Ukraine War, 17 February 2024: Mopping Up

Hello everybody!

After all the events in the Avidiivka sector of the last 48 hours, it’s time for another update.

Ah yes… A note before I go on: I’m fabricating disinformation, highly unreliable, a Marxist Neo-Con and Jihadist-supporter working for IRGC, Mossad, MI6 and BND: especially my critique of Israel is making me both ‘anti-Israel’ and ‘anti-Semite’. The mass of what I post here is what I’ve pulled out of my small finger. Therefore, please mind that if you continue reading this feature, you’re doing so at your own risk: I, certainly, cannot recommend anybody doing that.

***

For the start, and since I’m not sure any more if I’ve mentioned that: the VKS is said to have flown over 50 air strikes on ZSU’s positions in the Avidiivka area yesterday alone. Except for MPK/UMPK-armed Su-34s, it’s now deploying Su-24Ms equipped with up to four glide bombs. Below a photo showing one armed with a single weapon under the right underwing hardpoint. The other is probably attached to the same station of the left wing: right now, I’m not sure where are they installing the other two.

To make sure (by now you must know how unreliable I am), here a photo showing two UMPKs as seen from a similar aspect, but while attached to underwing hardpoints of a Su-34:

Today, the PSU reacted by - apparently - deploying at least one of its units equipped with advanced surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems somewhere west of Avidiivka. It’s unclear if this was a PAC-2/3, IRIS-T or NASAMS, but: Ukrainians have claimed two Su-34s and one Su-35 as shot down. All three should have been involved in operations against the ZSU in the Avidiivka area.

The chief of the PSU released the illustration below as evidence: that’s a screen-grab from the Cospas-Sarsat, an international satellite search and rescue (SAR) system, recording emissions from emergency beacons carried by pilots, and activated in the case of ejection. As can be seen, the Cospas-Sarsat has recorded a total of four emergency emissions:

…which would mean that all three jets were shot down within relatively limited period of time. Furthermore, and if this was all to be seen, this would mean that either the Su-35-pilot, or one of four Su-34-crewmembers, didn’t manage it out.

Independently from that, and gauging by the chatter in the Russian media, ‘only’ the downing of the Su-35 can be considered as confirmed by now. The pilot ejected safely, and was picked by a Mi-35M.

Group photo of SAR-crews that have recovered the downed Su-35-pilot, early today. In the background is one of Mi-35M attack helicopters that was involved.

***

On the ground…

By now it is known that the decision to deploy two battalions of the 3rd Assault Brigade to help evacuate Avidiivka was taken while General Zaluzhny was still in command of the ZSU. Moreover, except for these two units, ZSU is known to have also deployed:

• 225 OSHB (225th Independent Assault Battalion)

• Timur Group of the GUR MOD (special forces outfit that liberated the Snake Island), and

• the Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK).

Operators of the 225 OSHB, as seen on their return from the mission to Avidiivka.

By now it is certain that the Russian onslaught of yesterday has overrun several Ukrainian positions. Foremost in the northern-, and north-eastern parts of Avidiivka. This is where the ZSU lines collapsed, resulting in such a chaos - in that melee - in which the Ukrainians streaming through Avidiivka and the 9th District in western direction have suffered losses, too. As of the last night, talk was about ‘dozens of wounded left behind’ (the Russian media is meanwhile showing some of those captured making telephone calls to their families in Ukraine): meanwhile, talk is about ‘hundreds’.

One of ZSU units known to have suffered ‘significant’ losses is one of battalions from the 3rd Assault: this was, apparently, hit by the Russians from multiple sides while holding the northern sector of the 9th District. As of this morning, survivors from all four of these units were ‘out of Avidiivka’, which is leading to the conclusion that the ZSU has vacated the 9th District.

Indeed, videos surfaced in the Russian social media showing VSRF-troops planting their flags on several points that might be inside the Coke Plant. If this turns out to be right, then ZSU has completely evacuated Avidiivka, and the new frontline is running like this:

***

As about losses…

Usually, I’m not discussing ‘losses’ because completely reliable figures are next to never available when it comes to modern warfare. In this regards: really, everybody is lying. Moreover, even those who are sincere, think they are sincere, or want to be sincere frequently do not understand the meaning of something called ‘firepower’: sure, their users are almost certain to disagree, but there are drastic differences in the firepower already at the level of Western and Soviet/Russian heavy machine guns, not to talk about heavier weapons.

