Sorry for another ‘break’: life and work came in between. Moreover, must admit I’ve ‘intentionally delayed’ this report for at least 24 hours, in expectation of possible news ‘from the south’, which then didn’t turn up. Anyway, here a summary for the last few days.
Thanks Tom. It definitely causes anguish. I remain optimistic. Despite all the jerks, there are enough smart people working in western foreign policy, intelligence and military strategy to know that we cannot let Putain succeed.
Thank you! Besides my own, I'm conveying the one from my 87-years-old Mother who says: "If there is a fresh Cooper after I die - let me know, I'll read him anyway".
Hi Tom. Is losing ST-68U hurts Ukraine bad? (seems they have only few of them). I also could recall few strikes near Iskra plant in Zaporizhzhya where these things are made/upgraded. Looks like a dedicated effort.
I have yet to see any detailed analysis of the Russian supply requirements for Crimea--both military units needed to hold the isthmus and whatever civilian population remains--as compared with the carrying capacity of the various logistical options remaining to them. Water, it seems to me, is a serious problem for them. The battle for Crimea seems likely to wind down to a seige. How tight is it, already, and how much tighter will it get as the Ukrainians close the land bridge?
Crimea survived without water from Ukraine from 2014 to 2022. They can do it again.
It would not be critical - if not for the requirements to reserve logistical capacity for military supplies.
Capacity will be further limited by ongoing attacks on ruzzian naval transport capacity. Recent attacks against ruzzian amphibious vessels and tankers in Black Sea - reducing those logistical capabilities.
From 2014 to 2022 the Ruzzians did not have to cope with infrastructure disruptions, which I reckon are already frequent and will become moreso.
I am not suggesting that water, alone, will result in the Ruzzian collapse in Crimea (I think their troops will run out of ammunition and simply quit first). I am just illustrating how vast the Ruzzian logistical deficit in Crimea is. Using 100% of their supply capacity wouldn't even cover their water needs, much less food, fuel and ammunition, which must be several multiples of that.
AFAIK most of the high capacity ferries were sold to Greece after the bridge was completed. What they have now is a few car ferry, barely or not at all suitable for semis.
Also, IF the UAF would manage to destroy the Kerch bridge, hitting the ferry terminal wouldn't be difficult either.
I think you are correct. In terms of military - ruzzian government will prioritise military needs, blaming Ukraine for the conditions for civilians. They did it when Ukraine shut down the water supply after ruzzian occupation in 2014.
On the other hand there is always capacity of ruzzians to absorb hardship.
Sources I've found state the North Crimea Canal was, as of 2014, carrying 85% of Crimea's water supply, which averaged 300 m3/sec (around 26 million cubic meters--26 billion liters--a day, implying total water requirements of something like 30 billion liters a day). https://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CN%5CO%5CNorthCrimeanCanal.htm. 82% of that went to industrial and agricultural uses, so if the Russians shut those down, entirely (probably not possible as that would mean no steam-driven power plants), they would still be facing a water shortfall of nearly a billion liters a day. That is nearly a million tonnes of mass of water alone. From what I can find, the capacity of the railway over the Kerch Bridge is on the order of 14 million tonnes A YEAR, or less than 1/20 of the capacity Russia needs to supply its water needs, alone. https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/08/europe/crimea-bridge-explosion-intl-hnk/index.html. These estimates could be out by an order of magnitude and the Russians would still have a problem. And that is before they move a single kilo of petrol or ammunition.
Crimea has several significant reservoirs, but it was cut off from Dnipro water from 2014 until last year, and now is, again, so those reservoirs are likely nowhere close to full. What's more, while its agriculture is moribund, the Russians have reportedly moved in a LOT (as in upwards of a million) new civilians, so their non-discretionary water needs are likely higher than in 2014. They have got to be banging up against water shortages even now.
It is very hard for me to see how Crimean withstands a seige, especially unless the Russians begin evacuating civilians on a wholesale basis immediately.
The Russian civilians will have to care for themselves. Putler's Russia does not care for its citizens, it only uses them to populate "new territories".
The water supply from Dnipro is crucial only for the agriculture. To survive the Crimea can do without this water. Such is the main reason why Russia destroyed the Kakhovka dam. The lack of running water will be certainly uncomfortable for the civilians and for the tourists but Russians who visited Crimea are accustomed to such restrictions.
Hey Tom ! When you are using "heavy casualties" or "mauled", around what numbers do you think of ? In both NATO or Russian doctrines, the expected and accepted number or casualties per day of hard combat is, on average 4%. Casualties meaning: dead, prisoners, missing, wounded who require medical care > 48 h.
Regarding the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna-Spirne frontline: do we know how much did the UAF fortified these sectors? I mean it is obviously not the main attack axis, and also obviously the ideal point of attack for the Russians - the farther from Zaporyzhia the better. Did the UAF build similar defense lines here as the Russians in the south? It worked for them it can work against them as well.
Your information is really priceless! Many thanks! Maybe you have some information about the recent attack on Russian ships "en marche" by the Ukrainian drones? Russian sources claim all the drones shot down, as usual.
Thanks once more, Tom, for your relentless reporting.
It almost causes anguish to read about this darned struggles and I suspect it is also for you a heavy strain to write about it. Keep it up!
Спасибо, Том.
Thanks Tom. It definitely causes anguish. I remain optimistic. Despite all the jerks, there are enough smart people working in western foreign policy, intelligence and military strategy to know that we cannot let Putain succeed.
Thank you! Besides my own, I'm conveying the one from my 87-years-old Mother who says: "If there is a fresh Cooper after I die - let me know, I'll read him anyway".
Can't but love it, thanks a lot!
