No most of the missile that hit Kyiv on that day obliterated the Artem missile/weapon plant.
"Only" one aimed the children hospital, don't get me wrong, one is too much already but out of the minimum 8 missiles that hit, that's "only a small part".
It was confirmed by Ukrainians in the area that the Artem missile building was hit!! UA government officials had to ask the public not to share videos of the area being hit as well, although considering the hospital which is 1km away was hit, it was hard for people not to share this senseless attack. The lesson in all this is for Ukraine to set up underground facilities for the production of their missile systems.
Yes its most likely these buildings were being used for other purposes. If there were any civilians in the building then thats a great loss of life regardless of whether they were working in the military industry or not.
You are confusing missile engagement zones with radar coverage zones. As explained in the article, the "corridor" is cleared of both SAM systems AND radar coverage. So, while the Kyiv air defenses are the same as before, their warning time is much lower, bc they cannot rely on early warning assets that have been killed and have much less time to prepare for the attack.
Agreed. Tee problem is that those other ways of detection of missile paths are not as accurate as radar, and are not instantly fed into the fire control computers, so this still creates a time lag which works against the defenders.
-The NATO fire 30-50 HARM missiles daily at the Serbs radars and radar-decoys. That's how they can keep suppress the Serb SAM systems. Take note: the Serbs had two or three generation older SAM's ( SA-3 (S-125 Neva/Pechora) and SA-6 (2K12 Kub)) against the up-to-date NATO forces (top-notch jammers, towed decoys, HARM missiles, JSTAR, etc.). That's how they still manage to shoot down several planes (most notable an F-117A).
-Russia try the same tactics in Ukraine at 2022 as the NATO at 1999 in many ways, but they run out of the Kh-31P's around a month or two after the war begins. Take note, Ukraine in 2022 had more modern (still not up-to-date) SAM systems, like the S-300PT or PS (which still represent the 1970 and '80 era). Yet the Russians cannot penetrate and suppress the Ukrainan air defense completely. Even the S-300PT are not that easy target against a "simple" SEAD attack like the Serbian Neva's more than two decade earlier.
Very true, but now there is the issue of medium to long range ballistic missiles taking in data from "cheap" drones. The calculus has changed a bit because using ballistic missiles for SEAD is the antidote to Soviet medium to long range AD systems such as the S300 and BUK. Would be interesting to see what happens when if Ukraine starts hitting Russian S-300s stationed in Russia.
As far as I remember you pay more in revenue tax for a Leberkässemmel than Raiffeisenbank pays profit tax. Comparing that is generally too frustrating.
I remember you writing during the battle of Bahmut how small commanders "Napoleons" are bad for the ZSU. Now i read the "genius" Syrskyi have replaced one of the commanders that is defending Chasov Yar, because he refused to counter attack. Imagine counter attacking stronger force, when under heavy arthilery and bombing fire, it`s miracle they have not lost the city already. I can`t believe, how delusional the general staff is.
Well, sadly Russia defense have huge advantage, since UA is not allowed to hit Russia territory.
That have allowed them to create multi layer defense on places like Crimea. After all if the enemy will hit you, it`s better for you to get hit in your strongest point.
Ukraine regularily use NATO weapons to hit Russian territories. Himars, harmless HARMs, Czech made MLRS, German and French howitzers. So far, the only exceptions are ATACAMs and StormShadows. IL-76 with UA prisoners ready for exchange were downed by Patriot deep inside RU airspace.
I gave a ref on bbc to show that even utterly pro-UA sources confirm the case. Of course, they could not help mentioning nonsense from UA authorities but the message is clear.
There are a lot of other links, here's the video of UA prisoners being taken to the plane:
Anyway, at least noone confutes use of Patriot missile.
P.S. Tom, you were brave enough to start revealing UA
Inflated claims. I hope one sunny day you will have guts to investigate other UA war myths and staged "shows". This, of course, does not imply the change of sympathy to UA people.
