Ukraine War, 14 August 2023

Hello everybody!

A slightly more comprehensive ‘volley’ for today…

AIR/MISSILE WARFARE

Yesterday, there was another strike on the Kerch Bridge, too. AFAIK, road traffic was stopped for a few hours, and RUMINT has it that the railway section was hit again. Indeed, some say that an entire section collapsed. So far, haven’t seen any kind of photos or videos, but this is making lots of sense: it means that, after knocking out – or at least damaging - the bridges to Crimea and from Crimea to the mainland Ukraine, the ZSU (and/or the PSU) are ‘down’ to interdicting the flow of Russian supplies by sea, i.e. via the port of Berdyansk.

More about this in the ‘Part 3’ of the related feature (whenever I find the time to draw all the necessary maps and diagrams). Sufficient to say that this morning the port of Berdyansk woke up to the sound of several powerful detonations.

BATTLE OF DONBASS

Kupyansk… and ‘on demand’… essentially, the Russian 1^st GTA didn’t manage to penetrate even the lines of the 14^th Mech. Meanwhile, the latter was reinforced by a battalion of the 95^th Airborne and the entire 67^th Mech. Think, that was that with this ‘biiiiiiiiiiig Russian offensive’…

Once again (seems, I can’t repeat this often enough, or too many people ignore what I write): the way I’ve learned it, there something like 4-5 ‘levels’ of combat capability of every combat unit. From memory (the times at which I was learning stuff of this kind are some 30 years ago), these are something like:

-          A) Battered/mauled or tired units, or newly-established units, lacking rest and training: can barely hold own position, by day;

-          B) Re-built units, few weeks of training: can reliably hold own position, by day

-          C) so-so-units, have got a few months of training: can reliably hold own position and even run limited/local offensive operations, by day

-          D) relatively good units; have got enough training and even combat experience, are relatively well-staffed: can run offensive operations, by day

-          E) crack/top units: are in top condition and have received enough training; are almost complete (at war, no unit is ever fully manned), have enough training, can run offensive operations by all weather and night.

The VSRF entered this war with about 100 battalion tactical groups at the levels D and E (sure, it deployed some 80+ additional ones, but most of these were somewhere between A and C). It lost these forces the last year. They were shot away. Literally. Sure, thanks to mobilisation, quantity-wise it was completely re-built and even bolstered over the last 10 months. But, quantity is no replacement for quality – especially not when top tank- and artillery types (say: T-72B3, T-90M, MSTA-S) are replaced by T-62s and towed D-30s. At most, it’s requiring the opponent with more bullets (and artillery shells) to kill every Russian deployed. As a result, the VSRF is simply not capable of running even the D-level of operations…and only dream about the E-level. And when it tries to run the D-level of operations, like in the Svatove-area, recently, it’s suffering yet additional losses because even ‘weak’, ‘tired’, or ‘inexperienced’ ZSU units facing 3-vs-1 or even 5-vs-1 odds are still all at the D-level, and thus have enough capability and firepower to beat it back.

Kremina….air strikes, shelling, yet additional Russian attacks, losses, more losses, then Russian withdrawals. Mind: this is anything else than ‘pleasant’ for involved Ukrainian troops. Especially descriptions of the fighting in the Serebryansk Forest are meanwhile closely reminiscent of those from the Hürtgen Forest in north-western Germany of late 1944. It’s fighting at very close ranges, with threats from all around one’s position, and with heavy losses on both sides. Crucial is: the Russians are getting nowhere in this area, no matter how many of their ‘crack’ units are they throwing at Ukrainians.

Bakhmut…Seems, there’s something like ‘operational pause’ in force on both sides. For example, about 9 days ago, the 3^rd Assault was rotated out of the line, following three months of intensive combat. The Russians aren’t rotating anybody out: only bringing in ever more units. The mass of these into the lines east and south of Bakhmut. Apparently, and just like in southern Zaporizhzhya, these are building-up a new 1^st Defence line – some 10-15km WEST of the nominal ‘1^st Line (which is stretching, roughly, from Lysychansk in the north, down to Zaitseve in the south).

I find it funny to watch reactions to such Russian videos like this one, shown a, nowadays, typical ‘hit-and-run’ attack on Klishchivka: these are ranging from ‘well executed’ to ‘Klishchivka is contested’. Actually, the Russians are running such attacks on the northern side of the village for at least two-, if not three weeks – and all were unsuccessful. Sure, sometimes Ukrainians let them actually enter the village in their ‘cavalry style’ assaults: that’s making it easier to kill everybody involved (and capture the handful of survivors). This one didn’t get even that far.

The actual reason this video was released by the Russian PRBS-industrialists is that it’s showing ‘lots of fire and smoke’ – and thus looking ‘spectacular enough’ to please not only the Keystone Cops, but Mr. Pudding himself, too. That way, involved Russian commanders are providing evidence of them ‘trying hard’, and are making their masters happy.

