Syrian War, 1 December 2024
Hello everybody!
To round-up the last five days, and then answer some additional of your questions…
As of the evening of 26 November, the situation in Idlib and Aleppo provinces of Syria was something like this:
Essentially, frontlines were ‘frozen’ since ‘cease-fire agreements’ from 2019-2020. In western Idlib, forces of the Fatah Mobin OR moved into their starting positions. In western Aleppo, the IRGC expected no problems, and its primary formation - Liwa al-Qods (for backgrounds of this unit, please see here) - was still deployed opposite to the Israel-occuppied Golan Heights (south-western Syria). Assadists had only secondary units left in this area: the Republican Guards units (Bashar al-Assad) and the 4th Armoured Division (Maher al-Assad) were both deployed in the Damascus area or opposite to the Golan Heights. The Russians had few ‘observation posts’ in western Aleppo, plus two larger positions in northern Hama (‘protecting’ Christian towns of as-Suqaylabiyah and Muhradah). Their HQ was and remains at Hmeymim AB, south of Latakia.
Early on 27 November, the forces of Fatah Mobin OR launched their attacks. As first, they blew up the HQ of the IRGC in Aleppo City, and killed the IRGC commander for the area by an FPV, as well as the Director of Military Security (General Ahmad al-Ali). Shortly after, they assaulted IRGC-held positions west of Aleppo.
The IRGC frontline disintegrated and the forces of Fatah Mobin OR launched an advance in direction of Aleppo. Shocked, Assadists and IRGC in the city began fleeing (together with thousands of dependants): most of them along the road via as-Safira down to Khanasir, and then to Hama or Homs.
Amid growing chaos, on 28 November, the PKK/YPG units in the enclave north of Aleppo (these are no part of the ‘SDF’, and thus not supported by the USA) exploited the growing chaos to drive into Sheikh Masqood District of the city (predominantly populated by Kurds). From there, they continued for the (completely ruined by fighting in 2013-2015) Industrial Zone north-east of Aleppo. There they have split their columns: one drove on Kweres Air Base, then via Dayr Hafir on al-Khafasah, attempting to connect with (US-supported) PKK/YPG/SDF in the al-Khafsah area; the other drove for the Aleppo International Airport (IAP)/Nayrab AB, in south-eastern Aleppo.
Early on 29 November, the forces of the Fatah Mobin OR entered western outskirts of Aleppo. Meeting only sporadic resistance, they then rushed into the city centre.
North-west of Aleppo, forces of the Fatah Mobin launched an advance on Anadan, Tel Rifaat and Hraytan. North-east of Aleppo, forces of the (Türkye-controlled) Hawar Killis OR joined the battle by launching an advance from al-Bab on Aleppo and Kweres AB. In the process, they overrun at least two positions of either the Russian Spetsnaz or the GRU’s Redut PMC, killing and capturing several of operatives.
As the chaos in IRGC’s lines spread to their Assadist allies, other of insurgent forces turned south and drove all the way to the Abu ad-Duhor AB (finding there, between others, this wrecked MiG-23MS of Syrian Arab Air Force):
Finally, the insurgents punched through east of Ma’arat an-Nauman, and started flanking the Assadist positions in that town.
Through 30 November, the Assadist and IRGC resistance in eastern Idlib and Aleppo city all but collapsed. In the north-west, forces of the Fatah Mobin OR seized IRGC-strongholds in Nubol and Zahra. Because the IRGC fled, these were held by weak units of the PKK/YPG. In turn, the latter were attacked from north-west by insurgents of the (Türkye-supported) Ahrar ash-Sham, starting the battle of Tel Rifaat. As of noon today, the insurgents were inside western Tel Rifaat, and showing videos of lots of captured PKK/YPG combatants (here’s one example).
After securing most of Aleppo, the insurgents rushed out of the city and towards east: they rapidly advanced to as-Safira: this is a particularly important place, including several factories of ammunition and arms (all under IRGC’s control since 2013). From there, they drove all the way to Khanaser: another important place (if for no other reason, then because it’s controlling the major IRGC supply route to Aleppo). AFAIK, ever since, there is a battle going on between Abu ad-Duhor and Khanaser, as the Assadist and IRGC forces flanked by these drives are trying to punch out.
The poorly-controlled PKK/YPG’s corridor to al-Khafsah collapsed as the forces of the Hawar Killis OR punched through from the north and liberated both Kweres AB and Dayr Hafir. As of today, word is that the insurgents have even reached Manbij: a particularly important town on the right/western side of the Euphrates River, north of al-Khafsah (right upper corner of my map above).
Meanwhile, in the Kweres area… at the Kweres AB, the insurgents (not sure what unit; must first update myself on all of their new flags and insignia) have captured up to 7 Aero L-39ZA/ZO Delphin light strikers of the Syrian Arab Air Force (serials 2052, 2085, 2172, and 2126 were clearly identified by now; identity of the other three remains unclear).
This is of particular importance because the L-39 is meanwhile something like ‘primary mount’ of the Assadist air force: at least one available in biggest numbers (around 30 as of November last year) - primarily because it is extremely easy to service and operate. It is also the only type flown by the SyAAF in combat by night (thanks to modifications applied by North Koreans in 2016).
Nearby, and between others, the insurgents have also captured at least one Pantsyr S1- and one 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher) air defence system, each. Such ‘ghanima’ (‘battlefield loot’) is of immense importance because it can offer the insurgents the ability to protect at least some of IDP camps in north-western Syria, where over 3 million ‘internally displaced persons’ are herded - and constantly bombed by the Russian Air-Space Force (VKS), for years already.
