I do wonder if there will be any major counteroffensive actions around Bakhmut when the main counteroffensive begins. They haven't really had time to build those defensive lines like in the south there, since they are still on an offensive footing.
This action does, however, give an insight into Russian morale. Russia will inevitably have to counterattack when/if the Ukrainians attack. For Putin, this action does not bode well. Every army has a breaking point. We can only wait and see.
Russian social media demonstrates a lot of fear of the counter offensive. There is a chance, admittedly a very small one, that Russia will cut and run - if they run past their third line then....
Thank you for the update and great news at the front. Seems things are starting to change and its great the West is providing more artillery as requested for by Ukraine. As they say, trust the ZSU. They have definitely proven Western military planners wrong about Bakhmut(And in a nice way). Otherwise going by the Russian parade, it seems the Russian army has been seriously mauled in terms of equipment beyond what we can see via OSINT. Not a single modern tank or howitzer. I would have expected them to have some T-80s or T-90Ms to show off but this is so strange and embarrassing. Surely they should still have some modern tanks protecting Moscow that they could have gotten from just for the show?
Russia had about a 100 of T90Ms, according to Oryx - 19 lost, means at least 25-30. So, up to 70 remaining and surely they are all “in fields and forests”. Plus, parade troops are Kantemirov and Taman divisions: both very badly beaten by ZSU and now deployed between Svatove and Kreminna. So, even theoretically no tanks on parade were possible, especially T90Ms
I don't think we can draw conclusions from the parade. They might have decided to use few equipment, because they wanted to suggest that they take the war very seriously, and are not removing anything for the parade etc. It's a simbolic event and the contents are dictated by this. (I do think they had serious losses, I just don't think the parade is a good indicator)
Exactly. Anyone outside the Kremlin telling us why the parade was this or that is simply guessing. Perhaps an educated guess, but likely still just a guess. My guess: Anyone who knows isn't sharing with the rest of us.
They have still many of T-80s or T-90s, but could not show them on the parade for political reasons. If they would do it, Prigozhin and other far right nationalists would curse Shoigu and Gerasimov that they are making a show while the armor should be at the frontlines. (Similarly for Armata tanks.)
They normally have the handful of "new" T-14 Armatas in the parade, but there is a rumour that they're en-route to Ukraine as the latest entry in the turret-tossing competition.
What would Ukrainian success look like? Probably not clearing all the way to Sevastopol, but ZSU should persuade UA public and allies that ZSU with proper support is on the right way to victory.
BTW. No flamewar about "proper support", sight, yes, EU could to provide much more and faster. (Instead of typing useless answers to Internet, contact your politicians or send few bugs to https://www.weaponstoukraine.com/ )
Now it's clear why Zelenski V. O. was desperately stopping ZSU for months after Kherson liberation from any kind of attack on positions of ruscist occupants, wasting large amount of munition, lives of Ukrainian soldiers in Bahmut, instead of counter-attacking in South to liberate Ukrainian territory where ruscists are weaker, he was afraid of his fellow ruscist occupants will run away, crashing entire putler's SVO.
Nice development. Epecially in the face of all the Russian propaganda going around for the last few months in the line of "Russia controls 80% of Bakhmut, Ukrainians lost almost all their army defending it and are at the mercy of Putin". Overall I don't think many people are on the "Ukraine will crush Russia and go to Moscow" bandwagon. It's more like when there is lack of verifyable details smart people will stay silent and only fools think they have something worthwhile to say.
This mini-offensive feels like a test - for Ukrainian command themselves to assess the power of their offensive brigades before they commit them to more risky actions.
True, Russia could as well have conquered 100% of Bakhmut and a bunch of other towns and it would still have not changed anything. Russia lost this war 2-3 weeks after starting it, when it became clear it will not take Kyiv and thus has no realistic path towards forcing acceptance of its territorial claims outside the wet dreams of some idiots. Watching fights over dumpsters near the ruins of Bakhmut has as much point as explaining horizon effects to flat-earthers and yet... here we are doing it.
If the Russians built "terrible" defense lines with minefields and "dragons" - maybe then it makes sense to break through their defenses in those places from where they climb out - defeating their formations in bakhmut and through it go into the Russian rear. When they are hit hard and unexpectedly, they run well.
