Ukraine War, 18 May 2024: Part 2

Good evening everybody!

(…or good morning for those who might read this only in the morning…)

I’m a little bit late with the Part 2 of my update for today: the one concerning developments on the ground. Was held up preparing my next Q&A session, which is to follow in a day or two. Anyway, here we go: lets start with Kharkiv…

The Russians deployed there their XI Army Corps, which is:

-          2^nd Spetsnaz Brigade

-          7^th Motor-Rifle Regiment (directly subordinated)

-          18^th Motor-Rifle Division (Western flank; this is comprising 11^th Tank Regiment, 79^th Motor-Rifle Regiment, 275^th Motor-Rifle Regiment, and 280^th Motor-Rifle Regiment)

-          72^nd Motor-Rifle Division (Eastern flank; this is comprising 153^rd Tank Regiment, 30^th Motor-Rifle Regiment, 41^st Motor-Rifle Regiment)

-          25^th Motor-Rifle Brigade

-          138^th Motor-Rifle Brigade

-          104^th Artillery Brigade

-          244^th Artillery Brigade

The aim of this assault was not only the capture few border villages (like Lukyantsi and Liptsy, perhaps Hilyboke, too), or Vovchansk, but actually to drive all the way down to Kharkiv, and also to drive into the rear of the ZSU forces east of Oskil River and thus enable the Group West to start assaulting Kupyansk. By now it’s obvious that the Russians didn’t get very far. Indeed, they were slowed down already around 13-14 May, and stopped by around 15-16 May. They have also been prevented from encircling Vovchansk, and have to assault it frontally. Late on Friday, the Russians launched another, big assault on Lyptsi. This involved the 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (apparently deployed as line infantry?) Have gained some ground north and north-east of the place, but failed to enter it.

Since then, the situation is back to (meanwhile) ‘usual’ in this war. See: the Russians are grinding through assaulting, Ukrainians are k… kuddling lots of Russians, but also suffering some losses. Vovchansk was evacuated (at least largely), and since some three days there is fighting on the streets there. Above all: the Russians are bombarding the place with all means available: for me, that’s always a ‘good indication’ for how is the situation in the area in question.

In summary, I think the ZSU is assessing the situation as ‘stabile’. At least ‘under control’.

From the Russian point of view… well, OK, if you like, it’s ‘excellent’, because the Russians can claim ‘advance’ and ‘captured 2,5 villages in 8 days’. I doubt anybody there between the Keystone Cops in Moscow, or in the headquarters of the OSK South is particularly happy, though.

Problem is the public perception. Apparently, in Ukraine and in the West, many are already crying that the Russians got ‘too far’. Especially so because they’ve entered northern Vovchansk. However, I dare reminding that this is neither one of Arab-Israeli Wars of the 1950s or 1960s, nor is Ukraine the North/the Union party of the Secessionist War in the USA. With which I mean:

a)       no, Ukraine must not all the time fight for every square inch of Ukrainian soil (on the contrary, this would be pointless to do; if there are any doubts, see Bakhmut), and

b)      nope, Ukraine is not Union/the North so there’s a President Lincoln and he needs a general ‘doing something’ – even if that one is little else but Grant who then can’t do much more but squander another 8,000 troops for a single, pointless and unsuccessful assault, so the public (read: the media) is happy it can publish about ‘the army is doing something’.

What really matters, is something like this:

a)       nope, the Russians didn’t manage to reach Kharkiv.

b)      Actually, they didn’t even manage to reach the first line of Ukrainian defences (they’ve been stopped several kilometres north of it).

c)       Vovchansk was north of that defence line because it’s too close to the Russian border and thus all the Russian artillery there (i.e. Ukrainians intentionally constructed their defence line further south, because they knew that constructing it further north would be suicidal for their civilians and military engineers constructing that line).

d)      The rear of the ZSU frontline in the Kupyansk area is not under threat. And,

e)      once again, the VSRF has proven it can’t run an operational-level operation, nor can it seriously breach a selected portion of the Ukrainian frontline and then drive (at least) 50km deep behind it.

Bonus No.1: unlike the usual story of the last 7-8 months, not one of ZSU brigades – the 13^th Jäger, 42^nd Mech,  57^th Motorised, and 71^st Jäger (or Airborne Assault?) are deployed there, plus one artillery brigade – is complaining about the lack of shells. On the contrary: they are all well-supplied with artillery shells. And all the reporting is cool, even if, sometimes, ‘tense’.

(…and, shall I also mention that the ZSU has elements of the 92^nd Assault, 93^rd Mech, and the 3^rd Assault in reserve…?)

Bonus No.2: the Russians expected that the ZSU would be forced to re-deploy many more units to this ‘new frontline’. Meanwhile, it’s the Russians that are withdrawing their units from other sectors to bolster their assault on northern Kharkiv.

***

BATTLE OF DONBAS

Bakhmut… Ukrainians have destroyed the Russian bridgehead over the Donbas-Siversky Donets Canal, and forced them to withdraw about 200-300 metres back along the road T0504.

Avdiivka-Pokrovsk: the last week, the Rusians were assaulting in direction of Kalynove, Novooelksandrivka, Sokil, Novopokrovske, but didn’t get anywhere. Further south, they have completed the seizure of what was left of Netaliove, but that was about their only success in the last 10 days.

Mariinka… The Russians have gained some ground along the southern side of the village. Elsewhere, no new advances.

***

SOUTHERN DONETSK & ZAPORIZHZHYA

Staromaiorske… the Russians are still outside southern Urozhaine (the place of their much-lauded ‘major breakthrough’, two weeks ago). Therefore, they’re bombing the ruined village with UMPKs.

Robotyne… well, it turned out the Russians are back to holding just the south-western corner of the ruins of this village. And approaches to its southern side. It’s tragic to say it, actually, but that’s all the serious gains in this area of the last three months or so. Nice to see relatively new or at least inexperienced ZSU units – like the 141^st Infantry, 65^th Mech, and 117^th Mech – are holding out that well (moreover, the ZSU has the 82^nd Airborne, 115^th Mech, and the 15^th Kara-Dag as reserve in this sector).

Principal problem remain the Russian UAVs and glide-bomb strikes. The number of FPV-strikes has increased through this month (some 3,000+ were registered in the first two weeks of this month). The number of strikes by UMPK-bombs seems to be ‘stabile’ at around 150 per day.