Hello everybody! In the light of the NATO-summit in Vilnius, starting today, it appears to me all the related hype is reaching hysterical proportions. Sorry, but I’m not going to join the herd: instead I prefer to - once again - entirely ignore the entirely absurd political ping-pong and social-media’s ‘he said/she said’ about this war.
Storm-Z are convicts (often forcibly) mobilized from prisons by the MinDef. They don't have any freedom to choose sides.
Prigozhin hired from prisons in 2022 for half-year contracts. If a convict survived for half a year he was pardoned and also got lots of money. If one did not survive he was promised a good military burial and his relatives would get 5 million rubles in black cash.
Some time about the new year the MinDef closed the prisons for Prigozhin and started mobilizing prisoners for its own Storm-Z. However, the contracts cannot be ended before the end of the war, and in many cases it is a forced mobilization.
Thank you so much for the update Tom, was antsy to know what's going on. Been wondering though; have the ZSU been taking prisoners less and less? I don't doubt the Ukrainian's and if their observing protocols on POW's, but I've been noticing a lack of reports on prisoners being taken lately and it's making me wonder what's the situation
1.) because the PSU hasn't got enough MIM-104 Patriot systems to cover more than Kyiv and some other places. It's going to take deliveries of another 10-15 systems to seriously start covering the frontline.
2.) Not sure it was reduced. The Russians are just releasing fewer videos of their operations. Might be that the ZSU got better in avoiding them.
3.) It should have a theoretical CEP of 30-50 metres. Means: about 50% of MPK/UMPK bombs should hit within 30-50 metres of their aiming point (target). In reality, it seems a significant portion is malfunctioning already on release, or shortly after. And since the Russians wouldn't let us know how many have they released so far, and Ukrainians wouldn't let us know how many have hit, nobody can say.
Indeed, in regards of 'accuracy' of Russian airborne weapons, I've got to 'warn', kind of: until today, official Moscow has never released even the figures for the effectiveness of such obsolete guided weapons like R-3S air-to-air missiles over Vietnam or the Middle East of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Thus, expecting it to now start releasing precise figures about MPK/UMPK-series.... that's simply not going to happen.
Some sources claim France is ending Scalp-EG missiles with 500 km range, known in the English world as Storm Shadows long range.
Just for humour, the comment by convicted terrorist Igor Girkin
"It's not even funny anymore.
Official Moscow Peskov: France's decision to transfer long-range missiles to Kyiv is erroneous and fraught with consequences for Ukraine itself, because Russia will take countermeasures.
What countermeasures are he talking about? It would be better if he just kept silent than to disgrace the whole world."
Thank you for answer As Ukraniane I noticed tendency that ZSU never made big encirclements during previous offensives. But purpose is to destroy Russians army so isn’t this tactic of slow offensive better in this case. Because it seems like Russians behave on Southern front like AI in some Wargames: player takes a point of interest and AI spams units to give it back that is good option for ZSU to destroy them. So, is an offensive succesful in this sense?
2. Does Bradley and Leopard have more potential to be repaired after damage than soviet stuff
3. Do you have any information about Kransnopol laser guided shell?
4. France gave SCALP missle. I’ve read somewhere that they have cluster warhead
Bradleys and Leopards are better armoured than most Soviet stuff and on average Russian weapons are weaker than the newest Western stuff in Ukraine so they should be easier to repair.
Depends , of course, on available trained repair engineers and spare parts.
1.) As explained in the main feature today, and two days ago: yes, it is.
2.) Yup. Actually, most of Bradleys knocked out the last 5-6 weeks are meanwhile in the process of being re-built , some already back in operations (of course, there are total losses, too). On the other hand, those that are damaged are good decoys, because the Russians are eagerly spending 6-7-8 missiles at them.
3.) Nothing that wouldn't be available in the public.
4.) France is promising their SCALP-EG - and that after some should actually already be in Ukraine. SCALP-EG is the French version of the Storm Shadow. Not sure if there's a CBU-warhead for them though (but then, I'n not good at 'NATO').