An excellent update with a sober warning against "home by Christmas" rhetoric. Your comment on the fast Russian movement of reserves begs the question of what is known about their reserves? Part of an effective defense has to be some sort of rapid reaction force of considerable size? While convicts have been expended have some of the recently mobilised been used to form a reserve? These things should all be a given but there seems to be no limit to their incompetence.
While Tom fairly complains about throughput in his summaries, I had figured that as of the one-year anniversary the Ukrainians should have had around 500K 155mm shells stockpiled alone. Since the US for its part stopped publishing numbers of shells transferred in Jan/Feb, it's more difficult to say what Ukraine has received or bought in the past 2 months.
500K is exactly enough, I previously 'calculated' in the fall, for one month of strategic offensives, accounting for regular operations away from the main effort as well as provisioning an emergency reserve.
Some breakdown of the numbers:
Ukraine has long maintained that they fire around 3K 155mm a day, on average. Round it up to 100K a month, starting from May, when Western artillery first became a meaningful asset on the battlefield. 10 months from May through February, so 10*100 = 1 million. And indeed, the Pentagon leak indicated that around 1 million shells should have been expended by the end of the past February.
Based on those mostly-public statements of PDA transfers by the USG, the US should have donated at least 1.2 million 155mm shells in 12 months (around 1 million by December). Let's say 1.25 million. The UK IIRC made an official statement on having donated 100K in the first year, with an intent to supply another 100K in the second year: 1.35 million. Other countries individually donated very small quantities in that time period (e.g. a few thousand from France), but cumulatively and including market purchases it should easily be at least 1.5 million. But what precisely Ukraine has purchased or received direct from manufacturers is almost unknowable.
Ukraine has of course received further donations in March and April, of unknown quantity. Let's assume these have been enough to cover ongoing operational usage. So there you have it, 500K+ 155mm stockpiled.
(As for 122/152mm, between the initial stock, donations, purchases, and captures, I would assume Ukraine has had at least 2 million of these so far, but with at least 80-90% already expended. Ukraine's stock and throughput probably only allows a consistent usage of ~1K shells per day of these Soviet calibers.)
The Bulgaria story is indicative of the small-mindedness of Putin and his lackeys' thinking.
Yes, Belingcat know their stuff and this was very obvious Russian sabotage. And Bulgarian government at the time were exceptionally corrupt "get along with everyone" trash that would have been happy to look the other way for the right price.
But the target was a small private company acting as a middle-man between government-owned factories and non-disclosed clients. Sure, they may have scared a few potential other middlemen and small producers but they triggered early warning lamps in the public and in western intelligence agencies while doing basically nothing to reduce Bulgarian stocks or production capacities.
Tom's info comes from the frontline. So it's entirely possible Ukraine had been accumulating a "secret stash" all this time, which the frontline troops didn't know about. There were even explicit warnings from the US to conserve ammo - I mean the "help is finite" and "don't defend Bakhmut, it's a waste of resources" comments. Not enough to conclude anything but it's definitely plausible that the shell hunger in Bakhmut so far was on purpose and not inevitable.
Since the current Russian officer class was dismissed three weeks earlier than usual because they are obviously needed directly at the front, I wonder whether the Russian military has changed the training of its officers as a result of the experiences in Ukraine.
Apparently, the commanders there are making some mistakes objectively, and I wonder if the next generation of officers will just as stubbornly conduct their missions according to the old Russian military doctrine or if (God forbid) the Russian military will learn from its mistakes and adapt the training and requirements will change/modernize future officers. But I think that hardly anyone will get good information from outside.
I do wonder if there will be any major counteroffensive actions around Bakhmut when the main counteroffensive begins. They haven't really had time to build those defensive lines like in the south there, since they are still on an offensive footing.
This action does, however, give an insight into Russian morale. Russia will inevitably have to counterattack when/if the Ukrainians attack. For Putin, this action does not bode well. Every army has a breaking point. We can only wait and see.
Russian social media demonstrates a lot of fear of the counter offensive. There is a chance, admittedly a very small one, that Russia will cut and run - if they run past their third line then....
