The App that Kremlin made - and Ukraine can't live without

by Benjamin Cook

Hello everybody!

Yeah, we’re ‘singling out’ that one app, the Telegram, ‘instead’ of reminding about the Meta/Google’s social media platforms that are controlled by the NSA and dominating all the NATO and G8 countries (and primarily busying themselves with espionage of the public and allies, securing the public order that’s upside down: instead of remaining private and unknown to the state, ‘we’, ‘the people’ are ‘transparent’ for the ‘state/s’ [even more so: for few characters pretending they’re acting ‘on behalf of the society’], while the ‘state’ is more non-transparent than ever before.).

Still, and for reasons about to be explained by Benjamin, it’s hard not to advise Ukrainians to stay away from Telegram.

…almost as hard as it is for the Ukrainians to stop using it.

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Why Ukrainians Use—and Still Trust—Telegram

Note: I use Telegram and Whatsapp with great frequency. I occasionally use Viber and Signal. I keep VK as a time capsule and repository of my life in Ukraine from 2010-2015. I find myself messaging friends almost as much on Instagram as on Telegram. Not shown here but definitely used for communication is LinkedIn. I hate LinkedIn, but it remains professionally necessary. I say all of this to give you context. No one uses just one messaging app. We all use multiple. If you live a multinational multi-timezone life like I do, you probably use them all.

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Ukrainians’ reliance on Telegram isn’t a coincidence or a fad. It’s the result of hard lessons the necessities learned since 2014, a search for both functionality and trust, and the brutal reality of a nation at war in the information age.

The shift away from Russian social networks began with blood in the streets. After the 2014 Euromaidan revolution and Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Ukrainians rapidly abandoned platforms like VKontakte (VK). Founded by Pavel Durov, VK had become compromised—both technically and symbolically. Durov himself claimed he was forced out for refusing to hand over user data to Russian authorities.

Telegram, his next creation, emerged in 2013 as a privacy-first platform. It wasn’t just a better messenger—it was a political act. When the Ukrainian government officially banned VK and other Russian platforms in 2017, Telegram was already on the rise, viewed as secure, fast, and far more capable than legacy platforms like Viber. I should also point out that Ukrainians resisted being forced off of VK. Everyone I knew would just fire up a free VPN and use VK anyway. For a time. Eventually, that extra step and the simplicity of Telegram killed VK as a platform in Ukraine.

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Why Not Viber or WhatsApp?

Viber dominated Ukraine for a time, especially before the war. It was lightweight and had early adoption across Eastern Europe, but it quickly became unusable. Spam, ads, promotional junk channels—Viber lost its utility. WhatsApp, despite being globally dominant and popular in Ukraine (with around 17 million users), was seen as too basic, too closed, and lacking in customization. Telegram offered more: channels, bots, file sharing, and a fast API for developers.

Messaging Apps Are Regional

The popularity of messaging apps is not global—it’s regional. China has WeChat. South Korea uses KakaoTalk. Japan uses Line. Ukraine—despite knowing the complicated Russian ties behind Telegram—chose functionality and information velocity over ideology.

Telegram Is the War’s Frontline Feed

Telegram is more than a messaging app in Ukraine—it is the war’s broadcasting system. Every video you see on Twitter/X, every clip in a Reuters report, every analysis in Forbes or the Economist—virtually all of it was first posted on Telegram. OSINT professionals, military analysts, journalists, and even soldiers on the front use Telegram to distribute real-time footage. In the beginning of the war, absent a reliable command and control network, both Russia and Ukraine used Telegram to report troop movements, intercepted communications, and battle damage assessments.

The war in Ukraine is a Telegram-first war.

Did Russia Really Use Telegram to Control Drones?

Recent reports—some from credible technical experts in Ukraine—claim that Russia has used Telegram bots to interface with drones like the Shahed-136 or even cruise missiles. These bots would handle basic flight path instructions or transmit telemetry. The Economist and the Kyiv Independent have both reported this as a serious possibility. It’s technically plausible: Telegram bots can receive GPS data, trigger image uploads, and relay commands. Telegram’s cloud-based structure and lightweight data payloads make it ideal for operating in low-bandwidth or contested environments.

But the deeper question isn’t about feasibility—it’s about information operations.

An SBU or GRU Information Campaign?

There is a plausible, if unconfirmed, theory that Ukraine’s intelligence services—SBU or military intelligence (GUR)—are deliberately seeding or amplifying stories about Russia using Telegram bots to control drones. Why? Because it paints Telegram not just as a neutral platform, but as a military tool aiding the enemy.

Such a narrative would serve two strategic aims:

1. Undermine Telegram’s credibility among Western governments and users.

2. Put pressure on Pavel Durov personally, forcing him to address questions about the Russian origins of the platform and its potential misuse.

This isn’t provably true. But in the realm of hybrid war and information ops, the logic tracks.

Durov’s Double Life

Pavel Durov left Russia in 2014, presenting himself as a digital libertarian—untouchable, stateless, and committed to privacy. But critics point to his continued Russian citizenship, hidden visits to Russia, and Telegram’s murky early funding—possibly involving Russian oligarchs. These details matter in a war where the flow of information can determine the outcome of battles.

Key Takeaways

● Telegram dominates Ukraine's information ecosystem not because it’s ideologically aligned with the country, but because it works. It’s fast, functional, adaptable, and has become the default platform for both private communication and public wartime reporting.

● Virtually all war footage and frontline updates originate on Telegram. If you’re watching videos of drone strikes, trench assaults, or intercepted radio chatter, it almost certainly came from a Telegram channel—long before it appeared on X/Twitter or in traditional media.

● Ukrainians trust Telegram’s utility, not its origins. Despite its Russian roots and the controversy surrounding founder Pavel Durov, Telegram earned its place by outperforming other apps like Viber and WhatsApp. The ban on Russian platforms in 2017 accelerated this migration, but Telegram's feature set sealed the deal.

● Reports of Russian drone and missile coordination via Telegram bots are technically plausible—but they may also serve as an information warfare tool in themselves. Ukrainian intelligence could be amplifying these claims as a counterintelligence move against Telegram and Durov, casting the platform as compromised.

● Durov’s opaque ties to Russia still matter. Whether Telegram is being used actively by Russian forces or simply remains vulnerable due to its origin, the optics are increasingly a liability. In a hybrid war, even neutral platforms become strategic terrain.

Telegram isn’t just part of the story of the war in Ukraine—it is the story’s delivery mechanism.

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A ‘PS’ of sort: How a Spyware App Compromised Assad’s Army

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Benjamin Cook continues to travel to, often lives in, and works in Ukraine, a connection spanning more than 14 years. He holds an MA in International Security and Conflict Studies from Dublin City University and has consulted with journalists and intelligence professionals on AI in drones, U.S. military technology, and open-source intelligence (OSINT) related to the war in Ukraine. He is co-founder of the nonprofit UAO, working in southern Ukraine. You can find Mr. Cook between Odesa, Ukraine; Charleston, South Carolina; and Tucson, Arizona.

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