Because ‘fire and smoke’ = ‘we’re breaking their bones’.

That’s the way the Russian officers think nowadays. That’s the ‘medals & money’ described yesterday.

Mind: not one of Russian vehicles-, and not one of their troops have managed to reach even the gardens on the eastern side of the ruined place. And the Russians withdrew because they were suffering losses, which in turn means Ukrainians – despite all the Russian fire visible on this video – weren’t (otherwise Ukrainians couldn’t shoot at the Russian infantry). The sole difference to the ‘norm’ was that this one was run by the ‘fresh’ 85^th Motor Rifle Brigade, instead of all the units battered in earlier ‘counterattacks’ of this kind….

….and there’s quite a collection of these. From Optyne down to Kurdyumivka, these are the: 4^th MRB, 102^nd MRR, Prizrak Battalion, 347^th Spetsnaz Battalion, 1307^th MRR, 83^rd VDV Brigade, 80^th TR, and the two companies-worth-of-troops left of the BARS-13, 57^th and 72^nd MRBs).

And all of this in attempt to stop the advance of four Ukrainian brigades (5^th Assault, 22^nd Mech, 80^th Airborne, and the 28^th Mech) – which are meanwhile running reconnaissance and probing attacks east of the railway line, too.

UKRAINIAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE

In southern Zaporizhzhya and south-western Donetsk…. It can be said that the Russians are now beginning to give in. Not that they’ve given up trying to resist, but: their units in the first line have suffered too much and even all the bestialities of their commanding officers can’t hold them together any more.

Staromaiorske-Staromlynivka….AFAIK, since the guns of the 55^th Artillery Brigade (ZSU) have cut to pieces the Russian last-ditch attempt to ‘reinforce’ their garrison inside the village, on Friday (11 August), Urozhaine was free of Russians as of Saturday. However, mopping-up and de-mining is still in the process. Indeed, Ukrainian naval infantry has meanwhile pushed further south, and is meanwhile fighting along the northern edge of Zavitne Bazhannia.

Further west, after experiencing immense problems with minefields north of that village, over the last two months (density of minefields there is something like ‘5 per square metre!’, and that over the depth of something like 10km!!), since around Thursday (10 August), troops of the 23th Mech are well inside the north-western side of Pryyutne.

Robotyne…. It seems the ZSU has concluded it has to take Robotyne before continuing in southern direction. This is why fierce close-range combat is raging in the centre of the same, as Ukrainians are advancing from north, east and west: the latter because the last two days they not only captured two Russian defence lines west of Robotyne, but also entered northern Kopani.

East of Robotyne: the stretch of the Russian 2^nd Line under Ukrainian control is meanwhile about 2,000 metres long, and ‘ending’ inside northern Verbove. Read: all the desperate counterattacks by BARS-3 and BARS-14 were defeated and pushed back. As expected, the ZSU is leaveing the 100^th Reconnaissance Brigade in Verbove on its own (why causing trouble with a relatively fresh unit, if one can beat 3-4 mauled ones, nearby), and is in the process of reaching Novoprokopivka from the east.

BTW, the command of the 58^th CAA has managed to find a unit to reinforce to Novoprokopivka: 108^th VDV Regiment. It was re-deployed there from the banks of Dnipro (i.e. from the 49th CAA). At least when it comes to this sector of the frontline and the 58th CAA - the 108th is now something like the ‘Russian goalkeeper’: there’s nobody behind it (except one considers the very, very, very special 249th MRR ‘Akhmat’ for ‘serious military formation’, of course)…

(Before anybody complains again: yes, there are no videos of this yet; one can’t expect the troops to release any before they’re rotated back. And thinking everybody is releasing videos in ‘real time’ is an illusion: most are released 2-7 days after being taken.)

Vasylivka…there’s a lots of talk about the 128^th Mountain flanking the Russian defences in Zherebyanky, and driving well to the south (apparently into Luhove?). But, I either do not understand related reports, or lack enough details to gauge where and how. Cold fact remains: in this sector of the frontline, the ZSU is still ‘eyebrows-deep into the Russian minefields’.

Oleshky – Kozachi Laheri… it’s similar in regards of developments in this area. I’m not sure if Ukrainian attack over the Dnipro into the Kozachi Laheri region was ‘just a raid’, or if they really have created a bridgehead there, and are on advance in direction of Pidstepne, or not. Can only confirm that, yes, the ZSU has a bridgehead north-west of Oleshky, but right now, I do not ‘see’ how should it ‘exploit’ the same: not even how it might manage to drive the Russian artillery out of the range to Kherson (which is heavily shelled, every day, causing lots of civilian casualties).