Superb article ! Thanks a million Tom !
Thank you for the update and great news at the front. Seems things are starting to change and its great the West is providing more artillery as requested for by Ukraine. As they say, trust the ZSU. They have definitely proven Western military planners wrong about Bakhmut(And in a nice way). Otherwise going by the Russian parade, it seems the Russian army has been seriously mauled in terms of equipment beyond what we can see via OSINT. Not a single modern tank or howitzer. I would have expected them to have some T-80s or T-90Ms to show off but this is so strange and embarrassing. Surely they should still have some modern tanks protecting Moscow that they could have gotten from just for the show?
Russia had about a 100 of T90Ms, according to Oryx - 19 lost, means at least 25-30. So, up to 70 remaining and surely they are all “in fields and forests”. Plus, parade troops are Kantemirov and Taman divisions: both very badly beaten by ZSU and now deployed between Svatove and Kreminna. So, even theoretically no tanks on parade were possible, especially T90Ms
I don't think we can draw conclusions from the parade. They might have decided to use few equipment, because they wanted to suggest that they take the war very seriously, and are not removing anything for the parade etc. It's a simbolic event and the contents are dictated by this. (I do think they had serious losses, I just don't think the parade is a good indicator)
Exactly. Anyone outside the Kremlin telling us why the parade was this or that is simply guessing. Perhaps an educated guess, but likely still just a guess. My guess: Anyone who knows isn't sharing with the rest of us.
They have still many of T-80s or T-90s, but could not show them on the parade for political reasons. If they would do it, Prigozhin and other far right nationalists would curse Shoigu and Gerasimov that they are making a show while the armor should be at the frontlines. (Similarly for Armata tanks.)
They normally have the handful of "new" T-14 Armatas in the parade, but there is a rumour that they're en-route to Ukraine as the latest entry in the turret-tossing competition.
These Armatas are dummies - only to be shown at parades. Experimental developments will never build normal ones.
As the Americans say, the optics of the parade were awful. For the Russians watching at home it was not a projection of great power.
And Putin at this parade was constantly twitching from loud sounds))
Thanks a lot Tom
Best wishes
Tom spot on sahh. 🇬🇧👍🇬🇧
Thank you, as usual.
Some people in media need to spend a few days under artillery fire to calm down...
:-/
What would Ukrainian success look like? Probably not clearing all the way to Sevastopol, but ZSU should persuade UA public and allies that ZSU with proper support is on the right way to victory.
https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/ukraine-set-to-strike-back-but-what-would-success-look-like-20230502-p5d4ub.html
BTW. No flamewar about "proper support", sight, yes, EU could to provide much more and faster. (Instead of typing useless answers to Internet, contact your politicians or send few bugs to https://www.weaponstoukraine.com/ )
Now it's clear why Zelenski V. O. was desperately stopping ZSU for months after Kherson liberation from any kind of attack on positions of ruscist occupants, wasting large amount of munition, lives of Ukrainian soldiers in Bahmut, instead of counter-attacking in South to liberate Ukrainian territory where ruscists are weaker, he was afraid of his fellow ruscist occupants will run away, crashing entire putler's SVO.
Nice development. Epecially in the face of all the Russian propaganda going around for the last few months in the line of "Russia controls 80% of Bakhmut, Ukrainians lost almost all their army defending it and are at the mercy of Putin". Overall I don't think many people are on the "Ukraine will crush Russia and go to Moscow" bandwagon. It's more like when there is lack of verifyable details smart people will stay silent and only fools think they have something worthwhile to say.
This mini-offensive feels like a test - for Ukrainian command themselves to assess the power of their offensive brigades before they commit them to more risky actions.
True, Russia could as well have conquered 100% of Bakhmut and a bunch of other towns and it would still have not changed anything. Russia lost this war 2-3 weeks after starting it, when it became clear it will not take Kyiv and thus has no realistic path towards forcing acceptance of its territorial claims outside the wet dreams of some idiots. Watching fights over dumpsters near the ruins of Bakhmut has as much point as explaining horizon effects to flat-earthers and yet... here we are doing it.
