What % of the issues the Ukrainians are facing, a direct result of them not putting enough resources and thought into constructing adequate defensive positions during the summer?
It's hard to put a percentage on all the factors but the state of defensive positions is definitely one factor.
It's easy to take for granted the videos showing one round land at a time. Sometimes that round can have a devastating effect on the enemy. Most times it will have no effect or a partial effect with other troops and vehicles surviving to run away. The NATO standard is to have six rounds landing at the same time. It's devastating and it's much less likely that people and equipment in the impact zone will survive. NATO even trains to fire three rounds into the air at different trajectories so they will all land at about the same time. This video just shows one gun. Imagine if there were five more: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t2EP-_IMbpQ
But Ukraine doesn't have enough ammo to do that. Even the West doesn't have enough ammo to do that in a sustained conventional war. Two years after it was clear there wasn't enough ammo the West still isn't making the commitment to produce ammo in sufficient quantities, for Ukraine or themselves. But that's out of Ukraine's control.
Russia has long believed in the power of Electronic Warfare and they produced the equipment and trained their personnel to use it. Just like the aircraft of WW1, drones are evolving as a dominant force in this war. 80-90% of Ukraine's drone losses have been because of Russian EW. They've focused their EW assets around Kupiansk (because drones and smart munitions were destroying their artillery), Bakhmut and Avdiivka. EW support in Avdiivka led to Russian air superiority in the drone battlespace. This impacted kamikaze drones, drones that dropped munitions and observation drones. The observation drones improved the effectiveness of Russian artillery and artillery remains the largest producer of casualties in this war. But two weeks ago, Ukraine did something to change the equation and they now have EW superiority. As a result, Ukrainian drone attacks have dramatically increased and Russian drone attacks have decreased by the same margin. This also means Russian observation drones are impacted and the effect of Russian artillery has decreased. In the EW battlespace, for every move there is a counter, and also a counter to that counter. It's hard to say how long Ukraine will have this advantage but for now it is saving Ukrainian lives.
Training is another issue. There are plenty of shortcomings in NATO's training of Ukrainian troops but that doesn't relieve Ukraine of its responsibilities. They can, at a minimum, make sure each replacement is fully trained to a universal standard of basic skills, but replacements are arriving at units poorly trained. Also, most of the actions I've seen on videos are squad, platoon, or (rarely) a company-sized action. To be sure, combined arms operations at the battalion and brigade level is a difficult skill to attain. Ukraine didn't begin the war with that skill and they don't have the luxury to develop it in peacetime. But they're also not developing the skill through the bitter experience of war, either. This is their responsibility.
One of those basic skills is defensive operations, and defensive positions is a core skill. Mobilized Russian soldiers are poorly trained but they dig. They dig because it's important to Russia's senior leadership, so that makes it important to Russia's junior leadership. It's party of their army's culture and they do it well. It's not part of Ukraine's military culture and that's because senior leadership isn't making it a priority and holding junior leadership accountable. So, as with training, it all depends on the leadership and culture of the individual units. Some units dig in. Others do not. And the thing about the defense is that it's never completed. There's always something to be maintained, repaired, improved, or extended.
It's a basic fundamental problem that has impacted the entire war. So many times a Ukrainian squad or platoon has taken a position and is unable to hold onto it. Instead of taking a small piece of land, holding onto it, and then taking another piece of land, the same piece of land is fought over in a seesaw battle. A squad or platoon will take a tree line and try and dig in only to be forced back by one or more waves of Russian attacks. This happens time and time again.
The problem goes back to combined arms operations. It's the squad or platoon's job to seize the territory and hold onto it. It's the company's, battalion's and brigade's job to make sure they have the time to do so. Generally speaking (and there are exceptions), don't send them to assault unless you can protect them during and after the assault. Make sure your Bradley's, Leopards, drones, mortars and artillery not only support their attack, but also are ready to engage with any Russian counter attack. If the Russians engage them with mortars and artillery, make sure your drones and artillery can provide effective counter-battery. Combined arms can also be used to support small operations, but so many operations are individual isolated efforts.
There are examples of well-trained, well-led units but it is universally uneven in the Ukrainian army. Digging in is a vital component to survivability but ultimately it is a leadership responsibility to make sure it happens. For all the wonderful things the Ukrainian army has done, this is one area where they can definitely improve. Again, look at the Russian army with all its training shortcomings. They still manage to build trenches, communication trenches (to bring up replacements and supplies between trenches) and tunnels. Tunnels. The least Ukraine can do is dig a trench. They need to develop that culture.
