Ukraine War, 10 June 2023: Minefields

Hello everybody!

Having ‘vented’ my (endless) frustration over the Russian monstrosities, but also the obvious incompetence of ‘too many’ of ZSU’s officers, two days ago, lets get back to some ‘tactical analysis’ of what’s going on in southern Ukraine, especially in the southern Zaporizhzhya Oblast….

1.)    First things first: Terrain and Distances

The terrain is largely flat and open. Low, wavy hills at most. Open fields surrounded by hedgerows. Weather is fine, soil is OK. The road network is quite well-developed.

The first two factors are offering – mostly – unobstructed observation with naked eye (and bionculars) for 10+ kilometres.

Pay attention at the sheer size of the battlefield. We’re discussing here events taking place over dozens of kilometres. Unless somebody develops a (working) technology of ‘beaming’, alone the issue of communicating and travelling over the distances in question is going to remain extremely problematic. Even more so considerign the Russian superiorrity in electronic warfare (read: means to make conventional means of communication - like radios - de-facto useless).

For the sake of sanity – because the battlefield is really ‘too big’ – lets focus just on the ‘western flank’ of the frontlines in southern Zaporizhzhya. The Orikhiv Sector. That’s still some 100 kilometres in width.

Some food for thoughts: back in late February 2022, the 58^th Combined Arms Army (CAA) of the VSRF ‘took only’ something like 24 hours to drive from the northern Crimea to Melitopol, and then another three or four days to reach the Tokmak area. That was an advance of something like 120km on the first day, another 100km over the following two days. No doubt, a major military feat. However, thanks to treachery that remains unexplained by official Kyiv until this very day, it did so in face of absolutely no opposition (at least not before it tried to actually enter Melitopol). On the contrary, as soon as the 58^th CAA started encountering serious ZSU resistance, it not only began losing droves of vehicles, but its advance came to a standstill: 15 months later, rebuilt units of the 58^th CAA are, essentially, still where they used to be back in early March 2022.

2.)    Involved forces (and their intentions)

West of Orikhiv, the ZSU deployed its 128^th Mountain Assault (at least officially: home-based in Melitopol). As usually, this is supported by a miscellany of smaller units, including the Mavic Band (UAVs), the 15^th Kara Dag Assault Brigade of the National Guard, and the 39^th Air Defence Brigade. In Orikhiv is the 65^th Mechanised-, and east of the town are the 33^rd Mechanised and the 46^th Airmobile.  At least two, possibly more brigades – apparently including the 47^th Mechanised (considered something like ‘Ukrainian best’, at least by the Russians) – were brought in to run the offensive.

This concentration of forces is supported by at least a ‘detachment’ (say: 2-4) of M142 HIMARS or M270 MLRS, but also one, probably two artillery brigades. The PSU is capable of providing up to 12 ground-attack sorties in this area, too: it’s flying a handful of additional air strikes with AGM-88 HARMs and Storm Shadows against Russian air defence systems, HQs, supply depots (and/or such facilities like tank repair workshops) and troop concentrations in the Tokmak area, a day.

Their intention is to get all the way to Tokmak and beyond…

The 58^th CAA of the VSRF is still there, entrenched in three lines of defence. Anchored on a line of low hills, the first line of the 58^th CAA’s defences is stretching from Vasylivka in the West, to the area between Hulaipole and Polohy. It’s held by the reinforced 42^nd Motor Rifle Division (429^th Motor Rifle Regiment, 95^th Motor Rifle Regiment, 125^th Motor Rifle Regiment, 503^rd Motor Rifle Regiment, 291^st Motor Rifle Regiment, 70^th Motor Rifle Regiment….)

Depending on the area in question, the second line of the 58^th CAA’s defence is about 5-15km further south, stretching from Vasylivka, via Solodka Balka and Verbove to Polohy. It’s held by the BARS-11, and the 22^nd  Spetsnaz Brigade.

