The Russian Missile Campaign against Ukraine: May 2024

by Adrien Fontanellaz

Hello everybody!

A lot is going on in the air over Ukraine, the last few days, plus there are some interesting developments in regards of the Ukrainian military leadership, the last week or so. However, it’s taking time to collect all the relevant info and draw any kind of useful conclusions – while you want reliable information and analysis that’s making sense.

Thus, let us continue with Adrien’s summary of the Russian missile campaign against Ukraine in May this year.

***

From 1 until 31 May, according to official Kyiv, the Russians have released a total of 475 range weapons. Compared to 429 in April - this is indicating that the missile campaign is going on at the same rate.

As usually, the bulk of weapons in question were Iranian-designed Shaheds (aka Geran-2) attack UAVs: a total of 349 of these were launched, and 326 claimed as shot down.

The VKS released 82 cruise missiles (including 9 Kh-59/69 guided missiles), of which Ukrainians claimed 66 as shot down.

The Russians are known to have fired 20 ‘S-300s’ (or BM-30s), mostly against Kharkiv, 7 Iskander-Ms and 3 Kinzhals – none of which was shot down.

The latter point remains worth attention because it confirms that the Russians are deliberately avoiding to strike targets covered by the PAC-2/3 Patriot SAM-systems.

Like before, the Russians have run several ‘reconnaissance by fire’ operations, too. See: they release Shaheds into the Ukrainian airspace, these then ‘meandre around’ trying to prompt the PSU to power up its radars, then the Russians direct their ballistic- and cruise missiles ‘around’ the detected Ukrainian air defences.

Run on 31 May, the strike on Starokostiantyniv AB was a ‘classic example’ for ‘reconnaissance by fire’ operation: Pay attention at all the ‘flying around’ by Shaheds: essentially, they were deployed with the primary aim of forcing Ukrainian air defences to power up their radars, so the Russian electronic support measures (ESM) can detect these, and thus the Russians were able to ‘direct’ their following cruise missiles ‘around’ active Ukrainian air defence sites. This is possible to do because Shaheds are flying very slow (around 120-150km/h) - at least in comparison to cruise missiles. Means: the Russian ESM-systems have had ‘hours’ to detect and track-down positions of the Ukrainian air defence systems, before related data was forwarded to Tu-95MS-crews, so these can program routes of their Kh-101s and Kh-555s correspondingly.

Finally, there were three big attacks including more than 50 of different weapons.

The first and the biggest of the three took place during the night from 7 to 8 May, and included a total of 76 reported weapons:

-          1 Kinzhal

-          2 Iskander-M (from Crimea)

-          1 Iskander-K (from Crimea)

-          2 Kh-59/69 (from southern Zaporizhzhya; both shot down)

-          4 Kalibr (from the Black Sea; all shot down)

-          45 Kh-101 and Kh-555 (released by Tu-95MS’ from above the Saratov area, and the Caspian Sea; 33 shot down)

-          21 Shaheds (launched from two directions; all shot down or spoofed).

PSU’s claims for the night from 7 to 8 May 2024.

The second big strike took place during the night from 25 to 26 May. It included a total of 50 reported weapons:

-          1 Kinzhal

-          12 Kh-101 and Kh-555 (from Tu-95MS’, all from above the Saratov area; all 12 were reported as shot down)

-          36 Shaheds (at least 36, again launched from two directions; 31 were claimed as shot down).

The third major strike took place already during the night from 29 to 30 May, and included a total of 50 reported weapons again:

-          11 Kh-101 and Kh-555s (released by Tu-95MS’; 7 claimed as shot down)

-          31 Shaheds (all claimed as shot down)

-          8 S-300s/BM-30s (none shot down)

In total, the PSU claimed the destruction of 415 out of these 475 weapons: that’s a success rate of around 87%. However, such ‘key performance indicators’ (KPIs) must be taken with the proverbial pinch of salt – and that for at least three major reasons:

1.)    While official, these numbers are anything else than ‘the truth and the only truth’. They are Ukrainian claims. As such, they cannot be considered for ‘precise’, and even less so ‘definite’: rather, ‘useful indicators for trends’.

2.)    Different Russian weapons have different lethality. For example, the Shahed carries a warhead of 50kg, while ballistic- and cruise missiles have warheads of around 500kg. Moreover, ballistic- and cruise missiles are moving at much higher speeds, which is further increasing their destructive potential: indeed, and as proven time and again, they can still ‘kill’ even when shot down or missing.

3.)    There is a huge difference between targets – and thus the damage actually caused. For example: a ballistic missile with its heavier warhead is likely to be less useful if ‘just cratering the runway’, in comparison to a cruise missile – or a Shahed attack UAV – hitting an aircraft shelter with a combat aircraft inside.

Old Russian S-300P/PM SAMs. There is some controversy over their deployment in surface-to-surface mode. While official Kyiv is insistent they are used in big numbers - especially for strikes on Kharkiv and the Kharkiv Oblast - the information from several Russian sources is indicative of this not being the case: indeed, some of these are insistent that the weapons actually used (but then declared for ‘S-300s’ by Ukrainians) are different variants of the 9M55 rocket fired by BM-30 Smerch multiple-rocket launchers. Weighting around 800kg on launch, and with a warhead of 240 to 258kg (depending on variant), these have a range of up to 90km. Foremost: 9M55s are more precise than the S-300s, and BM-30-launchers can be coupled and aimed by 9S552 command posts of the Iskander system - which in turn enables their aiming with help of reconnaissance UAVs in real time.

Overall, the fifth Russian missile campaign against Ukraine (the 1^st was the one of the first few days of the war; the 2^nd the one lasting until mid-April 2022; the 3^rd was run from late April until August 2022; the 4^th from September 2022 until May-June 2023) is well underway and on the best way to not only destabilise, but actually to ruin the Ukrainian power supply in the long run.

After all, one should keep in mind that a relatively ‘light/small’ strike of 8 May, knocked out two hydroelectric power plants, and the Ukroenergo was forced to restrict the energy supply to industrial facilities, and then – in mid-May – to households. Black-outs caused by the necessity to stabilise and repair the grid, are still common occurrence.

Ironically, while this still appears to be ‘nothing to worry about’ in the West, at least the relevant authorities in Ukraine are already on the search for solutions. For one example (thanks Josep!), see the article here: Decentralisation of Energy Generation in Ukraine is possible within 12-15 Months: IMF Memorandum (in Ukrainian).

…or, in other words, don’t be surprised when you hear Zelensky making statements like, ‘The World is hurt that we are striking at the Energy Sector of the Russian Federation: Make sure it does not strike at Ours’.