Finally, amid the collapse of the Assadist lines, and the rout of their units (these have left something like 22 different T-55s and T-62s, 11 BMPs, 4 ZSU-23-4s, and at least 2 2S1s and 2S3s behind, in addition to collossal amounts of ammunition of all imaginable calibre and other gear), the insurgents of the Fatah Mobin OR first used an FPV to kill the commander of the Assadist ‘Military Security’ in the Hama area (General Ahmad Ghossa), before…
….amid the resulting chaos, yesterday evening, liberating Ma’arat an-Nauman, and then rushing all the way down the road to Hama. Their lightly-armed spearheads have actually entered the city on the heels of fleeing Assadists, but then withdrew when their UAV-reconnaissance detected the approach of first major reinforcements from the south: the 25th ‘(Super) Special Mission (Parachute) Forces Division’ of the Republican Guards (hope, I didn’t miss any of attributes of what was once the ‘Tiger Force’, but was meanwhile re-trained and re-organised by the Russians).
The 25th is meanwhile known to have been deployed to protect as-Suqaylabiyah, Muhradah, and to have re-established the old frontline 10-15km north of Hama (the so-called Muhradah Line, from 2015). Meanwhile, today a video emerged showing a TEL from the Assadist 19th Missile Brigade firing an OTR-21 Tochka ballistic missile. Some of Iranian contacts claim this had hit the al-Jowlani’s HQ in Idlib, killing him.
Of course, the VKS is flying some 30-40 sorties a day, too, bombing - between others - Idlib, Aleppo, and Jishr ash-Shughour (which is why I find the capture of that Pantsyr and the SA-13 as ‘important’).
***
In other related news…
Yesterday evening, there was lots of talk about some sort of ‘coup attempt in Damascus’. Have checked around in Damascus. Sure, my contacts there are not what they used to be just some 6-7 years ago (most of the people in question are meanwhile living abroad), but found no evidence for anything of that kind. Rather some sort of a dispute between few (drunk?) members of the Republican Guards and the 4th Armoured Division, apparently in front of the Four Seasons Hotel (one of most luxurious in Damascus, and well-known to me at least because it is positioned right next to the former Military Museum of Damascus, which your very own used to visit quite often, about 20 years ago). It’s quite likely that Pudding is going to scratch together enough additonal Sukhois of the VKS to reinforce the contingent at Hmeymim AB: he can’t afford ‘losing Syria’, because it’s a bridgehead for different of his African adventures…
Similarly, there was lots of guessing about the whereabouts of Bashar al-Assad. Yes, sure, he was in Moscow with his usual pleas for help, but that was back on 28-29 November. Yesterday, he was back to Damascus and on the phone with Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, dictator of the United Arab Emirates, who has promised him financial and political support. Reportedly, dictators of Saudi Arabia (which is neck-deep into reaching another PR China-negotiated major agreement with Iran) and Egypt followed in fashion. Some of them might have supported the original insurgency, but: that was back in 2012-2014 or so. Nowadays, most are allied with Russia. Foremost: just like in the Sudan, there is no way any of these lovely characters might permit the downfall of Assad, and his replacement by something like pluralism.
Of course, Iran - i.e. the IRGC - is not to be outdone by any of them: not only is the Iranian foreign minister visiting Damascus today, but the Iraqi social media is full of videos showing units of the (IRGC-sponsored, even if not ‘fully controlled’) Popular Mobilisation Forces, and the Katayib Hezbollah an-Nujba (Hezbollah Iraq) being mobilised and then rushing in long columns in direction of Syria. Mind that the IRGC’s ideologists consider Syria for ‘province of Iran’.
With other words: ‘to be continued’. At most, this was just the ‘Episode 1736’ in the Syrian (‘Civil’) War raging since 2011. Merely the frontlines in Idlib, Hama, and Aleppo are likely to return to about where they used to be at the onset of the Russian military intervention, back in August 2015.
Excellent analysis, thank you
I doubt Donnie and his cabinet nominees know where Syria is.
It is a good time to make life difficult for the US, Donnie's first three months will be chaotic.
The current forecast for the Congress House majority is GOP 220 vs Dem 215.
As the super high-IQ Donnie has promoted three GOP House reps out of the House, for at least the first three months of 2025, it will be GOP 217 (220 - 3) vs. Dem 215.
Consequently, the GOP cannot lose even one vote, as a tie in the House (216 vs. 216) is a loss, and there is no process to resolve ties.
Two of the 2025 House reps voted to impeach Donnie back in 2019 and retained their seats this time despite Donnie campaigning against them, so they are unlikely to support any extreme Trump initiatives. Then there is the usual mixture of Budget hawks, defense hawks and Ukraine fans, and not fans.
This Congress the GOP has proven they are incapable of governing, they have passed the fewest bills in a Congress session since it started almost 300 years ago.
After all of Donnie's talk of isolationism and America First I was surprised he threatened BRICS with sanctions.
Anway he is pushing on an open door as the last BRICS meeting showed no interest in an alternative currency to the $
I assume he knows this and is just showing his internal audience he is a "strong man".
I hope the rebels can use the air defence systems they captured and will locate them where they will be effective.
This is going to end badly. The advance will be held up, the front will stabilise and then Russia will spare a few of its resources to bomb the enlarged area under rebel control week after week, killing even more civilians. That's a few less resources dedicated to destruction in Ukraine. but not much.