If the Russians built "terrible" defense lines with minefields and "dragons" - maybe then it makes sense to break through their defenses in those places from where they climb out - defeating their formations in bakhmut and through it go into the Russian rear. When they are hit hard and unexpectedly, they run well.
An excellent update with a sober warning against "home by Christmas" rhetoric. Your comment on the fast Russian movement of reserves begs the question of what is known about their reserves? Part of an effective defense has to be some sort of rapid reaction force of considerable size? While convicts have been expended have some of the recently mobilised been used to form a reserve? These things should all be a given but there seems to be no limit to their incompetence.
A comment on artillery ammo:
While Tom fairly complains about throughput in his summaries, I had figured that as of the one-year anniversary the Ukrainians should have had around 500K 155mm shells stockpiled alone. Since the US for its part stopped publishing numbers of shells transferred in Jan/Feb, it's more difficult to say what Ukraine has received or bought in the past 2 months.
500K is exactly enough, I previously 'calculated' in the fall, for one month of strategic offensives, accounting for regular operations away from the main effort as well as provisioning an emergency reserve.
Some breakdown of the numbers:
Ukraine has long maintained that they fire around 3K 155mm a day, on average. Round it up to 100K a month, starting from May, when Western artillery first became a meaningful asset on the battlefield. 10 months from May through February, so 10*100 = 1 million. And indeed, the Pentagon leak indicated that around 1 million shells should have been expended by the end of the past February.
Based on those mostly-public statements of PDA transfers by the USG, the US should have donated at least 1.2 million 155mm shells in 12 months (around 1 million by December). Let's say 1.25 million. The UK IIRC made an official statement on having donated 100K in the first year, with an intent to supply another 100K in the second year: 1.35 million. Other countries individually donated very small quantities in that time period (e.g. a few thousand from France), but cumulatively and including market purchases it should easily be at least 1.5 million. But what precisely Ukraine has purchased or received direct from manufacturers is almost unknowable.
Ukraine has of course received further donations in March and April, of unknown quantity. Let's assume these have been enough to cover ongoing operational usage. So there you have it, 500K+ 155mm stockpiled.
(As for 122/152mm, between the initial stock, donations, purchases, and captures, I would assume Ukraine has had at least 2 million of these so far, but with at least 80-90% already expended. Ukraine's stock and throughput probably only allows a consistent usage of ~1K shells per day of these Soviet calibers.)
The Bulgaria story is indicative of the small-mindedness of Putin and his lackeys' thinking.
Yes, Belingcat know their stuff and this was very obvious Russian sabotage. And Bulgarian government at the time were exceptionally corrupt "get along with everyone" trash that would have been happy to look the other way for the right price.
But the target was a small private company acting as a middle-man between government-owned factories and non-disclosed clients. Sure, they may have scared a few potential other middlemen and small producers but they triggered early warning lamps in the public and in western intelligence agencies while doing basically nothing to reduce Bulgarian stocks or production capacities.
Tom's info comes from the frontline. So it's entirely possible Ukraine had been accumulating a "secret stash" all this time, which the frontline troops didn't know about. There were even explicit warnings from the US to conserve ammo - I mean the "help is finite" and "don't defend Bakhmut, it's a waste of resources" comments. Not enough to conclude anything but it's definitely plausible that the shell hunger in Bakhmut so far was on purpose and not inevitable.
It's not a secret. I'm commenting off public information.
I guess the point is that while Western donations keep Ukraine on a strict daily diet, it's clearly been enough to prepare for the 'main event.'
Since the current Russian officer class was dismissed three weeks earlier than usual because they are obviously needed directly at the front, I wonder whether the Russian military has changed the training of its officers as a result of the experiences in Ukraine.
Apparently, the commanders there are making some mistakes objectively, and I wonder if the next generation of officers will just as stubbornly conduct their missions according to the old Russian military doctrine or if (God forbid) the Russian military will learn from its mistakes and adapt the training and requirements will change/modernize future officers. But I think that hardly anyone will get good information from outside.
You cannot improve officer training to enable junior officers to make more decisions, while shortening the training programme.
Well, Uncle Fester Prigozhin wanted ammo, the Ukrainian Army obliged...
We have seen footage of Ukrainians training paratroopers. Could a combat jump be on the table?