Ukraine War, 1 October 2024
Hello everybody!
First day of a new month… but certain things never change.
Well, OK: before ‘returning’ to that wonderful screw up called the ‘Middle East’, let’s run a quick check of most important ‘stations’ of the war in Ukraine, these days.
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AIR/MISSILE WAR
One of nicest things to discover in the social media this morning was a Twitter-thread by somebody who was, finally, so kind (indeed: merciful) to check the VSRF’s reserves of surface-to-air missile (SAM) -systems.
Conclusions are interesting: the mass of systems still in reserve are short-ranged by nature, very few medium-range, and even less long-range systems (that said, yes, that’s all relative: there are still more of S-300Vs around than there are IRIS-T or SAMPs in all of NATO, combined…) Something like ‘good news’ is that the mass of equipment in question is based on 1970s-technology; the refurbishment of systems in question takes highly-qualified personnel, which Russia is meanwhile lacking; while the 75th Arsenal is already working full-steam and thus can’t accelerate a lot. That said, it remains unclear what are remaining stocks of missiles.
I’m, genuinely, thankful for such efforts: have neither the time nor nerves to do something similar. After bowing in awe in expression of gratitude, can only conclude I’m very much looking forward for a similar review in regards of VKS-operated SAM-systems.
Operations-wise… the Russians are continuing attrition of Ukrainian SAM-stocks through continuous streaming of Shahed attack UAVs into the Ukrainian airspace, every night. The primary news in this regards are that now some of Shaheds are also equipped with StarLink systems.
In turn, yesterday early in the morning, Ukrainians have targeted a storage site for Kinzhal missiles at the Yeysk AB. Claim to have killed Lieutenant-General Dvornikov, too (former commander of Russian forces in Ukraine).
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Kursk… On 28 and 29 September, the VDV deployed around the smaller salient on the western side, in the Glushkovo area, has run several counterattacks on Veseloe: lost a number of BMDs and fell back.
East of Korenevo, the ZSU continued improving its positions up in the hills above Kremyanove, Sheptukhovka, and Kauchuk. Makes it easier to blow up whatever the Russians try to send in direction of bits and pieces of the 810th NIB surrounded in the Kremyanove area, just for example.
On the eastern side… videos surfaced confirming the ZSU control over Kamyshevka: ‘very surprising’ considering the ZSU is in control the road to Lgov west of it, and the hills east of it for at least four weeks now… On the southern side…well, sorry, cannot but grin at reports about the Russians ‘recovering Ulanok’: that happened already two weeks ago; it’s just now it’s ‘video-confirmed’. Otherwise, they couldn’t assault and recover Borki…
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Kharkiv… gauging by Ukrainian reporting, one of super-brains – whether between the Keystone Cops in Moscow, or in the HQ OSK South - came to the idea of sending a mechanised assault group of the 82nd Motor-Rifle Regiment, comprising 17 MT-LBs, 3 MBTs, and more than 100 troops, into attack on (the ruins of) the Aggregate Works in Vovchansk. What a surprise the ZSU smashed this commedy, and is meanwhile mopping up the scattered survivors. Resulting videos and video-stills are full of body parts, thus you might prefer to jump over the following ‘illustrations’…
‘Good’ to see the VSRF has ‘learned’ all the lessons of 2,5 years, the last 10 years, and then those of Grozny: alone the idea for this operation is worthy nobody less than Pudding.
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Kupyansk-Svatove…the Russians are still assaulting Kruhliakivka: the 115th Mech is still holding out. One thing neither Donald nor I understand about the ZSU here – nor in a few other sectors: why is there no counterattack into the Russian flank? Sure, through their penetration at Pischane, the Russians have secured higher elevations north of that village. But, that shouldn’t mean it should be impossible to hit them from ZSU-controlled elevations on the southern side. And yet, the ZSU is simply not moving here: just holding positions. Exactly like in so many other cases. At least the current impression is: the sole two ZSU brigades running regular tactical counterattacks are the 3rd Assault and the 47th Mech. If any other units try doing that, the results are pointless, frontal counterattacks for no gain, only resulting in own losses – and generals getting rid of ‘unpleasant’ subordinates…
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Toretsk & Pokrovsk… the battles there are raging relentlessly, and the ZSU is under massive pressure. Nevertheless, the Russians are not really coming forward. On the contrary: in Toretsk, they’re still trying to push down the Tsentralnay Ulitsa; while east of Pokrovsk, and since securing most of Hrodivka, Krasnyi Yar and Novohrodivka, they’re not really coming forward.
The Russian intentions for Selydove are meanwhile clear: they’ve figured out they can’t get the place by a frontal attack, and are thus now attacking north and south of it - but in western direction. Obviously trying to pincer the 15th NG Kara-Dag.
Russian assaults on Hirnyk, Ostrivske and Kurakhove of the last few days were foremost characterised by yet more of their losses in troops and armour.
