I certainly didn't. I was surprised Russia attacked because even in early Feb 22 it should have been evident that Russia lacked the capability to do it (poor performance in Ukraine in 2014, Libya and Syria, lack of deep modernisation, outdated airpower doctrine, flawed tacti al doctrine that was already neutralised in 2014 (BTG), and reports that training was unrealistic).
Also attacking a massive country with 40+ million people with am easly 200,000 troops is insane.
But clearly the Russiand believed it and so did NATO despite all the evidence to the contrary.
Group think is as endemic in west as it is in Russia.
It hardly matters what you thought because the premise of your post was the superiority of the NATO's procedures which completely failed on all levels in addressing Russia's aggressive resurgence since the invasion of Georgia. To add, in what what kind of 'procedure book' can I find a complete cut off of assistance for half a year by the US right in the middle of Russia's Avdiivka offensive? Which cost Ukraine multiples of losses, mentioned by you about Krynky. The scale of blind spots in your lectures in truly epic.
Procedures are not predictions. Predictions are analysis of a situation, based on whatever information and theories you have. Both procedures and predictions can be wrong and must be updated, But they are never the same.
"You think without Krynky operation, russians would of just sit idle and do nothing?"
Beyond the inexcusable human cost, the Krinky debacle operation did NOT prevent the Russians from launching the offensives they wanted. Avdiïvka, Marinka, Chasiv Yar, Robotyne, Vovchanks.
None of it was prevented by Krynky. What Krynky did however was to get a lot of AFU killed and even more AFU manpower & supply stuck in an aimless operation at a time of manpower and artillery shells shortage.
I wouldn't be so sure. AFAIK, the russians had to keep way more personnel on the left bank, I mean additional 10K-50K, which could have been used elsewhere. (Sodol still needs to go to prison, but Krynky wasn't pointless)
But the Russians had many more troops anyway while the Ukrainians did not. Due to the nature of the fighting, Russia could have only commit its forces in Krynky elsewhere incrementally as it is already doing anyway.
On the opposite, Ukraine could have used its forces to relieve and rest others Brigades while the ammos spent in Krynky could have been used to defend places that actually matter.
Thus opening a new front played on Russia strength and Ukrainian weakness. And that front (Krynky) was highly disadvantageous for Ukraine.
Sorry, there's no way you're ever going to change my opinion in this regards: have more than enough experience with 'dumbest people imaginable' doing excellent - if only given a chance, and outlooks.
Overconfidence in my experience normally let people think they don't need those procedures as they mastered their craft. That leads with especially intelligent people that they leave things out that they shouldn't.
And yes, sticking to especially check lists is helping massively to avoid mistakes that result from that.
Another thing procedures are good is maintaining institutional knowledge. The lessons learned that Tom kept talking about are incorporated into procedures, so they are not lost when the individuals which came to that conclusion are killed or retire. Not the case in Ukraine it seems...
Furthermore it is the base condition for proper evaluation through gathering enough samples to compare what is working out and what not. If things are always threated hands on and therefore different, you never go that far and failures will be repeated.
As always, interesting info. Although I suspect that once this war is over (and let's hope that is soon), evidence will not support the view that the scale of losses were down to both sides pursuing an outdated Soviet doctrine. More that these loses are directly related to the objectives of each army and the realities of a serious peer to peer conflict (i.e. the greatest loss of life will be inflicted by artillery or when storming well fortified defences). And regarding objectives, for Russia the end objective is clear: ensuring that the West and Ukrainian nationalists cannot use Ukraine as a platform to threaten Russia. There are various means of achieving this, attritional conflict to wipe out Ukraine's military capacity, taking territory to create a safe buffer zone, the economic collapse of Ukraine. Russia has the means (industrial production, manpower, time, etc) to achieve all three. In contrast, Ukraine's primary military objective is to frustrate and delay this for as long as possible, primarily to prove to its Western sponsors that it is still in the fight and has to be kept supplied, and - ultimately - the hope of an eventual Western intervention (or failing this, Nato membership). Of these two objectives, the Ukrainian one entails a greater sacrifice of its men.
The conclusion seems to me that every Ukrainian pilot (probably all other pilots, too) should be removed from the cockpit and replaced with a swallow neurolinked to the controls. Humans can do maintenance and such, but leave the flying to the pros who have been refining their procedure for a million years, not just the past one hundred.
Jim, I hope that your comment is a sarcastic remark.
Not the Pilots or the guys working on the jets are problematic, it's obviously the leadership which saw or still see no necessity to adopt a different system or are unable to do so due to lack of money and support from politicians. Pilots are the first ones to see the advantage in improvements whatever they are, their everyday life depends on the most safe way to operate the aircraft while inflicting the most damage to the opposite party. their voice though is not heard, not in Ukraine and in none western countries. Even if they speak up to their wing commander and he is willing to put that voice forward, the request looses substance the further up it is forwarded in the chain of command. If someone upstairs, I mean all the way up, sees some necessity to act upon what's left from that request its parked in the cabinet due to no budget available, and in the end it is forgotten. Do not ask me how I know that, but I tell you that's the way it works.