Me thinks, that's another 'campaign of hysteria': it's attracting lots of public attention, thus generating 'clicks' on websites, or 'higher percentage of viewers' on the TV - and thus additional income for the media in question.
Actually, unless they start blowing up the reactors, directly, the probability is low.
All reactors in Enerhodar have received new 'armour capsules', in form of 1,5m thick concrete around them.
So, for example: if the Russians 'blow up the roof' of nearby buildings (which is where the SBU claimed the Russians have positioned explosives), or even 'blow up the roof of reactor buildings' - nothing happens to the reactors.
Don't know what kind of a violation would that be? Of the Grain Deal? If so, Turkey also announced it's going to protect ships exporting Ukrainian grain in the future. So, there's little the Russians can do about it: an attack on Turkey would be an attack on NATO.
Говорилось, что бойцы АЗОВ выведенные из Мариуполя должны находится в Турции до конца военных действий. А их вернули раньше. Зерновая к этому, наверное, не имеет не какого отношения. Или я ошибаюсь
Many thanks for your valuable information. Maybe it would be interesting for you to comment the article by Konstantin Mashovets in Tverezo.info. It is about "the great plan of general Gerasimov" to prevent Ukrainian offensive by attacking in Svatovo region.
Thanks Tom I read this with great interest, and its all fairly good from my view, I'm just amazed at how the Rats have totally annihilated the ZSU in Oleshky at least 4 or 5 times I'll stay tuned
Very excellent and large analysis today, you provided some positive news but also its now clear is this is a really serious war where the Russians are committing all they can. 15-20k men added per month is alot but glad at least to know the manning levels of the Russian units. On the other topic, I really wonder what the Ukrainian military was doing in the South, in the early days of the war if the Russian military was able to just drive all the way to Mariupol. The commanders in that Operational zone need to be thoroughly investigated as well, not just the southern intelligence officers that betrayed Ukraine. Also I think the soldier in the interview is very naive to think Russian mortars could have been behind stopped the explosives from working on the bridge because the same fate befell the Antonovsky bridge. Sounds like sabotage to me. One thing I'm really wondering is the fate of Russian medium to long range SAM systems like S-300/400 and BUKs. Its hard to get estimates based off the AD units deployed for the war. I heard an expert say Russia has about 300 S-300/400 batteries in total(Both at home and deployed for the Ukraine war). Which sounded too small but I cant tell since Ukraine in the past had about 55 S-300P series batteries(27 in service before 2014). 300 systems for Russia may be accurate, but I'm sure you know better. And then how many BUK systems do they have in total and deployed for Ukraine?. I think this is something that needs exploring. One major thing you highlighted is how much Ukraine is focused on taking out the ground artillery launchers. Double digit daily losses of self propelled howitzers is great news although its reported Russia still has a large amount of the 3400 MLRS launchers they had deployed for this war. Ukrainian MOD has only recorded ~670 destroyed so far so seems those are going to remain a problem.
Re. S-300/350/400.... I do not know exactly how many are in service, but doubt the number is higher than 50-60.
300 (+) such SAM-sites/battalions is somebody's daydreams. In reality: no way. Putin would've never spent so much of 'his' money for them.
Actually, there was always a chronic shortage of such systems in Russia. So much so, they were refusing to export even their older SAMs - like 'upgraded' Pechoras (SA-3) - even when customers were paying up front. They needed such old stuff for their own defence, because there was a shortage of S-300/350/400s.
3,400 MRLS'? Sorry, the most optimistic estimate I've heard was for around 1,300. And that was in July the last year. Say: 10+ TOS-1s, about 900 BM-21s, 150+ BM-27s, less than 100 BM-30s, and about 20 Tornado-S.
