Ukraine War, 18 May 2024: Part 1 (Air War)

Hello everybody!

Having taken care to finish my next book, and after a few days of resting my arms (and mind, too), here I am: back to reviewing latest developments and grinding myself through all the other work that’s waiting for your turn. Thank you for your patience.

For the start, this Part 1 is going to try catching with latest developments in regards of air warfare…

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Generally, the Ukrainian stocks of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) are still insufficient. See: the PSU (air force and air defence force), has only around enough to defend major urban centres, while the ZSU (ground forces) has not enough to properly defend its units deployed along the frontline. Indeed: there are still shortages of MANPADs (man portable/shoulder-launched air defence missiles).

Certainly enough, over the last 10 days, the ZSU claimed to have shot down 2 Russian Su-25s, and 1 Ka-52 (the latter by the 47th Mech Brigade in the Avdiivka area, back on 13 May). But:

a) confirmation for all three claims is ‘pending’, and

b) the ZSU needs so many MANPADs and SAMs, that it’s unlikely to re-stock properly before the end of June.

…while (this is a sort of an ‘update’) the PSU lost a Su-27 and its highly-experienced pilot, yesterday.

Therefore, the Russians remain in a position to blast ZSU positions along selected sections of the frontline with UMPK glide-bombs (‘KABs’, in Ukrainian vocabulary) at a rate of (at least) 150 a day (once again: they claim some 500 a day, but I’m yet to see any kind of confirmation for this).

Indeed, meanwhile there is no doubt that UMPKs now have new, improved guidance sections, significantly improving their precision. Which is why one can ever often see photos and videos like the following one, where 3 (if one malfunctions) or 4 UMPKs are targeting almost exactly the same area (in this one case: in Chasiv Yar, on or around 12 May):

Except in the Chasiv Yar area, the Russian air strikes of the last few days were targeting the area west of Avdiivka, where their ground troops are still assaulting Novooleksandrivka, Sokil, and Novopokrovske – exactly as described in my last updates, two weeks ago. With other words: no matter what is the VSRF’s Group South throwing at the ZSU there, they didn’t get through.

But, and for similar reasons, the Russians are still free to roam the sky over the battlefield – and behind it – by their Orlans and similar reconnaissance UAVs, and find targets for their attack drones. This is a problem I do not expect to be solved until somebody does something the Italians were offering already back in 1980s, but nobody was even thinking about paying attention about: launching a mass production of something in style of the Otomatic and/or Draco - a 76mm gun (or similar calibre) on the chassis of OF-40 or Leopard tank, or the Centauro armoured car. Such weapons have an effective engagement range of about 15,000m, which would enable them to target Russian reconnaissance UAVs that are meanwhile regularly operating at altitudes above 2,000-3,000 metres, thus remaining outside the range of (much too expensive) MANPADs, light anti-aircraft artillery pieces (like ZU-23, calibre 23mm), and heavy machine guns, too.

Of course, one could make things easier (and a lot cheaper) and install such a gun (and its fire-control system) on a truck, too…

…but, guess, that’s ‘too complex to think about’ (read: neither as complex nor as profitable as making overexpensive SAMs), and thus not (yet?) happening.

(Note: the Italian-designed 76mm gun in question is in widespread service with dozens of navies around the world (including the US Navy). Multiple fire-control systems for it are available, as are large stocks of ammunition…. but, then: that’s just me and my rambling….)

…with result that we still get to see something like 15-20 Russian-released videos a day showing these knocking out Ukrainian artillery pieces, tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and similar stuff – like in the case of this T-80 of the ZSU, hit some five kilometres behind the frontline in the Chasiv Yar area:

Indeed, the Russian UAVs are sometimes still flown up to 100km behind the frontlines and then enabling their Joint Strategic Command West (OSK West) to deploy Iskander or NM-23 ballistic missiles against targets there, like in the case of some Ukrainian storage facility some 50km south of Kharkiv, two days ago:

The Russians also continue releasing streams of Shahed attack UAVs deeper over Ukraine, almost every single night. At least the mass of these is shot down by Ukrainian SAMs… which cannot be said for strikes by Russian S-300 SAMs deployed in surface-to-surface mode, and other ballistic missiles, which are, ‘still’, and ‘regularly’ targeting Kharkiv and other cities and towns deeper behind the frontline (here just one report about some of effects of such attacks).

For their part, and pending official permission for deployment of Western weapons on the Russian turf, on 15 May, Ukrainians continued dismantling the Russian air defences on the occupied Crimea. This time, they have fired about 10 ATACMs to hit the Balbek AB, which is protected by the 12^th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (a part of the 31^st Air Defence Division, this regiment is operating S-400s protected by Pantsyr S1s). As far as is known, have destroyed two S-400 launchers, a 92N6E radar, and (gauging by all the papers flying around in the aftermath, see photo below) a 55K6 command post. Finally, this strike destroyed two MiG-31 interceptors and, possibly, a Su-27 interceptor (some say a ‘decoy MiG-29’, but I’m not that sure). Additionally (and according to the Russian reports), in the Sevastopol area, Ukrainian ATACMS have hit the main storage depot for R-37 and R-77 air-to-air missiles.

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Ah yes…. a ‘BTW’ while we’re at air warfare: yesterday, somebody asked me about the ‘stand’ right now. For more than two years, my colleague Milos Sipos is patiently collecting all the evidence (and it’s often so that full data is becoming available only months later). The result of his work are two big Excel sheets with all the available data about every single loss of each side (and of which we’re making lots of use when preparing books like this one, because that’s enabling us to recognise patterns and explain the technology, tactics, and the outcome, too). So, when one counts every single case in each sheet, and if I didn’t miscount anything, the figures are as follows.

Since 24 February 2022, Ukraine (PSU, Army Aviation, and Naval Aviation) lost:

-          38 aircraft (that’s all types, including 8 L-39s)

-          48 helicopters

Since 24 February 2022, Russia (VKS and VF-MA) lost:

-          99 aircraft

-          117 helicopters.

Mind: these are cases that can be considered ‘1000% confirmed’. See: there’s at least a photo or video of the wreckage (in the case of the Russians, there are also several videos showing several of their helicopters burning after being hit on specific air bases, or two or more aircraft destroyed by Ukrainian missiles etc.). Indeed, in most of these cases even the Bort (i.e. the two-digit identification number), registration (in the case of Russian aircraft that’s the five-digit number prefixed by ’RF-‘), and the name of the crew are known.

‘But’: in the case of Ukraine, I didn’t count all the civilian transports destroyed, nor all the aircraft and helicopters that were stored before the war and were then destroyed or captured by the Russians (like 22 stored Il-76s, captured at Melitopol IAP, on 25 February 2022, or some 20 helicopters captured at Chornobaivka/Kherson IAP, on 27 February 2022).

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Finally, for better understanding of the estate of electronic warfare in this conflict as of April-May 2024, I would recommend reading the following article (in Ukrainian, but ‘automatic’ translation with help of modern browsers shouldn’t be a problem):

Large enterprises are not interested in creating a small trench EW: Interview with engineer Sergey "Flash”

Of course, you can follow in fashion of all the major industrial enterprises, and ignore this discipline in this war, and thus this article as well. But then: don’t complain if you don’t understand lots of latest developments on the battlefield. After all, I neither know, nor am I able to explain everything that matters.

(…to be continued…)