To the part about KI, yeah the future will go further and further into the unmanned aircraft scenario, the reason for that is manifold. But it's not that pilots make too many mistakes, that they are unreliable and can fail, but they are very expensive and it takes lots of time to train them, keep them current in the present aircraft or train them on a new system or in a new role of employment.
Yes, I was sarcastic. The medium is known to be ill-suited for proper sarcasm, though, unless it's clearly marked. Swallows would unfortunately make poor pilots on any craft that differs from a swallow's body in size, form or structure. In addition, their brains might be too small for the necessary implants.
I'm also absolutely willing to believe that pilots have little bargaining power. I would imagine it's the case for most members of most armed forces - they may be paid or provided for well, but are ultimately expected to follow orders and not complain.
If there is any conselation I found it funny and sarcastic even before this «claimer». Hoser, this is a discussion on the Sarcastosaurus blog, and about procedures as well. So my question is, did you follow proper procedures for being sarcastic when not being Sarcastosaurus?
Thanks. Not sure about this blog, but the standard online procedure for unmarked sarcasm is being sufficiently over the top. That will give you a success rate of 50-60 percent, which is around the most you can get in this genre.
Well, I'm not aware of any specific procedure having been written. Hopefully Tom will be able to offer some guidelines once his other tasks are done (i.e. all his books are in print, Ukraine has won the war and Russia is a knitting club / candy store).
Also, manned fighter jets have a need to keep those meat bags alive and breathing, so they require room and equipment (mass) for such amenities as oxygen and air conditioning, and to limit the G forces at single digit numbers (while a combat robot doesn't suffer if the airframe can keep turning at 12+ Gs)
Not quite. The assumption that modern fighter aircraft are limited to 9 G's due to the human operator is an assumtion, in reality it is the lifespan of the airframe and the movable parts of it. If a pilot exceeds that limit it's not the pilot who goes to the hospital for a checkout, it's the aircraft which needs the checkout and sometimes major repairs. Feed in some asymmetrical G's and the max G limit is lower. The jet fully loaded with fuel will have a lower limit, add external stores and again the limit will be lower.
Not saying though that a lifeless artificial ape in the cockpit would be able to tolerate higher G's and that over unlimited time, the question is for what reason? Even today dogfighting will become a lost art, so what would those G's be good for?
As a side note: A human body strapped to the seat can sustain up to 40 transverse G's , and such a maneuver would p..ss of any opponent , though there is no aircraft out there in the near future which could do such a maneuver and which could withstand it structurally.
There was a video here a week ago about a Ukrainian MIG-29 doing a low flight - steep climb - sharp turn - quick dive sort of strike with a precision munition. They are doing this as they face heavy enemy air defense, but wouldn't this be a niche where a G-resistant robotic pilot could fit into nicely? So not as a fighter, but as a blockade runner-type ground-attack UAV hitting pre-set targets?
You miss the point. There is no aircraft out there which would need an robotic pilot for a possible surplus G tolerance. There is also no necessity for more G's in the mentioned maneuver, which by the way as mentioned before is a maneuver designed more than 40 years ago. It was called "loft delivery" and implemented for the delivery of nukes to give the pilot the possibility to release the weapon as far away from intended point zero and get asap away from the coming blast.
The delivery like shown is no longer a standard approach but more or less was a helpless exercise due to lack of other options.
There should be no doubt that there will be more and more future unmanned aircraft for all kinds of tasks, but not due to higher vertical G tolerance. G considerations.
Sorry, I may have been confusing. I don't doubt pilots can handle the G of a loft delivery, the one in the recent video seems to have survived it just fine. But what happens when they need to do it over and over again, for years?
Let's assume we have a conflict between peers, like now, which drags on. No side has air superiority guaranteed, so they frequently have to resort to maneuvers like this, with no end in sight. What would it do to human bodies on the long run? If I were to oversee the air force, I wouldn't want to wear down my highly trained, expensive pilots on tasks like this, rather give them something more fitting.
I don't wish to contradict you as you have a tad more experience in the field (to put it mildly), I'm just curious. It also seems probable that the G would be a secondary consideration next to robotic planes having: less wear on their smaller, lighter structure as well / a smaller cross-section / no need to expose human pilots to enemy AA in the first place - but it would seem like an added bonus still.
If you remove the need for a human pilot and its attendant overhead (canopy, seats, air conditioning, etc.), you can design for a smaller and less restricted airframe.
Like, say, the X-47 or a descendant designed for higher maneuverability.
If your jet fighter is more compact, it can become more fast in changing directions etc, and the techniques for a reliable operation at 9 Gs could scale up to 12+ Gs.
We can speculate for what improvement the weight savings of a pilotless aircraft could be used, for more G's available or more range, endurance and weapon load, equipment.
My bet is not on the first.
