Ukraine War, 13 August 2024

Good evening everybody!

For the start today, let me offer two answers.

1.) No, it is not truth that the Russian troops in the Sudzha area are surrendering in droves. There is no evidence for over 1,000 of them (conservative estimate), plus some 50+ Akhmats, plus up to 45 FSB-ers, plus some of FSIN’s prison guards, plus Russian Border Guards… meanwhile having to march into Ukrainian POW-camps….Ho-hum… and any related reports, and all the related photos and videos are fake news and fabrications. So, also this one:

2.) In reaction to my update from the last night, somebody asked: what are my sources?

I must’ve been asked this just some 738 times - the last year alone. Probably another 2,984 times a year before, And then at least as often the year before - and that not only in regards of my coverage of this war, but also about my coverage of different wars in the Middle East and in Africa.

Now, when writing books (I stopped writing articles for newspapers, magazines etc, years ago), and about events from 20-, 30-, 40- or more years ago - it’s relatively simple. If safe for the source, I name the contact in question and add at least the month of the interview. Sometimes, it’s with pride I can name the source. Because it’s a honour to have the trust of some very special people. Especially highly experienced military veterans.

Sadly, more often I can’t. There are countries where I must use ‘codenames’ to maintain safety of the contact in question. Tragically (especially when it comes to sources in the Middle East), and much too often, I can’t do even that. At least not as long as the source is still alive. Here an example from the book Wings of Iraq, Volume 2, where one of crucial contacts – a dear colleague and a friend too – was mentioned for one and only time in full, and that after nearly 15 years of cooperation which I couldn’t mention him by full name in the public.

Characteristically, for years I’ve been called a ‘liar’ and all the possible Experten were explaining that Brigadier-General Ahmad Sadik never existed…

Some people wonder how comes I have ‘that kind of contacts’ – and then ‘around the world’. I tend to answer: ‘because people like to talk, and I like to network’.

That said, I think at least as important is a) that I’ve got no religion- or nationality-based prejudices, and b) something called the discretion. See: all the things I’ve been told over the time, but have never published. Because, as much as people like to talk, discretion is of utmost importance. Because, sometimes, it’s better for me to shut up than to tell you everything I know.

(Well, with one exception: once I did actually publish a photo I should have never published… mistakes happen. At least there were no consequences for anybody involved… in that case. In this place I’ll, once again, offer my apology to the friend in question for that faux pas.)

This is not to say everything I’m publishing here (or in my books) is based on 1^st-hand sources. Far from that. At least as often, I’m using 2nd- or 3rd hand sources of reference - some book or an article in the case of past affairs, for example. When I do so in a book, it’s easy: I list the author, title of the book or article, newspaper or magazine in question, etc., etc., etc., in the endnotes and the bibliography.  

In the case of an ongoing conflict like this in Ukraine and then online… dooh… Sure, I could go listing at least some of that, but most often I’m so short on time, I’m writing my updates in a mad rush, in a matter of 15-20, rarely 30 minutes. Sorry, ‘no time for finesse’. At most, that part of the work is left for another of books in the War in Ukraine mini-series.

Thus, sufficient to say that I’m working like always: using a mix of 1st hand sources (i.e. contacts), and 2nd and 3rd hand sources (in this case, foremost the social media, and often things many of you reading this are kind enough to point me at per private messages – whether here, or on the Facebook, or per e-mail). And then I’m starting the process of cross-checking, and yet more cross-checking, which is then often taking weeks, months or even longer - before eventually resulting in one or other of statements in one or another of my books.

***

Now, with both official Kyiv and the ZSU being almost completely zip-lip about this operation inside Russia, and most of contacts simply being busy fighting this war, it’s hard to get info about the Ukrainian side of this operation. Thus, in this case, I’m mostly relying on the Russian contacts and the Russian social media.

Sometimes… sometimes that’s all nice and fine. But, other times… sigh… For example, I cannot but express my ‘love’ for repeated declarations by top of Pudding’s PRBS-industrialists that the Russians have ‘brought to a halt’ the Ukrainian offensive.

They’re so reliable that the journalistic pearls of the Austrian national broadcaster ORF were super-quick in accepting their version of the story (BTW, the same are pocketing awards for top-notch journalism in this country, every year, too). Because, quote, ‘one cannot independently verify reports of either side’. While, actually, it’s easy. It does take some experience in conflict-monitoring, and then especially a dose of something I’ve mentioned the last night: that skill in reading between the lines.

As example, lets take one of frequently quoted of Pudding’s PRBS-industrialists – without naming the character in question (my standard practice, because for me this is no pissing contest and nothing personal: simply fun). Reading his update from this morning, couldn’t but conclude that the situation on the Russian side is both, ‘critical’, but it also ‘can’t be better’, kind of. For instance, a quote from his update about the Malaya Loknya area (18km north of Sudzha):

·         “The enemy tried to solve several problems here at once yesterday. The first was to break the defense of our troops along the highway to Lgov (via Malaya Loknya). To do this, an attempt was made to deeply envelop our positions in this village with a maneuver armored group. Moreover, taking advantage of the lack of a continuous front line, the Ukrainian Armed Forces managed to penetrate quite deeply into our territory, but were stopped and partially thrown back. The key factor in our success here was that our units did not panic and stubbornly held the highway while the enemy armored group was repelled in their, essentially, rear.”

