Syria War, 5 December 2024

Hello everybody!

Special thanks for all the interesting questions of the last few days: cannot but ‘admit’, they’re providing plenty of motivation and inspiration. Indeed, the feature today is going to be largely addressing another set of questions.

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To start with: ‘who controls what’ - in Idlib, Aleppo, and Hama?

Again, there are two major insurgent factions:

• Command of Military Operations (former Fatah Mobin Operations Room, led by HTS), operating independently from Türkye

• Syrian National Army (Hawr Killis Operations Room), controlled by Türkye.

Have marked their approximate control of territories on the map below.

From north towards south:

• Since yesterday, big columns of the Türkish Army (primarily MRAPs and some artillery) are entering the SNA-controlled zone, passing through Azaz and heading for the former Minakh/Mengh AB (north of Tel Rifaat, in the top centre of my map above). Seems, the Türks are setting up a base there.

• Notable is something like ‘demarcation line’ between the CMO and the Türkish-controlled SNA (have marked it with light green). This is running from Tel Rifaat (south of Azaz, top centre of my map) in the north around northern outskirts of Aleppo, to south of the Kweres AB, and then to the area north of the Jirah AB. The exact status of the latter is unclear: the Russians withdrew from there (and then along the Euphrates River, through the area controlled by the US-supported PKK/YPG/SDF), but the Assadist garrison seems to still be around (together with one S-200/SA-5 Gammon SAM-site).

• In Aleppo, the leader of the HTS and thus the dominant figure of the CMO, Jowlani, appeared in the public yesterday. He repeated reassuring statements directed at Christians, Alawites and the international community, and announced that the HTS is not only going to respect the city’s distinct cultural and social norms and diversity, but also that all the insurgent formations are about to leave. They’re going to be replaced by the local police. Government employees are requested to return to work.

Several readers have asked, if Jowlani is going to ‘bring democracy to Syria?’.

No idea. What I do know is that he’s only the second Syrian insurgent-leader thinking in logical fashion. This is: remove Assad first, then discuss the future of the national politics. That’s exactly what the founder of the Free Syrian Army, Colonel Ryad al-Assad, was demanding when defecting from the Syrian Arab Army to found the Free Syrian Army, back in April 2011 (no surprise al-Assad meanwhile joined Jowlani). Contrary to Ryad al-Assad, though, Jowlani is powerful enough (because he’s also well-funded: Ryad al-Assad was denied outside help because he refused to subject himself to the control of the Muslim Brotherhood).

With this. we’ve got the HTS’, and thus the CMO’s ‘doctrine’: ‘toppling the regime of Bashar al-Assad first’.

Why that?

Because if Assad is removed from power, the Russians are not welcome in Syria any more, the IRGC is not welcome any more, and the PKK/YPG would thus lose its second and third most important allies (the first is the USA).

• About 60km east of Hama, on the road to Raqqa is the place called Ithriyah. According to their own reports, it is here that there is a big concentration of Assadist troops. While they’re boasting with ‘attacks’, actually, they are sitting still, perhaps constructing some defence positions, but foremost waiting to see if they might receive reinforcements from the IRGC-controlled Iraqi ‘Popular Mobilisation Units’ and the Katayib Hezbollah. Some of these are known to have reached the Dayr az-Zawr area, two days ago, but whether they’ve moved deeper inside Syria is unclear. Through reaching as-San, yesterday, the insurgents have cut off the road connection between Hama and/or Homs and Ithriyah.

• Hama: this is meanwhile the focal point of the CMO’s drive in southern direction. The CMO is bringing ever more reinforcements, its Shaheen UAV-unit is heavily targeting both Assadist positions along the frontline, but also the Hama AB, and the Shayrat AB (south-east of Homs). Although repeatedly targeted by both the Russian and Assadist combat aircraft, the insurgents have continued their advance. Between others, they have secured the base of the 87th Brigade and then that of the 25th Super-Special Division. That’s where they’ve captured that Podlet radar, mentioned yesterday, too. Foremost, they are pushing either side of the city, and have cut off at least four major roads to it by now. With other words: the Assadists inside Hama meanwhile have only two roads to Homs left, and both of these are about to get under the insurgent fire-control today.

A Su-25 fighter-bomber of the VKS as seen during a rocket-attack on advancing insurgents in northern Hama. Gauging by the flow of the fighting on the ground, such attacks are not particularly effective (regardless how courageous and loud).

Dramatically illustrating the ferocity of the fighting in the Hama area, here a video released by the CMO, and showing assault of its mechanised forces (marked in green) on fleeing Assadists (and yes, a number of fleeing combatants was outright crushed by advancing CMO vehicles; also, their SUV was hit by machine gun fire and then crashed against a tree). The video is said to have been taken during the insurgent assault into one of military bases surrounding the Hama AB (somewhere in the el-Shiyha area… sorry, don’t know Hama that well: have been there only a few hours).

Because of that break-through, this morning the Assadists began evacuating their remaining MiG-23s and Mi-8s from the Hama AB. At least one helicopter was shot down and crashed into the city (or what was left of the same after the Assadists razed half of Hama to the ground, during the mass-murder of local Sunnis, back in 2012):

Another helicopter was, reportedly, damaged.

Meanwhile, the insurgents are said to have reached the city centre - which is no surprise, considering the Assadists were really left with few options but to withdraw, or let themselves get encircled.