The third line is 15-20km further south, stretching from Balky to Tokmak (heavily fortified into an outright ‘fortress’ on its own), and then all the way to the Bilmak area… It’s held by the 19^th Motor and the 121^st Motor Rifle Brigades and few other units…

Except for artillery units of the 42^nd MRD, the Russians certainly have a full artillery brigade, plus a detachment of TOS-1s on hand. The VKS can provide about 20 ground attack sorties every 4-6 hours, plus about a dozen of sorties by attack helicopters a day, and it can fly 4-8 sorties deploying between 8 and 16 MPK/UMPK glide bombs a day. 

Their intention is to prevent Ukrainians from getting anywhere at all.

All together, this is looking something like nicely described on this map (from Poulet volant account on the Twitter):

3.)    Tactics

To advance some 45-60km from the Orikhiv area to Tokmak, the ZSU has to breach three-, heavily mined- and fortified defence lines, all protected by plentiful of entrenched Russian firepower.

Except for a dozen of major ground units, the Russians not only have their artillery (some 200+ guns, howitzers, and multiple rocket launchers), but also hundreds of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) at their disposal: most of these on the ground, additional ones on their attack helicopters.

From the ZSU’s point of view, crucial factor is the speed: the speed at which every of assaulting ZSU units can assemble and, even more so, the speed at which it can advance. The speed is important because the Russian chain of command is slow in reaction. Whenever there is a new development on the battlefield, it’s reacting with a ‘lag’ of 15-30 minutes.

The VSRF is overcoming this problem by pre-scribing its lower-ranks how to act in what case. This practice is similar to the game of chess: essentially, their commanders receive a set of orders explaining them, ‘if Ukrainians do this, you do this, and if Ukrainians do that, you do that’. This is including so-called pre-registered artillery fire: they’ve had months to estimate probable points at which ZSU units would assemble, and then teach their gunners where to shoot in what case. Means: it doesn’t take the commander of the 58^th CAA to react immediately, and even if he’s unlikely to do so quicker than within 15-30 minutes (if alcholoised, that might take even ‘hours’), his troops still ‘know what to do’. That way, their reaction time is reduced to 2-10 minutes.

On the other hand, the sheer size of the battlefield is such that any speed of ZSU ground units is hopelessly low. Thus, any concentration of vehicles – for example of a unit assembling for advance - is easily detected ‘even’ by ‘mediocre’ UAVs like the Iranian-made Mohajer-6 from out to 40 kilometres away. That means the UAV can detect such a deployment from outside the range of the ZSU’s short-range air defences (like Osa-AKM/SA-8 and Strela/SA-13), and well in advance of the unit in question actually launching its attack (thus ‘buying’ plent of time for VSRF’s ground commanders to react). The Russians are then deploying their lighter UAVs (Orlan-10, Orlan-30 etc.) to track the movement of that unit, and to deploy their artillery against it: this is what Ukrainians can and do counter with thier Osas, Strelas, and different man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS, like Stinger etc.), but there are a lot of Russian UAVs: essentially, every battalion should have two; a regiment at least 6, a brigade or division up to 30…

Even if using field-paths, or tertiary tarmacked roads, and including vehicles with theoretical maximum speed of 70-80km/h, a ‘column of tanks on advance’ is rarely (if ever) moving at more than 15-20km/h. Any higher speed is going to rattle the brains of its crews to the degree where they can neither see anything, nor think.

….and this speed is further reduced to ‘crawling’ 5-7km/h if this column has to ‘plough’ its way through minefields…

The ZSU can’t deploy too big units in one bunch: they would just offer too good targets for both the Russian artillery and air power. Therefore, it’s operating in small assault groups: 2-4 tanks, 4-8 infantry fighting vehicles, supported by 1-2 mine-clearing vehicles and a similar number of armoured recovery vehicles (ARVs). Because of the lack of mine-clearing equipment it can’t ‘spread’ such groups on a wide frontline, but has to deploy them one after the other, in so-called ‘echelons’.

