Syrian War, 30 November 2024: What to think of the 'Situation' in Aleppo?

Hello everybody!

Before I ‘return’ to the War in Ukraine, and ‘on popular demand’, ‘few words’ about dramatic developments in north-western Syria of the last few days. Hope, that way you might find it easier to follow that drama, too.

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For the start, the involved parties (where I cannot but recommend those with deeper interest in this conflict, to dive into my ‘write up’ about the Syrian [‘Civil’] War, provided here: Syria, Adventures of Clever & Smart).

Insurgents

They’re usually called ‘rebels’, ‘jihadists’ and similar. I call them ‘insurgents’, because that’s what they are. Armed insurgents that rose against the regime of Bashar al-Assad.

Their offensive is run by the Fatah Mobin Operations Room (OR), which is controlling forces of a coalition between:

• HTS (Hayat Tahrir as-Sham): Qatar-supported Sunny Islamist movement allied with the Syrian Salvation Government (in oposition to the Türkye-supported Syrian National Coalition); widely accused of being an ‘al-Qaeda affiliate’, although officially cutting all ties several times since 2013, and (mercilessly) eliminating all the clandestine networks of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (‘Daesh’) in (western) Idlib over the last five years.

• Sham Legion (an alliance of 19 Sunni Islamist insurgent groups);

• Northern Storm Brigade (secularist insurgents, ex-Free Syrian Army);

• Nour ad-Din az-Zenghi Movement (Sunni Islamist insurgents; formerly at odds with almost everybody, including the HTS).

What to think of them?

I would characterise them as a ‘logical result of everybody abandoning Syrians to onslaughts and subversion by Assadism, al-Qaeda, IS/ISIS/IGIL/Daesh, IRGC, the Russians, Zionism, Türkye, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates’. That said, claiming they are ‘al-Qaeda’ or even ‘Islamic State’ is as wrong as limiting them to ‘Türkye-controlled’ or this or that: yes, HTS’ leader Muhammad al-Jawlani might be after establishing something like an ‘Islamic Emirate’, but mind that he and the mass of other leaders of that organisation was extremised in Assadists prisons - and left out of them by Assad (to tarnish the reputation of the original Syrian uprising against him), back in 2011. And that he’s experienced fierce restiance from Syrian population under his (nominal) control, whenever trying to impose his will. Foremost: limiting ‘Syria’ to ‘jihadism’ is plain stupid. If at all, the country is ‘extremely pluralist’. So much so that the Islamic State used to consider its population - even the Syrian Salafists - for ‘unteachable scum’, because they were refusing its indoctrination.

Point is: there is no way of finding out what the insurgents of the HTS and allies might do if they bring a large portion of the country under their control, without them first doing that (while, and for comparison, the effects of Assadist, IRGC/Hezbollah’s, PKK’s etc. terror should be well-known by now).

‘Regime’ Forces

• IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps [of Iran]): one of most ironic (indeed: ‘funny’) aspects of this war is that especially the USA ‘can’t find’ any kind of Iranian (i.e. IRGC’s) presence in Syria. Not even when this is bombed by the Israelis for 12 years already. Correspondingly, both the official US and much of the Western media are reporting about ‘(Assad) regime-affiliated forces’ even when there’s nothing to see of these, only yellow flags of, de-facto ‘Hezbollah Syria’ (which, along IRGC’s own publications, was bigger than the ‘Lebanese original’ already back in around 2017). The IRGC - i.e. its surrogates like the Liwa al-Qods (a de-facto division staffed by Palestinians that grew up in the Aleppo area) - used to control much of western Aleppo province and the city, plus most of southern Aleppo province.

• Republican Guards (Forces/Division): units directly subordinated to Bashar al-Assad (like 30th Division) or his brother Maher al-Assad (like 4th Armoured Division). Ironically, they are usually reported as ‘parts of the Syrian Armed Forces’, although not controlled by the Ministry of Defence in Damascus. On the contrary: even the Russian reform of Assadist armed formations has failed to completely ‘de-couple’ them from the IRGC.

