Hello everybody! As announced yesterday, here are few details on one of latest Ukrainian counterattacks in Bakhmut. Guess, you’ve ‘heard‘ it in the social media, meanwhile: essentially, Prigorzhin is complaining about ‘some 72nd Brigade’ and this running away; losing kilometres of frontline; he’s fiercely complaining about the Keystone Cops in Moscow, and that Wagner had to save the day….and you might have heard about the 3
I do wonder if there will be any major counteroffensive actions around Bakhmut when the main counteroffensive begins. They haven't really had time to build those defensive lines like in the south there, since they are still on an offensive footing.
This action does, however, give an insight into Russian morale. Russia will inevitably have to counterattack when/if the Ukrainians attack. For Putin, this action does not bode well. Every army has a breaking point. We can only wait and see.
Thank you for the update and great news at the front. Seems things are starting to change and its great the West is providing more artillery as requested for by Ukraine. As they say, trust the ZSU. They have definitely proven Western military planners wrong about Bakhmut(And in a nice way). Otherwise going by the Russian parade, it seems the Russian army has been seriously mauled in terms of equipment beyond what we can see via OSINT. Not a single modern tank or howitzer. I would have expected them to have some T-80s or T-90Ms to show off but this is so strange and embarrassing. Surely they should still have some modern tanks protecting Moscow that they could have gotten from just for the show?
What would Ukrainian success look like? Probably not clearing all the way to Sevastopol, but ZSU should persuade UA public and allies that ZSU with proper support is on the right way to victory.
BTW. No flamewar about "proper support", sight, yes, EU could to provide much more and faster. (Instead of typing useless answers to Internet, contact your politicians or send few bugs to https://www.weaponstoukraine.com/ )
Now it's clear why Zelenski V. O. was desperately stopping ZSU for months after Kherson liberation from any kind of attack on positions of ruscist occupants, wasting large amount of munition, lives of Ukrainian soldiers in Bahmut, instead of counter-attacking in South to liberate Ukrainian territory where ruscists are weaker, he was afraid of his fellow ruscist occupants will run away, crashing entire putler's SVO.
Nice development. Epecially in the face of all the Russian propaganda going around for the last few months in the line of "Russia controls 80% of Bakhmut, Ukrainians lost almost all their army defending it and are at the mercy of Putin". Overall I don't think many people are on the "Ukraine will crush Russia and go to Moscow" bandwagon. It's more like when there is lack of verifyable details smart people will stay silent and only fools think they have something worthwhile to say.
This mini-offensive feels like a test - for Ukrainian command themselves to assess the power of their offensive brigades before they commit them to more risky actions.
If the Russians built "terrible" defense lines with minefields and "dragons" - maybe then it makes sense to break through their defenses in those places from where they climb out - defeating their formations in bakhmut and through it go into the Russian rear. When they are hit hard and unexpectedly, they run well.
An excellent update with a sober warning against "home by Christmas" rhetoric. Your comment on the fast Russian movement of reserves begs the question of what is known about their reserves? Part of an effective defense has to be some sort of rapid reaction force of considerable size? While convicts have been expended have some of the recently mobilised been used to form a reserve? These things should all be a given but there seems to be no limit to their incompetence.
While Tom fairly complains about throughput in his summaries, I had figured that as of the one-year anniversary the Ukrainians should have had around 500K 155mm shells stockpiled alone. Since the US for its part stopped publishing numbers of shells transferred in Jan/Feb, it's more difficult to say what Ukraine has received or bought in the past 2 months.
500K is exactly enough, I previously 'calculated' in the fall, for one month of strategic offensives, accounting for regular operations away from the main effort as well as provisioning an emergency reserve.
Some breakdown of the numbers:
Ukraine has long maintained that they fire around 3K 155mm a day, on average. Round it up to 100K a month, starting from May, when Western artillery first became a meaningful asset on the battlefield. 10 months from May through February, so 10*100 = 1 million. And indeed, the Pentagon leak indicated that around 1 million shells should have been expended by the end of the past February.
Based on those mostly-public statements of PDA transfers by the USG, the US should have donated at least 1.2 million 155mm shells in 12 months (around 1 million by December). Let's say 1.25 million. The UK IIRC made an official statement on having donated 100K in the first year, with an intent to supply another 100K in the second year: 1.35 million. Other countries individually donated very small quantities in that time period (e.g. a few thousand from France), but cumulatively and including market purchases it should easily be at least 1.5 million. But what precisely Ukraine has purchased or received direct from manufacturers is almost unknowable.
Ukraine has of course received further donations in March and April, of unknown quantity. Let's assume these have been enough to cover ongoing operational usage. So there you have it, 500K+ 155mm stockpiled.
(As for 122/152mm, between the initial stock, donations, purchases, and captures, I would assume Ukraine has had at least 2 million of these so far, but with at least 80-90% already expended. Ukraine's stock and throughput probably only allows a consistent usage of ~1K shells per day of these Soviet calibers.)
Since the current Russian officer class was dismissed three weeks earlier than usual because they are obviously needed directly at the front, I wonder whether the Russian military has changed the training of its officers as a result of the experiences in Ukraine.
Apparently, the commanders there are making some mistakes objectively, and I wonder if the next generation of officers will just as stubbornly conduct their missions according to the old Russian military doctrine or if (God forbid) the Russian military will learn from its mistakes and adapt the training and requirements will change/modernize future officers. But I think that hardly anyone will get good information from outside.