Because there is always a shortage of mine-clearing equipment (I doubt even all of NATO combined could scratch enough of this to equip itself properly), most of vehicles equipped with mine-ploughs or -rollers are deployed within the ‘1^st echelon’: the unit moving out as the first: only 2, perhaps 3 or 4 of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles might be equipped with so-called ‘mine-ploughs’ or ‘mine-rollers’, etc. The ‘2^nd echelon’ is unlikely to have more than two such vehicles: moreover, it’s usually equipped with MRAPs and used to transport infantry necessary to secure the objectives reached by the 1^st echelon (because ‘tanks’ on their own can’t secure anything at all, especially no hamelts and/or villages). Means: the 1^st echelon is ‘clearing the way’ for everybody who follows, ‘like ants’, in a single, perhaps two lines…

Now comes the point at which commanding skills are crucial. If the commanding officer (CO) is ‘good’, he’s trained his unit to assemble quickly. If not….well, the unit is going to take more than 15-20 minutes to assemble and, as result, get smashed by enemy artillery already while assembling to advance…

…and then, about one hour later, by enemy fighter-bombers while trying to recover its casualties and damaged vehicles…

As next, if the CO is good, he’s going to develop his plan so that the 1^st echelon knows its task ‘by heart’; the 2^nd echelon knows not only its own task, but also that of the 1^st echelon, should that become necessary; the 3^rd echelon knows its own task, plus those of the 1^st and 2^nd echelon; the 4^th echelon knows its task, plus those of the three echelons moving ahead of it, and so on… And, he’s training his subordinates to work as a team: to communicate and to cooperate (and that, regardless of their possible - even likely - personal differences, because there are always personal differences, resulting in mistrust etc.); to constantly keep each other informed about what’s going on; to train their own subordinates to replace them if they’re knocked out: to provide mutual support…. and everybody to stick to the plan, but also not to be afraid of acting at their own if they consider that necessary.

…if not, then we get to see videos like when the first echelon is pinned down – its advance is stopped by mines, ATGMs, and/or then artillery – then the 2^nd echelon follows up into exactly the same area, starts losing vehicles while trying to by-pass disabled ones of the 1st echelon to the left and right, gets pinned down by enemy artillery as a result, or - something like ‘at best’ - ‘runs in circles’ while having no clue what to do or how to react….

***

So, now, lets say the GRU MO and the field reconnaissance by the ZSU have done their job: they’ve found all the relevant Russian positions. This is enabling the CO to select a route of advance (or multiple routes of advance) in direction of areas where his unit is likely to encounter less enemy resistance.

Lets say the ZSU artillery is ‘working’, and ‘doing a good job’: it hit the enemy air defences so to suppress them; then it hit the enemy headquarters (HQ; including those slightly closer to the frontline, and those withdrawn to ‘outside the HIMARS-range’) thus disrupting their function; it hit the enemy artillery, again and again, reducing it to few operational guns and/or launchers; it hit enemy tanks used as self-propelled artillery pieces, and it hit suspected or confirmed/known positions of enemy ATGMs…..and then the assaulting unit assembled quickly enough and started moving….

‘Everything’s fine’?

Not the least.

If nothing else, it’s the modern artillery that is a ‘bitch’: it takes little else but 5-6 shells with cluster warheads to sow a minefield where there was none before, or to reinforce an existing minefield, to ‘re-mine’ a lane ‘cleared’ by the 1^st echelon. Sure, the mines in question are ‘light’: but, they’re still enough to cut the track of a Leopard tank, not to talk about that of a Bradley – and thus instantly immobilise the vehicle - although not destroying it. Whenever a vehicle hits a mine, everybody (whether on board or nearby) is first checking if there are casualties. In best case, these might be limited to dislocated- or broken limbs (caused by the force of explosion). Still, they have to be evacuated. Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) is at least slowing, if not/in worst case entirely stopping the advance….