Thank you this clears up alot. For the 3400 MLRS at the start, I thought I read it from a report by RUSI a collaboration between Gen. Zabrodskyi and Jack Watling titled "Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion
of Ukraine: February–July 2022". But I cannot find it!!. Most likely I read 3400 howitzers and misremembered as for each howitzers and MLRS. But the paper as I read it now states Russia deployed around 1100 tube artillery pieces in the Donbas after the Kyiv defeat(which is basically the same as your figure of 1300). But for these ground artillery systems, how capable are they at replacing them?? Particularly the rocket artillery systems you mention. Because seems the Ukrainians are taking out like 2-5 a day.
On the other hand, I heard from Jason Bronk(air defence expert) in his recent video speech titled "New insights and lessons learned from Ukraine - how can Sweden contribute to NATO?"(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uxLwPb89azo). He states at 15-16 minute mark, Russia has around 300 such systems(short,medium and long range mobile AD systems) so I again I misheard thinking it was 300 long range systems. But how can they defend the large Russian airspace as well as the land they hold in Ukraine with only 50-60 S-300/400 batteries? On the other hand they must have so many Pantsirs, Kubs, BUKs, Tunguska. Its unbelievable just how dense Ukrainian SAM network was compared to Russia's even after the years of Russia trying to destroy the Ukrainian defence industry. Otherwise thank you for the great work.
On the linked article about Ivan Sestryvatovskyi and the failure of Ukraine to destroy the bridges at Chonhar, you need to read the whole article to understand what when on February of 2022. In his words as summary:
"Why didn't the bridges blow up? I know the answer: either it was the work of a Russian sabotage group, or the wires were damaged by a mortar. I have no other answer, and I'm not looking for it."
He also postulates:
"I personally believe that had the bridges been blown up, it would not have stopped the [Russian - ed.] offensive. It would only delay it, but not for long – for an hour and a half, perhaps. They would just have thrown down pontoons. They were preparing for this war."
This is not denying the general staff has tried to minimize the event (or lack thereof). only that for one person in the know, Ivan Sestryvatovskyi, the bridges where mined and an attempt was made to detonate those mines.
If there is an overriding moral (sic) to the story, naive assumptions fail spectacularly in face of naked aggression. The bridges at Chonhar are yet another chapter.
Ivan Sestryvatovskyi if you believe his own words was not a "sapper". Maybe that was part of the problem in the fail attempt at destruction of Chonhar bridges.
As to the wider issue of why there was no response to Russian aggression, I don't see his story, as compelling as it is, as much relevance to where the rest of the Ukraine army, southern commend, was.
Of much more terminal interest to me is how the Russian army was able to cross the Dnipro River. Why wasn't the Antonivka Bridge blown up? I believe there were some arrests early on, but as the article referenced mentions, it is still ongoing.
"However, mind that at war no unit is permanently manned at 100%. "
Not even in peactime. Somebody is always sick, has a injury, is on holiday, maternity leave, detached to some training course etc. Same for the machines, always some BTR, tank, truck, gun is broken and in need of repairs or maintenance. Not even considering that you might have problems in staffing all your positions. Everybody has this problem. Some units are more prestigious than others and some locations are considered better than others. I have yet to see a single formation with 100% or close to it. The accepted norm is around 80-85% at all times.
As i know 2 generals were fired after catastrophy in the south, Zelensky said something like some people need to decide to which country their loyalty lie, and these guys chosen poorly, attack from Crimea shoudnt have been succesfull.... Here is one of the articles on that subject.
I've explained this already several times by now. But OK, here we go again....
Kryvoruchko was the Director SBU in Kherson. And Naumov the former Director SBU. Two intelligence people. No two military people.
Neither was in command of any ZSU unit as of early 2022. The SBU has no say in regards of commanding the ZSU.
...which is the point: it must've been somebody in the ZSU to have ordered the 53rd or 54th (home-based in Nova Kahkhovka) to Donbass, in early February, and then the 36th Naval Infantry - without its heavy arms - into southern Kherson, and to have mobilisied the Melitopol brigade only on the morning of 24th etc.
There was not a single ZSU brigade on the isthmus, otherwise, the Russians couldn't have reached Melitopol already on the morning of 25 February, or secured Kherson only two days later.