Concerning the X-47, I have no knowledge if it is designed for 12 G, but I bet we would have heard about if that would be the case.
The author claims in several recent articles that the bulk of the Ukrainian troops are fighting according to Soviet standards. From the rank and file to the commanders-in-chief. And the Russian troops are waging war in the same way.
Since it is known that the Russians on average produce 3-5 times more shells and 50-100 times more bombs and missiles. The Russians are not inferior in the number of attack drones.
Then what about the statement that is often heard here that Russians suffer much greater losses in manpower than Ukrainians?
So far, the only answer to this question has been the following :
The Ukrainians use excellent tactics and this allows them to ignore the overwhelming superiority of the Russians in firepower.
But the author has shattered these illusions.
And it seems that Ukrainians are now and if earlier, they are losing more than Russians. And more precisely by how much the Russians outnumber the Ukrainians in firepower.
> The author claims in several recent articles that the bulk of the Ukrainian troops are fighting according to Soviet standards. From the rank and file to the commanders-in-chief.
He does no such thing. Grow the fuck up and represent what you're responding to accurately.
Here's what you're missing: The Russians are not fighting by Soviet standards.
Whatever shortcomings the Soviets had, and every nation has them, they were much better trained and equipped than the Russians are. The Soviets trained individuals and held unit exercises. The money they spent on national defense largely went to national defense.
With Russia, 30% of the nation's wealth went to the oligarchs every year. They had tires on trucks that were destroyed because they WEREN'T used, they were just sitting in a vehicle park for years while soldiers siphoned fuel out of them to sell on the black market. Senior NCO's in a Russian company don't even know how to strip a machine gun down for maintenance.
If one side is fighting according to Soviet doctrine and the other side is fighting with demonstrated Russian capabilities, the side using the Soviet doctrine is going to have a distinct advantage. Then if that side has a few units that have demonstrated even better procedures and capabilities and these units can be used as fire brigades to counter any crisis, their advantage is even bigger.
I wonder if keeping some elite units as fire brigades is their best use in an attritional war, though.
For example, if the 3rd assault spends its time all months putting fires off across Kharkiv, then Luhansk, then somewhere else, how can they utilize best their capabilities when spending all their time in defense?
Strategically, Ukraine is on the defense, so they are supporting Ukrainian objectives. They still conduct local counterattacks to strengthen their position/weaken the Russian position.
If they are in Luhansk it is because Ukraine believed Russian pressure was going to be strong there. Ukraine stated that they believe that Borova is a Russian objective, and the 3rd directly in the path to Borova 20 km away. Russia will not advance through them without great difficulty. Stabilizing the front is a good use of their capabilities.
Operating in "fire brigade mode" all the time may be a problem, though.
I remember the book "Tigers in the mud" by Otto Carius, in which his unit was constantly playing "fire brigade" against the Soviet army.
I don't remember reading about any attack initiative in the book, and they were badly worn down after 2+ years of continuous fighting in defense operations. Keeping a number of brigades continually in such a role may blunt their capacity for attacking and holding ground
The Ukrainians are fighting a defensive battle. That requires far less troops, less materiel and less sophisticated tactics and coordination.
Remember a single well placed machine gun crew of 2-3 men can easily neutralise an attacking platoon and can stall a larger formation.
Remember the old "rule" you need a raio of 3 to 1 when attacking. Whilst extremely simplistic, you do need concentration of force when attacking.
Also remember that when the Ukrainians attempted to do tbe same thing the Russians did (attack fortified lines) in 2023 they failed as miserably as the Russians did in most of their offensive actions.
The reversion to immobile trench warfare is what happens when semi incompetent armies clash eg Iran- iraq or Eritrea-Ethiopia.
In essence both sides are competent enough to defend against an equally or less competent attacker but too incompetent to coordinate successful attacks, breakthroughs and then exploitation phases.
MG team has no chance against the platoon (which include art observer, granade lanchers, own MG crews and sniping teams); 1÷3 ratio applies to Napoleonic style battles; defensive warfare is not easier than attacking bcs attacker has choice where and when to strike, while defender cannot be eqaually strong everywhere. Which army on the globe without backing by USAF would perform better?
1. Your average platoon does not have an artillery observer (especially in Russian style armies which often don't even have radios at platoon level).
2. Not all platoons are built the same way.
3. Terrain.
4. Positioning eg whether the MG is in enfilade and/ordefilade
5. Platoon tactics.
So yes a well concealed MG in fortified position can stall a platoon advance. if the platoon is poorly handled, it could suffer catastrophic damage from a single MG and be neutralised.
Indeed in Ukraine a lot of the Ukrainian (but also Russian defences) are very thinly held - often a fireteam of 3-4 people. Some helmet cam footage show 1-2 soldiers defending large positions such as ruined buildings with individual soldiers often using multiple weapons (both PK LMG and GP25 grenade launchers).
