The Saga of Ukraine and F-16s: Offensive Counter-Air (a.k.a. Part 5)

Since yesterday, the video from which the following ‘screen-grab’ was drawn is making circles in the social media:  

Reportedly, this was taken ‘somewhere in Ukraine’, a day or two ago.

The jet visible on the video and the still is – definitely – an F-16. Indeed, one armed with AIM-120s on its wing-tips, and carrying the usual pair of drop tanks on its inboard underwing stations. That much is sure.

The rest…. right now: who can say… Point is: it could be authentic and if it is, then: ‘they are there’.

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Meanwhile… as explained in the ‘Quick Reaction Alert/Part 4’, the ‘predominant Thesis No.1’ is that the Ukrainian F-16s are first going to be used to ‘bolster Ukrainian air defences’.

I’ve expressed my doubts about this, and indeed: I do think they’re going to be useful for few other thingies, too. For example, for something called ‘offensive counter-air’ in military jargon.

Whether they have received additional modifications or not prior to their delivery to Ukraine, F-16AMs (these are single-seaters; there are also F-16BM two-seaters, but they are few, used for conversion training and thus ‘precious’: I do not expect to see them being deployed in combat very often), should arrive in Ukraine equipped with

-          AIM-120C Slammer active radar homing, medium-range-, and

-          AIM-9X Sidewinder infra-red homing, short-range air-to-air missiles.

….in addition to their M61 six-barrel gun calibre 20mm, installed internally. Coupled with their upgraded AN/APG-662A pulse Doppler radars (max range around 80km), they should offer a better air-to-air platform than any MiG-29s or Su-27s currently in Ukrainian service.

Why ‘better’?

Because they are more reliable systems (read: have longer ‘between failure’ periods) and easier to operate, more ergonomic than what is currently installed in Ukrainian MiG-29s and Su-27s.

The biggest question mark at that point is: how far can the PSU integrate its F-16AMs with its existing IADS (integrated air defence system)?

About a year ago, there was a lots of talk about the PSU receiving the IBCS BN Gateway system from the USA: essentially, the same is a computer system with software capable of integrating not only current, Western-made radars and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), but all sorts of old, Soviet-designed radars and SAMs. That’s great, but… pay attention at the diagram below, and then especially something called ‘Link 16’ there: this is the capability of the IADS to communicate/network itself with, for example, aircraft.

Why is this important? …why would that ‘Link-16’ be important?

Because the ‘Link-16’ is something like ‘US/NATO’s internet for combat purposes’. It’s networking all the intelligence and providing it straight to the ‘trigger pullers’, thus immensely increasing their situational awareness. For example: ‘at a click on a button’, an F-16-pilot on a jet equipped with the Link-16 would be as well-informed about all the known positions of Russian air defences and airborne interceptors, as his commander on the ground: he can see the same information on a display in his cockpit.

So, if the PSU really has the IBCS BN Gateway, and then gets the Link 16, its F-16s could receive the same ‘picture’ like the Ukrainian air defence network and that ‘in real time’.

In turn, this means that the Ukrainian F-16s could also operate without revealing their presence through radio transmissions or through powering up their own radars.

Why is this important?

Because the Russians have a very comprehensive system of electronic support measures (ESM) deployed in and around Ukraine - for example: such passive detection systems like Kolchuga, the same that are in service in Ukraine - and you can be 1000% sure that the first way in which the Russian military intelligence (GRU) is going to learn about the presence of F-16s in Ukraine will be either F-16-related radio transmissions or radar emissions. And the point is: no matter what’s the range of (for example) radios, or radars installed into Ukrainian F-16s, their emissions can always be detected from about two times further away.

The result is that even if an F-16 is, for example, airborne over Starokostyantyniv Air Base, its emissions are near-certain to get picked up by GRU’s ESM-stations still deployed in southern Belarus. And, every time these pick up ‘F-16-related’ transmissions/emissions, the Russians are going to know the F-16s are around, airborne, and thus a direct threat. They’ll be putting their air defence system on alert, scrambling their manned interceptors, probably scrambling even their brigades equipped with Iskander-Ms and -Ks for a possible deployment of missiles against possible Ukrainian F-16-bases, too.