Thus, the traitor - or a super-incompetent idiot - is within the top ranks of the ZSU, not within the SBU.
Storm-Z = convicts. There's not just one 'detachment' of them: there are dozens. They're spent like like Wagner's convicts.
Storm-Z are convicts (often forcibly) mobilized from prisons by the MinDef. They don't have any freedom to choose sides.
Prigozhin hired from prisons in 2022 for half-year contracts. If a convict survived for half a year he was pardoned and also got lots of money. If one did not survive he was promised a good military burial and his relatives would get 5 million rubles in black cash.
Some time about the new year the MinDef closed the prisons for Prigozhin and started mobilizing prisoners for its own Storm-Z. However, the contracts cannot be ended before the end of the war, and in many cases it is a forced mobilization.
Thank you so much for the update Tom, was antsy to know what's going on. Been wondering though; have the ZSU been taking prisoners less and less? I don't doubt the Ukrainian's and if their observing protocols on POW's, but I've been noticing a lack of reports on prisoners being taken lately and it's making me wonder what's the situation
Haven't seen anything indicating some sort of a 'pattern' of the ZSU taking less Russian POWs.
On the contrary, my impression is that the ZSU is taking ever more and more Russian POWs, the last few days.
Today it was reported about 19 prisoners.
A lot of them are convicts from jail.
https://meduza.io/feature/2023/07/06/ukrainskiy-proekt-hochu-zhit-kotoryy-pomogaet-rossiyskim-voennym-sdavatsya-v-plen-opublikoval-opros-voennoplennyh
https://novyny.online.ua/zsu-vzyali-v-polon-rekordnu-kilkist-viyskovih-rf-na-tavriyskomu-napryamku_n860723/
Hi Tom Thank you for your report. I have a few questions:
1. Why ZSU isn't use Patriot to shot down a few UMPK carriers on the South
2. Was an activity of Ka 52 reduced due to airport strikes and work of spaa
3. What is an accuracy of UMPK
4.How significant is losses of VSRF artillery and how they influence on firepower of them
My pleasure.
Re. your questions, it's something like this:
1.) because the PSU hasn't got enough MIM-104 Patriot systems to cover more than Kyiv and some other places. It's going to take deliveries of another 10-15 systems to seriously start covering the frontline.
2.) Not sure it was reduced. The Russians are just releasing fewer videos of their operations. Might be that the ZSU got better in avoiding them.
3.) It should have a theoretical CEP of 30-50 metres. Means: about 50% of MPK/UMPK bombs should hit within 30-50 metres of their aiming point (target). In reality, it seems a significant portion is malfunctioning already on release, or shortly after. And since the Russians wouldn't let us know how many have they released so far, and Ukrainians wouldn't let us know how many have hit, nobody can say.
Indeed, in regards of 'accuracy' of Russian airborne weapons, I've got to 'warn', kind of: until today, official Moscow has never released even the figures for the effectiveness of such obsolete guided weapons like R-3S air-to-air missiles over Vietnam or the Middle East of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Thus, expecting it to now start releasing precise figures about MPK/UMPK-series.... that's simply not going to happen.
Germany announced today two more Patriot launchers for Ukraine, very small steps but in the right direction.
France also announced more Storm Shadows will be sent.
I did find an announcement by Saab of a large US order for GLSDBs so we can still hope, although that announcement seems to have disappeared.
Correction;
Some sources claim France is ending Scalp-EG missiles with 500 km range, known in the English world as Storm Shadows long range.
Just for humour, the comment by convicted terrorist Igor Girkin
"It's not even funny anymore.
Official Moscow Peskov: France's decision to transfer long-range missiles to Kyiv is erroneous and fraught with consequences for Ukraine itself, because Russia will take countermeasures.
What countermeasures are he talking about? It would be better if he just kept silent than to disgrace the whole world."
Thank you for answer As Ukraniane I noticed tendency that ZSU never made big encirclements during previous offensives. But purpose is to destroy Russians army so isn’t this tactic of slow offensive better in this case. Because it seems like Russians behave on Southern front like AI in some Wargames: player takes a point of interest and AI spams units to give it back that is good option for ZSU to destroy them. So, is an offensive succesful in this sense?
