Obviously, I didn’t post any updates in days. Arguably, was busy with my ‘usual “work”’, but also monitoring – often in awe – all the shiploads of morbid nonsense flying around both the mainstream- and social media in reaction to latest developments in the War in Ukraine. No doubt, the last 5-6 days were highly exciting: missiles were – and, today, are – streaking across the skies, there were explosions, fires, things got shot down, one party attacked in this- and the other in the other direction, and lots of people got killed… One way or the other, instead of rushing to ‘report’; I’ve decided to, yes: sit down, lean back, take a deep breath, and do some reflecting – before continuing with my ‘blog’. At least by my profession, I am a historian, and kind of ‘can’t’ but react like one.
Thanks for this post. As an Argentine, I need to confirm that by a single book about the AD in Malvinas, we have almost ten books in english and spanish about the Air war from a "Pilot" view. At least is a very well documented conflict, available because we are still "westeners".
I'm looking forward the next parts, I'm very anxious about the 4 losses VKS un a single day and what is going on with all the Kinzhals and PAC-3 issue.
The story about the Egyptian AD site reminds me of a similar incident in the Battle of Britain, when the Germans managed to knock out one of huge British radar positions by hitting its electrical substation. A mobile emitter was quickly set up by the RAF, and even though it lacked the range and sensitivity of the original array, the Germans picked up its emmissions and concluded their attacks on large antennae of the Chain Home radar are not effective. They decided not to press on with the attacks on British radars, not knowing that there actually was a hole in British radar system, and that continued attacks might succeed in degrading the entire system enough to make it useless.
Thank you so much for this. Excited to read about it and learn more. I really enjoyed your writings about the Angolan FAA and Zimbabwean Airforce in the books on the Congolese Uganda/Rwanda war. Really excited for the rest of this and can get a sense for where its going.
Hi Tom, commenting here since its impossible to reach you in FB understandably. Do you know of any books that have an indepth military analysis about the Eelam war in sri lanka. There are a few books written in the local language but most of it isn't researched well and mostly repeating propaganda. I'm hoping that as an conflict involving the only (as per my knowledge) insurgent group to possess an airforce and also one of the few conflicts where a strong insurgent group was thoroughly defeated by a conventional military
Cannot but recommend the mini-series 'Paradise Afire', by Adrien Fontanellaz. Three volumes have been published by now, rolling out the Sri Lankan 'Civil' War from its reasons up to the end. Adrien did extensive research into military aspects of this war, and a lot of that with help of info obtained from former intel operatives. Moreover, he's entirely focusing on facts: thus, the books are free of usual propaganda and hear-say.
So, the point here is that an AD system effectiveness can't just be measured in how many flying objects it shots down but in how much it disrupts the enemy air operations on its area of influence. I see it now. Thanks for the time you invest sharing your deep knowledge, looking forward to read the "Episode 2".
I just checked in on an occasional Russian blogger, and wonder what Tom makes of the specific narrative he draws with respect to the analysis of the Iraq wars: https://t.me/atomiccherry/547
***
Observing the consequences of what happened near Ugledar and the intensification of public calls for punishment of the military leadership of the RF Armed Forces, I remembered one instructive story that I would like to tell the reader.
I'll start with a long introduction. Have you ever wondered on the basis of what experience the army of the Russian Federation was built? Hardly. Most will answer this question with something banal like “it’s no different from the Soviet one,” and they’ll be mistaken.
The Russian army was built based on the experience of the US wars in Iraq ... more precisely, based on how this experience was perceived in the Russian Federation. All Russian military construction is an altar of worship to the "Desert Storm": the purchase of thousands of cruise missiles, units of the MTR of all types and stripes, parodying the combat work of the US Air Force, contract units, battalion tactical groups, private military companies, pixel camouflages... list can be long. If you work a little and bring up the open publications of the Russian General Staff of the early 2000s, then you will read an endless ode to the might of the American armed forces.
The very process of copying US military practices, however, failed somewhere - for some reason, the theory of planning air operations did not come along with cruise missiles, the F-15 did not come out of the Su-27 family, whatever you call it, and Gordon Ramsay did not headed Blackwater. But it's all little things, isn't it?
So, the experience of Iraq determined everything, and this medal had two sides - Moscow also listened very carefully to what happened to Saddam. And no, the point was not at all that hundreds of thousands of Coalition soldiers came to his soul - the point was in his domestic political decisions.
From the point of view of the Russian patriotic public, Saddam Hussein was an ideal leader - a strong and tough manager, a kind of popular Joseph Stalin with Middle Eastern specifics. He knew how to be both charismatic and generous, and tough and uncompromising - and his army in 1991 learned this the hard way.
The Iraqi generals in the mass perception are sometimes mistakenly associated with stupidity and incompetence - in fact, they lacked both. The Iraqi generals were professionals, albeit spoiled by the experience of a ten-year positional meat grinder with Iran (this greatly affected their speed of decision-making). Their problem was different - Saddam categorically did not accept any retreats, planted his views on the strategic planning of the army, and as a cherry on the cake (nuclear?) Forbade the use of aviation, which paralyzed the work of the entire air defense system of the country.
