraine-operated MANPADS have an effective range of 2-4km, Mistrals have got a range of 8km, and thus can hit the Russians where they expect this the least.

24 July:
- PSU claims to have shot down 17 Shaheds, 4 Zalas, 2 SuperCams, and 2 Orlan-10s.
- The Russians targeted the port of Izmail with Shaheds. At least three Shaheds flew 12km deep into the Romanian airspace: three crashed outside the village of Plauru, in Romania.
- GUR sabotage group reportedly destroyed a Mi-8 at Kryazh AB (Samara Oblast).
- Mi-28 involved in anti-UAV-operations in the Bryansk region crashed in the Kaluga region. The helo belonged to a recently-established anti-UAV unit. The crew of 2 was KIA.

25 July:
- PSU claims to have shot down 25 out of 28 Shaheds during the night.
- Around 02.41hrs, a total of 13 powerful explosions were reported from the area of the Saki AB: Ukrainian UAVs reportedly hit multiple targets in the Okunevka area (Simferopol) on the Crimea. One weapon hit an ammunition depot at Saki AB, causing multiple explosions.
- 1 Pantsyr S1 knocked out by Ukrainian missiles or UAVs in the Kherson oblast; 2 of the crew WIA.
- 1 Pantsyr S1 knocked out by HIMARS-strike in the Donetsk area.

A Russian Pantsyr S1 SHORAD knocked out by Ukrainians on 25 July, southern Kherson.

This Pantsyr S1 was found and tracked by a Shark UAV somewhere in the Donetsk Oblast (Sharks are usually, but not exclusively, operated by the Ukrianian SSO).

26 July:
- PSU claims to have shot down 20 out of 22 Shaheds during the night. Romanian air defences claim to have shot down several Shaheds as these were approaching the port of Izmail via the Romanian airspace.
- During the night, the Ukrainians have targeted the Saki AB by 8 ATACMs. Two ATACMs were shot down, one missed. Reportedly destroyed was one 9S19 Nebo radar (positioned outside the village of Shovkovychne), 3 9A84 launchers, 1 9A83 launcher, and one Su-30SM; another Su-30SM was reportedly damaged. The Russians should have lost 2 KIA and 4 WIA.
- Su-34 of the VKS crashed in the Volgograd region. The crew reportedly ejected safely.

27 July:
- PSU claims to have shot down 1 Kh-59 and 4 Shaheds during the night. One of Shaheds exploded in the Romanian territory. Additionally, the PSU claimed 4 SuperCam, 1 Forpost, 2 Lancets and one other UAV.
- Ukrainian UAVs hit the Ryazan area, including the Dyagilevo AB again. Reportedly, there were 10 explosions from that area.
- 1 Pantsyr S1 knocked out by Ukrainian missiles or UAVs in the Streletske area, Belgorod oblast.

28 July:
- Kyiv claims to have targeted multiple VKS air bases by drones, including:
- Saratov AB
- Dyaghilevo AB
- Olenya AB (1800km from Ukraine; was actually attacked in the afternoon of 25 July: SBU claims to have damaged Tu-22M-3s Borts 31 and 33; Ukrainians claim that one was confirmed as destroyed)
- Oil refinery in the Ryazan Oblast

29 July:
- PSU claims 1 Kh-59/69 and 9 Shaheds as shot down.
- Ukrainian UAVs truck multiple substations of the Russian electricity network in the Tomarovka area, Belgorod Oblast, and in the Glazunovka, Oryol Oblast.

30 July:
- Ukrainian UAVs hit the Kursk-Vostochny AB; POL depot was reportedly set afire.
- ZSU shot down a VKS Mi-8MTV-2 Bort 59 using an FPV drone, about 50km behind the frontline, in the Donetsk Oblast (the Russians first claimed the helo as shot down by their own air defences; meanwhile, there are photos of their FAB-1500M-54-UMPKs with inscriptions like ‘Za Bort 59’, in sense of ‘avenging Bort 59’, because the helo appears to have carried a CSAR-team).
- The MOD in Moscow claimed its Su-35S shot down a MiG-29 PSU over a range of 213km. As usually, no evidence or other details were released.
- Reports from the Russian and Italian social media are describing the VSRF creating an infantry unit consisting of VKS personnel. This should include at least one former fighter-pilot.
- PSU delivers a JDAM-strike on a 'company-command post & UAV operators'.