Hi Tom. Is losing ST-68U hurts Ukraine bad? (seems they have only few of them). I also could recall few strikes near Iskra plant in Zaporizhzhya where these things are made/upgraded. Looks like a dedicated effort.
Re Oil Rigs operation - If someone interested there is a video from Ukrainian GUR with eng subs https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dOO9e2ygOdU
I have yet to see any detailed analysis of the Russian supply requirements for Crimea--both military units needed to hold the isthmus and whatever civilian population remains--as compared with the carrying capacity of the various logistical options remaining to them. Water, it seems to me, is a serious problem for them. The battle for Crimea seems likely to wind down to a seige. How tight is it, already, and how much tighter will it get as the Ukrainians close the land bridge?
Crimea survived without water from Ukraine from 2014 to 2022. They can do it again.
It would not be critical - if not for the requirements to reserve logistical capacity for military supplies.
Capacity will be further limited by ongoing attacks on ruzzian naval transport capacity. Recent attacks against ruzzian amphibious vessels and tankers in Black Sea - reducing those logistical capabilities.
From 2014 to 2022 the Ruzzians did not have to cope with infrastructure disruptions, which I reckon are already frequent and will become moreso.
I am not suggesting that water, alone, will result in the Ruzzian collapse in Crimea (I think their troops will run out of ammunition and simply quit first). I am just illustrating how vast the Ruzzian logistical deficit in Crimea is. Using 100% of their supply capacity wouldn't even cover their water needs, much less food, fuel and ammunition, which must be several multiples of that.
They are in an extremely precarious position
Infrastructure disruptions?
Remember the Kerch bridge was only completed in 2018.
They transported everything with ferries, there was limited or no trade via the bridges to the Ukraine mainland
AFAIK most of the high capacity ferries were sold to Greece after the bridge was completed. What they have now is a few car ferry, barely or not at all suitable for semis.
Also, IF the UAF would manage to destroy the Kerch bridge, hitting the ferry terminal wouldn't be difficult either.
There was no war in 2018. So there was no need in constant supply of ammunition and other means of warfare.
I reckon exploding drones tend to disrupt infrastructure, no?
I think you are correct. In terms of military - ruzzian government will prioritise military needs, blaming Ukraine for the conditions for civilians. They did it when Ukraine shut down the water supply after ruzzian occupation in 2014.
On the other hand there is always capacity of ruzzians to absorb hardship.
Thank you.
Sources I've found state the North Crimea Canal was, as of 2014, carrying 85% of Crimea's water supply, which averaged 300 m3/sec (around 26 million cubic meters--26 billion liters--a day, implying total water requirements of something like 30 billion liters a day). https://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CN%5CO%5CNorthCrimeanCanal.htm. 82% of that went to industrial and agricultural uses, so if the Russians shut those down, entirely (probably not possible as that would mean no steam-driven power plants), they would still be facing a water shortfall of nearly a billion liters a day. That is nearly a million tonnes of mass of water alone. From what I can find, the capacity of the railway over the Kerch Bridge is on the order of 14 million tonnes A YEAR, or less than 1/20 of the capacity Russia needs to supply its water needs, alone. https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/08/europe/crimea-bridge-explosion-intl-hnk/index.html. These estimates could be out by an order of magnitude and the Russians would still have a problem. And that is before they move a single kilo of petrol or ammunition.
Crimea has several significant reservoirs, but it was cut off from Dnipro water from 2014 until last year, and now is, again, so those reservoirs are likely nowhere close to full. What's more, while its agriculture is moribund, the Russians have reportedly moved in a LOT (as in upwards of a million) new civilians, so their non-discretionary water needs are likely higher than in 2014. They have got to be banging up against water shortages even now.
More on Crimean water reserves (paltry) here: http://www.eecca-water.net/content/view/73/27/lang,english/
It is very hard for me to see how Crimean withstands a seige, especially unless the Russians begin evacuating civilians on a wholesale basis immediately.
The Russian civilians will have to care for themselves. Putler's Russia does not care for its citizens, it only uses them to populate "new territories".
The water supply from Dnipro is crucial only for the agriculture. To survive the Crimea can do without this water. Such is the main reason why Russia destroyed the Kakhovka dam. The lack of running water will be certainly uncomfortable for the civilians and for the tourists but Russians who visited Crimea are accustomed to such restrictions.
Thank you Tom.
many thanks for this good description. Keep going!
Thank you for your update Tom.
Hey Tom ! When you are using "heavy casualties" or "mauled", around what numbers do you think of ? In both NATO or Russian doctrines, the expected and accepted number or casualties per day of hard combat is, on average 4%. Casualties meaning: dead, prisoners, missing, wounded who require medical care > 48 h.
Thanks for a good report, appreciate them because they are well balanced and objective.
One question , Tom:
Could you update us re.the Bayraktars ?
We don’t see any videos anymore reporting their magic tricks.
Have the Russians finally been able to neutralize them, through electronic warfare systems or else ?
Are they all down ?
This might be also important for another battlefield where they were active : the Armenian/ Azerbaïdjan conflict .
They were shot down by the layered air defense during the first month of the war.
There were two operations that involved Bayraktars since:
1) Drowning Moskva cruiser - there were rumors of one or two Bayraktars used as a bait.
2) An air strike on Kinburn split a week ago - that is a very remote place out of range of the Russian air defense.
Thank you for the summary!
Regarding the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna-Spirne frontline: do we know how much did the UAF fortified these sectors? I mean it is obviously not the main attack axis, and also obviously the ideal point of attack for the Russians - the farther from Zaporyzhia the better. Did the UAF build similar defense lines here as the Russians in the south? It worked for them it can work against them as well.
Your information is really priceless! Many thanks! Maybe you have some information about the recent attack on Russian ships "en marche" by the Ukrainian drones? Russian sources claim all the drones shot down, as usual.