The Saga of Ukraine and F-16s: Find Nemo (a.k.a 'Part 3')

On 10 July… yes, meanwhile, that’s now more than two weeks ago… the White House has officially granted permission for (‘actual’) delivery of F-16s to Ukraine. That is: the Trio Fantasticus (Biden-Blinken-Sullivan) has granted the third and final permission – for the actual delivery of jets. To Ukraine.

….and ever since…. ‘crickets’…

Which is good that way.

Why?

Because it’s not only since ‘now’ – where the first jets are either about to be delivered, or perhaps already in the country – that there is a mad rush in Russia to find them: that all the possible GRU- and FSB-informants in Ukraine, and multiple sub-branches, and units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (VSRF) and the Russian Air-Space Force (VKS) have been tasked with ‘finding Nemo’… erm… F-16s…and with forwarding related intelligence to Moscow.

I’ll repeat this for emphasis and so there are no doubts: the Russians are already now running an outright manhunt for every single F-16 that might ever reach Ukraine, every single pilot and member of the ground crew – and that for months already.

How do I know?

Oh, I do not know. I’m guessing.

If you like, call it an ‘educated guess’, or ‘simple logic’; a conclusion based on studying Soviet- and then Russian allies for 35+ years, and, more recently, the Russians. For example: it’s simply ‘logical’ that the GRU- and FSB-informants (or ‘spies’) ‘active’ in ‘the West’ (see: European NATO-members) have been feeding whatever info they could get on the training of PSU’s F-16-pilots and -ground personnel, and that right since the moment the decision to start the same was taken.

That’s simply the way the Russians fight their wars.

And then, they’ve – and this is something for which I’m ready to sign a written guarantee – certainly tracked the transfer of donated F-16s to Romania, and their activity there, too. Be sure, Russian informants in Romania are keeping them updated as good as they can, too.

And then they have support from somebody else.  

This ‘somebody else’ is… remember reports about Ukrainian UAV strikes on such Russian over-the-horizon (OTH) radars like a Voronezh-M near Orsk, or the Voronezh-DM near Armavir, back in May?

Sure, these are huge installations; ‘not even really looking like radars’, ‘more like buildings’ – thus the majority of people is not recognising them as such. They’re next to unknown. And, sure, for most of weirdos like me, they’re known as labour intensive and complex to maintain and calibrate, and something like, ‘actually used for anti-ballistic missile defence’….

Typical antenna of the Voronezh-M OTH radar.

However, they can be used, and the Russians are using them for tracking air traffic, too.

The two radars known to have been attacked and damaged by Ukrainians were ‘not really the best positioned to track the traffic inside the Ukrainian airspace’. There are others, much better positioned for that purpose. But, me thinks, Ukrainians have attacked them because they have tried to knock out at least some of the Russian capability to track the delivery and early operations of their F-16s. 

Why that?

The two radars hit by the Ukrainian UAVs were (relatively) ‘simple’ targets: big metal constructions, resembling big buildings (see the photo above). However, there are other OTH radars that actually consist of long lines of tall masts made of metal. They are anything else than easy to hit.

Antennas of the Konteyner OTH radar.

Point is: depending on their type and position, and gauging by the frequency of their pulses (about 50 per second), the OTH systems in, say, ‘western central Russia’ can detect and track aircraft and/or helicopters over a range of some 3,000-3,700km.

A simplified diagram explaining the function of an OTH radar (don’t worry: the West has its own, too… just Ukraine has none).

Actually, they’re certainly good enough to pick up not only flying objects, but also big buildings and the naval traffic, too. Perhaps more. And the Russians had years of time to calibrate them properly, so that their software is ‘filtering out’ anything they don’t care about (like big buildings). But, the point is: they can track an F-16 (and not only F-16s: they’re picking literal thousands of aircraft and helicopters at any time) - from some 3,000 or so kilometres away, and until this is something like 800-900 kilometres away (as much as they have a very long range, OTH radars have also a big ‘blind zone’ within their minimal range). The only problem with OTH radars is that they’re not particularly precise when it comes to positions of flying objects: but, at such ranges, ‘2000-3000 metres left or right’ is perfectly enough.

A screen-shot from a Zvezda TV ‘documentary’ about one of Konteyner OTH radars. As can be seen, all of Ukraine is easily within its reach… actually, the portion in the north-east is within its blind zone.

Another point about OTH radars is this: thanks to them, the Russians already have a very good ‘picture’ about what’s up in all of the Ukrainian airspace. Especially in the airspace over western Ukraine. They know (or, at least the VKS knows) where are Ukrainian jets and helicopters moving from and where to. Add a few Kolchuga passive electronic support systems to that, and be sure: they’ve ‘got the picture’. And that in real time. Every day, any time of the day. Which is why they’re regularly striking selected air bases by their missiles (as long as the bases in question are within the reach of their missiles, of course).

