Ukraine War, 14 December 2024: Part 2

(…continued from Part 1)

I’ve ended the first part of this feature with discussing the Glavcom. I’ll get back to him while analysing developments in the ground warfare of the last few weeks.

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Kursk… This is one of ‘autonomous zones’ of the ZSU: an area not under micromanagement by Syrsky, and that’s felt. By both sides. The last week - which is: between 6 and 12 December - the Russians run another major counterattack - and recovered the ruins of Plekhovo. The Russians sound very happy when reporting how they’ve sent North Korean special forces through (two kilometres of?) minefields, to recapture the place ‘within two hours’. In turn, Ukrainians that have experienced that attack are talking about a large number of assailants, but also their poor coordination and heavy losses.

The Russians are not as proudly describing how the 51st, then 104th and then the 234th VDV Regiment - reportedly also reinforced by North Koreans - attempted to reach Malaya Loknya from the western side and how all their efforts ended in usual fashion, costing them numerous BMP-3s and BMD-4s (plus, reportedly, lots of North Korean troops).

A part of me would like to see better evidence for North Korean involvement in these two attacks, but: it is obvious the Russians are sending their best - the VDV - and, perhaps also due to the lack of air support, that best is not enough against Ukrainian best (without Syrsky). That, however, is ‘no news’: is a matter of fact that should be known already since around March 2022.

BMD-4Ms of the 51st VDV Regiment, knocked out on 7 December.

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Kupyansk-Svatove… the situation there is meanwhile quiet. It was only funny following reactions in the Russian social media, when they’ve realised that - contrary to bombastic claims from around two weeks ago - the VSRF is not in control of the town, and no ‘20,000 Ukrainian militants’ have been encircled.

…as much as they are tragic, if there is anything ‘good’ about wars, then the fact that they’re always full of ironic, and indeed: funny moments…

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Kremina… is also quiet. Apparently, the Keystone Cops in Moscow are really sending all their reserves either to Kursk or to Pokrovsk.

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Siversk… nothing new. Well, except additional Russian frontal assaults which are easily repelled by the ZSU, because this is another of areas ‘autonomous’ from Syrsky’s micromanagement… probably because somebody on the other side has forgotten to distribute VSRF’s latest tactical manuals to the officers in this area.

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Chasiv Yar… no news for nearly a week. Which means that the Russians are inside the town, but can’t come forward, and lack reinforcements necessary to continue advancing. Shouldn’t mean that’s going to remain that way forever.

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Toretsk… I do know that some say something else, but I can’t shake off the impression that somebody there - and there can be only one ‘somebody there’ - has withdrawn the 12th NG 'Azov’ Brigade (the former Azov Regiment) from the town, about two, probably three weeks ago. Because, instead of recovering the town, like back in November, ever since the Ukrainians are losing it. Most intensive fighting is in the southern side, where the two sides are killing each other for two big slag heaps.

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Pokrovsk.. the developments in this area of the last week - and their consequences - are reminding me of that place in the Old Testament, where it reads something like (from memory), ‘…and Abraham fathered Isaac, and Isaac fathered Jacob, and Jacob fathered…’

See: about a year ago, Syrsky dismissed incompetent general Moskalev as the commander of the Donetsk Group, and replaced him by incompetent general Lutsenko. Arguably, Lutsenko is the former CO of the 79th Airborne Brigade: one of best units of the ZSU, no matter how often mishandled by him. But, at his new position he was nothing but trouble: he not only excelled in causing one crisis after another - foremost because he was regularly forgetting to coordinate between different brigades (see: has forgotten to withdraw a battalion here, and a battery there), but - and just like Moskalev (and Syrsky before him) - he excelled in being completely unable to support units to his left and right: what was his was his, and what was going on in neighbouring sectors… *shrugs shoulders*, ‘not his problem’. Finally, Lutsenko became famous for wildly exaggerating claims for numbers of killed Russian troops, while not reporting any kind of failures or under-reporting losses. Read: for lying.