Tom stressed it several times that ru has a max training capacity of 15-20k per month. What is the same for ua? I assume it must be much smaller. (why? what exactly is training capacity?). Im asking because it s been widely circulating ua media that we need 20k conscripts monthly. So im trying to understand is this some sort of media bullshit getting society ready for smth or real need and capability.
It's my understanding that Ukraine cannot train large amount of troops inside UA territory, because training camps are prime targets for ballistic missiles. And that makes it much harder to train troops in adequate quantities and quality. Ukraine needs to use training facilities in some NATO countries for this, but this puts limits to the amount of new recruits to be accepted/trained.
Hence the reliance on veterans of the battles from 2014 and onward, leading to age averages of 43+ years in the Ukraine army.
The average age is high because mobilization effectively starts from 27 to 60. With median exactly at 43.5 . And secondary factor mobilization was hash for countryside which has and older population.
It's much quicker to mobilize veterans of the wars of 2014-2022 in Donbas region than training fresh recruits. But Ukraine will need to refresh the armed forces instead of exhausting their veteran resources who are still trained in old Soviet era doctrines etc.
Indeed: in the ZSU there are entire brigades staffed entirely by troops from the Donbas.
I think, this is one of PR-points Kyiv is constantly failing to score: it should better underline that this is not just a war against the Russian invasion. For people in question, it is a war for _liberty_ of their homeland, and that of so many families they've had to leave behind under the Russian occupation.
Please mind that this rate is changing - indeed: increasing - with the time. The more time passes by, the more troops the Russians can train, because they're constantly expanding their training capacity.
So, what was valid in this regards early this year, is not valid any more. Meanwhile, I would gauge the Russian training capacity with 25,000-30,000 troops a month.
Not entirely clear to me. The ZSU has a fundamentally different training system, taking much longer and emphasising quality over quantity. And lots of ZSU troops is meanwhile trained outside the country: apparently, this is including at least 'entire battalions', if not entire brigades. Can't follow all of this at once, thus not sure. We'll try to find out, though.
What does it all means while a disgusting show is taking place in the USA! Maybe this show of political puppets is the only decisive thing of this winter campaign.
Thanks Tom! Waiting impatiently for the latest updates
What % of the issues the Ukrainians are facing, a direct result of them not putting enough resources and thought into constructing adequate defensive positions during the summer?
It's hard to put a percentage on all the factors but the state of defensive positions is definitely one factor.
It's easy to take for granted the videos showing one round land at a time. Sometimes that round can have a devastating effect on the enemy. Most times it will have no effect or a partial effect with other troops and vehicles surviving to run away. The NATO standard is to have six rounds landing at the same time. It's devastating and it's much less likely that people and equipment in the impact zone will survive. NATO even trains to fire three rounds into the air at different trajectories so they will all land at about the same time. This video just shows one gun. Imagine if there were five more: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t2EP-_IMbpQ
But Ukraine doesn't have enough ammo to do that. Even the West doesn't have enough ammo to do that in a sustained conventional war. Two years after it was clear there wasn't enough ammo the West still isn't making the commitment to produce ammo in sufficient quantities, for Ukraine or themselves. But that's out of Ukraine's control.
Russia has long believed in the power of Electronic Warfare and they produced the equipment and trained their personnel to use it. Just like the aircraft of WW1, drones are evolving as a dominant force in this war. 80-90% of Ukraine's drone losses have been because of Russian EW. They've focused their EW assets around Kupiansk (because drones and smart munitions were destroying their artillery), Bakhmut and Avdiivka. EW support in Avdiivka led to Russian air superiority in the drone battlespace. This impacted kamikaze drones, drones that dropped munitions and observation drones. The observation drones improved the effectiveness of Russian artillery and artillery remains the largest producer of casualties in this war. But two weeks ago, Ukraine did something to change the equation and they now have EW superiority. As a result, Ukrainian drone attacks have dramatically increased and Russian drone attacks have decreased by the same margin. This also means Russian observation drones are impacted and the effect of Russian artillery has decreased. In the EW battlespace, for every move there is a counter, and also a counter to that counter. It's hard to say how long Ukraine will have this advantage but for now it is saving Ukrainian lives.
Training is another issue. There are plenty of shortcomings in NATO's training of Ukrainian troops but that doesn't relieve Ukraine of its responsibilities. They can, at a minimum, make sure each replacement is fully trained to a universal standard of basic skills, but replacements are arriving at units poorly trained. Also, most of the actions I've seen on videos are squad, platoon, or (rarely) a company-sized action. To be sure, combined arms operations at the battalion and brigade level is a difficult skill to attain. Ukraine didn't begin the war with that skill and they don't have the luxury to develop it in peacetime. But they're also not developing the skill through the bitter experience of war, either. This is their responsibility.