2. Does Bradley and Leopard have more potential to be repaired after damage than soviet stuff
3. Do you have any information about Kransnopol laser guided shell?
4. France gave SCALP missle. I’ve read somewhere that they have cluster warhead
@ ArturTomakhov
Bradleys and Leopards are better armoured than most Soviet stuff and on average Russian weapons are weaker than the newest Western stuff in Ukraine so they should be easier to repair.
Depends , of course, on available trained repair engineers and spare parts.
1.) As explained in the main feature today, and two days ago: yes, it is.
2.) Yup. Actually, most of Bradleys knocked out the last 5-6 weeks are meanwhile in the process of being re-built , some already back in operations (of course, there are total losses, too). On the other hand, those that are damaged are good decoys, because the Russians are eagerly spending 6-7-8 missiles at them.
3.) Nothing that wouldn't be available in the public.
4.) France is promising their SCALP-EG - and that after some should actually already be in Ukraine. SCALP-EG is the French version of the Storm Shadow. Not sure if there's a CBU-warhead for them though (but then, I'n not good at 'NATO').
Thanks for your time Tom. It's all so interesting. Must be terrible for the troops. Rob lee.
....which is why I'm always trying to focus on what matters to them.
(And here's a very good example on what matters to them: https://www.facebook.com/vostochniyvariant/posts/pfbid02MWvAaoqDmhfLdY6yCTj6Yiw6BDGb2GQrLtNDuGdGB2S9wyJppGu6c9S6ZaWGhbvul)
....instead of entire 'armies' of corrupt self-promoters in Vinius, Washington, Berlin, Paris and few other places, and in the social media....
Какова вероятность нарушения целостности Атомной Электростанции в Энергодаре? Учитывая опыт...
Спрашиваю, потому что уже больше недели паблики Украины только об этом и говорят.
Me thinks, that's another 'campaign of hysteria': it's attracting lots of public attention, thus generating 'clicks' on websites, or 'higher percentage of viewers' on the TV - and thus additional income for the media in question.
Actually, unless they start blowing up the reactors, directly, the probability is low.
All reactors in Enerhodar have received new 'armour capsules', in form of 1,5m thick concrete around them.
So, for example: if the Russians 'blow up the roof' of nearby buildings (which is where the SBU claimed the Russians have positioned explosives), or even 'blow up the roof of reactor buildings' - nothing happens to the reactors.
Приятная новость (для Украины) что бойцы АЗОВ вернулись из Турции... Хотя это нарушение каких-то договоров. Что думаете об этом?
Нарушение договора с постоянным нарушителем всех договоров. Давно пора так поступать.
Don't know what kind of a violation would that be? Of the Grain Deal? If so, Turkey also announced it's going to protect ships exporting Ukrainian grain in the future. So, there's little the Russians can do about it: an attack on Turkey would be an attack on NATO.
Говорилось, что бойцы АЗОВ выведенные из Мариуполя должны находится в Турции до конца военных действий. А их вернули раньше. Зерновая к этому, наверное, не имеет не какого отношения. Или я ошибаюсь
AFAIK, bringing them to Turkey - and keeping them there 'for the duration of the conflict' - was a condition for the Grain Deal.
Seems to me Erdogan is sensing weakness in Putin and so pushing him.
Look at Erdogan's strong statement supporting Ukraine for NATO.
Probably Erdogan is hoping for more concessions from Putin like cheap gas or whatever.
Erdogan is a typically big-mouthed populist, and as such an opportunist bent-over.
Whoever is patient in negotiations with him, gets what he wants.
More fighting talk from Erdogan, polishing his Islamic virtues
"Another reason why we are confident about the future of Ukraine is that the Crimean Tatars are zealously fighting for the freedom of their country,"
Many thanks for your valuable information. Maybe it would be interesting for you to comment the article by Konstantin Mashovets in Tverezo.info. It is about "the great plan of general Gerasimov" to prevent Ukrainian offensive by attacking in Svatovo region.
