Ukraine War, 11 July 2023: the Price

Hello everybody!

In the light of the NATO-summit in Vilnius, starting today, it appears to me all the related hype is reaching hysterical proportions. Sorry, but I’m not going to join the herd: instead I prefer to - once again - entirely ignore the entirely absurd political ping-pong and social-media’s ‘he said/she said’ about this war.

At least I find such topics like the story of the ZSU Marine who was supposed to blow up the Chongar Bridge at the start of the war far more important: I still find it ridiculous that the official Kyiv is explaining the affair about letting the Russians occupy most of Kherson and Zaporizhzhya in just 3-4 days for ‘none of its business’ (i.e. a ‘purely military affair’), while the ZSU is excusing with the ’15 times superior Russian forces’ and ‘under official investigation’. No, it’s not ‘some Marine’ to blame: he did what he could, and the mining didn’t work. Much more than this, somebody in the ZSU has messed up the entire defence system of southern Ukraine: there were simply no units in position to stop the Russian onslaughts on Melitopol and Kherson. And that somebody is – almost certainly – still in his function…

AIR/MISSILE WARFARE

Early on 8 July, the Russians targeted Lyman with BM-27 or BM-30 MRLS’, killing at least eight, and wounding 13 civilians. The Sumy Oblast experienced at least 11 air- and missile strikes during that day.

Early on 9 July, the PSU hit another Russian depot in the Melitopol area: this time a site between Zarichne and Mirne. Around the same time, the Russians targeted a school in Orikhiv with an UMPK glide bomb. The building was actually used to distribute humanitarian aid to the population but…. sigh…. Have already discussed ‘that’ with the quality of GRU’s informers and their ‘intelligence’… Five people were killed, at least 11 hospitalised. Three are still sought for under the rubble…

Later on 9 July, Ukrainians might have attacked the Bryansk area with V.860/V.880 missiles. At first the Russians claimed that two were shot down, but the wreckage of one crashed into a sawmill: then corrected this to claim that the sawmill was hit by an UAV. Furthermore, the Russians claimed that another ‘Ukrainian cruise missile’ was ‘shot down near Kerch’, and that ‘air defences were activated in the Rostov-na-Donu area’.

The Keystone Cops in Moscow claimed an Ukrainian Su-27 as shot down over the ‘Novogrigorovka’ area, plus two Su-25s of the PSU as ‘shot down between Novoandriivka and Georgievka, and one in the ‘Odarovka’ area - all of this of yesterday. Furthermore, they claimed another Storm Shadow as shot down.

Early this morning (approx. 03.30-04.10hrs local time), the Russians launched 28 Shahed-136s at Ukraine: 26 were claimed shot down by the PSU – including all of those that approached Kyiv, but not all of those that approached Odesa. Additionally, Zaporizhzhya (city) was targeted by several S-300s fired in ballistic mode.

BATTLE OF DONBAS

Kupyansk-Svatove-Kremina… in the Kuzemivka area, the Russians continued assaulting the 103^rd TD (reinforced by a battalion of the 92^nd Mech), the last few days. The same is valid for assaults by the 15^th, 21^st and 30^th Motor Rifle Brigades on positions of the 66^th Mech between Kovalivka and Novovodiane. All were repelled.

West of Kremina, the Russians seem to have gained some terrain along the road connecting that town with Zarichne, but actually: they ‘secured’ about 500 metres of no-man’s land, and the 63^rd and 67^th Mech are still in their positions from about a week ago. Thus, the Keystone Cops then re-directed their effort, and yesterday launched an all-out assault in the direction of Torske. Reportedly, this was stopped some 500m east of that village…

Why are the Keystone Cops so obsessed with squandering their re-filled regular units in this area: no idea. Guess, I’m missing some piece of info in this regards.

Or….perhaps I should apply some deduction…? It’s going to appear as some digression at first, but lets try. For the ‘quality-‘ – indeed: the nature – of this Russian counteroffensive….I think the best way is to read the this article (in Russian), published in the Baykal Journal. Sufficient to say that according to the source in question, an entire battalion of the 1452^nd Regiment, thrown into the battle in the Kremina area on 20 June, was encircled and annihilated: not even a company ‘worth’ of them survived…

Or check this (warning: the end is ‘graffic’).

….which in turn is bringing me to a question I’ve been asked several times, the last week or so: the ‘normal/nominal size’ of a Russian (Motor Rifle) company?

