Ukraine War, 11 February 2024

Hello everybody!

As usually, Don will be back with his weekly-review, tomorrow. I’m ‘just jumping in’ with few comments and observations.

For the start, these days, we can watch, almost ‘live’, what happens when the West screws up so much with artillery ammunition supply for Ukraine, that things are ‘rapidly going downhill’. Combined with an ‘all-out’ Russian push on multiple points along the frontline, and adapted assault tactics – see ‘mining under enemy positions’ – this is enabling Pudding’s hordes significant advances in places where they have systematically failed over the last two years. And that at the time when, thanks to a major showdown between leading idiots in the US Congress, the Pentagon has run out of money to fund new weapons contracts for Kyiv, or funds that would allow it to take inventory from its stockpiles and ship these to Ukraine. With other words: Russia is exploiting its advantage in resources to make gains in few locations of its interest.

In Kyiv, meanwhile, and as far as political masters and higher commands of the ZSU are not busy fighting off repeated Russian missile strikes… General Syrsky has assumed the command of the ZSU, and promptly taken few steps. Those I’ve heard about are something as follows:

-          Rushing reserves to Avidiivka (word is: Syrsky promised Zelensky to hold the town)

-          Appointing his Deputy UAV Sector;

-          Appointing his Deputy Technologies & Innovations;

-          Appointing his Deputy Staff Training; and,

-          Appointing his Deputy Acquisitions.

From what I’ve heard, the officers in question are all though, combat-experienced professionals. So, no reason for anybody in Ukraine (or anywhere in the West), to panic: the war is not lost because Zaluzhny is out of his office.

(Well, with exception of the Deputy Acquisitions: RUMINT has it, his first action in new position was to – inadvertently – erase all the files from all the PCs in his department…shit happens, especially in a rush….)

BATTLE FOR DONBAS

Regarding the situation on the battlefields: as so often the last few months, I’m too short on time. Thus, I’ll focus on three points.

Siversk….

The first is Bilohorivka (the one on the Siversky Donets), because it’s such a typical example. Early in the morning of 31 January, a squad of Russians has managed to infiltrate the Ukrainian positions on the north-eastern side of the (completely ruined) village. They were discovered when it was almost too late, and a fire-fight ensued at ranges of 5-10 metres. Everything was happening under the ruins of houses, and thus the UAVs were useless. Only one Ukrainian soldier has survived the battle: after witnessing the death of his comrades, he called for artillery fire on his position.

Although several M777 towed-howitzers were available, none fired – because there are no shells for them. A week later, it looks like the ZSU has lost the eastern side of the village, but the soldier that called for artillery fire on his position was found - wounded and weak, but still alive…

Avidiivka…

The last two weeks, the Russian Air-Space Force (VKS) flew one of most-intensive series of glide-bomb attacks so far. Almost constant air strikes began on 1 and 2 February. Here’s one of (many) videos of resulting strikes. In the course of one of them, on 7 February, the Russian MiG-31s or Su-35s have shot down the PSU’s Su-25  flown by Vladyslav Rykov, using an R-37 long-range, air-to-air missile. Ukrainian pilot was killed. (Notably: the Russians claimed a ‘MiG-29’).

Then, on 8 February alone, the Russian Su-34s have released over 50 MPK/UMPKs – all on Avidiivka. Between others, glide bombs have targeted tall buildings in the town, because these were extensively used by Ukrainian anti-tank-guided-missile-teams (ATGM-teams), and snipers. This bombardment was  supported by comprehensive activity of the VKS against Ukrainian ground-based air defences. Although releasing no details (mind: I’m not talking about releases by the Keystone Cops in Moscow), they seem to be quite satisfied with results. There’s not a beep in this regards from the Ukrainian side, which usually means nothing good.

This volume of air strikes was not for nothing, but run in support of a massive ground attack underway since around 1 February. This is primarily aiming to break through the Ukrainian 110^th Mech Brigade along the northern edges of Avidiivka, and reach the Road O0542.

By now it’s clear: the Russians have breached Ukrainian defences there and drove deep into northern Avidiivka. No surprise, considering several companies of the 110th Mech were down to 35-40 troops…. Indeed, for a few days, reports streaming from the area were indicating a ‘chaos’: essentially, despite suffering murderous losses in vehicles (especially armour), the Russian infantry was scattered ‘everywhere’ in northern Avidiivka and all the way to the Industrial Zone north of the town. Something like on the map below (from the Russian social media, obviously):  

Sometimes around 7 or 8 February - and something like ‘in the last minute’ - at least a part of the 3^rd Assault Brigade arrived on the scene, together with a few M2 Bradleys they’ve received recently.