One of those basic skills is defensive operations, and defensive positions is a core skill. Mobilized Russian soldiers are poorly trained but they dig. They dig because it's important to Russia's senior leadership, so that makes it important to Russia's junior leadership. It's party of their army's culture and they do it well. It's not part of Ukraine's military culture and that's because senior leadership isn't making it a priority and holding junior leadership accountable. So, as with training, it all depends on the leadership and culture of the individual units. Some units dig in. Others do not. And the thing about the defense is that it's never completed. There's always something to be maintained, repaired, improved, or extended.
It's a basic fundamental problem that has impacted the entire war. So many times a Ukrainian squad or platoon has taken a position and is unable to hold onto it. Instead of taking a small piece of land, holding onto it, and then taking another piece of land, the same piece of land is fought over in a seesaw battle. A squad or platoon will take a tree line and try and dig in only to be forced back by one or more waves of Russian attacks. This happens time and time again.
The problem goes back to combined arms operations. It's the squad or platoon's job to seize the territory and hold onto it. It's the company's, battalion's and brigade's job to make sure they have the time to do so. Generally speaking (and there are exceptions), don't send them to assault unless you can protect them during and after the assault. Make sure your Bradley's, Leopards, drones, mortars and artillery not only support their attack, but also are ready to engage with any Russian counter attack. If the Russians engage them with mortars and artillery, make sure your drones and artillery can provide effective counter-battery. Combined arms can also be used to support small operations, but so many operations are individual isolated efforts.
There are examples of well-trained, well-led units but it is universally uneven in the Ukrainian army. Digging in is a vital component to survivability but ultimately it is a leadership responsibility to make sure it happens. For all the wonderful things the Ukrainian army has done, this is one area where they can definitely improve. Again, look at the Russian army with all its training shortcomings. They still manage to build trenches, communication trenches (to bring up replacements and supplies between trenches) and tunnels. Tunnels. The least Ukraine can do is dig a trench. They need to develop that culture.
Tom stressed it several times that ru has a max training capacity of 15-20k per month. What is the same for ua? I assume it must be much smaller. (why? what exactly is training capacity?). Im asking because it s been widely circulating ua media that we need 20k conscripts monthly. So im trying to understand is this some sort of media bullshit getting society ready for smth or real need and capability.
It's my understanding that Ukraine cannot train large amount of troops inside UA territory, because training camps are prime targets for ballistic missiles. And that makes it much harder to train troops in adequate quantities and quality. Ukraine needs to use training facilities in some NATO countries for this, but this puts limits to the amount of new recruits to be accepted/trained.
Hence the reliance on veterans of the battles from 2014 and onward, leading to age averages of 43+ years in the Ukraine army.
(this is my own guess, and I may be wrong)
The average age is high because mobilization effectively starts from 27 to 60. With median exactly at 43.5 . And secondary factor mobilization was hash for countryside which has and older population.
It's much quicker to mobilize veterans of the wars of 2014-2022 in Donbas region than training fresh recruits. But Ukraine will need to refresh the armed forces instead of exhausting their veteran resources who are still trained in old Soviet era doctrines etc.
Indeed: in the ZSU there are entire brigades staffed entirely by troops from the Donbas.
I think, this is one of PR-points Kyiv is constantly failing to score: it should better underline that this is not just a war against the Russian invasion. For people in question, it is a war for _liberty_ of their homeland, and that of so many families they've had to leave behind under the Russian occupation.
Please mind that this rate is changing - indeed: increasing - with the time. The more time passes by, the more troops the Russians can train, because they're constantly expanding their training capacity.
So, what was valid in this regards early this year, is not valid any more. Meanwhile, I would gauge the Russian training capacity with 25,000-30,000 troops a month.
Thank you.
What about Ukraine?
What is the monthly limit? What are the limiting factors?
Not entirely clear to me. The ZSU has a fundamentally different training system, taking much longer and emphasising quality over quantity. And lots of ZSU troops is meanwhile trained outside the country: apparently, this is including at least 'entire battalions', if not entire brigades. Can't follow all of this at once, thus not sure. We'll try to find out, though.
What can you say about what Repke writes about the possible retreat of Ukraine from many positions such as Kupyansk, Avdeevka, Liman, etc.?
Oh these chatterboxes having a good time in security and writing speculations about the battlefield!
Sorry, neither of us is making any kind of predictions.
What does it all means while a disgusting show is taking place in the USA! Maybe this show of political puppets is the only decisive thing of this winter campaign.