If there had been UA POWs on the IL-76, Russia would have released pictures of the remains at the crash site. The fact the Russians didnt even bother faking pictures of killed UA POWs at the IL-76 crash, proves there were none. Only a vatnik or closet vatnik would believe the lie you've regurgitated.
I was afraid you would be ridiculed for the corridor picture and description since it oversimplified the “wheel”. Hopefully this article will indicate to most how complicated air warfare really is.
My thought too. Pretty obvious that the map corridors were created by a computer mouse. From which I concluded that it’s no doubt more complicated in real life, but the concept is clear.
Nice article Tom. I understood the concept of corridors on the previous article but this gives more meat to the subject. As always institutions have to reflect and critique themselves to become better.
I just want to add an alternative perspective to your well simplified explanation of Russia taking advantage of 'corridors' in Ukraine's IADS [In-process-of-being-integrated-through-improvised-means Air Defense System]. I still think the majority people still don't understand how it works (and in all honesty, it doesn't need to make sense to everyone outside of the system), simply because it requires one to imagine an extremely complex network of systems which mainly functions within the unseen electromagnetic spectrum, from a 4-dimensional perspective. The majority people, including many so-called military planners, still view military problems from a linear perspective why many challenges remain unsolved (along with the constant internal challenges of a small minority of disruptive thinkers in the ranks of the regular military who constantly challenge the people in control that prefer doing things 'the way it was always done' only to be labelled as being problematic).
However, looking at Ukraine's IADS dilemma, the main challenge lies with the integration of multiple [technological] generations of obsolete analogue based Western systems to work in unison with an equally large arsenal of multiple generations of obsolete Soviet analogue systems. For an effective IADS, all systems need to be networked on a digitalized command & control system to achieve full situational awareness by means of creating a synthetic image of the battlespace, thus closing any 'corridors' for enemy exploitation. Ukraine does not have this capability, and it is still far from achieving this capability mainly due to the following factors:
1.) Technological
2.) Technical
3.) Human resources
4.) Logistics
5.) Operational necessity
The technological challenges mainly implies technology that does not exist; not only in Ukraine, but in fact anywhere simply because what Ukraine is forced to do out of necessity to survive the day has never been done before simply because it has never been required to be done before by any nation in the history of modern warfare. To explain this, I shall try to explain this in as simple a manner possible: Hypothetically Ukraine needs a hot cup of coffee (a metaphor for a functional IADS). It has the coffee, water, and fire, but it lacks the means (an interface) for bringing those basic elements together to prepare the coffee (desired end product). So, keeping to coffee, Ukraine requires a percolator as interface to produce the coffee using the elements it has available. However, the challenge is that the percolator that Ukraine requires does not exist, and it needs to be designed to meet Ukraine's unique specifications determined by the characteristics of the availability of resources. To complicate things further, some coffee is ground, some are beans, some still require roasting. Also, the water is of different specifications, some being potable, some needing modification to be palatable. My point is: The main technological challenge to Ukraine is the development of a suitable interface to integrate various generations of analogue technologies (multi-national Western, French & Soviet) to effectively link into a digital network. Looking at all of the different [obsolete] systems donated to Ukraine, each system is unique in design characteristics which requires its own unique analogue-to-digital converter feeding into a system specific network interface to enhance battlespace awareness in a 4D model. This is basically what the US is trying to achieve with its digitalized battlespace doctrine, the primary challenge being that the majority of US hardware still being analogue based. The F35 represents what is required to enable a digitalized battlespace in terms of hardware, why it seems that US armaments design is now being influenced by F35 technological capabilities. This is also one of the reasons why the US is gladly dumping obsolete analogue systems in Ukraine to make space for newer digital systems. Just an example, the most 'modern' US supplied ADS in Ukraine are primarily analogue (especially the sensors), but converted to digital via a converter for network integration. However, the digital data generated by these systems are designed for integration with the highly advanced US networking capabilities which is not available in Ukraine, and will never be. Ukraine can basically extract only a small percentage of functionality from the data generated until it has designed the technology to extract more value from these systems. Now add the ex-Soviet analogue hardware to an already complex problem, and we start seeing a picture of what Ukraine needs to do to 'make things work'. What the majority laymen don't understand is that being given complex armaments with complex sensors means nothing if you can't interpret the data generated into something useful and actionable within workable time limits. This is one of the 'corridors' exploited by Russia.