• Syrian Arab Army: was reformed by the Russians over the last eight years (foremost through re-organising different militias into official army formations), but, so far, I haven’t seen much evidence that its formations are involved in this battle (or if, they’re busy fleeing). Which is no surprise: the IRGC is claiming Aleppo as its own at least since 2014 or so (and Syria for Iran’s 28th province, too).

• Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (VSRF, and supported by the Russian Air-Space Force, VKS): present in this part of Syria foremost in form of multiple outposts manned either by VSRF’s Spetsnaz or the GRU-run Redut PMC (which, de-facto, expelled the Wagner PMC from Syria, few years ago).

PKK

This is the funniest factor of all. The PKK is a terrorist organisation of Kurdish extremists from Türkye (and declared a terrorist organisation by most of NATO, including the USA). Of course, it has its branch in Syria, abbreviated with YPG and has imposed this upon the local Kurds and local Arab population with help from Assadists and through literal extermination of local Kurdish- and Arab leaders, in 2012-2013. Back in 2014-2015, the Pentagon then re-named a part of the YPG into the ‘Syrian Democratic Forces’ (SDF), although its members are members of the PKK and they openly say, ‘yes, we’re PKK’. Ever since, the resulting PKK/YPG/SDF-conglomerate is controlling almost a third of Syria (essentially, nearly all of the country between the Turkish border in the north, Iraqi border in the East, and the Euphrates River in the south). Plus the ‘Afrin Enclave in north-western Syria, which, however, the Pentagon never considered as ‘part of the SDF’.

Traditionally, the PKK is allied with both Assad regime and with Moscow, and its leadership is openly supporting the Russian invasion of Ukraine, while its terrorists are carrying gear with that Russian ‘Z’ while running terrorist attacks in Turkey.

But, now the PKK/YPG/SDF-conglomerate is claiming that it’s ‘Syrian’ (although all of its brigades were established in Cizre, a town in Turkey), and ‘fighting Jihadists and al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorism to liberate Syria’. And, of course, the PKK/YPG/SDF-conglomerate is allied with and supported by the USA, which are maintaining a strong military presence in ‘SDF-controlled’ parts of Syria.

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On 27 November, the Fatah Mobin OR launched its forces into attacks on IRGC positions in western Aleppo (‘Operation Deterrence of Aggression’). The offensive seems to have been initiated with an infiltration of IRGC’s positions to strike its regional headquarters in New Aleppo, where they killed the IRGC General Pourhashemi, a number of Assadist officers, and - perhaps - a few Russians, too.

Few important things to keep in mind in regards of this operation:

1.) HTS is Qatar-supported, but not Türkye-controlled. That said, the offensive by forces of the Fatah Mobin Operations Room into western Aleppo must have been undertaken at least in agreement with Türkye, i.e. with Erdogan's government (because it takes Turkish agreement for the Qatar-sponsored supplies to reach the HTS-controlled parts of Syria).

2.) The offensive was launched because both Türkye, Qatar and the HTS & allies grew fed up of constant Assadist, IRGC's and Russian terror strikes on millions of Syrians herded into north-western Syria (and especially HTS-controlled western Idlib province), which was killing dozens every week.

3.) However, contacts within the Syrian insurgency I’ve asked about all said 'it's just a limited operation', 'perhaps up to M-5 Highway'. I.e. Ankara/Erdogan seem to have granted permission 'just' for an operation aiming to recover the ground in western Aleppo and north-western Idlib, lost back in 2019-2020.

However, by now this is an operation with strategic implications.

It seems the initial blow of this operation caught the IRGC and Assadists completely unprepared. Arguably, the insurgents lost at least 50 killed in the first hours, but they breached the enemy defence line and then launched an ever faster advance. Initially, they have reached the M-5 Highway, but then also secured Kfar Bissin, Anadan, Bashnatrah and Kfar Dael, Kfar Naha and Khan Assal. As of yesterday afternoon, and after securing Saraqeb and Hader (both ethnically cleansed and ‘looted to the boone’ by Assadists and the IRGC), they have entered Aleppo city. And not only entered it: as the IRGC and Assadists fled, they have secured all of the western parts of the city (including the main Police HQ, the Governor Palace, HQs of different intelligence agencies, IRGC HQ, etc.), and then the famous medieval citadel in the centre.