As explained months ago, the VSRF has meanwhile abandoned its concept of ‘battalion tactical groups’, and is back to fighting in its classic formations. Thus, at least nominally, each of VSRF’s motor rifle companies should have around 70-90 troops (say: 3 platoons of infantry, the heavy weapons platoon, and the headquarters section). At least three such companies, plus a headquarters section, perhaps a heavy weapons company too (as far as available) are usually making a battalion, with a total of around 200 troops… However, mind that at war no unit is permanently manned at 100%, regardless what armed forces: it appears the Russians are not letting their troops to go home for a leave, but there are always the wounded and sick to keep in mind. Indeed, in combat, and particularly in this war, any unit that hasn’t experienced combat before (and that’s valid especially for the mass of the Russian mobiks, plus a good part of newly-established brigades of the ZSU) is rather quick in suffering losses. Heavy losses. The reason is the firepower: artillery, mortars, automatic grenade launchers, machine guns are deployed in large numbers by both sides, and in lavish quantities…

Sure, the mobilisation in Russia initiated in late September is providing the VSRF with a ‘steady stream’ of some 15,000 to 20,000 ‘fresh’ troops every month. This enabled the VSRF to establish dozens of ‘new’ battalions and regiments (such units are ‘easy’ to recognise by their designations in 1xxx-range), even a few larger units ever since. However, the Russian armed forces lack the ‘cadre’ (officers and non-commissioned officers) to properly organise, train, and command the ‘re-built/re-filled/re-established/new’ units. As a consequence, the mass of units staffed by mobiks are resembling, say, conscripts of the Austrian Bundesheer after their first one or two weeks of national service: essentially, disorganised groups of armed yet disoriented men, more of a danger for themselves than for the enemy. That’s resulting in severe losses.

Few examples… In early June, at the start of Ukrainian counteroffensive in southern Zaporizhzhya, average motor rifle battalion of the VSRF deployed along the frontline had around 200 troops. The mass of battalions in question is meanwhile down to 30-40% of that. Means: they’ve lost around 150 of their original troops. All had to be re-filled. Don’t know what’s the case with Russian tank units, but something like ‘general agreement’ is that the mass of VSRF’s artillery units is down to around 50% of their nominal strength. Their self-propelled artillery pieces are shot away at a (documented) rate of about a dozen per day – and if, then replaced by towed, less manoeuvrable pieces. My assessment is that the same is valid for the VSRF units in the Bakhmut area.

Perhaps the most drastic example was the 72^nd Motor Rifle Brigade (VSRF). Over the last month, this was exposed to almost continuous attacks by three battle-hardened brigades of the ZSU (that is: one battalion each from three different brigades). As a consequence, and although the mass of resulting clashes rarely included more than 50-100 troops, the 72^nd Motor Rifle suffered such losses that it had to be ‘re-filled’ by 200%. Means: its original complement – including at least three motor rifle battalions, a tank battalion, its artillery group, its engineer battalion etc. – was all shot away at least two times over the last 40 days. To make sure this is no typo or mistake: every single battalion, two times. And every single battalion had to be ‘re-filled’ by battalions (all consisting of mobiks) two times. What’s left of the original 72^nd Motor Rifle is meanwhile something like a ‘reinforced company’ in total: the rest consists of three severely depleted reservist battalions, supported by a handful of tanks and artillery pieces. Of course, the brigade is ‘still fighting’, because the mobiks shot away are replaced by yet more mobiks…. And the Russians brought in the 83^rd VDV Brigade, plus another tank battalion to reinforce it: everything, just to prevent the fall of Klishchivka….

Now, the Russians have ‘no problem’ with ‘re-filling’ their depleted units in western Luhansk and north-western Donetsk. That’s why the 72^nd Motor Rifle is still around, regardless how often shot to pieces. But, they are experiencing growing problems with doing the same in southern Zaporizhzhya. The reason are constant Ukrainian strikes on the railway system from the occupied Crimean Peninsula. This is hindering the flow of the Russian reinforcements and supplies…

I.e. instead of running ‘flashy Cossack-cavalry-style’ attacks into the enemy lines, the GenStab-U is seeking for a similar ‘solution’ like in the Kyiv and Chernihiv areas of March 2022, in the (wider) Kharkiv area of mid-2022, and in the Kherson area of October-November 2022: one where at least the Russian supplies of ammunition are exhausted to the point where their firepower is crippled: where their (severely depleted) units can’t hold their lines – and where the Keystone Cops in Moscow are then forced into another theatrical ‘good-will gesture’… In Kyiv and Chernihiv, that took over a month; in Kharkiv, almost five months, and in Kherson more than two months…