I've seen footage of conflict in Afghanistan where a single or couple of Taliban have stalled a US platoon enough for them to evacuate their entire force (mind you in 1 instance the US platoon were moronic, they had a UAV available that they didn't use until they had already taken fire, they didn't seem to use fire and manoeuvre and instead charged up to a village where they were taking sporadic fire from. They claimed 50 dead Taliban yet all they found was a broken radio and some casings).
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Choosing where to attack - well no, not in this instance. The Russian- Ukrainian War no longer has manoeuvre and both sides struggle to maintain any operational secrecy due to drones, ELINT, SIGINT etc.
The stagnancy of the front line means that potential attack avenues are well known eg Chasiv Yar or whatever.
As long as the Ukrainians and Russians both maintain their current defensive posture. and tactics and whilst they both lack NATO grade C3 and offensive tactical capabilities, breakthrough is not possible on either side.
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Numerical superiority has always been a concept. in modern conventional warfare. It is actually a key component of modern manoeuvre warfare (what the Germans refer to as schwerepunkt in WW2). Another way to look at it is centre of gravity or main focus.
You don't have to have overall numerical superiority but you should be able to concentrate capability at key areas to create local numerical superiority.
Indeed the Russian invasion failed simply because they were spread too thin. 200,000 men in 3 different fronts (Crimea, north Ukraine, east Ukraine near Kharkov) and even then split across numerous smaller groupings.
There was no concentration of force/main emphasis/schwerepunkt.
A lot of the attacking formations were too weak to be able to push through any kind of organised resistance especially in the north (around Kiev, Sumy). They could not advance in echelon or support each others' flanks.
Russians got lucky the Ukrainians were caught with their pants down in Kherson and Kharkiv (plus the terrain was more conducive to armoured thrusts much like it was in 1941-44). But Kiev, Sumy etc the Russians were too weak especially given the terrain.
(Indeed it took the Germans 544,000 men to conquer just Kiev back in 1941).
Your swallow analogy is so spot-on!!! The only thing I can say is never say never and I hope they swallow -haha--their pride! As a nuclear propulsion officer in the US Navy, we lived with our procedures so the number of submarine dives equals the number of surfaces
I served as the Supply Officer of a fast attack in the 1970s. I served on watches: DOOW, COOW, OOD, DO in port. We lived by procedures so much so that I began to think that we were a bunch of aviators! LOL
Tom, you reminded me of a story from an ex-pilot working in one of aviation museums in Ukraine. There were a couple documentaries about the museum in the past years and the guy is working at the museum now and likes to tell the story of how he was fired from his pilot job. Basically some woman was leaving service and he took her for an unauthorized goodbye flight in a fucking Tu-22. Just him and her I assume. He was fired but I don't think even received any jailtime. He's still complaining decades later how he was doing a nice thing and it was unfair to fire him. I could barely handle hearing him tell the story yet the journo and people in the comments were completely fine with it. I can find the video if you care to watch it yourself, I probably messed up some of the details.
Recently, I have started to use Edge read aloud function. Women with sweet and little bit arousing voice is reading text about war thematic.
For me Tom sound like sexy lady :D
I have always through it`s easy for the west to fix the human shortages, because they simple can provide most of the pilots and ground crew, until UA get proficient enough. But that can`t fix the command issues, that are rooted deep in the system.
More likely that they can’t deploy western-trained pilots (active or contractor) precisely because of the existing command issues. A western-trained pilot is obviously not going to perform well in a Soviet-style command context for all the reasons outlined above.
This may be another reason that western training is done exclusively outside of Ukraine, as the level of meddling from above if they tried to do it in situ would likely be immense.
As I understand this is a big problem faced by Western veterans who engaged in the International Legion. On top of them facing for the first time an opponent with equal/superior firepower.
With the second issue only magnifying the first problem as more than ever, they need a reliable environment and a reliable commanding structure to confront the foe.
a possible solution could be to have a separate group of squadrons, which would operate in a separate geographical region? (not very easy when covering large distances in a hour, though)
Tom, your articles are published by many Ukrainian media. I hope someone pays attention to this problem and the procedure of the PSU reform will start.
Tom, does the fact that Ukraine will need to develop an entirely new unit to operate F16s, and that this unit will thus be introducing many “new ways of doing things” to the air force as a whole, give you any hope that this could be a catalyzing event that triggers some of the overdue organizational/operational changes that you have been critiquing as of late?
Everyone believed Russia's propaganda.
I certainly didn't. I was surprised Russia attacked because even in early Feb 22 it should have been evident that Russia lacked the capability to do it (poor performance in Ukraine in 2014, Libya and Syria, lack of deep modernisation, outdated airpower doctrine, flawed tacti al doctrine that was already neutralised in 2014 (BTG), and reports that training was unrealistic).
Also attacking a massive country with 40+ million people with am easly 200,000 troops is insane.
But clearly the Russiand believed it and so did NATO despite all the evidence to the contrary.
Group think is as endemic in west as it is in Russia.
