Ukraine War, 10 August 2024

Hello everybody!

The Ukrainian offensive into the Kursk Oblast of the Russian Federation is definitely going on. I.e. by now it’s 100% sure: this is no ‘raid’. Although: yes, it does contain a lots of ‘raids’ (it is so that, ‘Ukrainians wouldn’t be Ukrainians without running any raids in their offensive operations’). But, let me approach the situation in usual fashion: step-by-step.

***

It’s rather ironic – though perfectly d ’accord with what is meanwhile known about the ZSU’s ‘procedures’ – to conclude that this operation is run in ‘best traditions of the Soviet military doctrine’. And, whether to increase that irony or whatever else, there’s no denial that the disciplinarian and micromanager General Syrsky (chief of the Ukrainian GenStab, or ‘GenStab-U’) is meanwhile easily outmatching even General Gerasimov (Chief of the Russian GenStab) in this discipline. Foremost because, yes, he’s better at adapting new technologies to his procedures; not only because he’s a far better disciplinarian. It’s nothing else but a ‘guess’, if you like, but yes, I dare going as far as to say: indeed, this operation is a ‘perfect example of the Soviet military doctrine, with few modern-day ingredients’ – like the VSRF’s  ‘RUK concept’.

The result is a ‘well-prepared’ (near-perfect reconnaissance) and better-planned operation than usually. Which is also better fitting the ZSU – not only because of the way the mass of its officers and troops are trained, but also because (unlike any of Western/NATO armed force) it can’t count on any kind of serious amounts of air support from the PSU (which, mind: shouldn’t mean the PSU and/or the ZSU’s Army Aviation aren’t involved). What’s also better fitting the ZSU is that it’s fighting mobile warfare, instead of having to grind itself through 20-kilometres deep Russian minefields…not to talk about having to hunker down in trenches while being exposed to constant shelling by the Russian artillery and/or dozens of UMPK-strikes a day…

So, what we’ve got to see was (6 August) the ZSU first infiltrating the border: subjecting forward Russian positions to a mass of FPV-strikes while its troops were encircling forward enemy positions. Once this was done, the ZSU advanced north over the border, overrunning something like three poorly-trained battalions of the VSRF there (that is: two were overrun, the third smashed while it attempted to counterattack). That was on 6-7 August. Simultaneously, the ZSU was running raids deep into the Russian rear, while confusing the GenStab in Moscow by turning east, infiltrating and securing Sudzha, and crossing the first Russian defence line constructed – and well-fortified - in this area at the most opportune point: where this was only poorly protected, i.e. barely occupied by any troops (this was completed by the end of 7 Aug). To keep the Russians off balance, meanwhile the ZSU ‘fanned out’ yet additional raids, wreaking havoc in the Russian rear all the way up to Korenovo, and then in direction of such towns along the E38 highway like ivanovskoe, Lgov and Chermoshnoi.

The ‘result’ of one of raids…

A SUV of the ZSU in the process of crossing a minefield and trenches of the (largely unoccupied) Russian defence line, probably ‘somewhere north-west of Sudzha’, on 7 or 8 August.

This was ‘cool’ because it pre-empted the slowly-reacting Russian GenStab: this was caught with having no clue what’s going on. Because it had no idea what is going on, it also had no plan for this kind of eventuality. And the VSRF simply can’t fight if it’s got no plan: it’s officers are trained to act according to heavily prescribed procedures. If they have none, they’re doing nothing… or are running away (like de-facto all the officers of the 488^th Motor-Rifle Regiment did).

What followed (since the evening of 7 August) was, de-facto, ‘as expected’ by the GenStab-U: the Russian GenStab continued using the E38 to move its reinforcements – and that in full sight of Ukrainian UAVs. This enabled the GenStab-U to wreck several of VSRF’s intervention units with help of long-range weaponry like M142 HIMARS and GLMRS. Combined with a power-outage in the Kurchatov area (unclear if caused by an intentional hit or because the Russians managed to shot down an Ukrainian UAV and this then crashed into one of local substations, as the Russians claim), this caused a mass panic between the local population. Dozens of thousands are meanwhile fleeing east. Unsurprisingly, the VSRF reinforcements still trying to reach the combat zone are running into long car treks of ‘internally displaced persons’, which is slowing them down…

The - meanwhile ‘famous’ - column of a Russian motor-rifle battalion savaged by HIMARS or GLMRS strike while underway in the Oktyabrskoe, 5km east of Rylsk, late on 7 August. Several other columns were hit in similar fashion, elsewhere (see yellow/red ‘explosions’ on the map below).

….which in turn is buying time for the ZSU to deploy yet additional forces (including its artillery) inside Russia, and then follow its early raids with serious advance.

Although since yesterday the Russian PRBS-industrialists (certainly: on order from Kremlin) are all insistent on the VSRF having ‘stopped’ the Ukrainian advance, actually, the ZSU is only ‘now’ (i.e. the last 36 or so hours) seriously advancing: expanding its ‘bridgehead into Russia’ from the Line connecting Snegost, Novoivanovka, Mala Loknya, Cherkasskoe Porechnoe, and Martynovka – in northern and eastern directions.