Technical challenges exist in the availability of the technological resources and knowledge to design and develop the interface required to integrate these systems on a shoestring budget, further exacerbated by the constant challenge of finding, managing and developing alternative replacement parts to keep obsolete analogue systems operating within its most basic modes (similar to the near impossible task of tasking NASA to resume moon missions in 2024 using obsolete Gemini and Titan technologies where the production capabilities and tooling for those systems do not exist anymore - in other words, the systems are so old that the original production technology is lost). Just basic wear and tear plays into Russia's favor when systems fail, not even taking into account battlefield damage. This is another 'corridor' exploited by Russia.
From a human resources perspective, Ukraine requires appropriately skilled people to operate the multitude of systems effectively. At best it requires years of training and experience to master the use of these systems to its optimum capacity. In 2024, Ukraine is only now starting to master the use of most of the older systems in its inventory at the tactical level, but restricted at the operational level for reasons explained before. However, more critical than system operators are the unseen army of technical maintainers and engineers responsible for keeping these systems working, sometimes through rudimentary means. The time it takes to get obsolete systems working again after damages/breakages can take 10x longer than what is considered normal in NATO with established technical support infrastucture and resources. Also, the maintainers need to be trained on all the different systems originating from all the different donor countries who each had their own unique design specifications, some of these systems not being compatible. Just to achieve matured technical support capabilities requires years of training and experience, especially having to learn the operation of obsolete analogue systems, and how to integrate (and modernize) using available digital resources, not even discussing the importance of standardization in field modifications throughout the force.
The main logistical challenges that Ukraine faces operating its fleet of obsolete ADS hardware is availability of spares, and the availability of resources required for power supply. The major weakness of older analogue systems is sustainable power supply. These systems, especially radar, require a lot of energy to function effectively, and when the logistical chain is disrupted, so is the supply of power disrupted causing temporary capability gaps. These are the next 'corridors' exploited by Russia, why Russian attacks are so focussed on attacking electricity infrastructure and fuel supply depots. If Russia can disrupt this system for even one day, it creates a 'corridor' for the next attack.
The last factor I wish to mention is operational necessity. Fact is, Ukraine does not have enough hardware to effectively establish an IADS, even if all the challenges mentioned before were resolved. In other words, if Ukraine achieved the impossible by having 100% fleet mission capability, all integrated into a digitalized network with full sensors integration, there would still be major gaps ('corridors') in Ukraine's air defenses. At present Ukraine employs its most capable systems to safeguard the most critical infrastructure, why Russia engages in random attacks on alternative locations which don't always make sense simply as an attempt to break up these ADS concentrations. Point is: There are many gaps within the Ukrainian airspace simply because there aren't enough available resources, and munitions need to be spared for utilization in accordance with engagement priorities, why some Russian attacks occur unopposed. It is Russia's objective to deplete as much of Ukraine's limited supply of air defense munitions as quick as possible, but also knowing that Ukraine lacks the option of engaging everything thrown at them effectively.
Now, having mentioned munitions, Ukraine also has the added burden of figuring out donor ammunition performance data being unique to each manufacturer. Example: US made 155 mm artillery rounds and French produced 155 mm artillery rounds are both compatible in most 155 mm artillery systems, but they differ in terms of performance specifications simply because NATO does not have uniform munitions design specifications. Same challenges apply to air defense munitions. If munitions performance data differs between manufacturers, and fire control systems aren't adjusted to compensate for these differences (due to uninformed systems operators), then system performance is compromised. This is another 'corridor' exploited by Russia.