Have commented that above. Essentially, we're in agreement.
Let us hope this "great plan" will fail as his other great plans.
Thanks Tom I read this with great interest, and its all fairly good from my view, I'm just amazed at how the Rats have totally annihilated the ZSU in Oleshky at least 4 or 5 times I'll stay tuned
Very excellent and large analysis today, you provided some positive news but also its now clear is this is a really serious war where the Russians are committing all they can. 15-20k men added per month is alot but glad at least to know the manning levels of the Russian units. On the other topic, I really wonder what the Ukrainian military was doing in the South, in the early days of the war if the Russian military was able to just drive all the way to Mariupol. The commanders in that Operational zone need to be thoroughly investigated as well, not just the southern intelligence officers that betrayed Ukraine. Also I think the soldier in the interview is very naive to think Russian mortars could have been behind stopped the explosives from working on the bridge because the same fate befell the Antonovsky bridge. Sounds like sabotage to me. One thing I'm really wondering is the fate of Russian medium to long range SAM systems like S-300/400 and BUKs. Its hard to get estimates based off the AD units deployed for the war. I heard an expert say Russia has about 300 S-300/400 batteries in total(Both at home and deployed for the Ukraine war). Which sounded too small but I cant tell since Ukraine in the past had about 55 S-300P series batteries(27 in service before 2014). 300 systems for Russia may be accurate, but I'm sure you know better. And then how many BUK systems do they have in total and deployed for Ukraine?. I think this is something that needs exploring. One major thing you highlighted is how much Ukraine is focused on taking out the ground artillery launchers. Double digit daily losses of self propelled howitzers is great news although its reported Russia still has a large amount of the 3400 MLRS launchers they had deployed for this war. Ukrainian MOD has only recorded ~670 destroyed so far so seems those are going to remain a problem.
My pleasure.
Re. S-300/350/400.... I do not know exactly how many are in service, but doubt the number is higher than 50-60.
300 (+) such SAM-sites/battalions is somebody's daydreams. In reality: no way. Putin would've never spent so much of 'his' money for them.
Actually, there was always a chronic shortage of such systems in Russia. So much so, they were refusing to export even their older SAMs - like 'upgraded' Pechoras (SA-3) - even when customers were paying up front. They needed such old stuff for their own defence, because there was a shortage of S-300/350/400s.
3,400 MRLS'? Sorry, the most optimistic estimate I've heard was for around 1,300. And that was in July the last year. Say: 10+ TOS-1s, about 900 BM-21s, 150+ BM-27s, less than 100 BM-30s, and about 20 Tornado-S.
Thank you this clears up alot. For the 3400 MLRS at the start, I thought I read it from a report by RUSI a collaboration between Gen. Zabrodskyi and Jack Watling titled "Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion
of Ukraine: February–July 2022". But I cannot find it!!. Most likely I read 3400 howitzers and misremembered as for each howitzers and MLRS. But the paper as I read it now states Russia deployed around 1100 tube artillery pieces in the Donbas after the Kyiv defeat(which is basically the same as your figure of 1300). But for these ground artillery systems, how capable are they at replacing them?? Particularly the rocket artillery systems you mention. Because seems the Ukrainians are taking out like 2-5 a day.
On the other hand, I heard from Jason Bronk(air defence expert) in his recent video speech titled "New insights and lessons learned from Ukraine - how can Sweden contribute to NATO?"(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uxLwPb89azo). He states at 15-16 minute mark, Russia has around 300 such systems(short,medium and long range mobile AD systems) so I again I misheard thinking it was 300 long range systems. But how can they defend the large Russian airspace as well as the land they hold in Ukraine with only 50-60 S-300/400 batteries? On the other hand they must have so many Pantsirs, Kubs, BUKs, Tunguska. Its unbelievable just how dense Ukrainian SAM network was compared to Russia's even after the years of Russia trying to destroy the Ukrainian defence industry. Otherwise thank you for the great work.