Correspondingly: the best way for Ukrainian F-16s to operate (and that ‘right now, and for the next year or so’), will be to operate without emitting anything at all. That’s going to keep them safe - because it’s going to deny the Russians the option of obtaining superior situational awareness.

Operating that way sounds easy, but is anything else than that. It requires lots of preparation – not so much by the pilots or the unit operating F-16s, as by the entire Ukrainian air defence system (and then the air defence system of the PSU, plus the air defence system of the ZSU). People in command of the same must know there are going to be F-16s in a specific area, and their troops shouldn’t open fire at them. Just for example. That alone takes awfully lots of organisation and coordination, because there are thousands of people involved, and the closer they are deployed to the frontline, the poorer are communications with them. ….which is why a few of PSU’s jets and helicopters have already been shot down by their own forces: so much so, most of those still operational have received large parts of their surfaces painted in Ukrainian national colours. As ‘methods of quick identification’…. like those applied on this Su-24:

Anyway… lets assume, the PSU has got both, the IBCS BN Gateway and the Link-16…

In such case, the PSU could start deploying its F-16s for what I’ve mentioned above: for ‘offensive counter-air’ operations.

…Against UMPK-glide-bomb-releasing Su-34s?

Nope. The Russian Su-24s and Su-34s are usually releasing these from altitudes around 9,000-12,000 metres and 70km away. Thus, they’re going to remain outside the Ukrainian reach for a while longer.

However, the Russian Air-Space Force (VKS) is constantly operating its Su-25 ground attack aircraft and Ka-52 attack helicopters for strikes on Ukrainian ground positions. These are flying dozens of combat sorties, every single day. Moreover, 10+ kilometres behind the frontline, the VKS is deploying its (unreliable, and weather-sensitive) Mi-28 attack helicopters to hunt down Ukrainian UAVs. Thus, theoretically, there is plenty of opportunity for the PSU to deploy one (or more) of its F-16s to kill one of these.

Potentially at least, all of these would be within reach of Ukrainian F-16s.

….of course: all provided one of incoming Russian formations is detected on time, and reliably tracked by the Ukrainian air defence system, of course – so that F-16s can be scrambled from their bases in time, too.

In such case, the PSU could scramble one (or more) of its F-16/s and vector it into an intercept attempt.

Even then, and essentially, the jet will still have to operate without emitting any kind of electronic emissions at all, and also fly the way that MiG-29 was operating, visible on the video from two weeks ago.

Why that?

Except for having a comprehensive ESM-system deployed in- and arund Ukraine, the Russians are still in possession of aerial superiority over the battlefield, and if the F-16-pilots aren’t careful enough, they’ll get shot down already while trying to approach the combat zone in order to lob one of their AIM-120 at one or another Ka-52 or Su-25. Means: the Ukrainians will have to use ‘terrain masking’: fly extremely low, between hills, and man-made constructions while approaching the combat zone.

And that’s going to be ‘just for the start’: once within range, and thus inside the combat zone, an F-16 will have to ‘jink’ upwards, almost exactly like that MiG-29. However, contrary to that MiG-29 that, upon releasing its bombs, promptly entered a hard turn and returned back to the ground only seconds later – an F-16 on a counter-air mission will have to stay up there for a while longer: it will have to activate its radar, acquire the target and fire the missile, before returning back to the low altitude.

Means: actually, that part of the mission is going to be even more dangerous than the release of JDAMS or HAMMERs by MiG-29s and/or Su-27s – because F-16s will have to continue flying in full sight of Russian radars, and in direction of these radars, for at least 15-20 seconds. And even once the F-16 will have fired its missile/s, it will still have to distance itself from the combat zone without getting intercepted by Russian long-range SAMs or manned interceptors (especially MiG-31BMs and Su-35S’ in return).

I.e. the game of hide-and-seek is going to continue. Just with few new weapons.

But, killing one or another Su-25, or Ka-52… or Mi-28… that would be a nice success – and give the Russians about a week or two of some very hard thinking (about what has got the aircraft in question and how to counter it). At least it would make them much more cautious before they would continue sending Su-25s and Ka-52s the harms way.