So, just to summarize my comment, air defense is an extremely complex system, and it is nearly impossible for Ukraine within its current state and circumstances to achieve effective IADS any time soon. In fact, I think this war has been a major eye opener to even the US who is studying every aspect of this war to enhance its own military capabilities with a treasure trove of relevant data based on Ukraine's daily experiences.
However, there is also operational factors to IADS which I choose not to discuss. Bottomline is that Ukraine needs time to adapt, but it can only adapt after experienced is gained using a system. The longer it takes for donor equipment to be delivered to Ukraine, the longer it takes Ukraine to constructively adapt to the expanding Russian threat. This is also the reason why the much anticipated F-16 deliveries are gradually approaching the point of being irrelevant and useless, for Ukraine first needs to have some form of functional IADS which it can't establish without the necessary resources.
Thanks for this. Just got my copy of the WAR IN UKRAINE VOLUME 2 on Amazon. Very interesting developments. What you said makes sense to a lay man like me. As well you were the first person to correctly identify Patriot systems as being responsible for the Russian aircraft losses in Bryansk in 2023. On that note, Ukraine and its European partners need to look into ways of atrophying Russian AD systems stationed in Russia. It doesnt make sense that they can afford to put a lot of their AD systems in Ukraine with the comfort that nothing threatens whatever they have left in Russia.
The weird passivity of the US, British, German, and French leaderships in planning ahead for future problems surely has to be another syndrome in its own right. They love rushing token amounts of aid to the frontline. Germany and France in particular are addicted to re-announcing aid so that they seem like they're giving more. I may be wrong, but I get the impression smaller nations have reacted with more urgency and relative generosity. It took more than a year before serious action was taken to address looming munitions shortages and it will take years before all those new and re-opened production lines are fully operational. Or maybe the Mobutu Syndrome does apply here. The leadership of larger NATO countries just don't want to hear inconvenient expensive truths?
I was wandering. As a Ukrainian, issues you describe here were of no surprise to me. And what comes to my mind as one possible solution is promotion of capable leaders to higher positions (such as in 3rd Assault etc.) or at least possibility for them to critique their superiors in order to improve them or at least to disclose their incompetence so that there is more social pressure for changes (something that is happening right now with Bohdan Krotevych).
Having this in mind, I recalled your articles from the time of Bahmut defence. Specifically - fall of Soledar. I remember you mentioning the issue of junior officers blaming "faggot generals" and so on.
And as well your comments regarding the change of Zaluzhnyi to Syrskyi being a good thing - as Syrskyi was more capable of bringer order to the structure and reducing freedoms that some units were experiencing under Zaluznyi.
So I was wandering, wouldn't this freedom actually be beneficial for promoting changes of "soviet style" commanding officers to someone younger and more capable(I'm very aware that being younger doesn't make you more capable). Of course taking into account the fact that this is still military structure that requires discipline. But in this case I feel that discipline reduces the flexibility that is needed for changes.
No most of the missile that hit Kyiv on that day obliterated the Artem missile/weapon plant.
"Only" one aimed the children hospital, don't get me wrong, one is too much already but out of the minimum 8 missiles that hit, that's "only a small part".
So you mean the Ukrainians are not letting us know when their weapons and missiles factory get hit ? How surprising....
But there's footages and even Tom mentioned it in one of his post few days ago
It was confirmed by Ukrainians in the area that the Artem missile building was hit!! UA government officials had to ask the public not to share videos of the area being hit as well, although considering the hospital which is 1km away was hit, it was hard for people not to share this senseless attack. The lesson in all this is for Ukraine to set up underground facilities for the production of their missile systems.
