Syria War, 4 December 2024 (UPDATED)

Hello everybody!

‘Sorry’ for coming back with more discussion of developments in Syria, ‘instead’ (as, actually, announced) ‘returning’ to Ukraine. However, both the mainstream- and the social media ‘exploded’ with all sorts of fake news about Syria and involved parties there, and there are so many questions and requests for additional details, that, right now, I can’t but address these.

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The fundamental issue is that of who outside Syria is supporting whom inside Syria, and why. Thus, here the simplest possible explanation I can formulate:

Syrian Insurgents

• CMO (former Fatah Mobin OR): HTS & 13 other fractions. Qatar-supported, but neither Türkye-supported nor Türkye-controlled. They have launched the offensive in Idlib (on 27 November), they have liberated Aleppo, and they are meanwhile assaulting Hama.

• SNA (Hawr Killis OR): dozens of other insurgent fractions; Türkey-supported and Türkey-controlled. The SNA was not even informed about this offensive and has ‘joined’ it only on 30 November. They have cut off the PKK/YPG ‘corridor’ from Aleppo to Manbij; they have liberated the Kweres AB and Dayr Hafer.

Assadist and IRGC-shills in the social media are claiming that both are Türkye-supported. All available evidence is showing that only the SNA is Türkye-supported. However, the principal forces in this offensive are those of the CMO. They are not Türkye-supported. Indeed, according to contacts in the CMO, Erdogan was - via the Türkish military intelligence service (MIT) - informed about the offensive, back in October. They say that Erdogan has betrayed this to Putin, and that this is why from 14 to 17 October 2024, the Russians heavily bombed western Idlib, killing scores of civilians. The CMO kept quiet, waited for another opportunity and then acted - entirely on its own.

Two of CMO’s field commanders: Abu Hassan (HTS, left), and Abu Mundhir (Ahrar ash-Sham) as seen north of Hama, two days ago.

Assadist and IRGC-shills, as well as different characters who like to present themselves as ‘fans of Israel’ in the social media are claiming that ‘over 80% of insurgents’ are ‘foreign jihadists’. Indeed, that they are ‘Türkish-supported al-Qaeda jihadists’.

There is no doubt (it was never made secret) that the HTS - a part of the CMO - is including the Turkistan Islamic Party (also ‘Turkistan Brigade’, Uygurs from PR China); Xhemati Alban (Albanian snipers); Fursan Tactical (Turkish SF-like unit); Yurtugh Tactical (Uygur SF-like unit); and Muhojir Tactical (Uzbeks). These are small units (50-100 combatants): except for Fursan Tactical (which seized the Nayrab AB/Aleppo IAP from the PKK/YPG), most are involved in providing tactical training to the CMO, not in combat.

Operative of the Yurtugh Tactical, training troops of the CMO.

Foremost: at least 90% of the HTS is consisting of Syrian nationals. Correspondingly, already the rate of Syrian Nationals in the Fatah Mobin OR was over 95%, and now when this was expanded through at least nine additional Syrian insurgent fractions (some of them ‘defecting’ from the SNA), this rate is even higher (except for characters convinced that ‘perhaps 500’ is ‘80% of 60,000+’… it doesn’t matter where and who they are, but for extremists of all kind: mathematics and physical laws do not matter…)

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Insurgent Aims

This is a topic about which there is almost total confusion. Apparently, de-facto all the prominent ‘journalists’ in the mainstream media - regardless where - can’t say who in Syria has what kind of aims and designs. The amount of rubbish flying through the social media can be measured in ‘shiploads’…

Actually, and as explained already three times, aims of insurgent factions depend on two factors:

• a) is any foreign power backing them? and

• b) what does that foreign power want?

The HTS is financially supported by Qatar. Exactly in what amounts: that’s unclear. But, one can deduct quite a lot.

For example: when one follows social media accounts of Syrian activists over this year alone, it’s easy to notice how they were bitterly complaining about the HTS taxing Syrians (even IDPs) in western Idlib, about its corruption and incompetence. Here a good example (scroll down to posts from March, April, May).

Then, pay attention: in mid-October - right about the time it is now said that the original offensive was about to be launched - ‘boom’: all such complaints stopped at once.