What would be necessary for the PSU to operate its F-16s that way, would be at least two… ‘ingredients’:

-          ALQ-131 electronic countermeasure pods. Actually, these are already installed on Danish, Dutch, and Norwegian F-16AMs. The question is whether the Trio Fantasticus and the Pentagon might grant permission for their delivery to Ukraine. Essence of ALQ-131’s function is jamming selected enemy radars and radar-guidance systems. Effects of its work could be roughly compared to those of ‘shields’ on spacecraft from TV-series like Star Trek: it could take the Russians by surprise, cause quite a lots of problems to their SAM-operators, and cause their missiles to miss. Thus: ALQ-131s would keep Ukrainian F-16s safe. Most of the time.

A pair of F-16s (here of the US Air Force) equipped with ALQ-131 ECM-pods: the latter are visible under the centre of each of these two jets.

At least as good – and, indeed, something for which one must ‘hope and pray’ (even if an atheist) – would be the delivery of so-called ‘towed decoys’. Thingies like AN/ALE-50, for example (photo below): they’re streamed behind the jet, and have proven exceptionally effective – both during testing and in actual combat. Sufficient to say, SAMs ‘love’ towed decoys, and that’s good that way, because they always go for towed decoy, instead for the aircraft towing the decoy. Means: towed decoys are also keeping aircraft safe from enemy missiles.

Finding the ALE-50 on this photo is not easy… thus,, Don was so kind to mark it in yellow.

Finally, i.e. something like ‘Thesis No. 3’, would be for Ukrainian F-16s to do the same things Ukrainian MiG-29s, Su-25s, and Su-27s are already doing: to be deployed for launching AGM-88 HARM anti-radar missiles and/or precision guided munition like GBU-39, GBU-63, or the French-made HAMMER.

In this regards, there would be not many differences between what an F-16 could do, and what Ukrainian MiG-29, Su-25, and Su-27s are already doing. I.e. see the video linked above…

Me thinks, this is – currently – not that likely for a simple reason that the PSU is already expending so many of GBUs and HAMMERs, that their stocks are constantly critically low. Read: there are never more than around 20-30 of either in Ukraine. The West is not delivering enough for ‘more’. Sure, this can change in the future (especially if the F-16s arrived together with ALQ-131s and towed decoys), but: right now, this is simply not the case and thus, I think, there’s no point in discussing this.

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For the end, I’ve got lots of private messages and other kind of reactions to ‘The Saga of Ukraine and F-16s’. Sadly, it’s impossible - physically and mentally - to address all of them. Thus, let me conclude with trying to address at least a few that appear (to meI) something like, ‘most important/most interesting related questions’.

For example, does the fact that Ukraine will need to develop an entirely new unit to operate F-16s, and that this unit will thus be introducing many ‘new ways of doing things’ (to the air force as a whole), offers any hope this could be a catalysing event that triggers some of overdue organisational/operational changes?

Yes. Definitely so.

….or, at least when the first Ukrainian F-16 gets shot down (though, I hope: well before that), ‘somebody there’ in the High Command PSU and/or the GenStab-U will have to accept the reality. And thus start kicking asses (his own as first) into a serious reform.

The reason is that there’s simply no other way out of this fracas – not for the PSU, not for the ZSU, not for all of Ukraine, nor for its Western supporters (not really ‘allies’). All of the Ukrainian armed forces must be reformed, and then reformed and re-reformed to such a degree, so often, and so long, until its quality (and with this I mean: the quality of every single of its brigades, battalions, companies and squadrons, and every platoon) is improved to the degree where it can – dependably, and just for example – ‘kill 30+ Russians for every own casualty’.  

‘We lack artillery/mortar ammunition, tanks, F-16s etc.’ – is no excuse for a failure to reform the very fundamentals of the force: procedures and thus methods of training and operations. Force-wide.

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Wouldn’t it be easier to modernise the existing Ukrainian fleet of MiG-29s, Su-24s, Su-25s, and Su-27s – than acquire F-16s?