So the Iraqi command lost the opportunity to implement the only correct decision in their situation - to save the army, avoiding its complete defeat (the army leadership of Iraq initially understood that they had no chance of winning, and therefore tried to save the lives of soldiers and equipment).
In 1991, Saddam Hussein executed 14 generals and 126 senior officers. 620 were arrested, over 1500 were demoted. The purges did not stop until 2003, until a new war broke out ......
And when a new war broke out, the Iraqi generals, perfectly aware of their chances of survival, began to massively abandon their troops and surrender to the United States. Someone did it for money, someone just saved their lives - the fact was that almost all of the high command of Iraq decided that they did not like Saddam's methods of disciplinary influence at all and would definitely be better in captivity.
The subsequent history of Iraq and Saddam Hussein personally, I think, needs no explanation.
And the people in the high offices of Moscow perfectly learned this lesson - better, perhaps, than those that they tried to embody in their military development.
Broken battalions can be reassembled. You can recover from defeat. You can buy new tanks - you can even buy new people. All these are insignificant factors for the stability of the vertical of power.
Only one thing is truly dangerous for the vertical - the manifestation of disloyalty among the elements that make up its structure.
Thank you for your update, Tom. Probably, the reason of not too much written about this SAM-Wild Weasel fights from the opposite site of the fence - because the most majority of the counterparts didn't speak neither Arabic nor English at all? They were Soviet "adviser" which officially never been there, like "ich tam net" (they aren't there) at Dondass, starting from spring 2014? All of them (advisors) were Soviet officers, members of КПСС (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), thoroughly selected and checked by KGB for very important mission delegated by Party to defend Motherland (thousands km away) against imperialism.
Guess I'm a weirdo too finding this reading about SAM super interesting.
Thanks for another great read.
Got it with the 1st photo. :))
Thanks for this post. As an Argentine, I need to confirm that by a single book about the AD in Malvinas, we have almost ten books in english and spanish about the Air war from a "Pilot" view. At least is a very well documented conflict, available because we are still "westeners".
I'm looking forward the next parts, I'm very anxious about the 4 losses VKS un a single day and what is going on with all the Kinzhals and PAC-3 issue.
Thanks for your work!
Noo, you get us hoocked and just left us to root :-(
Oh, Gosh! He titled it Episode 1 and some sexy pilots attacked the Death Star (fort)...
Great post, I eagerly waited for the continuation, thanks Tom!
Thnk you for this article, I think it's extremely interesting..
The story about the Egyptian AD site reminds me of a similar incident in the Battle of Britain, when the Germans managed to knock out one of huge British radar positions by hitting its electrical substation. A mobile emitter was quickly set up by the RAF, and even though it lacked the range and sensitivity of the original array, the Germans picked up its emmissions and concluded their attacks on large antennae of the Chain Home radar are not effective. They decided not to press on with the attacks on British radars, not knowing that there actually was a hole in British radar system, and that continued attacks might succeed in degrading the entire system enough to make it useless.
Thank you so much for this. Excited to read about it and learn more. I really enjoyed your writings about the Angolan FAA and Zimbabwean Airforce in the books on the Congolese Uganda/Rwanda war. Really excited for the rest of this and can get a sense for where its going.
Hi Tom, commenting here since its impossible to reach you in FB understandably. Do you know of any books that have an indepth military analysis about the Eelam war in sri lanka. There are a few books written in the local language but most of it isn't researched well and mostly repeating propaganda. I'm hoping that as an conflict involving the only (as per my knowledge) insurgent group to possess an airforce and also one of the few conflicts where a strong insurgent group was thoroughly defeated by a conventional military
Sure.
Cannot but recommend the mini-series 'Paradise Afire', by Adrien Fontanellaz. Three volumes have been published by now, rolling out the Sri Lankan 'Civil' War from its reasons up to the end. Adrien did extensive research into military aspects of this war, and a lot of that with help of info obtained from former intel operatives. Moreover, he's entirely focusing on facts: thus, the books are free of usual propaganda and hear-say.
Eelam War is covered in the Volume 1.
Paradise Afire, Vol.1 (for period 1971-1987):
https://www.helion.co.uk/military-history-books/paradise-afire-volume-1-the-sri-lankan-war-1971-1987.php?sid=d735af1377bf66c80d552e2e7f5f217b
Paradise Afire, Vol.2 (for period 1987-1990):
https://www.helion.co.uk/military-history-books/paradise-afire-volume-2-the-sri-lankan-war-1987-1990.php?sid=d735af1377bf66c80d552e2e7f5f217b
Paradise Afire, Vol.3 (for period 1990-1994):
https://www.helion.co.uk/military-history-books/paradise-afire-volume-3-the-sri-lankan-war-1990-1994.php?sid=d735af1377bf66c80d552e2e7f5f217b
Obviously, Eelam War II is covered in the Volume 3.