Meanwhile, HTS-run services do have the money to run de-mining, to repair roads, to restore electricity supply (so also for Aleppo that, actually, is the biggest city in Syria, and to which Assadists were providing electricity for about 1 hour a day), to restore telecommunications etc. Indeed, they’re in the process of re-establishing the local police, too.

At least as important is the ideology. Yes, the core of the HTS is the former Jabhat an-Nusra. This organisation is on the US list of terrorist organisation, and the Pentagon has, only yesterday, repeated that it considers them ‘jihadists’. In the case of the Pentagon: that’s no surprise. For reasons explained over a year ago, already back in 2012 the Primitives there have declared the entire uprising against Bashar al-Assad’s regime for ‘instigated by al-Qaeda’.

And yes, the leader of the HTS, Jowlani is a cold, calculated, power-hungry, and merciless character. No doubt about that. Can tell you stories I’ve got to hear about him and his top aides from contacts and friends from Syria, incarcerated together with them in Sednaya back in 2008-2011, and how such (and, back then still ‘future’) ‘noble warriors of Islam’ (including a few of subsequent ‘Emirs’ of the Daesh, i.e. ‘IS/ISIS/ISIL/IGIL’) - were foremost excelling in lifting clean underwear of other inmates…

However: over the last 5-6 years, Jowlani has crystalised a new doctrine. He moved away from (mis)using Islam to dictate a normative order of the entire state and society and not tolerating any other religious groups, to using Islam as a tool of a national re-birth of Syria (no surprise: according to census from 2004, 85%+ of Syrians were Sunni Muslims). Nowadays, he’s not after imposing Islam upon everybody living in Syria (and, he was never after ‘running Jihad all over the world’, anyway; that was also the reason for rift between him and al-Qaeda, already back in 2013). Which is why activists of the CMO are all working hard on spreading this new message all over liberated areas as well. Furthermore, the independent White Helmets civilian organisation is expanding its search and rescue operations from Idlib to Aleppo.

….which is, between others, why nobody is molesting Christian and Druze minorities in western Idlib over the last 6-7 years, nor is now molesting the Shi’a of Nubol and Zahra, nor Roman Catholic, Assyrian or Greek Christians of Aleppo, or the Kurds of Sheikh Maqsood District of Aleppo (except for the PKK/YPG: their units were granted free evacuation to the Manbij area, controlled by the US-supported PKK/YPG/SDF-conglomerate).

…except when these are bombed by the Russians and the Assadists, of course…

On the contrary, the insurgents of the SNA (i.e. those under the control of the Hawr Killis OR) ‘can’t but’ follow the Türkish command. They have summarily executed several Assadist troops in a widely published video, few days ago, and they are already publicly announcing their intention to assault the PKK/YPG/SDF-controlled Manbij, for example. Like if it wants to ‘underline’ this intention, two days ago the artillery of the Turkish Army has shelled the Manbij area to kill Yasar Celik, one of top commanders of the PKK/YPG/SDF-conglomerate.

In retaliation, the (US-supported part of the) PKK/YPG/SDF has summarily executed about 20 SNA insurgents it captured, and is currently running an operation of forceful recruitment of youngster Arabs in north-eastern Syria under its control.

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Note: the CMO has meanwhile forced the SNA out of the Aleppo Thermal Power Plant, and also demands a hand-over of the Kweres AB (obviously: with all the heavy weapons captured there, including one S-125/SA-3 SAM-site).

In turn, the SNA has meanwhile secured the water pumping station at the northern side of the Assad Lake (on the Euphrates River): lets hope this can help improve the water-supply of the city (presently, the city has got water only some 3 hours a day - because back in 2015, the Russians bombed out its main water-supply centre, claiming it for ‘IS-camp’).

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In what relation are news about the USA bombing ‘regime and IRGC positions’ in the ‘Khasham area’?

None. At most, the PKK/YPG-part that is supported by the USA (in form of the ‘Syrian Democratic Forces/SDF’), is exploiting the weakness of the Assadists and the IRGC, to assault and grab the so-called ‘Khasham pocket’. That’s a relatively narrow ‘bridgehead’ established by the IRGC in 2017, directly east of Dayr az-Zawr, in eastern Syria, on the left/eastern bank of the Euphrates River.