Theoretically, this sounds so nice. Almost ‘sexy’. ‘Just replace the black boxes’…. In reality, it is not. By side that Western avionics needs its own types of sources of power, and requires lots of power, and thus is not always simple to install into a Soviet-designed/manufactured aircraft (so much so, the mass of modern Western jets has so-called ‘auxiliary power units/APUs’ installed… you can recognise them by relatively big exhausts, somewhere low on the rear part of the airframe). But, the airframes operated by the PSU right now are still 40-years old. Many of them actually ‘flown to death’. Literally: ‘bent’. Sure, so are F-16AMs Ukraine is about to get (or has already got), but at least one can hope the technical condition of F-16s handed over to the Ukrainians is going to be much better. So much better, the jets might be flown for another 2-5 years before they start (literally) falling apart.

Foremost, mind that the Western avionics is extremely expensive. Out of 100% of the costs for a new jet made here in the West, up to 30-35% is spent for avionics. Another 50% (sometimes more), for engines (read: the airframe itself is actually ‘the least of problems’). Means: cost-wise, re-quipping existing Ukrainian jets with Western avionics would likely cost as much (if not more) as donating F-16s.

And then mind the factor ‘Western defence sector’: imagine what a fight…a war would it cause if, for example, the EU Parliament announces it’s planning to finance the re-equipment the PSU’s fleet of Soviet-made fighter-jets with Western avionics. Who would be in charge? Who would control what? Who would earn billions from that project? Dassault and Thales would fight the Euroradar, Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH, Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency, Leonardo, Saab and thus the British Aerospace – and the other way around -  ‘to death’, literally (at least: ‘certainly, more fiercely than any of these corporations might ever fight the Russians’). ….and that would go on for ‘years’…

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…or, how about employing foreign volunteers to serve with the PSU and fly and maintain F-16s…? something like, ‘Eric Prince-led Flying Tigers’?

Up front, the last few years, it was Qatar that ‘bought’ the ‘best’ between that kind of people. See: when facing a Saudi-Emirati-imposed ‘blockade’, back in 2017, and almost around the same time, Qatar – which at the time had an air force flying about a dozen of Mirage 2000s, with a similar number of pilots and ground crews – placed an order for a total of about 150 of F-15Es in the USA, EF-2000s in the EU, and Rafales in France. Horny for profit, and ignoring the fact that Qatar is also the biggest sponsor of extremist ‘Islam’ in the EU, the West jumped to the opportunity and sold everything the Qataris wanted. Including 10,000 best milk-cows from Germany, best of the local hay-harvest… and lots of highly-experienced, veteran military personnel.

Read: because Qatar couldn’t man even a squadron of all these nice new jets, it began hiring abroad like crazy. The result is that nowadays the ‘Qatar Emiri Air Force’ (QEAF) is to 90% staffed by hundreds of ex-USAF, ex-US Navy, ex-US Marine Corps, ex-RAF, ex-Armée de l’Air and similar people, all carefully selected by US, British and French officers already working for the QEAF since earlier times. Plus some Pakistanis and Turks, of course. The situation is not very much different in the case of the Royal Bahraini Air Force (where at least a squadron of F-5s and another of F-16s are manned by expatriates). And…sigh… a part of me does not really want to know how many other of Western expats are serving in ‘advisory’ functions for the United Arab Emirates Air Force, in the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (yes: the air force of the PR China) and similar other services…

As next, there are such private military companies like Top Aces, which are flying ex-Israeli and whatever jets, and providing ‘aggressor’ services to the US armed forces. They’ve taken lots of ‘talent’ away from the ‘free market’ too.

Last – but not least: The Saga of Ukraine and F-16s is run by European members of NATO. Now, to make sure, it’s not as if Europeans would lack experience in ‘private military contractor/company’ sector: let me remind you how the Algerian- and European employees of the US-based Griffon Airspace created the Chadian Air Force (and that through hiring Ukrainians, Algerians, Ethiopians, Mexicans etc.) back in the 2000s.