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This doctrine is also answering the following question: can the CMO be expected to hit the Russians at their major base in Syria, Hmeymim AB, south of Latakia?

This question emerged in the wake of visually-confirmed reports about the CMO troops capturing (at least) 1 BM-27 launcher and 2 or 3 BM-30 launchers. And the fact that through liberating the villages in the Qalaat al-Mudiq area, on the Gab Plain, the insurgents are only some 40km away from Hmeymim.

One of (at least) 2 BM-30 launchers captured by CMO insurgents.

Well, on the flat screen of your monitor or smartphone, that appears ‘close’. And, certainly enough, it’s within range of weapons like BM-27 and BM-30. However…

In reality, there are 2,500 metres high mountains in between. For example, when you drive up these mountains, this is the look at towards east, over the Gab plain (and then in March, following the rain season):

Then you turn around to face west, cross the road, and can see the coastal plain of Syria in the Banyas area (also visible is the coastal highway connecting Homs with Tartous and Latakia):

…and in between, the terrain is like this:

Pay attention at deep ravines, and hills dotted by villages and terrace-farms. Advancing here would take lots of troops, supplies, and even more time…

But OK: back to those captured BM-27s and BM-30s… To make them operational, the CMO first has to recover the vehicles in question: they were abandoned along the road from as-Safira to Khanasir and Ihtrya, about 150km east from Qalaat al-Midiq. That takes fuel and people who can drive them. Then it has to find - or train - people who can operate, maintain, and aim BM-30s. And it has to find ammunition for them. All of that is certain to take ‘at least a few weeks’.

Foremost, mind the HTS’s doctrine: ‘Assad first’. And mind that the CMO is a well-organised, professional military force, led by young officers that have learned their lessons. Therefore, it’s commanders are sticking to the military arts, where it’s never a good idea to ‘dissipate efforts’. Right now, they are fully-focused on liberating Hama. They’re rushing all the available reinforcements there, all the available troops, armament and supplies (that is including ever additional units nominally under the control of the SNA). Starting to target Hmeymim AB would mean re-routing a lot of troops and supplies in a different direction: it would mean ‘dissipating efforts’. Regardless what are which of Pudding’s PRBS-industrialists claiming: sorry, I do not think they’re going to do that any time soon.

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(NO) Türkish ‘Support’

Again: the CMO’s offensive is NOT Türkey supported. On the contrary, and regardless how much is it ‘playing into Erdogan’s hands’ (also: regardless how ‘popular’ in Türkey it might appear), there is a growing number of reports that Erdogan actually tried to prevent it, and is exercising growing pressure upon HTS to stop it.

Considering his repeated failures and proven incompetence from negotiations with Pudding, back in 2019-2020… well, perhaps I’ve overestimated him after all: perhaps he’s really too dumb and thus obsessed with bringing the CMO - and thus the ‘situation in Idlib, Aleppo and Hama’ - under his control, but to understand all the advantages for Türkye this operation is offering.

Sure, it is near-certain that Tehran is exercising massive pressure upon Erdogan to stop the offensive. However, fact is that he can’t any more. Not only because he’s not in control of the CMO, but also because the insurgents have now captured - just for example - some 150 tanks, 100 other armoured vehicles, and about 100 artillery pieces, plus enough ammunition and supplies to run the operation entirely on their own, even without Qatar’s support. (BTW, Tehran is also said to be attempting to persuade Moscow to ‘do more’ for Assad. And, just in case that Moscow can’t do so on its own, there are rumours along which the Wagner/African Legion PMC is recruiting ‘around Sahel’, with the aim of re-deploying to Syria, and then creating a situation similar to that in Libya of 2019-2020: back then, Türkye prevented the Wagner’s seizure of Tripoli; now the Russians would deploy Wagner/African Legion PMC to prevent the CMO’s seizure of Damascus… if the Russians are really thinking ‘this far’, then one can deduce their opinion about the capability of Assadist formations to defend not only Hama, but also Homs, just for example).

Moreover, as mentioned above, the Türkish armed forces are meanwhile deploying their own units inside northern Syria. Sure, they are moving those of SNA/Hawr Killis OR into positions around Manbij, and the idea behind that is obvious: another of Türkish interests is to drive the (US-supported) PKK/YPG/SDF away from its borders. However, I do wonder if the presence of Türkish troops in the SNA/Hawr Killis OR-controlled zone is not aiming to exercise pressure upon the CMO, too?

With Erdogan in charge in Ankara: one can never know…

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Bottom line: this is a complex war. A war that, already since November 2011 (start of the IRGC/Iranian military intervention) is involving a growing number of foreign actors. It is also a war for Syria: at least the dictators in Tehran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE know, better than any of us here, that this the cultural and spiritual ‘centre’ of the ‘Arab World’. Therefore, attempts to oversimplify and reduce it to ‘HTS = jihadists’ is as dumb as misdeclaring this conflict for ‘jihadists vs progressive Assad’ (or ‘jihadists vs Palestine-supporting Assad’), babbling about ‘civilised and Christians-protecting IRGC (and Russians)’ and ‘Palestine = Hamas’ or ‘PKK = Kurds’.

And nobody can predict the future (even less so of a country so much ‘at war’ like Syria is). Therefore, don’t jump to conclusions, but inform yourself and be patient.