Thus, a note for those who might wonder: the sole reason the Russians need UAVs to hit places like Myhorod AB or Aviatorske AB or Kryvyi Rih then, is to actually pinpoint parked PSU jets or helicopters. Because, ‘knowing’ these are ‘there’ is not enough: air bases/airports are very large and well fortified, and even a dozen of Iskander-M warheads couldn’t obliterate every aircraft/helicopter parked on one. Therefore, the Russian need UAVs to pinpoint parked aircraft so to strike them with necessary precision.

By now, I guess, you’ve already got the picture, right?

Yes, we must expect the Russians to be ‘sharpening their swords’ – not only preparing, but actually running their ‘Find Nemo’ and/or ‘anti-F-16-campaign’ already for months: they’ve got their OTH radars; some might be undergoing repairs, but they have others (like Konteyner and Resonans-N); they’re fine-tuning their RUK-concept (see: deployment of Iskanders on basis of UAV-supplied targeting intel) for months; and their informants are searching for possible Ukrainian F-16-bases in Ukraine at least since early this year.

Great. Now, mind the following: what all of this means is that (and just for the start), as soon as the Russian OTH radars start picking up ‘some new traffic’, something they didn’t pick up before, somewhere in Ukraine and this starts moving from place A to place B, or C, or D, or E or wherever else, and then back to A, and does so time and again, the Russians are going to start focusing their search to specific areas and specific air bases. Because this is going to be something like ‘new appearance’; ‘something unusual’. And the only really new appearance in the Ukrainian airspace since independence… your bet: will be these F-16s. Indeed, even if OTH radars can’t do that, at least the GRU should have good enough intel to - thanks to monitoring by OTH radars of the VKS - recognise F-16s from other aircraft alone by their speed, or specific flight patterns (like before landing): because this is slightly different than that of MiG-29s, or Su-24s, or Su-27s…

….which is why one must hope (‘…and pray’) the PSU has not only hit those two Voronezh-radars, but is going to hit a few more. Moreover, one must hope (‘….and pray’) the PSU is - already for months – ‘lulling’ the Russians through mimicking ‘F-16-like operations’.

….where, hand on heart, considering my earlier conclusions about the PSU (and the SBU): I do not have much hope. But, one should never say never.

Overall, even if having no trace of evidence for anything more but Ukrainian strikes on those two Voronezh-OTH-radars, we can assume that the ‘battle for Ukrainian F-16s’ is already raging. And that at least form Bucharest to Moscow.

That’s ‘just for the start’. Now, lets consider the next step…

This battle is not going to be over before this war is over. On the contrary: the Russians must be expected to do their utmost to destroy the F-16s. At least one of them. Better more. And, if they can kill one or another of their pilots, or ground personnel – ‘even better’.

I think one can ‘track’ their related preparations already now. No idea if anybody is paying attention, but since they’ve instigated the massacre of civilians in two hospitals of Kyiv, on 8 July, the Russians have deployed very few cruise missiles again. Which means that they’re ‘stocking’ them: letting their stocks grow through manufacturing additional rounds, so that once they might find out where is any F-16 actually stationed, to saturate the place with as many missiles as possible. To make sure they can overpower the air defences and they are going to at least one – preferably several of them – before they can actually go into action. 

Which in turn means that the PSU has yet another incentive to hide its F-16s as good as it physically can. See: base them at places well outside the sight of the public, and then well-camouflaged, too; add as many decoys as possible. Meanwhile, we must hope (‘…and pray’) that both the PSU and the SBU have tightened the security to the maximum: that all the related information is circulated between as few persons as possible: essentially, only people who really need to know, are informed.

Which in turn means: if taken as seriously as it should be, the entire Ukrainian ‘we’ve got F-16s, isn’t that great’-enterprise is already now, before the jets actually went into action, quite a complex, massive and expensive exercise… and, the mere survival of the jets, their personnel, their support equipment and ammunition is going to become one of crucial issues in this war.

….where one must also keep in mind: the Russians have lots of UAVs and missiles, while… the number of suitable air bases in Ukraine is always going to be extremely limited…while… well: thanks to the ^^endless wisdom^^ of both Ukrainian and Western politicians and strategists alike, they didn’t think about securing the survival of PSU’s F-16s through delivering enough surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) on time.

At least they’ve proven themselves as unable to deliver enough SAMs on time to secure the survival of the Ukrainian energy sector, or several major children hospitals. Thus, the F-16s are ‘peanuts’ in comparison…