The reason I’m making an exception from ‘my own rules’ is that I would like to try assessing how much might the VSRF remain capable of continuing any kind of large-scale operations.

That said, I am perfectly aware that the following is going to result in significant criticism - simply because it’s a mix of available official and unoffiical figures, and assessed and (partially) confirmed losses, and there are lots of people who can’t understand the difference between official and unofficial figures, between assessed and confirmed losses, and even less so the fact that a unit in which less than 30% still can stand and hold their firearm, is considered ‘wiped out’, anywhere - but in Russia.

My actual problem with the figures in question is the fact that the ZSU does not control the battlefield any more, and thus simply can’t know. Still, the following can be considered at least as ‘helpful’ for the purpose.

One way or the other, I would like to politely request all the possible wiseacres to STOP reading at least here. I do not want to hurt anybody’s feelings but: it’s certain you’re only going to find yourself badly confused and understanding nothing at all. If you can’t hold yourself back, at least be so kind to mind that beliefs are something for places of religious worship.

ZSU

Losses of the ZSU remain largely unclear: available information is that one battalion of the 3rd Assault, and one battalion of the 110th Mech have suffered ‘significant’ losses. How much is that ‘significant’: no idea. There are videos from one of stabilisation points of the 3rd Assault, though, and these are showing ‘about a dozen’ of wounded undergoing treatment.

The 47th Mech might have suffered additional losses while repelling the latest of Russian assaults in the Krasnohorivka area, but there is no clarity in this regards, either.

VSRF

Here it’s notable that

a) none of below-listed Russian units went into this operation with more than about 65-70% of its nominal complement;

b) the 3rd Assault and 47th Mech claim to have caused over 4,000 casualties to the 74th Motor Rifle and the 114th Motor Rifle alone. AFAIK, neither the 3rd nor the 47th Mech have stated in what period, though. For those in rearmost rows: this shouldn’t mean ‘yesterday’. The Russians (unofficially) admitted one of their GRU brigades to have suffered similar losses when deployed as ‘assault infantry’ in the Krasnohorivka area (see the link below, where one can hear somebody talking about ‘less than 30% of the brigade left).

2nd GCAA
- 15th Motor Rifle Brigade: down to 40-45% of nominal complement
- 21st Motor Rifle Brigade: down to 35-40%

41st CAA
- 35th Motor Rifle Brigade: down to 40-45%
- 55th Motor Rifle Brigade: down to 35-40%
- 74th Motor Rifle Brigade: ‘total loss’ (i.e. less than 30% left)

others

- 1st Slovyansk Brigade: down to 40-45%

- 30th Motor Rifle Brigade: down to 45%
- 114th Motor Rifle Brigade: ‘total loss’ (i.e. less than 30% left; yes, I know the few survivors were left to raise one of victory flags: you might want to know that this means not this brigade might be ‘useful for limited defence purposes’ any more.)

GRU

(special-forces/rangers-like assets, primarily running night operations and infiltration, but lately deployed for all-out assaults, too).

- unknown Spetsnaz brigade: less than 30% (Krasnohorivka area)

- unknown Spetsnaz brigade: less than 50% (9th District; this was the unit causing most of problems, the last 4-5 days)

Additionally, and although on withdrawal, the ZSU has captured several dozens of Russian troops, the last two days: that’s a nice confirmation what an utter chaos the final hours of the battle of Avidiivka were.

Considering masses of the VSRF’s armour destroyed in this battle (below a ‘nice’ illustration for this fact, from back in January): I would say that at least two of VSRF’s combined arms armies and much of the GRU are now out of action. Probably for something like two or three months.

…which is why I’m not surprised about (Ukrainian) reports that a total of two Russian divisions were re-deployed away from Kupaynsk, in the course of this week (one to the Kremina area, the other ‘at least’ to the Bakhmut area, if not ‘all the way to the Avidiivka’ area).

Conclusion is on hand that the Russian conquest of Avidiivka has similar effects like the Battle of Vuhledar, last year in January: that it’s leaving the Keystone Cops in Moscow with few options but to, sometimes in 2-3-4 weeks, re-focus on some other part of the battlefield as a conclusion of this winter’s offensive. The only difference is: back then, the ZSU was able to hold its ground; this time it was forced to withdraw, and it did suffer ‘significant’ losses, too.