It hardly matters what you thought because the premise of your post was the superiority of the NATO's procedures which completely failed on all levels in addressing Russia's aggressive resurgence since the invasion of Georgia. To add, in what what kind of 'procedure book' can I find a complete cut off of assistance for half a year by the US right in the middle of Russia's Avdiivka offensive? Which cost Ukraine multiples of losses, mentioned by you about Krynky. The scale of blind spots in your lectures in truly epic.
You are correct in the last sentence, which is very important. But that is why it is so important to establish a culture of learning.
Procedures are not predictions. Predictions are analysis of a situation, based on whatever information and theories you have. Both procedures and predictions can be wrong and must be updated, But they are never the same.
Lots of predictions are based on very limited data and high level of gut feeling by the predictor.
superb post! bravo!
Excellent
I thought and hoped Krynky was to distract russians from everyday bombardment on Kherson and spend all the energy on that bridgehead.
You think without Krynky operation, russians would of just sit idle and do nothing?
I'm not saying it was awesome operation, but I think a ton of russian energy was pulled on military, instead civilians.
"You think without Krynky operation, russians would of just sit idle and do nothing?"
Beyond the inexcusable human cost, the Krinky debacle operation did NOT prevent the Russians from launching the offensives they wanted. Avdiïvka, Marinka, Chasiv Yar, Robotyne, Vovchanks.
None of it was prevented by Krynky. What Krynky did however was to get a lot of AFU killed and even more AFU manpower & supply stuck in an aimless operation at a time of manpower and artillery shells shortage.
I wouldn't be so sure. AFAIK, the russians had to keep way more personnel on the left bank, I mean additional 10K-50K, which could have been used elsewhere. (Sodol still needs to go to prison, but Krynky wasn't pointless)
But the Russians had many more troops anyway while the Ukrainians did not. Due to the nature of the fighting, Russia could have only commit its forces in Krynky elsewhere incrementally as it is already doing anyway.
On the opposite, Ukraine could have used its forces to relieve and rest others Brigades while the ammos spent in Krynky could have been used to defend places that actually matter.
Thus opening a new front played on Russia strength and Ukrainian weakness. And that front (Krynky) was highly disadvantageous for Ukraine.
"However, being intelligent is making us lazy and forgettable, too."
I am claiming overconfidence into this list. The Dunning Kruger effect is to my experience and opinion the key factor for really stupid decisions.
Sorry, there's no way you're ever going to change my opinion in this regards: have more than enough experience with 'dumbest people imaginable' doing excellent - if only given a chance, and outlooks.
Overconfidence in my experience normally let people think they don't need those procedures as they mastered their craft. That leads with especially intelligent people that they leave things out that they shouldn't.
And yes, sticking to especially check lists is helping massively to avoid mistakes that result from that.
Another thing procedures are good is maintaining institutional knowledge. The lessons learned that Tom kept talking about are incorporated into procedures, so they are not lost when the individuals which came to that conclusion are killed or retire. Not the case in Ukraine it seems...
Furthermore it is the base condition for proper evaluation through gathering enough samples to compare what is working out and what not. If things are always threated hands on and therefore different, you never go that far and failures will be repeated.
As always, interesting info. Although I suspect that once this war is over (and let's hope that is soon), evidence will not support the view that the scale of losses were down to both sides pursuing an outdated Soviet doctrine. More that these loses are directly related to the objectives of each army and the realities of a serious peer to peer conflict (i.e. the greatest loss of life will be inflicted by artillery or when storming well fortified defences). And regarding objectives, for Russia the end objective is clear: ensuring that the West and Ukrainian nationalists cannot use Ukraine as a platform to threaten Russia. There are various means of achieving this, attritional conflict to wipe out Ukraine's military capacity, taking territory to create a safe buffer zone, the economic collapse of Ukraine. Russia has the means (industrial production, manpower, time, etc) to achieve all three. In contrast, Ukraine's primary military objective is to frustrate and delay this for as long as possible, primarily to prove to its Western sponsors that it is still in the fight and has to be kept supplied, and - ultimately - the hope of an eventual Western intervention (or failing this, Nato membership). Of these two objectives, the Ukrainian one entails a greater sacrifice of its men.
Reptiloids. Never forget reptiloids in your political objectives analysis.
The conclusion seems to me that every Ukrainian pilot (probably all other pilots, too) should be removed from the cockpit and replaced with a swallow neurolinked to the controls. Humans can do maintenance and such, but leave the flying to the pros who have been refining their procedure for a million years, not just the past one hundred.
Jim, I hope that your comment is a sarcastic remark.
Not the Pilots or the guys working on the jets are problematic, it's obviously the leadership which saw or still see no necessity to adopt a different system or are unable to do so due to lack of money and support from politicians. Pilots are the first ones to see the advantage in improvements whatever they are, their everyday life depends on the most safe way to operate the aircraft while inflicting the most damage to the opposite party. their voice though is not heard, not in Ukraine and in none western countries. Even if they speak up to their wing commander and he is willing to put that voice forward, the request looses substance the further up it is forwarded in the chain of command. If someone upstairs, I mean all the way up, sees some necessity to act upon what's left from that request its parked in the cabinet due to no budget available, and in the end it is forgotten. Do not ask me how I know that, but I tell you that's the way it works.