Any news on the 10 plus destroyed Bradleys? This is during the last few days
I know about three that run into mines. Any evidence for '10 destroyed'?
Yes. The 12 destroyed Bradley M2A2s in Rabotino area
Russians are fighting very bravely
On the linked article about Ivan Sestryvatovskyi and the failure of Ukraine to destroy the bridges at Chonhar, you need to read the whole article to understand what when on February of 2022. In his words as summary:
"Why didn't the bridges blow up? I know the answer: either it was the work of a Russian sabotage group, or the wires were damaged by a mortar. I have no other answer, and I'm not looking for it."
He also postulates:
"I personally believe that had the bridges been blown up, it would not have stopped the [Russian - ed.] offensive. It would only delay it, but not for long – for an hour and a half, perhaps. They would just have thrown down pontoons. They were preparing for this war."
This is not denying the general staff has tried to minimize the event (or lack thereof). only that for one person in the know, Ivan Sestryvatovskyi, the bridges where mined and an attempt was made to detonate those mines.
If there is an overriding moral (sic) to the story, naive assumptions fail spectacularly in face of naked aggression. The bridges at Chonhar are yet another chapter.
If mortar fire was able to destroy the wire, it was badly done.
He forgets another option. What if the people that put the mines on got bribed to do it not properly.
Thank you and don't worry: I've read the whole article.
That's precisely the reason why am I not blaming the marine sappare in question, but asking questions which I'm asking.
Ivan Sestryvatovskyi if you believe his own words was not a "sapper". Maybe that was part of the problem in the fail attempt at destruction of Chonhar bridges.
As to the wider issue of why there was no response to Russian aggression, I don't see his story, as compelling as it is, as much relevance to where the rest of the Ukraine army, southern commend, was.
Of much more terminal interest to me is how the Russian army was able to cross the Dnipro River. Why wasn't the Antonivka Bridge blown up? I believe there were some arrests early on, but as the article referenced mentions, it is still ongoing.
"However, mind that at war no unit is permanently manned at 100%. "
Not even in peactime. Somebody is always sick, has a injury, is on holiday, maternity leave, detached to some training course etc. Same for the machines, always some BTR, tank, truck, gun is broken and in need of repairs or maintenance. Not even considering that you might have problems in staffing all your positions. Everybody has this problem. Some units are more prestigious than others and some locations are considered better than others. I have yet to see a single formation with 100% or close to it. The accepted norm is around 80-85% at all times.
Thank you for the update, Tom!
As i know 2 generals were fired after catastrophy in the south, Zelensky said something like some people need to decide to which country their loyalty lie, and these guys chosen poorly, attack from Crimea shoudnt have been succesfull.... Here is one of the articles on that subject.
https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news-2022-04-01/card/president-zelensky-fires-two-generals-cASwBg7pfy4FKlh2f25t
I've explained this already several times by now. But OK, here we go again....
Kryvoruchko was the Director SBU in Kherson. And Naumov the former Director SBU. Two intelligence people. No two military people.
Neither was in command of any ZSU unit as of early 2022. The SBU has no say in regards of commanding the ZSU.
...which is the point: it must've been somebody in the ZSU to have ordered the 53rd or 54th (home-based in Nova Kahkhovka) to Donbass, in early February, and then the 36th Naval Infantry - without its heavy arms - into southern Kherson, and to have mobilisied the Melitopol brigade only on the morning of 24th etc.
There was not a single ZSU brigade on the isthmus, otherwise, the Russians couldn't have reached Melitopol already on the morning of 25 February, or secured Kherson only two days later.
Thus, the traitor - or a super-incompetent idiot - is within the top ranks of the ZSU, not within the SBU.
What a disaster the south was. Thanks for explaining this the officer corps complicity in the whole thing
As far as I understand, much of the air defense was moved to Kyiv. Whatever units remained in the steppes of the South were extremely vulnerable.
Thx for clarification, and that is really a worrying prospect if that person is still in command, or better say "persons".