Yes its most likely these buildings were being used for other purposes. If there were any civilians in the building then thats a great loss of life regardless of whether they were working in the military industry or not.
You are confusing missile engagement zones with radar coverage zones. As explained in the article, the "corridor" is cleared of both SAM systems AND radar coverage. So, while the Kyiv air defenses are the same as before, their warning time is much lower, bc they cannot rely on early warning assets that have been killed and have much less time to prepare for the attack.
So whats your explanation for the successes of the last attack on Kyiv ?
Agreed. Tee problem is that those other ways of detection of missile paths are not as accurate as radar, and are not instantly fed into the fire control computers, so this still creates a time lag which works against the defenders.
For some clear-up:
-The NATO fire 30-50 HARM missiles daily at the Serbs radars and radar-decoys. That's how they can keep suppress the Serb SAM systems. Take note: the Serbs had two or three generation older SAM's ( SA-3 (S-125 Neva/Pechora) and SA-6 (2K12 Kub)) against the up-to-date NATO forces (top-notch jammers, towed decoys, HARM missiles, JSTAR, etc.). That's how they still manage to shoot down several planes (most notable an F-117A).
-Russia try the same tactics in Ukraine at 2022 as the NATO at 1999 in many ways, but they run out of the Kh-31P's around a month or two after the war begins. Take note, Ukraine in 2022 had more modern (still not up-to-date) SAM systems, like the S-300PT or PS (which still represent the 1970 and '80 era). Yet the Russians cannot penetrate and suppress the Ukrainan air defense completely. Even the S-300PT are not that easy target against a "simple" SEAD attack like the Serbian Neva's more than two decade earlier.
Very true, but now there is the issue of medium to long range ballistic missiles taking in data from "cheap" drones. The calculus has changed a bit because using ballistic missiles for SEAD is the antidote to Soviet medium to long range AD systems such as the S300 and BUK. Would be interesting to see what happens when if Ukraine starts hitting Russian S-300s stationed in Russia.
"my taxpayer’s money" If you are paying your taxes in Austria I highly doubt that.
Austria is involved in the Sky Shield program, and this is - at least 'indirectly' - financing different other stuff, too.
Are we really paying our fare share for that?
Certainly more so than oligarchs like Musk: the last year, he's paid perhaps 2% income tax.
As far as I remember you pay more in revenue tax for a Leberkässemmel than Raiffeisenbank pays profit tax. Comparing that is generally too frustrating.
I remember you writing during the battle of Bahmut how small commanders "Napoleons" are bad for the ZSU. Now i read the "genius" Syrskyi have replaced one of the commanders that is defending Chasov Yar, because he refused to counter attack. Imagine counter attacking stronger force, when under heavy arthilery and bombing fire, it`s miracle they have not lost the city already. I can`t believe, how delusional the general staff is.
Well, sadly Russia defense have huge advantage, since UA is not allowed to hit Russia territory.
That have allowed them to create multi layer defense on places like Crimea. After all if the enemy will hit you, it`s better for you to get hit in your strongest point.
Ukraine regularily use NATO weapons to hit Russian territories. Himars, harmless HARMs, Czech made MLRS, German and French howitzers. So far, the only exceptions are ATACAMs and StormShadows. IL-76 with UA prisoners ready for exchange were downed by Patriot deep inside RU airspace.
"IL-76 with UA prisoners ready for exchange were downed by Patriot deep inside RU airspace."
Liar.
Sure thing. I lie together with hundreds sources:
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68101731
Oh come on: BBC 'couldn't find' the battle of N'Djili although having a team in the middle of the same.
....because 'Rwandans were not there'.
Besides, have you actually read the article you've linked?
I gave a ref on bbc to show that even utterly pro-UA sources confirm the case. Of course, they could not help mentioning nonsense from UA authorities but the message is clear.
There are a lot of other links, here's the video of UA prisoners being taken to the plane:
https://t.me/sledcom_press/11284
Anyway, at least noone confutes use of Patriot missile.