To the part about KI, yeah the future will go further and further into the unmanned aircraft scenario, the reason for that is manifold. But it's not that pilots make too many mistakes, that they are unreliable and can fail, but they are very expensive and it takes lots of time to train them, keep them current in the present aircraft or train them on a new system or in a new role of employment.
Yes, I was sarcastic. The medium is known to be ill-suited for proper sarcasm, though, unless it's clearly marked. Swallows would unfortunately make poor pilots on any craft that differs from a swallow's body in size, form or structure. In addition, their brains might be too small for the necessary implants.
I'm also absolutely willing to believe that pilots have little bargaining power. I would imagine it's the case for most members of most armed forces - they may be paid or provided for well, but are ultimately expected to follow orders and not complain.
If there is any conselation I found it funny and sarcastic even before this «claimer». Hoser, this is a discussion on the Sarcastosaurus blog, and about procedures as well. So my question is, did you follow proper procedures for being sarcastic when not being Sarcastosaurus?
Thanks. Not sure about this blog, but the standard online procedure for unmarked sarcasm is being sufficiently over the top. That will give you a success rate of 50-60 percent, which is around the most you can get in this genre.
Agree. But I was talking about being sarcastic on Sarcastosaurus blogg, not in general.
Well, I'm not aware of any specific procedure having been written. Hopefully Tom will be able to offer some guidelines once his other tasks are done (i.e. all his books are in print, Ukraine has won the war and Russia is a knitting club / candy store).
Also, manned fighter jets have a need to keep those meat bags alive and breathing, so they require room and equipment (mass) for such amenities as oxygen and air conditioning, and to limit the G forces at single digit numbers (while a combat robot doesn't suffer if the airframe can keep turning at 12+ Gs)
Not quite. The assumption that modern fighter aircraft are limited to 9 G's due to the human operator is an assumtion, in reality it is the lifespan of the airframe and the movable parts of it. If a pilot exceeds that limit it's not the pilot who goes to the hospital for a checkout, it's the aircraft which needs the checkout and sometimes major repairs. Feed in some asymmetrical G's and the max G limit is lower. The jet fully loaded with fuel will have a lower limit, add external stores and again the limit will be lower.
Not saying though that a lifeless artificial ape in the cockpit would be able to tolerate higher G's and that over unlimited time, the question is for what reason? Even today dogfighting will become a lost art, so what would those G's be good for?
As a side note: A human body strapped to the seat can sustain up to 40 transverse G's , and such a maneuver would p..ss of any opponent , though there is no aircraft out there in the near future which could do such a maneuver and which could withstand it structurally.
"what would those G's be good for? "
There was a video here a week ago about a Ukrainian MIG-29 doing a low flight - steep climb - sharp turn - quick dive sort of strike with a precision munition. They are doing this as they face heavy enemy air defense, but wouldn't this be a niche where a G-resistant robotic pilot could fit into nicely? So not as a fighter, but as a blockade runner-type ground-attack UAV hitting pre-set targets?
You miss the point. There is no aircraft out there which would need an robotic pilot for a possible surplus G tolerance. There is also no necessity for more G's in the mentioned maneuver, which by the way as mentioned before is a maneuver designed more than 40 years ago. It was called "loft delivery" and implemented for the delivery of nukes to give the pilot the possibility to release the weapon as far away from intended point zero and get asap away from the coming blast.
The delivery like shown is no longer a standard approach but more or less was a helpless exercise due to lack of other options.
There should be no doubt that there will be more and more future unmanned aircraft for all kinds of tasks, but not due to higher vertical G tolerance. G considerations.
Sorry, I may have been confusing. I don't doubt pilots can handle the G of a loft delivery, the one in the recent video seems to have survived it just fine. But what happens when they need to do it over and over again, for years?
Let's assume we have a conflict between peers, like now, which drags on. No side has air superiority guaranteed, so they frequently have to resort to maneuvers like this, with no end in sight. What would it do to human bodies on the long run? If I were to oversee the air force, I wouldn't want to wear down my highly trained, expensive pilots on tasks like this, rather give them something more fitting.
I don't wish to contradict you as you have a tad more experience in the field (to put it mildly), I'm just curious. It also seems probable that the G would be a secondary consideration next to robotic planes having: less wear on their smaller, lighter structure as well / a smaller cross-section / no need to expose human pilots to enemy AA in the first place - but it would seem like an added bonus still.
If you remove the need for a human pilot and its attendant overhead (canopy, seats, air conditioning, etc.), you can design for a smaller and less restricted airframe.
Like, say, the X-47 or a descendant designed for higher maneuverability.
If your jet fighter is more compact, it can become more fast in changing directions etc, and the techniques for a reliable operation at 9 Gs could scale up to 12+ Gs.