In a position as crucial as his, this is not only criminal negligence of duty, but outright treachery. But, Syrsky kept him in position. And so, while Moskalev (in cooperation with similarly incompetent Tarnavsky, and all the time supervised - even regularly overruled - by Syrsky) managed to lose Avdiivka, Lutsenko (with Syrsky’s support) then managed to lose Ocheretyne and the entire area east of that place - almost to Pokrovsk…

The ‘rock began rolling’ only once the recently-constructed fortifications - and then, contacts say (quote): ‘finally, well-constructed fortifications’ - in the Zhovte area were seized by the Russians, more or less without a fight. Because Lutsenko forgot to coordinate between two brigades and an independent battalion. Of course, once the Russians were within Ukrainan lines, Lutsenko didn’t forget to promptly order two battalions into entirely pointless counterattacks, because ‘positions must be held and/or recovered’, you know. Wouldn’t that have costed the ZSU additional casualties, it could be described as laughable: how shall any unit recover positions it has never held…?

A typical Russian ‘assault vehicle’ in the Pokrovsk area of the last few weeks: essentially, a ‘reconditioned’ civilian truck… moments later, it was blown up by one of Ukrainian FPVs…

The resulting chaos then enabled the Russians to break through and seize a section of the second line of (newly-constructed) defences of Pokrovsk in the Novotroitske area. From there, they are meanwhile in the process of assaulting the third line, with the aim of reaching the fourth in the Vovkove and Pishchane area - which in turn should bring them to the railway berm from Pokrovsk in western direction, to Mezhova (and then to Dnipro).

Bottom line: how great that the Ministry of Defence in Kyiv has spent hundreds of millions of Hrynas for construction of defences of Pokrovsk, this summer: thanks to Syrsky and his buddies, these haven’t held even a week…

Of course, at that point in time, as reported in my last update, Syrsky then decided to assume the command of the Pokrovsk sector in person. Simply brilliant, isn’t it?

For those who are ‘not fluent’ in military arts: this is such an unprofessional act, so dripping of incompetence by everybody involved, can’t say. Mind: even the most incompetent Russian commanders are sacked for such actions; even the Keystone Cops in Moscow are removing them - like they did in the Siversk sector, about a month ago. Only Ukrainians ‘can’t’.

Why has Syrsky appointed incompetents in such responsible positions - even if they’re then largely ignored by him, and by brigade commanders - and why is he retaining them if he’s all the time having to micromanage a battle they have proven themselves as unable to command? What are they paid for by Ukrainian taxpayers? Finally, Syrsky must have known that Lutsenko is not dependable already for months: why didn’t he dismiss him? …except Syrsky is incompetent, too? …or corrupt because he’s owing Lusenko a favour…?

…and for those who are fluent in military arts: imagine George C Marshall overruling Eisenhower, Bradley, and Patton to assume the command of something like 1,5 divisions of Patton’s 3rd Army during the ‘Battle of the Bulge/Ardennes Offensive’ (fought almost exactly 80 years ago) - and that after Bradley lied to him, and Paton didn’t manage to turn his army around, while Eisenhower was… all the time playing golf in Scotland…?

Gauging by reactions of different Ukrainians, it is so that the ‘answer’ to such question is simple: Ukraine is already a NATO member, and NATO is full of incompetents. Therefore, the ZSU must adapt to the level of incompetence.

That itch in my small toe, if you like, is telling me that might even be truth, just with the fundamental difference that NATO is not (yet) fighting a war for its naked survivals.

(Apparently, Ukrainian generals are certainly not concerned about that fact… probably because mind-wise they are already ‘in NATO’… though, if so: well, then somebody should arrange a special course that would teach all of them that that red arrows denoting Russian advances on maps in front of them are not marking ‘friends’ - but the enemy…)

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Kurakhove… Syrsky’s micromanagement was highly successful in this area, too. Since around 11 December, the Russians have managed to push the 46th Airborne out of the centre of that town, and as of the last two days, the brigade was barely managing to hold out in its western outskirts. Even that was actually irrelevant: Kurakhove is lost. If at all, holding out between it and the Dachne, further west, is now foremost important for the ZSU because of what was (and still is) going on further south.

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Sukhy Yaly River…If you think what I’ve described above were all the misfortunes that befell the ZSU troops in the Pokrovsk area thanks to their incompetent generals: sorry, they were not. The worst of all actually happened in the Hannivka area (south/south-east of Kurakhove), where either Lutsenko or Syrsky ‘forgot’ to inform the 79th Airborne about developments on its left flank. Specifically, on 5-6 December the 33rd Mechanised was forced to abandon Dalnje, and then the Russians punched south of there in direction of Uspenivka - into the rear of the 79th. Result: by 7 December, between 300 and 700 troops (sources differ, but it was probably a battalion of around 440) of the 79th Airborne Brigade that was cut off. Although one of counterattacks launched in the meantime has temporarily re-established land connection, by 9 December, the Russians actually reached Uspenivka, closing the encirclement again. It was only during the night from 12 to 13 December that the 214th OPFOR Battalion effected the evacuation of the last of encircled troops from Hannivka to Uspenivka.