P.S. Tom, you were brave enough to start revealing UA
Inflated claims. I hope one sunny day you will have guts to investigate other UA war myths and staged "shows". This, of course, does not imply the change of sympathy to UA people.
"I gave a ref on bbc to show that even utterly pro-UA sources confirm the case"
Liar.
Can´t comment on the unaccessible link but a liar is a liar.
If there had been UA POWs on the IL-76, Russia would have released pictures of the remains at the crash site. The fact the Russians didnt even bother faking pictures of killed UA POWs at the IL-76 crash, proves there were none. Only a vatnik or closet vatnik would believe the lie you've regurgitated.
Superb article!
I was afraid you would be ridiculed for the corridor picture and description since it oversimplified the “wheel”. Hopefully this article will indicate to most how complicated air warfare really is.
As Clausewitz said, Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult.
My thought too. Pretty obvious that the map corridors were created by a computer mouse. From which I concluded that it’s no doubt more complicated in real life, but the concept is clear.
Nice article Tom. I understood the concept of corridors on the previous article but this gives more meat to the subject. As always institutions have to reflect and critique themselves to become better.
RU Genstab decided to prove they use FAB3000 on this video https://x.com/ua_zinkoviy/status/1812386064440365165?s=46&t=QUiM7LZ9A97O6jTTo9WKQQ
....and they're still lying: it's an UMPK on FAB-1500M-54.
I just want to add an alternative perspective to your well simplified explanation of Russia taking advantage of 'corridors' in Ukraine's IADS [In-process-of-being-integrated-through-improvised-means Air Defense System]. I still think the majority people still don't understand how it works (and in all honesty, it doesn't need to make sense to everyone outside of the system), simply because it requires one to imagine an extremely complex network of systems which mainly functions within the unseen electromagnetic spectrum, from a 4-dimensional perspective. The majority people, including many so-called military planners, still view military problems from a linear perspective why many challenges remain unsolved (along with the constant internal challenges of a small minority of disruptive thinkers in the ranks of the regular military who constantly challenge the people in control that prefer doing things 'the way it was always done' only to be labelled as being problematic).
However, looking at Ukraine's IADS dilemma, the main challenge lies with the integration of multiple [technological] generations of obsolete analogue based Western systems to work in unison with an equally large arsenal of multiple generations of obsolete Soviet analogue systems. For an effective IADS, all systems need to be networked on a digitalized command & control system to achieve full situational awareness by means of creating a synthetic image of the battlespace, thus closing any 'corridors' for enemy exploitation. Ukraine does not have this capability, and it is still far from achieving this capability mainly due to the following factors:
1.) Technological
2.) Technical
3.) Human resources
4.) Logistics
5.) Operational necessity
The technological challenges mainly implies technology that does not exist; not only in Ukraine, but in fact anywhere simply because what Ukraine is forced to do out of necessity to survive the day has never been done before simply because it has never been required to be done before by any nation in the history of modern warfare. To explain this, I shall try to explain this in as simple a manner possible: Hypothetically Ukraine needs a hot cup of coffee (a metaphor for a functional IADS). It has the coffee, water, and fire, but it lacks the means (an interface) for bringing those basic elements together to prepare the coffee (desired end product). So, keeping to coffee, Ukraine requires a percolator as interface to produce the coffee using the elements it has available. However, the challenge is that the percolator that Ukraine requires does not exist, and it needs to be designed to meet Ukraine's unique specifications determined by the characteristics of the availability of resources. To complicate things further, some coffee is ground, some are beans, some still require roasting. Also, the water is of different specifications, some being potable, some needing modification to be palatable. My point is: The main technological challenge to Ukraine is the development of a suitable interface to integrate various generations of analogue technologies (multi-national Western, French & Soviet) to effectively link into a digital network. Looking at all of the different [obsolete] systems donated to Ukraine, each system is unique in design characteristics which requires its own unique analogue-to-digital converter feeding into a system specific network interface to enhance battlespace awareness in a 4D model. This is basically what the US is trying to achieve with its digitalized battlespace doctrine, the primary challenge being that the majority of US hardware still being analogue based. The F35 represents what is required to enable a digitalized battlespace in terms of