With other words: the ZSU passed by several Russian strongholds. In northern direction, of course.

….of course, ‘because the Ukrainian advance was stopped’, you know…

That was followed by an obligatory portion of every such Russian account: ‘the lesson’. The Russians in his position are expected to teach people a lesson. In this case, the lesson is that although the Ukrainians drove around their flank, the Russians didn’t lose nerves, and this made them successful. Which in turn is a two-fold message: yes, they did lose nerves, and Ukrainians did get through, but all of you other Russians – yes, you, the ones reading this - you all better do not lose nerves!

Lesson learned, eh?

Then, the next segment:

·         “The second was an attempt to break through our defense in the direction of Bolshoye Soldatskoye. Also, the enemy was generally repelled, but had tactical successes.”

This is a typical statement, the essence of which is: the enemy was unsuccessful, but was successful.

….and you, dear reader, guess the rest on your own…

But wait: the best part is only coming:  

·         “Southern sector… Here, too, yesterday an attempt to break through our defense was noted, but with the same success as in the north. Having suffered significant losses, the enemy was mostly thrown back. The only unpleasant but important loss for us here was the actual abandonment of Sudzha and its occupation by the enemy (for the most part, it makes no sense for the Ukrainian Armed Forces to keep every street under control, and it is stupid to waste forces on this in the current situation).”

Once again the story with ‘the enemy was unsuccessful, but was successful’….getting boring, isn’t it?

But, then there follows the pearl: Sudzha is so unimportant that one is left to wonder why has the GenStab in Moscow and the OSK South (or West?) ordered the remnants of the 488th Motor-Rifle Regiment ‘no step back’, and that for a full week? Why was the Russian media full of reports about heroic defence of the town for days? And why have the Ukrainians ever come to the idea to capture the place?

Indeed: why is anybody on this planet wasting his/her time with Sudzha at all? And why have any people ever lived there – or are still doing so…?

But OK. At least the final paragraph is explaining the outcome. It’s starting with:

·         “So, the main event of yesterday was not even the withdrawal of our units from Sudzha,...”

Meh… we’ve had that: who cares about Sudzha? If the Russians had to withdraw from there, the place is simply unimportant! Right? Great.

Now we’re getting to the gist of the story:

·         “... but an attempt to quickly break through our defense in the direction of the settlement of Giryi-Belitsa. The enemy's interest in this area is understandable. It is here that the strategic bridge across the Psel River is located, without taking control of which it is unthinkable to think about an offensive in the direction of the Belovsky district from the side of Sudzha with large forces. This was probably the task facing the two enemy columns that were trying to reach the bridge to the north and south of the river (i.e. from both sides). Moreover, as is now traditional, all this was done under the information cover of several maneuver sabotage and reconnaissance groups that were trying to bring chaos to our defense ranks. But it didn't work here either. As a result, one group was routed, and the second was unable to break through to help it. Nevertheless, the enemy held some of the occupied positions by morning, and will probably, relying on them, try to develop its success here in the morning. We pray and keep our fingers crossed for the guys.”

Aha. So, actually, the character in question is back to that with ‘the enemy was unsuccessful, but successful’. Even some of, ‘yupee, we’ve smashed two Ukrainian columns, but then they secured at least parts of Belitsa and Giri...’ …which, as any quick check of the map of this area is quickly showing: Ukrainians must’ve seized also the area from Kurilovka and Guyevo all the way to Belitsa and Giri – which is an area of some 20 by 10 kilometres – otherwise, they couldn’t get to the latter two. At least not without help of tele-transporting technology from the TV series Startrek…

I love this. Honestly. It’s crystal clear evidence for the Ukrainian offensive into the Kursk Oblast coming to its ultimate end. Period.

…with all of which, BTW, you’ve also got the answer to the question: why is this blog called the ‘Sarcastosaurus’.

What do I mean?

Well, imagine doing this for nearly 40 years. And that for living.

***

But OK. Most of you are not here to trouble yourself with me. So, let me list what was up in  South-Western Kursk, the last 36 hours, ‘or so’.

For your easier orientation, please enjoy the following with some of this map:

-          Korenovo: the 82^nd Airborne didn’t manage to secure Toplino, but fighting for that place and further north is still going on (and that’s not ‘just another raid’).

-          South of Korenovo (say: the Glushkovo area): the 103^rd Territorial Defence continued pushing on Glushkovo: concerned about their outlooks, the Russians have initiated the evacuation of all the population between that place and Tetkino (on the border to Ukraine; left edge of the map).