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Vuhledar… this is meanwhile closely resembling the end of the battle for Aleppo, back in autumn 2017. Only the weather is slightly better: still not freezing…
Indeed, now even the lines of the 72nd Mech are coming apart.
Essentially, the Russians continued assaulting from three sides (from directions of Vodiane, Prechystivka, and Pavlivka). What’s worse, and as explained here, the way out is meanwhile under constant artillery and mortar fire. Means: what is left of the 72nd still inside Vuhledar has massive problems while trying to withdraw. As usually, the evacuation is run in small groups, but: out of 10 people (on average) in every group, only 3-4 are managing it out…
Unsurprisingly, the Russians are confirmed as present in the eastern side of the town, and the 5th Tank- and the 37th Motor-Rifle seem to be in the process of entering the western side, too.
Don’t worry: nobody there on the Ukrainian side came to the idea to bring in at least one fresh battalion, launch some sort of a counterattack (for example into the northern flank of the Russian advance on Vuhledar from the direction of Prechystivka) or help extract the 72nd. Why doing so where the 72nd is meanwhile running out of food, medical supplies, and fuel, and seems to have been forced to leave behind a large number of wounded in need of evacuation?
Instead, amid the resulting chaos, the GenStab-U is busy with replacing the CO of the brigade by Colonel Oleksandr Okhrimenko (currently the CO of one of its mechanised battalions). Probably because, in best traditions of the ZSU, the typical Ukrainian petty-bickering is already in full swing.
For example, ‘officers of the 72nd’ should be complaining that it’s Maryana Bezuhla who ‘misreported a rotation of that brigade as withdrawal’, and did so in the public, thus making the Russians aware of an opportune point in time. The VSRF then deployed reinforcements and attacked in force and that’s why the (ruined) town is now short of failing…
Gentlemen: on what planet were you living until a week ago?
For everybody’s orientation: a nobody like me knew about the intended rotation (at least) around 20-22 August (sorry, can’t recall exactly). OK, I didn’t report it in the public, but: if I knew about it, what do you think how ‘safe’ was that plan from the Russian GRU?!?
And, what idiot there still thinks this is the first time – ever, ever, ever – the Russians have attacked at the time of a planned rotation of ZSU units?
Sorry, but: I’m growing fed up of this nonsense. This is like yelling at a deaf person there’s a danger behind his/her backs - and then wondering how comes there’s no timely reaction.
If at all, I’m only curious to hear about how much is somebody there keen to put all the blame upon-, and thus get rid of one of the loudest critics of GenStab-U’s systemic incompetence? Because I simply can’t believe any serious, professional military officer is trying to explain that Bezuhla is now responsible for systemic incompetence and lax internal security within top ranks of the ZSU.
What about how easily could’ve this catastrophe been avoided if only the GenStab-U would be doing its actual job? Like taking care to rotate the completely exhausted 72nd Mech out on time? Or writing that darn new doctrine, so all the officers of the ZSU are trained according to experiences from this war – instead on basis of 70+ -years-old Soviet experiences from the Second World War – and there are no problems every time there’s another rotation of units?
Finally: do ‘we’ really have to ‘discuss’ all of this in the public, for months, and again and again – because otherwise nobody is ever going to take care and reform that bardak known as the GenStab-U and the ZSU? Or what?
…and then people wonder how comes the mass of ZSU brigades can’t attract enough volunteers…
Thanks Tom.
"One thing neither Donald nor I understand about the ZSU here – nor in a few other sectors: why is there no counterattack into the Russian flank?"
I've been befuddled by this for at least a year now, and bitterly complaining about it as well. The ZSU have completely lost the ability to conduct any offensive maneuvers, except for a very small number of brigades. The only counter attacking actions that the ZSU have conducted in the past year, are with the elite brigades involved in the Kursk offensive and the National Guard brigades, primarily Azov. All other ZSU units have been rendered inoperable, from the offensive point of view.
That much is clear, but the reasons for it are not. I agree with those more knowledgeable than me. UA (gov & the ZSU) have made a catastrophic strategic error of constantly creating new units, for which they neither have the equipment, but more importantly officers & NCOs, while starving the existing combat units of replacements and materiel. As if that wasn't bad enough, the ZSU has doubled down on ripping out individual battalions from their brigades, so there is never a chance for brigade staff to learn how to fight as a brigade. The brigades don't even know what battalions they will be commanding next week. The National Guard are the exception, where the number of units has been mostly unchanged, but the existing units have been constantly replenished. I don't think I need to remind people who in the past loved creating hollow units.
The lack of swift flank counterattacks has frustrated me for a long time now. My assumption is that drones make it too difficult to achieve surprise, otherwise Ukrainian frontline units would try this more.
But the top level command structure is clearly in need of reform. Starting to really think it's best to have Syrskyi and a few capable subordinates manage a gaggle of 20 corps-sized units built around the competent brigade staffs that exist.