Meanwhile, ARVs are rushing to the scene, trying to either recover or help repair immobilised vehicles. Of course, the enemy artillery is switching its fire to them, making repair efforts impossible, perhaps reducing them to attempts of towing away immobilised vehicles….amid the resulting chaos (and there is always a chaos in such as situation, further increased by immense volumes of electronic warfare, which ware making radio communications next to impossible), the 2^nd echelon is arriving and – if the CO of that unit is of any use – trying to start clearing a new line in order to by-pass and continue the advance… In worst case, the 2nd echelon is trying to continue the advance ‘through’ the first - and then that’s resulting in images of this kind:

Now, if the CO is good, and his unit not only well-trained but also well-supported, at that point in time his artillery is going to re-focus entirely on countering the enemy artillery and silencing the same for good (an example from the Donetsk Oblast)

However, the Russians not only have plenty of guns: they also have attack helicopters like Ka-52s on hand. These are sent to knock out immobilised vehicles with ATGMs – and they can deploy the latter from over 4000 metres away, thus remaining outside the range of Ukrainian short-range air defences. The latter can’t follow too closely behind the 1^st and 2^nd echelon, or they’re going to get hit by the Russian artillery and air power…at least not before the Russian artillery is largely neutralised…And even if sometimes attack helicopters might be forced to get closer, they can still approach unobserved, deploy their weapons, and then avoid the enemy anti-aircraft fire…

One way or the other, it’s only once the ZSU punches through all of this, it can unleash it’s ‘XY echelon’, and then assault and capture enemy positions behind, for example, the 1st defence line, like Lobkove.

***

Bottom line. It’s taking Ukrainians lots of ‘echelons’, and lots of damaged and destroyed vehicles (which can, but must not mean ‘lots of casualties’: by now it should be obvious that the Western-made tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and MRAPs are not blowing up as easily as T-72s and BMPs) - just to pass the minefields. And even once they’re through the known minefields, because of mine-sowing artillery, they can never be sure they’re ‘on the other side of the minefield’. Indeed, if properly trained, even the units following the 1^st echelon along the cleared lanes are always counting on running into newly-sown and thus entirely unknown minefields.

Sadly, it seems many of ZSU’s COs either are too arrogant to be taught and thus didn’t know, or have ‘forgotten’ (or whatever) to inform (i.e. train) their crews correspondingly. Or simply can’t cope with modern warfare at all (just like the mass of Russian officers can’t do so at all). And it seems that most of them are still not training their subordinates in the so-called Auftragstaktik (or ‘mission-type tactics’, where emphasis is on the outcome of the mission, rather than on respect of ranks, the chain-of-command, and methods). Tragically, there is no doubt that the ZSU remains hopelessly under-equipped for this kind of warfare - and that this is not going to change even if NATO really delivers another ‘100’ Leopard 2s. Otherwise, we would get to see a lots of ‘deviations’. For example, the 2^nd echelon wouldn’t regularly ‘blindly follow’ the cleared lane of the first - thus making things easier for the Russians by entire magnitudes.

….and that’s – between few other things – what’s so damn frustrating for me when watching all the videos and photos of knocked out ZSU tanks and other armoured vehicles of the last few days.

However – and unless the GenStabU concludes it has no way to reach at least minimal objectives of its biiiiiiiiiiiiig counteroffensive without suffering unacceptable losses – that’s ‘about all’ we’re going to see happening in this sector of the frontline for days longer.

Things might change only if the ZSU finds a way to overpower the Russian artillery and overcome extensive minefields (and the latter must be expected to be ‘endless’), but also the ‘intervention forces’ in hands of VSRF’s commanders (like their attack helicopters and tactical reserves), and then fighter-bombers of the VKS, too…Or if Kyiv concludes something like, ‘this is too much, we’ve got to stop it’ - and abandons its attack.

Of course, the full force of Putin’s PRBS-machinery is deployed to create precisely that impression.

***

Ceterum censeo Russian armis esse extermino.