Eealam War III will be covered in following volumes (Vol.4, for example, is planned for latter this year).
Thanks Tom...will definitely check this out. Thanks for the great work you are doing
Patriot is destroyed for sure... It is much simpler and less diversified system... russians neve lie...
Wow, this one's gonna be a banger! Thank you, Tom for a really interesting first part
So, the point here is that an AD system effectiveness can't just be measured in how many flying objects it shots down but in how much it disrupts the enemy air operations on its area of influence. I see it now. Thanks for the time you invest sharing your deep knowledge, looking forward to read the "Episode 2".
Exactly. And very much my pleasure.
Thanks Tom, I like the story to me is interesting and am waiting future additions
I just checked in on an occasional Russian blogger, and wonder what Tom makes of the specific narrative he draws with respect to the analysis of the Iraq wars: https://t.me/atomiccherry/547
***
Observing the consequences of what happened near Ugledar and the intensification of public calls for punishment of the military leadership of the RF Armed Forces, I remembered one instructive story that I would like to tell the reader.
I'll start with a long introduction. Have you ever wondered on the basis of what experience the army of the Russian Federation was built? Hardly. Most will answer this question with something banal like “it’s no different from the Soviet one,” and they’ll be mistaken.
The Russian army was built based on the experience of the US wars in Iraq ... more precisely, based on how this experience was perceived in the Russian Federation. All Russian military construction is an altar of worship to the "Desert Storm": the purchase of thousands of cruise missiles, units of the MTR of all types and stripes, parodying the combat work of the US Air Force, contract units, battalion tactical groups, private military companies, pixel camouflages... list can be long. If you work a little and bring up the open publications of the Russian General Staff of the early 2000s, then you will read an endless ode to the might of the American armed forces.
The very process of copying US military practices, however, failed somewhere - for some reason, the theory of planning air operations did not come along with cruise missiles, the F-15 did not come out of the Su-27 family, whatever you call it, and Gordon Ramsay did not headed Blackwater. But it's all little things, isn't it?
So, the experience of Iraq determined everything, and this medal had two sides - Moscow also listened very carefully to what happened to Saddam. And no, the point was not at all that hundreds of thousands of Coalition soldiers came to his soul - the point was in his domestic political decisions.
From the point of view of the Russian patriotic public, Saddam Hussein was an ideal leader - a strong and tough manager, a kind of popular Joseph Stalin with Middle Eastern specifics. He knew how to be both charismatic and generous, and tough and uncompromising - and his army in 1991 learned this the hard way.
The Iraqi generals in the mass perception are sometimes mistakenly associated with stupidity and incompetence - in fact, they lacked both. The Iraqi generals were professionals, albeit spoiled by the experience of a ten-year positional meat grinder with Iran (this greatly affected their speed of decision-making). Their problem was different - Saddam categorically did not accept any retreats, planted his views on the strategic planning of the army, and as a cherry on the cake (nuclear?) Forbade the use of aviation, which paralyzed the work of the entire air defense system of the country.
So the Iraqi command lost the opportunity to implement the only correct decision in their situation - to save the army, avoiding its complete defeat (the army leadership of Iraq initially understood that they had no chance of winning, and therefore tried to save the lives of soldiers and equipment).
In 1991, Saddam Hussein executed 14 generals and 126 senior officers. 620 were arrested, over 1500 were demoted. The purges did not stop until 2003, until a new war broke out ......
And when a new war broke out, the Iraqi generals, perfectly aware of their chances of survival, began to massively abandon their troops and surrender to the United States. Someone did it for money, someone just saved their lives - the fact was that almost all of the high command of Iraq decided that they did not like Saddam's methods of disciplinary influence at all and would definitely be better in captivity.
The subsequent history of Iraq and Saddam Hussein personally, I think, needs no explanation.
And the people in the high offices of Moscow perfectly learned this lesson - better, perhaps, than those that they tried to embody in their military development.
Broken battalions can be reassembled. You can recover from defeat. You can buy new tanks - you can even buy new people. All these are insignificant factors for the stability of the vertical of power.
Only one thing is truly dangerous for the vertical - the manifestation of disloyalty among the elements that make up its structure.
***
'He' might prefer to start addressing me directly: otherwise, I'm not feeling addressed... ;-)
And the thesis in question is hogwash. The VSRF was never built 'based on experience of the US wars in Iraq'. Not the least.
What an interesting read... One can only wander... why would you start from this story?
Would it have anything to do with the certain destruction of six Death Stars by ruzzian Kinzhal missile a few days ago?
:-)
Thank you for your update, Tom. Probably, the reason of not too much written about this SAM-Wild Weasel fights from the opposite site of the fence - because the most majority of the counterparts didn't speak neither Arabic nor English at all? They were Soviet "adviser" which officially never been there, like "ich tam net" (they aren't there) at Dondass, starting from spring 2014? All of them (advisors) were Soviet officers, members of КПСС (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), thoroughly selected and checked by KGB for very important mission delegated by Party to defend Motherland (thousands km away) against imperialism.