That, in turn is imposing the question of the ‘price’. Think, this should be more than ‘well-known’, actually. For example, the defence of Kyiv mauled three Russian combined arms armies, but cost the ZSU the 72^nd Mech (and much of the 4^th National Guard Brigade). Nine months later, the 72^nd was still recovering when sent to defend Vuhledar…. Ukrainian defence of Chernihiv was highly successful and cost the VSRF another two armies – but was also costly for the 1^st Tank. A year later, the unit is still recovering, and only two of its battalions are ‘operational’. In similar fashion, the defence of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, the counteroffensive in eastern Kharkiv, and the mauling of the Wagner PMC and dozens of thousands of its convicts in Bakhmut, were made possible by the 81^st Airborne, and the 92^nd and 93^rd Mech. Plus cost the ZSU a better part of the 46^th Airmobile Brigade. Even if the 92^nd and the 93^rd each have at least a battalion involved in current operations, and the 81^st is holding the Bilohorivka area (the one on the Siversky Donetsk) – and that together with the 4^th NG – actually, all five are ‘still recovering’. Finally, the success in Kherson cost the ZSU most of the 28^th Mech: the unit took half a year to recover before being sent to the Kurdiumivka sector… All of these are proud units that have achieved a lot, no doubt. But, at the price of crippling losses, which are preventing most of them from being deployed for offensive operations.

From that point of view, the aim of the Russian ‘biiiiiiiiiiig counteroffensive’ in the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kremina area would be ‘crippling the northern flank of the ZSU’s Khortezya Group of Forces’: weakening its ability to launch an advance into the occupied Luhansk Oblast. That much is ‘obvious’…

Bakhmut….north….Back on 7 July, the K-2 Battalion of the 54^th Mech released a video showing its elements ‘on advance’:

Don’t worry: they’re not ‘crazy and revealing their positions’. This video is actually showing their advance through the ‘no-man’s land’ (or ‘grey zone’, in modern-day social media’s language) from (at least) two days earlier. Essentially, something like two companies of mechanised infantry (from the 54^th, but also from the 92^nd Mech), were deployed into attack on the Russian lines protecting the northern side of Soledar and Yakovlivka. They seem to have gained some ground west of Yakovlivka, but I’m not sure if they’ve reached the ‘official’ Russian 1^st Line of Defence in this area, yet. Of course, the Russians reacted with a massive artillery barrage that, as of 10 July, converted most of the local hedgerows into a wasteland.

(Some food for thoughts: why has the HQ Khotezya (re-)deployed battalions from the 54^th and the 92^nd Mech for this attack, instead of the 30^th Mech that’s ‘already there’`?…. No idea. Might be related to the experience of the two ‘senior’ units.)

Berkhivka…the ZSU is certainly in the centre of this village, and also assaulting a hill dominating the area between this village and Bakhmut in the south – but both areas are under fierce counterattacks by a combination of several battalions of mobiks and the 217^th VDV Regiment. The fighting is still going on.

Klishchivka-Kurdiumivka…elements of the 5^th Assault, 22^nd Mech, and/or 80^th Airborne appear to still be fighting elements of the 72^nd Motor Rifle, the BARS-13, and the 68^th Tank Regiment along the eastern and southern edges of the village.

Five Russians (two are visible in the upper centre of this video-still) surrendering to troops of the 80th Airborne, in one of hedgerows outside Klishchivka, on 5 July.

On the lighter side: RUMINT has it the 141^st Special Motor Rifle Regiment (‘Kadyrovites’) was rushed to the scene, too – but quickly lost over 50, including its commander… This morning, official Kyiv denied the presence of Kadyrovites in the Klishchivka area, though.

Further south, the 28^th Mech is still fighting elements of the 3^rd DNR Brigade and the 57^th Motor Rifle in Kurdiumivka.

Avdiivka…back on 6 or 7 July, the 21st Mech smashed a bigger Russian assault.

SOUTHERN ZAPORIZHZHYA (& SOUTH-WESTERN DONETSK)

Vasilivka…the 128^th is still grinding through Zherebianky. Not really sure if it can get through any time soon, though: the VSRF has meanwhile deployed two brigades and some 5-6 battalions in front of it.

Orikhiv….the 47^th Mech seem to have secured a low hill and hedgerows north-west, north-east and east of Robotyne (losing two Bradleys damaged by mines in the process), but no matter how often it entered the village, it’s always forced out of it. Considering reports about numerous Russian tanks being knocked out south of the village, me thinks, Ukrainians are meanwhile running an enveloping attack instead…

Staromaiorske-Staromlynivka…the fighting inside Pryutne and west of Staromairoske is going on. AFAIK, there were no advances by either side, the last 2-3 days. The ZSU attack in direction of Kermenchyk seems to have been repelled, on 9 July.

Oleshky…. Well, it does look like all the Russian bombardments and counterattacks have failed and the ZSU is maintaining a…. well, don’t know how to characterise it, because there’s still too little info… ‘bridgehead’ around (and along) the southern side of the Antonovsky Bridge. At least I doubt that Putin’s PRBS-machinery would be foaming as much as it does if this would’ve been ‘liquidated’ by now.