However, for the European members of NATO, ‘hiring expats to fly and maintain Ukrainian F-16s’ would be equal to ‘related to the term mercenary’ – and thus an anathema. Both the governments and the public here ‘do not feel at ease’ when they think of ‘private military companies/contractors’: indeed, even in France, the times of the DGSE hiring mercenaries to ‘fly somewhere in Africa’ are meanwhile over. Now, just imagine the media finding out that the ‘Ukro-Nazis are hiring Western mercenaries’ like Eric Prince or Habib Boukharouba….the reaction would be nothing short of a ‘public outrage’.

Therefore, the ‘EU-part of NATO’ is running this ‘project’ by their own, official military personnel.

The people in question are good and professional. Their qualifications are not the problem. And the results of their work is going to be corresponding. Again: ‘state-owned’ does not mean ‘less efficient’ (even less so: ‘more expensive’ or ‘taking much longer’…). It only means that European governments are never going to let any of their own military officers (and other ranks) actually fly and fight for Ukraine, or to maintain F-16s in the country.

It’s the circumstances under which the people in question have to work – that ‘famous/notorious’ mix of professional incompetence of their own political masters, plus the Ukrainian adventurism, overconfidence, and incompetence at the top, plus the US-meddling (certain to remain ‘in power’ well beyond the Trio Fantasticus dominating the White House) – that are the problem.

So, this saga is going to ‘end’ the same way like the deployment of Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG in Ukraine: the stuff will be brought to the border, and then picked up by ‘some causal bystanders from the other side’ (indeed, in the case of Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG, the situation is such that staff from NATO-members is planning every mission, then brings the ‘tapes’ with all the details to the border, and the Ukrainians then… ‘do the rest’).

To a certain degree, think that’s good that way, because the PSU is going to be less burdened with ‘deep’ maintenance of its F-16s, early on. For example: we can expect its technicians to dismount and ‘send West’ any engine that is broken, or any major assembly/sub-assembly. Like the ZSU is already doing with Leopard 2 tanks and Panzerhaubitze 2000s. This is going to be something like the ‘most inconvenient’ part of this entire saga.

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Finally, how are you (readers) to ‘read’ this Saga? As an explanation of why the transfer of F-16s is taking so much longer, or why is it likely to become ‘nothing but trouble’? Or as ‘Ukrainian F-16s are going to become an expensive fiasco’?

Read it the way it’s told:

-          1.) Both Ukrainian politicians and generals demanding F-16s lack the understanding for how Western (and especially: US) weapons systems work.

-          2.) Western politicians donating F-16s to Ukraine lack the understanding for how weapons systems work.

-          3.) This combination alone is creating circumstances where it’s next to impossible to actually make Ukrainian F-16s ‘work’.

-          4.) Contrary to NATO-members, Ukraine has no air force adapted to the US-made air warfare system. This means it’s going to take it ‘about a generation in time’ to change this. (Withb other words: this shouldn’t mean Ukraine is never going to have such an air force; it will, but sometimes in 10-15 years….and this wouldn’t have been any different even if NATO began donating F-16s to Ukraine already back in 2014 or so.)

-          5.) Meanwhile, Ukrainian F-16s are going to cost both their donors and Ukraine far too many resources that, at this point in time, would be better spent for many other things both Ukraine and its armed forces need even more urgently.

-          6.) The number of F-16s available to Ukraine for the next 2-3 years will be too small to change anything in grand total, while

-          7.) the F-16 as weapons system is going to be compromised to the Russians, who are thus going to get even more opportunity to develop advanced countermeasures – which is then going to hit back upon Ukrainians as a boomerang, once they do have enough F-16s to expect these to be able to make the difference.

-          8.) Meanwhile, any loss of an Ukrainian F-16s is going to quickly earn it bad reputation, while becoming a major morale bolster for the Russians, and a ‘major defeat’ for the Ukrainians (and their allies).

….and… well, that ache in my small toe is telling me that this issue (especially ‘morale’) might be of some relevance both in a war of attrition, like this one in Ukraine meanwhile is, and at the times Ukraine is overdependent on continuous, undisrupted and certain financial- and military support of the West, which is already now certain to remain insufficient for years longer.