Pre-war photo of the Mi-8MTV-2 Bort 59.

31 July:
- The PSU claims to have shot down 1 Kh-59 and all 89 Shaheds it detected during the night of 30-31 July.
- Ukrainian UAVs hit the Omsk refinery; reportedly, 600,000 tons of crude oil burned out and repairs are going to take 3-4 months.

***

What can be concluded on basis of all of this is (rather randomly) something like the following:

1.) Ukrainian SBU is continuing its attack-UAV-campaign against the Russian oil/gas-industry. Between others, this means: Kyiv is unimpressed with Hungarian and Slovak (for example) complaints about its decision to cut off the flow of the Russian oil/gas via the Ukrainian pipeline system to the West.

2.) The SBU has listened to related adavices and has expanded its list to the ‘frontline’ Russian air bases. Arguably, attack UAVs deployed for these purposes lack the terminal guidance system that would enable them to strike ‘targets of opportunity’ - like parked aircraft: therefore, they’re regularly deployed to hit depots for ‘petrol/oil/lubricants’ (POL) on such air bases, ‘instead’. Apparently, they’re also used to strike ammunition depots on VKS facilities, and - gauging by all the resulting detonations and fires - have been quite successful at that.

3.) The strike on the Olenya AB, on the Kola Peninsula, near Murmansk, and 1,800km away from Ukraine is a good idea. It should be repeated as often as possible to become seriously effective, though.

4.) So far, Ukrainian UAV-strikes on VKS’ air bases have not had effects in sense of decreasing the number of Russian air strikes by UMPK glide-bombs. But, this can still change: crucial for campaigns of this kind is to run such strikes regularly: to keep the VKS under pressure and thus disturb their operations. ‘One or two strikes on this or that air bases a month’ - are not enough.

5.) The Russians continue running air strikes by Shahed attack-UAVs almost every night. Most of operations are serving ‘mapping’ purposes: they’re trying to force PSU’s air defences to activate their radars, so they can track them down. Sure, the mass of Shaheds is shot down, but when they hit…

6.) NATO’s (non-)reaction to the Russians using the Romanian/NATO air space to strike the Ukrainian port of Izmail is only encouraging Pudding & Co KG GesmbH AG…

7.) The PSU seems to have no operational Storm Shadow/Scalp-EG air-launched missiles, right now (at least saw no trace of any being deployed since… was it 2 July?). No idea if the donors run out of stocks or are holding them back. Instead, MiG-29s and Su-27s continued deploying JDAMs and HAMMERS against targets closer to the frontline.

8.) The integrated air defence system (IADS) of the VKS is overstretched. Due to combat losses and attacks on many different facilities over the months, the Russians are trying to do the only thing sensible, which is to concentrate their air defences for protection of particularly important areas. In turn, this is leaving a lot of their other facilities poorly-protected.

9.) Since around 20 July, the Ukrainian (and other) sources are reporting that the Russians have withdrawn their air defence systems from western and southern Crimea and re-organised all of them in the Kerch area (eastern Crimea). I doubt this was the case: the Russians would never leave all of their units and facilities on the ‘holy land’ completely unprotected from Ukrainian missile- and UAV-strikes. It’s more likely they’ve re-located their remaining S-300/400 SAM-sites to the Dzhankoi-Kerch area, while leaving facilities elsewhere protected by Buks, Tors, and Pantsyrs.

10.) The VKS crews of S-400, Buk, Tor, and Pantsyr systems seem to be getting better in intercepting ATACMs: meanwhile, they’re shooting down up to 30% of incoming missiles.