-          Sheptukhovka: turned out to still be under the Russian control – and the troops holding that place (plus Pogrebki, further south) turned out to be from the 11^th VDV Brigade, not the 11^th Motor-Rifle. Still, since making their first experience in getting HIMARS-ed, four days ago, the Desantniki of this unit seem to prefer camping in the nature and watching the 80^th Airborne passing by in northern direction. Must be, the countryside there is particularly nice and just now the only radio in the entire brigade broke down and thus they can’t reach any of superiors…

-          Martykovka: after three days of fighting, the Russian 810^th Naval Infantry (i.e. probably about two coompanies of it; the rest is somewhere in the Korenovo area), was mauled to the degree where it retreated from this place. The 22^nd Mech secured the village, but then turned around and stampeded away in northern direction. What exactly is going on along the highway R200 ever since… nobody would say.

-          Sudzha and the area further south-east: yesterday in the morning, and after 6 days of getting mauled by the Ukrainians at every opportunity, what was left of the Russian 488^th Motor-Rifle Regiment run away as soon as seeing a few MRAPs of the 88^th Mech approaching their positions from the north. That’s why entire Sudzha came under the Ukrainian control. Which is as unimportant as described- and for reasons listed above…

-          However, this is what then had something of a ‘chain reaction’ as result. The actual reason the survivors of the 488^th run away in such an enthusiastic fashion was the fact that already since the evening of the 11^th, the 92^nd Mech of the ZSU was exercising fire-control over the road from Sudzha to Ulanok – i.e. the Russian supply-, and escape route. However, the command of the 92^nd then misunderstood the situation and prematurely launched a pursuit (can’t blame them: this worked so well in so many cases in the Kharkiv-Izyum area, back in March-April-May-June 2022, when they’ve decimated some 9-10 Russian BTGs in similar fashion). This even more so because another column of that brigade, reinforced by SSO, was in the process of approaching Girki from the south, from the direction of Borki.

-          However, the survivors of the 488^th, plus whatever was there of the 4^th Tank Regiment, did not flee all the way to Belitsa: AFAIK, their beloved Akhmat-Chechens managed to stop them in Ulanok. At a gunpoint. Thus, the northern column of the 92^nd Mech drove in between of two Russian positions: it was sighted by the Russians on time, reported, and then subjected to attacks by Lancets and an ambush while entering northern Belitsa. Lost at least 5 BTR-4s knocked out, and two captured. Plus an unknown number of troops.

One of 5 BTR-4s confirmed as knocked out while entering northern Belitsa…

….and one of captured BTR-4s.

-          The southern column of the 92^nd Mech then attempted to approach from the south, but lost a Stryker (badly damaged and towed away by the Russians) - and was forced to withdraw: not entirely out of that village, but away from critically important bridges there.

This report would be incomplete if - for the purpose of making Pudding-fans happy - I do not list all the achievements of the Akhmat super-special-runaway force, of course. According to them, in Giri alone, they’ve destroyed:

3 tanks

6 Bradleys

2 Kozak MRAPs

2 BTR-4s, and killed 110 Ukrainians, while taking 1 POW.

…and that in addition to destroying 28 other AFVs and killing 34 Ukrainian troops in Belitsa.

…while you, dear reader, are left to wonder if ZSU units deployed inside the Kursk Oblast might have as many armoured fighting vehicles – combined….

***

Bottom line: fighting for Korenovo is going on, but seems the ZSU is keen to force the Russians inside to capitulate, instead of assaulting the town. The idea was working great, the last few days, resulting in quick collapse of numerous smaller Russian units further south-east. Perhaps it’s going to work there, too? This is likely to depend on the ability of the ZSU to continue at least raiding towards the north, both along the road to Rylsk, and along the highway E38, as it’s doing for some 3-4 days now. the more it does, the more isolated the Russians further south feel, the more inactive – if not outright: paralysed by indecision – they are, and the more likely to surrender.

Of course, the ZSU must keep the campers of the Russian 11th VDV under permanent control. One can never know if these might re-establish radio-contact to somebody else in Russia.

What’s going to happen along the R200… no idea: we’ve got to wait and see. And, Belitsa and Giri are certainly going to be a place of another major show-down in the coming days. Alone because both sides are in the process of rushing reinforcements in that direction.

***

Regarding developments in Donbas - and, specifically: Pokrovsk area - I hope to have enough time tomorrow to cover them, too. Before I close my shop for this evening, let me do so with something that’s really ‘nervy’.

SOUTHERN KHERSON

My most-super-über-favourite between Ukrainian generals, ever, ever, ever - has made his next super-turbo-genius move. Back on Friday, 10 August, he’s sent a team of special forces operators to the Kinburn Spit… to plant a flag…

Now, OK, they’ve not only planted the f….g flag, but also (and reportedly) k…kuddled up to 30 Russians, and destroyed six (useless) trucks, some of which are visible below. Unsurprisingly, the Ukrainian public seems to be happy.

….with exception of people who know a bit more about the end of this story – which was anything else than ‘happy end’.

Makes me wonder if family members were informed so far?

….what a surprise then, the number of Ukrainians white-mad about the most-super-turbo-genius of Ukrainian generals, ever, ever, ever is on steady increase…