Ukraine War, 14 February 2024: Showdown in Avidiivka
Hello everybody!
A ‘quick and dirty’ today, mainly focusing on Avidiivka, where the situation is reaching the point of ‘critical’.
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As far as is known, the Russian Air-Space force flew more than 30 air strikes deploying MPK/UMPK glide bombs, on each of the last two days. Notably: since early January, Su-34s are deploying up to four bombs per sortie, not just two - like most of the last year. RUMINT has it that they’re working on developing the capability to deploy up to six glide bombs per sortie.
Primary target remain high-raise buildings used by Ukrainians for observation purposes, plus to deploy anti-tank guided missiles and snipers. Here a still from one of Russian videos showing a strike by several UMPKs:
On the ground, as of yesterday, the Russians claimed to have reached - and thus cut off - the road O0542/Industrialny Prospect: the ‘life-line’ of the ZSU troops inside the town. Something like this:
Ukrainians do confirm that the Russians are ‘nearby’ and the traffic along this road interrupted, but also stress,
a) there are alternative routes
b) nope, the Russians do not control the road.
Rather, they say, there is no stable frontline: a hellish battle is raging, localities changing hands ‘10 times a day’; one side holding one home, the other the other home; the Russians ‘holding lodgments close to the road’… Seems to be confirmed by a video released by the 3rd Assault, which is showing results of that unit’s counterattacks immediately north of the area claimed as seized by the Russians:
Heavy fighting is reported from Pervomaiske, too - where Ukrainians say there is also no stable frontline left, either: troops are intermingled, with Ukrainians holding one-, the Russians another home.
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As for why the ZSU is not withdrawing from Avidiivka: well, contacts deployed there say it’s better to continue fighting inside the town, where there is plentiful of cover, than to withdraw west of it - into the open, where there is no cover. For reasons nicely explained by Don, two days ago, even field fortifications there wouldn’t offer as good protection as the ruins of Avidiivka and the Coke Plant.
While I understand that this is entirely incomprehensible to lots of people monitoring this conflict from the safety of their living rooms, it could be there’s some logic in what people actually fighting there in Avidiivka and similar places, and going through this hell of high explosives, mud, cold, and blood every single day, say.
Who can know…
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In other news…
there are reports about the Russians deploying their Zircon hypersonic missiles in Ukraine;
Ukrainians claim to have sunk the Russian Navy’s amphibious assault ship Tsesar Kurnikov (Ropucha-class) in the Black Sea, using Magura V5 drones; unofficial Russian sources (see: social media) seem to confirm the loss, but ‘stress’ there were no casualties and all the crew was rescued;
Ukrainian Mi-24 might have been shot down by the Russians in the Robotyne area; and,
just days after I’ve observed that there is a need for a major modernisation of infantry-equipment, photos surfaced showing Russian troops equipped with portable electronic warfare systems, used to jam drones.
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While I understand that this is entirely incomprehensible to lots of people monitoring this conflict from the safety of their living rooms, it could be there’s some logic in what people actually fighting there in Avidiivka and similar places, and going through this hell of high explosives, mud, cold, and blood every single day, say.
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One recalls how in the past fall, the Ukrainian government admitted that there were basically no fortifications starting 5-10 km 'behind' Avdiivka, and so were authorizing new construction. Even assuming something has been built, 5-10 km behind Avdiivka implies there's not much fortified behind Berdychi, so a retracted frontline would be relatively like an eggshell.
But this wouldn't really be a problem (compared to the alternative of fighting in operational encirclement again), given the defensive hallmarks of this war, if UFOR had historical levels of ordnance and infantry reserves. Indeed, political failures in the West have prevented them from exploiting a golden opportunity to punish an overactive RuFOR offensive, but they're not the ones responsible for staffing in Ukraine. Recent reporting indicates that after Zelensky's purge of mobilization commisars half a year ago, almost no new conscripts have been reaching frontline units, and the dysfunction remains uncorrected. That's just Ukraine imposing the same mistake on itself that Russia did in 2022...
Almost like, as in the case of Bakhmut, it would have made sense to invest in serious counterattacks early in the process (for Avdiivka, this was even March 2023!), when resources and tactical opportunities were more available, to prevent a very tactically-significant and desirable sector from becoming compromised...
Thanks for this update Tom. Sober as usual. This glide bombing tactics thats VKS is working on, Only apply for the Ucranian and maybe an adversary without a good front line ADN, ot could be refined yo be used against NATO in the baltics? How better prepeared are NATO battle formations? Or it's usless as a AC-130 would be over Russian forces?
At the same time, Su-25 are still using Spread and Pray low quality tactics, si it's still dangerous to get too close to manpads.
I ask it because maybe the VKS is finding a way yo be more efficient un this war, but this maybe don't going to work in any other environment of they concern. Like mastering a useless and time consuming tactic that can't be extrapolated.