hardware, why it seems that US armaments design is now being influenced by F35 technological capabilities. This is also one of the reasons why the US is gladly dumping obsolete analogue systems in Ukraine to make space for newer digital systems. Just an example, the most 'modern' US supplied ADS in Ukraine are primarily analogue (especially the sensors), but converted to digital via a converter for network integration. However, the digital data generated by these systems are designed for integration with the highly advanced US networking capabilities which is not available in Ukraine, and will never be. Ukraine can basically extract only a small percentage of functionality from the data generated until it has designed the technology to extract more value from these systems. Now add the ex-Soviet analogue hardware to an already complex problem, and we start seeing a picture of what Ukraine needs to do to 'make things work'. What the majority laymen don't understand is that being given complex armaments with complex sensors means nothing if you can't interpret the data generated into something useful and actionable within workable time limits. This is one of the 'corridors' exploited by Russia.
Technical challenges exist in the availability of the technological resources and knowledge to design and develop the interface required to integrate these systems on a shoestring budget, further exacerbated by the constant challenge of finding, managing and developing alternative replacement parts to keep obsolete analogue systems operating within its most basic modes (similar to the near impossible task of tasking NASA to resume moon missions in 2024 using obsolete Gemini and Titan technologies where the production capabilities and tooling for those systems do not exist anymore - in other words, the systems are so old that the original production technology is lost). Just basic wear and tear plays into Russia's favor when systems fail, not even taking into account battlefield damage. This is another 'corridor' exploited by Russia.
From a human resources perspective, Ukraine requires appropriately skilled people to operate the multitude of systems effectively. At best it requires years of training and experience to master the use of these systems to its optimum capacity. In 2024, Ukraine is only now starting to master the use of most of the older systems in its inventory at the tactical level, but restricted at the operational level for reasons explained before. However, more critical than system operators are the unseen army of technical maintainers and engineers responsible for keeping these systems working, sometimes through rudimentary means. The time it takes to get obsolete systems working again after damages/breakages can take 10x longer than what is considered normal in NATO with established technical support infrastucture and resources. Also, the maintainers need to be trained on all the different systems originating from all the different donor countries who each had their own unique design specifications, some of these systems not being compatible. Just to achieve matured technical support capabilities requires years of training and experience, especially having to learn the operation of obsolete analogue systems, and how to integrate (and modernize) using available digital resources, not even discussing the importance of standardization in field modifications throughout the force.
The main logistical challenges that Ukraine faces operating its fleet of obsolete ADS hardware is availability of spares, and the availability of resources required for power supply. The major weakness of older analogue systems is sustainable power supply. These systems, especially radar, require a lot of energy to function effectively, and when the logistical chain is disrupted, so is the supply of power disrupted causing temporary capability gaps. These are the next 'corridors' exploited by Russia, why Russian attacks are so focussed on attacking electricity infrastructure and fuel supply depots. If Russia can disrupt this system for even one day, it creates a 'corridor' for the next attack.
The last factor I wish to mention is operational necessity. Fact is, Ukraine does not have enough hardware to effectively establish an IADS, even if all the challenges mentioned before were resolved. In other words, if Ukraine achieved the impossible by having 100% fleet mission capability, all integrated into a digitalized network with full sensors integration, there would still be major gaps ('corridors') in Ukraine's air defenses. At present Ukraine employs its most capable systems to safeguard the most critical infrastructure, why Russia engages in random attacks on alternative locations which don't always make sense simply as an attempt to break up these ADS concentrations. Point is: There are many gaps within the Ukrainian airspace simply because there aren't enough available resources, and munitions need to be spared for utilization in accordance with engagement priorities, why some Russian attacks occur unopposed. It is Russia's objective to deplete as much of Ukraine's limited supply of air defense munitions as quick as possible, but also knowing that Ukraine lacks the option of engaging everything thrown at them effectively.