We can speculate for what improvement the weight savings of a pilotless aircraft could be used, for more G's available or more range, endurance and weapon load, equipment.
My bet is not on the first.
Concerning the X-47, I have no knowledge if it is designed for 12 G, but I bet we would have heard about if that would be the case.
I'm interested.
The author claims in several recent articles that the bulk of the Ukrainian troops are fighting according to Soviet standards. From the rank and file to the commanders-in-chief. And the Russian troops are waging war in the same way.
Since it is known that the Russians on average produce 3-5 times more shells and 50-100 times more bombs and missiles. The Russians are not inferior in the number of attack drones.
Then what about the statement that is often heard here that Russians suffer much greater losses in manpower than Ukrainians?
So far, the only answer to this question has been the following :
The Ukrainians use excellent tactics and this allows them to ignore the overwhelming superiority of the Russians in firepower.
But the author has shattered these illusions.
And it seems that Ukrainians are now and if earlier, they are losing more than Russians. And more precisely by how much the Russians outnumber the Ukrainians in firepower.
That is, several times.
> The author claims in several recent articles that the bulk of the Ukrainian troops are fighting according to Soviet standards. From the rank and file to the commanders-in-chief.
He does no such thing. Grow the fuck up and represent what you're responding to accurately.
I don’t ever remember Tom saying the Ukrainians are losing more men than the Russians. Your interpretation of what he presented is way off point.
Прочитайте мой комментарий ещё раз.
Я не говорил, что Том утверждал подобное.
Это говорю я.
Here's what you're missing: The Russians are not fighting by Soviet standards.
Whatever shortcomings the Soviets had, and every nation has them, they were much better trained and equipped than the Russians are. The Soviets trained individuals and held unit exercises. The money they spent on national defense largely went to national defense.
With Russia, 30% of the nation's wealth went to the oligarchs every year. They had tires on trucks that were destroyed because they WEREN'T used, they were just sitting in a vehicle park for years while soldiers siphoned fuel out of them to sell on the black market. Senior NCO's in a Russian company don't even know how to strip a machine gun down for maintenance.
If one side is fighting according to Soviet doctrine and the other side is fighting with demonstrated Russian capabilities, the side using the Soviet doctrine is going to have a distinct advantage. Then if that side has a few units that have demonstrated even better procedures and capabilities and these units can be used as fire brigades to counter any crisis, their advantage is even bigger.
I wonder if keeping some elite units as fire brigades is their best use in an attritional war, though.
For example, if the 3rd assault spends its time all months putting fires off across Kharkiv, then Luhansk, then somewhere else, how can they utilize best their capabilities when spending all their time in defense?
Strategically, Ukraine is on the defense, so they are supporting Ukrainian objectives. They still conduct local counterattacks to strengthen their position/weaken the Russian position.
If they are in Luhansk it is because Ukraine believed Russian pressure was going to be strong there. Ukraine stated that they believe that Borova is a Russian objective, and the 3rd directly in the path to Borova 20 km away. Russia will not advance through them without great difficulty. Stabilizing the front is a good use of their capabilities.
Operating in "fire brigade mode" all the time may be a problem, though.
I remember the book "Tigers in the mud" by Otto Carius, in which his unit was constantly playing "fire brigade" against the Soviet army.
I don't remember reading about any attack initiative in the book, and they were badly worn down after 2+ years of continuous fighting in defense operations. Keeping a number of brigades continually in such a role may blunt their capacity for attacking and holding ground
The Ukrainians are fighting a defensive battle. That requires far less troops, less materiel and less sophisticated tactics and coordination.
Remember a single well placed machine gun crew of 2-3 men can easily neutralise an attacking platoon and can stall a larger formation.
Remember the old "rule" you need a raio of 3 to 1 when attacking. Whilst extremely simplistic, you do need concentration of force when attacking.
Also remember that when the Ukrainians attempted to do tbe same thing the Russians did (attack fortified lines) in 2023 they failed as miserably as the Russians did in most of their offensive actions.
The reversion to immobile trench warfare is what happens when semi incompetent armies clash eg Iran- iraq or Eritrea-Ethiopia.
In essence both sides are competent enough to defend against an equally or less competent attacker but too incompetent to coordinate successful attacks, breakthroughs and then exploitation phases.
MG team has no chance against the platoon (which include art observer, granade lanchers, own MG crews and sniping teams); 1÷3 ratio applies to Napoleonic style battles; defensive warfare is not easier than attacking bcs attacker has choice where and when to strike, while defender cannot be eqaually strong everywhere. Which army on the globe without backing by USAF would perform better?
1. Your average platoon does not have an artillery observer (especially in Russian style armies which often don't even have radios at platoon level).
2. Not all platoons are built the same way.
3. Terrain.
4. Positioning eg whether the MG is in enfilade and/ordefilade
5. Platoon tactics.
So yes a well concealed MG in fortified position can stall a platoon advance. if the platoon is poorly handled, it could suffer catastrophic damage from a single MG and be neutralised.