I do wonder if there will be any major counteroffensive actions around Bakhmut when the main counteroffensive begins. They haven't really had time to build those defensive lines like in the south there, since they are still on an offensive footing.
This action does, however, give an insight into Russian morale. Russia will inevitably have to counterattack when/if the Ukrainians attack. For Putin, this action does not bode well. Every army has a breaking point. We can only wait and see.
Superb article ! Thanks a million Tom !
Thank you for the update and great news at the front. Seems things are starting to change and its great the West is providing more artillery as requested for by Ukraine. As they say, trust the ZSU. They have definitely proven Western military planners wrong about Bakhmut(And in a nice way). Otherwise going by the Russian parade, it seems the Russian army has been seriously mauled in terms of equipment beyond what we can see via OSINT. Not a single modern tank or howitzer. I would have expected them to have some T-80s or T-90Ms to show off but this is so strange and embarrassing. Surely they should still have some modern tanks protecting Moscow that they could have gotten from just for the show?
Thanks a lot Tom
Best wishes
Tom spot on sahh. 🇬🇧👍🇬🇧
Thank you, as usual.
Some people in media need to spend a few days under artillery fire to calm down...
:-/
What would Ukrainian success look like? Probably not clearing all the way to Sevastopol, but ZSU should persuade UA public and allies that ZSU with proper support is on the right way to victory.
https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/ukraine-set-to-strike-back-but-what-would-success-look-like-20230502-p5d4ub.html
BTW. No flamewar about "proper support", sight, yes, EU could to provide much more and faster. (Instead of typing useless answers to Internet, contact your politicians or send few bugs to https://www.weaponstoukraine.com/ )
Now it's clear why Zelenski V. O. was desperately stopping ZSU for months after Kherson liberation from any kind of attack on positions of ruscist occupants, wasting large amount of munition, lives of Ukrainian soldiers in Bahmut, instead of counter-attacking in South to liberate Ukrainian territory where ruscists are weaker, he was afraid of his fellow ruscist occupants will run away, crashing entire putler's SVO.
Nice development. Epecially in the face of all the Russian propaganda going around for the last few months in the line of "Russia controls 80% of Bakhmut, Ukrainians lost almost all their army defending it and are at the mercy of Putin". Overall I don't think many people are on the "Ukraine will crush Russia and go to Moscow" bandwagon. It's more like when there is lack of verifyable details smart people will stay silent and only fools think they have something worthwhile to say.
This mini-offensive feels like a test - for Ukrainian command themselves to assess the power of their offensive brigades before they commit them to more risky actions.
If the Russians built "terrible" defense lines with minefields and "dragons" - maybe then it makes sense to break through their defenses in those places from where they climb out - defeating their formations in bakhmut and through it go into the Russian rear. When they are hit hard and unexpectedly, they run well.
An excellent update with a sober warning against "home by Christmas" rhetoric. Your comment on the fast Russian movement of reserves begs the question of what is known about their reserves? Part of an effective defense has to be some sort of rapid reaction force of considerable size? While convicts have been expended have some of the recently mobilised been used to form a reserve? These things should all be a given but there seems to be no limit to their incompetence.
A comment on artillery ammo:
While Tom fairly complains about throughput in his summaries, I had figured that as of the one-year anniversary the Ukrainians should have had around 500K 155mm shells stockpiled alone. Since the US for its part stopped publishing numbers of shells transferred in Jan/Feb, it's more difficult to say what Ukraine has received or bought in the past 2 months.
500K is exactly enough, I previously 'calculated' in the fall, for one month of strategic offensives, accounting for regular operations away from the main effort as well as provisioning an emergency reserve.
Some breakdown of the numbers:
Ukraine has long maintained that they fire around 3K 155mm a day, on average. Round it up to 100K a month, starting from May, when Western artillery first became a meaningful asset on the battlefield. 10 months from May through February, so 10*100 = 1 million. And indeed, the Pentagon leak indicated that around 1 million shells should have been expended by the end of the past February.
Based on those mostly-public statements of PDA transfers by the USG, the US should have donated at least 1.2 million 155mm shells in 12 months (around 1 million by December). Let's say 1.25 million. The UK IIRC made an official statement on having donated 100K in the first year, with an intent to supply another 100K in the second year: 1.35 million. Other countries individually donated very small quantities in that time period (e.g. a few thousand from France), but cumulatively and including market purchases it should easily be at least 1.5 million. But what precisely Ukraine has purchased or received direct from manufacturers is almost unknowable.
Ukraine has of course received further donations in March and April, of unknown quantity. Let's assume these have been enough to cover ongoing operational usage. So there you have it, 500K+ 155mm stockpiled.
(As for 122/152mm, between the initial stock, donations, purchases, and captures, I would assume Ukraine has had at least 2 million of these so far, but with at least 80-90% already expended. Ukraine's stock and throughput probably only allows a consistent usage of ~1K shells per day of these Soviet calibers.)
Since the current Russian officer class was dismissed three weeks earlier than usual because they are obviously needed directly at the front, I wonder whether the Russian military has changed the training of its officers as a result of the experiences in Ukraine.
Apparently, the commanders there are making some mistakes objectively, and I wonder if the next generation of officers will just as stubbornly conduct their missions according to the old Russian military doctrine or if (God forbid) the Russian military will learn from its mistakes and adapt the training and requirements will change/modernize future officers. But I think that hardly anyone will get good information from outside.
Well, Uncle Fester Prigozhin wanted ammo, the Ukrainian Army obliged...
We have seen footage of Ukrainians training paratroopers. Could a combat jump be on the table?