(Of course, the SDF is explaining this with ‘calls from the local population to liberate them from Assadism’ and similar nonsense, but, actually, the locals are demanding Assad to come and save them from the PKK…)

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Is CMO ‘supporting Hamas’?

Because the troops of the CMO have streamed big flags of the Syrian Revolution and of Palestine on the Aleppo Citadel, but especially because one of ex-Hamas talking-heads living abroad has published a video, two nights ago, damning the IRGC and Hezbollah, and expressing his support for the CMO, now all the possible Assad- and IRGC-shills (including a number of ‘fans of Israel’) are claiming that the CMO is ‘supporting Hamas’.

Quasi: ‘see Israel & West, they’re no friends of yours’.

Fact: Hamas and Assadists were never ‘friends’. Considering fundamental differences in their ideology (including the fact that the Assad regime was always supporting the PFLP-GC and also created the ‘Palestinian Liberation Army’ as its own proxy, already back in 1967): no surprise.

Moreover, the flag in question is actually that of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation and the Palestinian Authority - i.e. neither that of Hamas, and even less so of Palestine.

That said, I was unable to find any related statements by the CMO. If you have found any: I’m all ear.

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Is Assad ‘switching sides’ by informing Israel he’s about to force the IRGC out of Syria, in exchange for Israel and/or US support against (CMO) insurgents?

I do know that this was claimed by a Saudi newspaper with a strongly anti-Iranian stance, and widely quoted in the social media. Some of the Israeli media seems to have simply bought the story, without any cross examination. No idea why: I haven’t heard anything of this kind from any kind of a reliable source.

Foremost, something of this kind would mean that Assad is accepting Israeli claim for the Golan Heights. Fact: he wouldn’t survive - neither politically nor physically - any such decision. It would instantly convert him for ‘saviour of Syria’ into a traitor, and that foremost between the ranks of his own fans.

Moreover, here I cannot but remind: even if, the IRGC considers Syria for ‘Iranian province’. I doubt it’s going to let anybody kick it ‘out of the Iranian province of Syria, just like that’ - and regardless if it’s ‘just’ Assad, or Netanyahu, or ‘St Peter & Paul’. While, as should be well-known, the US officials can’t even find ‘IRGC’ in Syria… (if they might have changed this, then only since yesterday).

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Has the Russian Navy evacuated the Port of Tartous?

Some claim that the Russian Navy has evacuated the port of Tartous - and are supporting this with satellite photographs showing empty docks there. I’m not so sure. AFAIK, the last few days the Russian Mediterranean Flotilla was conducting live-firing exercises in the eastern Mediterranean. It’s a norm for ships to first ‘fill the docks’ before any such exercise, load ammo and fuel, and then ‘docks to be empty’ when the ships have left.

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Is the VKS evacuating the Hmeymim AB?

Others say, the VKS is evacuating the Hmeymim AB. Evidence for this should be satellite photographs showing the presence of one A-50 SRDLO and 2 Il-20s as of October, and then none at all in early December (see below).

I’m not sure. It is perfectly possible that all the three aircraft were ‘simply airborne’ when more recent photographs were taken. Even more so if they were involved in the above-mentioned exercise.

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Note: in general, since 27 November, whenever and wherever the CMO is attacking, the Russians are always the first to flee. With exception of two of their positions in northern Idlib (both of which were overrun by the insurgents), they were the first to flee from Aleppo, from the Kweres AB, from as-Safira, and from Khanasir. They also fled from as-Suqaylabiyah and Muhradah - two Christian towns in northern Hama.

Indeed, they fled so hard, they’ve left behind several MRAPs and, as the CMO made it known yesterday, also this advanced 48Y6-K1 Podlet early warning/surveillance radar, captured (intact, even if in folded condition) at Mount Kafra (the hill overlooking Hama):

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Has Ukraine trained and equipped the Fatah Mobin OR/CMO with UAVs?

I do know that some of the Ukrainian media is boasting with such reports, but, in essence: the mass of that is little else but rubbish.