While the offensive ‘also’ hit positions of Assadist formations (and destroyed several of minor Republican Guards units), it primarily overrun IRGC positions, as obvious from - between others - the video from which this still was taken (at least I doubt the flag shown is that of the Syrian Arab Republic; but, of course, feel free to accuse me of ‘seeing the IRGC everywhere’, and teach me better).

An insurgent of the Fatah Mobin OR-controlled formations, with a captured ….ahem… ‘Syrian’ flag and and Iranian-made jeep with multiple rocket launcher.

IRGC withdrawing its artillery - M-46 gun - through Aleppo, yesterday.

As the IRGC and Assadists fled from Aleppo (and areas further north), two things happened:

• as of early this morning, the insurgents have secured most of the city, but

• the PKK/YPG/SDF-conglomerate rushed its own formations into the area north-west-, north- and even south of Aleppo, to take over. Between others, the PKK/YPG-SDF-conglomerate has secured Nubol and Zahra (two IRGC-strongholds north-west of Aleppo), then the Sheikh Najjar Industrial Zone north-east of the city, and then drove around the city to secure Aleppo International Airport (including its Nayrab Air Base), which - just days ago - was still used by the IRGC to haul arms for Hezbollah in Syria and Lebanon, and thus repeatedly bombed by the Israelis.

The ‘results’ can be well-traced with help of the Syria Live Map (where PKK/YPG/SDF-controlled areas are marked yellow, those controlled by the HTS and allies in darker green, those controlled by the Türkye-supported Syrian insurgents in lighter green, and those controlled by the IRGC, Assadists, and the Russians in purple):

Things became further complicated already the last night when, rumours have it, the Pentagon ordered air strikes on Türkye-supported Syrian insurgent formations launching an advance from al-Bab in direction of northern Aleppo. Quasi ‘because they are al-Qaeda’ (which is the Pentagon’s usual explanation for nearly everything it’s doing in Syria since around 2012). Indeed, it seems that the Pentagon is meanwhile actively supporting the PKK/YPG/SDF’s major advance into most of northern and eastern Aleppo province, resulting in a situation around the noon local time looking something like this:

Meanwhile, south of Aleppo, the insurgents have secured the (ruined) Abu ad-Duhor Air Base,

…plus (very important), Ma’arat an-Nauman (major insurgent stronghold in 2011-2019), capturing immense volumes of heavy arms and ammunition, while surviving Assadists and IRGC are fleeing ever further south.

As usually, the VKS in Syria (home-based at the 555th Air Base at Hmeymim, south of Lattakia) reacted by intensive air strikes of western Idlib and Idlib (city), but especially the Jishr ash-Shughour area. As usually, the Russians are primarily bombing civilians on pre-selected geographic coordinates, by free-fall bombs from high altitude: just like back in 2015-2017, their air force remains unable to target mobile targets (at least not without sending Sukhoi Su-25 attack jets to strike with unguided rockets form low altitude).

….and, considering the insurgents have overrun several VSRF positions (either Spetnaz or GRU-controlled Redut), and killed a number of Russian servicemen (or mercenaries, which used to systematically target civilians by FPVs, just like the Russians are doing in Kherson, for example), I cannot wait to hear the Smoker (Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov) to declared this operation for ‘organised/instigated by Ukrainian intelligence in cooperation with al-Qaeda in Syria’…

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Now it remains to hope this one is not going to end like the offensive into northwest Hama, back in 2017, or into eastern Idlib in 2019-2020: at the time, the insurgents came forward very well, then hunkered down in captured positions, but were then systematically killed by weeks-long air-strikes- and artillery barrages... And then Erdogan drank too much vodka while ‘negotiating’ with Pudding, and junked a clear-cut victory…

Point is: with IRGC and Hezbollah still being busy in Lebanon and south-western Syria, and the Assadist regime lacking resources (read: money) to do anything on its own, and the Russians busy in Ukraine, the outcome of this operation is going to heavily depend on what Turkey and the USA (read: Israel, which is influencing both Washington and the PKK/YPG/SDF-conglomerate) might agree between themselves.