Now, having mentioned munitions, Ukraine also has the added burden of figuring out donor ammunition performance data being unique to each manufacturer. Example: US made 155 mm artillery rounds and French produced 155 mm artillery rounds are both compatible in most 155 mm artillery systems, but they differ in terms of performance specifications simply because NATO does not have uniform munitions design specifications. Same challenges apply to air defense munitions. If munitions performance data differs between manufacturers, and fire control systems aren't adjusted to compensate for these differences (due to uninformed systems operators), then system performance is compromised. This is another 'corridor' exploited by Russia.
So, just to summarize my comment, air defense is an extremely complex system, and it is nearly impossible for Ukraine within its current state and circumstances to achieve effective IADS any time soon. In fact, I think this war has been a major eye opener to even the US who is studying every aspect of this war to enhance its own military capabilities with a treasure trove of relevant data based on Ukraine's daily experiences.
However, there is also operational factors to IADS which I choose not to discuss. Bottomline is that Ukraine needs time to adapt, but it can only adapt after experienced is gained using a system. The longer it takes for donor equipment to be delivered to Ukraine, the longer it takes Ukraine to constructively adapt to the expanding Russian threat. This is also the reason why the much anticipated F-16 deliveries are gradually approaching the point of being irrelevant and useless, for Ukraine first needs to have some form of functional IADS which it can't establish without the necessary resources.
Thanks for this. Just got my copy of the WAR IN UKRAINE VOLUME 2 on Amazon. Very interesting developments. What you said makes sense to a lay man like me. As well you were the first person to correctly identify Patriot systems as being responsible for the Russian aircraft losses in Bryansk in 2023. On that note, Ukraine and its European partners need to look into ways of atrophying Russian AD systems stationed in Russia. It doesnt make sense that they can afford to put a lot of their AD systems in Ukraine with the comfort that nothing threatens whatever they have left in Russia.
The weird passivity of the US, British, German, and French leaderships in planning ahead for future problems surely has to be another syndrome in its own right. They love rushing token amounts of aid to the frontline. Germany and France in particular are addicted to re-announcing aid so that they seem like they're giving more. I may be wrong, but I get the impression smaller nations have reacted with more urgency and relative generosity. It took more than a year before serious action was taken to address looming munitions shortages and it will take years before all those new and re-opened production lines are fully operational. Or maybe the Mobutu Syndrome does apply here. The leadership of larger NATO countries just don't want to hear inconvenient expensive truths?
Dear Tom
Many thanks for your great work!
I was wandering. As a Ukrainian, issues you describe here were of no surprise to me. And what comes to my mind as one possible solution is promotion of capable leaders to higher positions (such as in 3rd Assault etc.) or at least possibility for them to critique their superiors in order to improve them or at least to disclose their incompetence so that there is more social pressure for changes (something that is happening right now with Bohdan Krotevych).
Having this in mind, I recalled your articles from the time of Bahmut defence. Specifically - fall of Soledar. I remember you mentioning the issue of junior officers blaming "faggot generals" and so on.
And as well your comments regarding the change of Zaluzhnyi to Syrskyi being a good thing - as Syrskyi was more capable of bringer order to the structure and reducing freedoms that some units were experiencing under Zaluznyi.
So I was wandering, wouldn't this freedom actually be beneficial for promoting changes of "soviet style" commanding officers to someone younger and more capable(I'm very aware that being younger doesn't make you more capable). Of course taking into account the fact that this is still military structure that requires discipline. But in this case I feel that discipline reduces the flexibility that is needed for changes.
Will be happy to hear your opinion on this!