Here it’s another detail that reminds strongly about the Soviet doctrine: advancing Ukrainian units are not wasting their time and troops with frontal assaults into urban areas. They’re first advancing in between of these, scouting and raiding them, then encircling and infiltrating them, before ‘collapsing them from within’. Thus, except for what are UAVs and raiding elements doing, no advance is really going ‘straight along the road’.

Moreover, and to add salt to the injury, the ZSU opened a major advance through the broken terrain south of Sudzha and secured the village of Plekhovo, south of Sudzha. With this, the VSRF units still holding out in the Makhnovka area, directly south of Sudzha, are meanwhile threatened by envelopment on both flanks…

The only ‘unusual’ aspect of this operation would be the ‘economy of force’: the ZSU simply hasn’t got ‘dozens’ of brigades and battalions to spare. Still, it has got something like a ‘Soviet-style operation manoeuvre group’ (OMG) behind its foremost unit: few units capable of ‘exploiting’ the situation and waiting for an opportunity to drive deeper into Russia.

Why that?

Because, by now it must be clear even to the Keystone Cops in Moscow (and if it’s not: they’re an even bigger bunch of incompetents than I can imagine, and even reading this amateurish reconstruction can’t help them), that there are no 5, and no 15 Ukrainian brigades involved. It’s break-through was achieved by only three, plus few independent battalions, one artillery brigade, and several UAV-units in support. Approximately as follows:

-          western sector (Korenovo and area south of it): 82^nd Airborne Assault Brigade (might appear a ‘strange’ selection of a unit for advancing into this open terrain, but mind: this brigade is equipped with Challengers, Marders, Strykers, and M109s)

-          central sector (Sudzha and area north of it): 22^nd Mechanised Brigade (PT-91/T-72s, and 2S3s… seems to have replaced its BMP-1s with M2/3 Bradleys)

-          southern sector (south of Sudzha): 88^th Mechanised Brigade (T-72s and BMP-1s, but no surprise considering the broken terrain in this sector).

A gun-less T-64BV, equipped with mine-rollers, as seen from a Russian UAV. Early during the Ukrainian break-through, the Russian FPVs and attack-drones were still active over the battlefield (later on, they were largely blocked by the Ukrainian electronic warfare), and thus they’ve managed to hit at least two T-64BVs, 3-4 PT-91/T-72s and a Bradley. It’s unclear how many of these were really ‘destroyed’, though.

‘But’…. there are a few behind them, held in reserve as a potential OMG… or at least that was the case as of the evening of 8 August.

Why do I mention this (and am I revealing too much)?

Because it is important to keep in mind: for people like Syrsky or Gerasimov, war is like a game of chess. Correspondingly, they’re ‘playing’ – with thousands of troops, vehicles and fire-power: all the while listening to reports of their intelligence services about enemy movements and positions, they’re calculating what position or manoeuvre is going to be of advantage – 10, 15, 20, 25… ‘1000’ steps in advance’.

It’s nothing personal. That’s the way their indoctrination and experiences taught them to do.

Therefore, just like for the GenStab-U right now it’s crucial to find out what Russian reinforcements are moving to what place, along what roads, and how long they might take time to get there, the crucial question for the GenStab in Moscow is what is that ‘Ukrainian OMG’ going to do: where is it and in what direction might Syrsky unleash it? How much ammo and supplies he might have to enable him this or that manoeuvre?

Right now, that’s unclear. And that’s good that way, because as long as this is unclear, the Russians are not going to react in any meaningful fashion – except for trying to establish a coherent frontline. If then this or that Ukrainian unit surfaces already behind that frontline, it’s got good outlooks for collapsing the frontline, too. Because the Russian officers are not trained to react flexibly, without a plan. And they’ve got no plan for a situation where their enemy is around their flanks and/or behind them. Sure, they’ll be ‘counterattacking’ – sending ever additional battalions into counterattacks here and there – but only wasting yet more troops in the process: getting hit by HIMARs and similar stuff while still approaching the battlefield, then running into Ukrainian ambushes, finding their units isolated by Ukrainian flanking, their positions infiltrated by Ukrainian troops etc.

….at least unless Gerasimov manages to drag, kick and push enough of VSRF troops out of positions in northern Kharkiv, Kremina, Bakhmut and similar places and bring them to the Kharkiv area.

A ‘nice to have’ point here: Gerasimov meanwhile has next to no useful reserves left: those ‘crack’ units, big mechanised formations like the 90th Tank, or the 2nd and 4th Motor-Rifle Divisions the VSRF used to have at the start of the Russian all-out invasion. These have been decimated over the last two years and have lost nearly all of their ‘top’ equipment. The number of battalions still operating stuff like T-90s can be ‘counted on fingers of one hand’. Even his ‘strategic reserve’ - the VDV - is largely involved in ongoing battles or corsetting shaky mobiks, and that atop of being decimated and re-filled by reservists of dubious quality. Point is: right now, he’s got not a single division proven as capable - and equipped for - anything bigger than a reinforced-company-sized attack. Thus, the ‘best’ he can send in the way of the ZSU’s offensive are units rebuilt, rebuilt, and rebuilt and refilled with troops already exhausted by running their relentless infantry attacks, the last weeks and months.

That’s about ‘the situation right now’. As next, we’ve got to wait and see what kind of ‘ace up sleeve’ might Syrsky or Gerasimov pull out, after all..

(Caption by …. a ‘fellow bird-watcher’)