Indeed in Ukraine a lot of the Ukrainian (but also Russian defences) are very thinly held - often a fireteam of 3-4 people. Some helmet cam footage show 1-2 soldiers defending large positions such as ruined buildings with individual soldiers often using multiple weapons (both PK LMG and GP25 grenade launchers).
I've seen footage of conflict in Afghanistan where a single or couple of Taliban have stalled a US platoon enough for them to evacuate their entire force (mind you in 1 instance the US platoon were moronic, they had a UAV available that they didn't use until they had already taken fire, they didn't seem to use fire and manoeuvre and instead charged up to a village where they were taking sporadic fire from. They claimed 50 dead Taliban yet all they found was a broken radio and some casings).
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Choosing where to attack - well no, not in this instance. The Russian- Ukrainian War no longer has manoeuvre and both sides struggle to maintain any operational secrecy due to drones, ELINT, SIGINT etc.
The stagnancy of the front line means that potential attack avenues are well known eg Chasiv Yar or whatever.
As long as the Ukrainians and Russians both maintain their current defensive posture. and tactics and whilst they both lack NATO grade C3 and offensive tactical capabilities, breakthrough is not possible on either side.
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Numerical superiority has always been a concept. in modern conventional warfare. It is actually a key component of modern manoeuvre warfare (what the Germans refer to as schwerepunkt in WW2). Another way to look at it is centre of gravity or main focus.
You don't have to have overall numerical superiority but you should be able to concentrate capability at key areas to create local numerical superiority.
Indeed the Russian invasion failed simply because they were spread too thin. 200,000 men in 3 different fronts (Crimea, north Ukraine, east Ukraine near Kharkov) and even then split across numerous smaller groupings.
There was no concentration of force/main emphasis/schwerepunkt.
A lot of the attacking formations were too weak to be able to push through any kind of organised resistance especially in the north (around Kiev, Sumy). They could not advance in echelon or support each others' flanks.
Russians got lucky the Ukrainians were caught with their pants down in Kherson and Kharkiv (plus the terrain was more conducive to armoured thrusts much like it was in 1941-44). But Kiev, Sumy etc the Russians were too weak especially given the terrain.
(Indeed it took the Germans 544,000 men to conquer just Kiev back in 1941).
Your swallow analogy is so spot-on!!! The only thing I can say is never say never and I hope they swallow -haha--their pride! As a nuclear propulsion officer in the US Navy, we lived with our procedures so the number of submarine dives equals the number of surfaces
I served as the Supply Officer of a fast attack in the 1970s. I served on watches: DOOW, COOW, OOD, DO in port. We lived by procedures so much so that I began to think that we were a bunch of aviators! LOL
We loved our chops 🤩
That's because you ate well on your boat! heh heh heh heh heh
Tom, you reminded me of a story from an ex-pilot working in one of aviation museums in Ukraine. There were a couple documentaries about the museum in the past years and the guy is working at the museum now and likes to tell the story of how he was fired from his pilot job. Basically some woman was leaving service and he took her for an unauthorized goodbye flight in a fucking Tu-22. Just him and her I assume. He was fired but I don't think even received any jailtime. He's still complaining decades later how he was doing a nice thing and it was unfair to fire him. I could barely handle hearing him tell the story yet the journo and people in the comments were completely fine with it. I can find the video if you care to watch it yourself, I probably messed up some of the details.
Recently, I have started to use Edge read aloud function. Women with sweet and little bit arousing voice is reading text about war thematic.
For me Tom sound like sexy lady :D
I have always through it`s easy for the west to fix the human shortages, because they simple can provide most of the pilots and ground crew, until UA get proficient enough. But that can`t fix the command issues, that are rooted deep in the system.
More likely that they can’t deploy western-trained pilots (active or contractor) precisely because of the existing command issues. A western-trained pilot is obviously not going to perform well in a Soviet-style command context for all the reasons outlined above.
This may be another reason that western training is done exclusively outside of Ukraine, as the level of meddling from above if they tried to do it in situ would likely be immense.
As I understand this is a big problem faced by Western veterans who engaged in the International Legion. On top of them facing for the first time an opponent with equal/superior firepower.
With the second issue only magnifying the first problem as more than ever, they need a reliable environment and a reliable commanding structure to confront the foe.
a possible solution could be to have a separate group of squadrons, which would operate in a separate geographical region? (not very easy when covering large distances in a hour, though)
Great post! Factual and to the point
Tom, your articles are published by many Ukrainian media. I hope someone pays attention to this problem and the procedure of the PSU reform will start.
Tom, does the fact that Ukraine will need to develop an entirely new unit to operate F16s, and that this unit will thus be introducing many “new ways of doing things” to the air force as a whole, give you any hope that this could be a catalyzing event that triggers some of the overdue organizational/operational changes that you have been critiquing as of late?
Thanks for this, well written.