The way things are looking right now, the 3^rd seems to have stopped the Russian push about 150 metres short of the Industrialny Avenue (i.e. the O0542) – foremost because the unit arrived together with plentiful supply of ammo for its 120mm mortars. The latter are ‘working non-stop’, ever since, though: thus, the question is when might they run out of ammunition…

Obviously, the O0542 is of crucial importance because it’s the last tarmacked connection to the garrison further south. Arguably, there are two other roads, including a tarmacked road from Sieverne to the town, but this is exposed to the Russian fire (which, in turn, is the reason for severe activity of ZSU’s FPV-drones against Russian positions further south, in between of Vodiane and Opytne). The third is a field way, not really suitable for movement of heavy wheeled vehicles, like trucks hauling supplies, ammunition, and reinforcements).

In southern Avidiivka, on 9 February, the Russians reported to have overcome one of major Ukrainian positions ‘east of Opytne’. Read: they have managed to continue their push along the Sportyvna and Chernyshevskoho Streets. Hard to gauge how much – even more so because they’re constantly under attacks of Ukrainian FPVs, and that along both of these roads, and all the way back to their starting positions, south of the town.

Bottom line, the situation in Avidiivka is nearing the point at which the ZSU will either have to start withdrawing its garrison from positions along the H20 and in the eastern parts of the town, or….which is something I’m not expecting to happen: launch a major counterattack into the flanks of either the northern or southern Russian push around the town. However, for a counteroffensive, the ZSU would need artillery ammunition and air defences: right now, it’s not getting even enough artillery shells for defence…

….which in turn is making the Ukrainian hold on positions in Stepove (north of Avidiivka), the Industrial Zone (north-west of Avidiivka), and Sieverne (west of Avidiivka), of crucial importance – because these are going to be directions in which the Russians are going to try pushing as next, if they didn’t already try to get there (like in the case of Stepove, which they’re trying to reach for something like two months, meanwhile).

Finally, Novomykhailivka…

This is a village south of Mariinka… indeed, something like half-way between Mariinka in the north and Vuheldar in the south. And the situation there is critical. As of Tuesday, the Russians were pushing into the village from three sides: the push from the north-east was repelled by Ukrainians, but the one from the south-east has reached the village.

Mind this place, please: it’s of crucial importance for the defence of Vuhledar.

***

For the end, one – I think - important impression about latest developments within the VSRF (Armed Forces of the Russian Federation). Word is that the conditions of service are massively improving. Unlike the situation from the last summer, nowadays, both ‘kontraktinki’ (contract troops, i.e. professionals), and ‘mobiks’ (mobilised reservists), are not ‘rushed straight to the front’, with only a bare minimum of training (if any). On the contrary: at least I’m getting to hear about careful preparations, including at least two months of good tactical training. There are even reports about exams for non-commissioned officers and lower-ranking officers, before appointing them in command of anything. Contract-troops are meanwhile granted permission for vacation, too. Usually, this is lasting two weeks. After the vacation, they’re not rushed back to the frontline, but sent for two weeks of re-training. And nobody is complaining about the lack of equipment and arms… (at least not to me: exceptions in the social media are a different story, of course).

Means: because the West has failed to ship the ammo and heavy equipment it has promised it would ship, the VSRF has got plentiful of time (8 months, meanwhile), to rebuild its manpower. Even its massive casualties of the last three months were not enough to change anything about this. Or the Ukrainian claims in this regards were massively exaggerated. Or (and worst of all): both of this…

Of course, the replacement of all the heavy equipment is going to be a bit harder, but,

a)       Even the Keystone Cops in Moscow are meanwhile something like a year ahead of NATO in bolstering their industrial output, and

b)      as long as there are old T-55s, T-62s, and M-46s around: ‘there are enough tanks and guns to keep on pushing’ and thus ‘no problem’ for Moscow.

Cannot but end this one with a my expression of gratitude: special thanks for your skilled statesmanship and farsight, Mr. Biden, Mr. Scholz, Mr. Macron, Mr. Sunak & Co KG GesmbH AG SPA, plus all the armies of your super-clever advisors…