How many ZSU troops were killed while retreating, how much equipment and ammunition was left behind... I doubt even Saint Stalin knows. As usually in Ukraine, there’s complete silence in this regards - and that’s not going to change unless one of involved officers vents his frustration in the social media…

Of course, mistakes happen - wether at war or in civilian life. But, this is not the first mistake of this kind: rather 15th or even the 20th in this calendar year alone. All because of the lack of communication at top command positions, and a complete disregard for flank protection of units in crucial positions. Moreover, mistakes of this kind are 1000% more likely to happen when there is just one person micromanaging a battle involving hundreds of different brigades and battalions. Because in such cases it is ‘unavoidable’ for that person to miss the coming-into-being of a crisis like this one (especially if that person is then also ‘supported’ by a liar), although this could’ve been monitored for weeks. I repeat for emphasis: for weeks. Already back in October, at least in early November, it was perfectly clear that the 79th Airborne was much too exposed and that stubborn holding on Hannivka and villages further east was making absolutely no sense, because there were no serious defence positions along the Sukhy Yaly River in the south (to protect the southern flank of the 79th), while north of the 79th, the 33rd Mech couldn’t hold the (literally) empty fields without mines and fortifications ‘forever’.

If that is not enough: regardless how much he’s announced his abandonment of ‘no step back’ doctrine, it is obvious that Zelensky is still insistent on such ideas; and Syrsky and his buddies do not care, but are following such orders to the last dot and comma (plus, the ZSU still has no doctrine based on experiences from the last three years, and thus ‘does not know’ the meaning of the word ‘withdrawal’, nor is training its troops in such operations). With other words: once again, all the announcements of ‘best intentions’ - including Drapatiy’s (commander, Ground Forces ZSU) recent announcements about major improvements in regards of training and rotation of troops and entire units - were yet another set of lies.

And if that’s not enough: as it became known yesterday, Syrsky has meanwhile managed to screw up even the brand new 155th Mechanised Brigade: the unit recently returned from training in France. Has broken it down into battalions which he’s then used to patch up different sectors of the frontline, while its air defence element - trained to use French-made Mistrals - was handed out US-made FIM-92A Stingers, and should now make do with them, although lacking related training.

That is only resembling one performance: that of all the French Army generals responsible for the Sedan sector of 10-21 May 1940. Especially the one that… have forgotten his name, but, in essence: instead of applying lessons from months-long training in running a counterattack on a German bridgehead on the Mass, when the same has actually happened, he reacted by breaking down his two armoured divisions into single tanks assigned to the infantry, and then tidily distributed these along a 20-kilometres (+) long line, to help disintegrate both formations…

Back to present times: the way things are right now, the ‘next stop’ on the ZSU’s withdrawal from this part of Ukraine is going to be the line Dachne - Yantarne. Hope, this time, they’re going to reach it before their generals forget to inform them about another Russian breakthrough somewhere else…

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South-Western Donets… one sector of the front where it became obvious that Syrsky is ‘busy somewhere else’, lately, is that of Velyka Novosilka. Arguably, before refocusing on Pokrovsk, the greatest Ukrainian general of all the times has patched up the frontline by a hodgepodge of nearly a dozen of different battalions. However, once left on their own, Presidential Brigade- and the 128th Mountain Assault Brigades have restored order and stabilised the frontline. Indeed, the latter is running regular counterattacks, and a growing number of these are successful. Sad is only that before it was so far, the Russians have reached the eastern outskirts of Velyka Novosilka, and seized Blahodatne - a place for which too many good Ukrainian defenders paid the ultimate price, in summer of the last year…

Sadly, early today an Ukrainian Su-25 was shot down by a Russian S-400 SAM, while supporting ground troops in this zone. Pilot was killed…

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So much for this one. Obviously, I still owe all of you an update on our collection for the ZSU (including the one for the SSO’s Shark). Hope to manage that tomorrow.