Fact is: the HTS began operating FPVs for attack purposes already back in late 2017 (i.e. long before Ukraine ever thought about doing that).

‘Impossible for dumb jihadists to do that?’ Oh, but sure. Here links with evidence (indeed, links showing that already by 2018, the deployment of FPVs for attack purposes was a part of the HTS’ tactics):

https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1726209370378383852

https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2018/01/12/the_poor_mans_airforce/chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/

https://paxforpeace.nl/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/import/2022-11/PAX_Syria_A%20Laboratory%20of%20Drone%20Warfare_2022.pdf

https://www.twz.com/17433/russias-air-base-in-syria-seems-to-be-under-regular-attack-now

However, it is near-certain that the Ukrainian GUR has contacts to the CMO, and has, or has had some presence in western Idlib. According to the insurgents, the GRU helped with providing details on the bomb-release mechanism for UAVs, ‘providing 3D printing files to make the bomb carrier, the tail, and the warhead’, plus ‘details on signal transmissions and targeting’. Here, ‘from horse’s mouth’, so to say:

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How many combat aircraft have the Russians got in Syria?

Don’t know. Precisely in reaction to the HTS’ FPV-attacks of 2017-2018 the Russians have constructed a row of ‘shelters’ for their combat aircraft at the Hmeymim AB. Ever since, it is impossible to count how many of these are occupied and by what aircraft. The only parts of the base clearly visible are the QRA platform (usually occuppied by four Su-27s, or four Su-30s, or four Su-35s), and the big tarmac in the south-east, usually occuppied by Il-20s and A-50s.

The other thingy I do know is that Moscow has sent four Su-27 interceptors to Hmeymim AB, two days ago.

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What’s the status of the Syrian Arab Air Force, and how many aircraft has it got?

In general, the SyAAF is in similar condition to that of the Assadist armed forces: yes, the Russians have helped with spares and training, the last 5-6 years, but corruption, incompetence, lack of funding and the resulting lack of training are making it no more capable than 6, 7, 8 years ago. Only the aircraft are even older and more worn out. Gauging by available photographs from this period, it’s got something like (and that without all the L-39s captured at the Kweres and Nayrab ABs):

• 13 L-39ZOs

• 15 L-39ZAs

• MiG-23BN: 2

• MiG-23MF/ML/MLD: 17

• Su-22: 30

• Su-24MK2: 12

On average, less than 50% of these are ‘fully mission capable’ at any time.

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Is it correct that the Libyan ‘Marshal’ Haftar has donated 4-5 Aero L-39s to Assad, in exchange for SyAAF training his pilots?

In 2022, Haftar did send a group of young Libyans to Syria for training. However, soon after the start of that project, an L-39 with a Libyan student and a Syrian instructor crashed, killing both occupants. AFAIK, the project was cancelled shortly after. The cold fact was that the SyAAF could not offer the necessary quality of training on the type.

Foremost: the number of ex-Libyan L-39s known to be in Syria is much too high. I’ve counted at least 6, if not 8 or more at Nayrab and Kweres. Haftar’s forces are in control of eastern Libya, and had next to no L-39s on hand - because the majority of these were traditionally based in Tripoli and Misurata, and were secured by forces loyal to the (internationally recognised) government in Tripoli. And this has not exchanged any kind of aircraft with the Assad regime.

Ex-Libyan L-39s are easy to reconise by their camouflage pattern, which is still the same as applied prior to delivery from Czechoslovakia, back in the 1980s. Careful observers are also going to note their national insignia, in form of a green field applied in the middle of the fin (Libyan national insignia from 1977 until 2011).

Finally, presence of ex-Libyan L-39s in Syria (initially at the Kweres AB, later at Nayrab AB too) can be traced back to at least 2017. Long before the agreement between Haftar and Assad. Correspondingly, it’s at least as likely that the Libyan L-39s in question have been supplied to Syria already back in 1982-1983, when Qaddafi is known to have donated a number of MiG-21bis’ and MiG-23MS’ to Syria (to - partially - replace losses the SyAAF suffered during the fighting in Lebanon of 1982).

For comparison, ‘genuine’ Syrian L-39s are wearing camouflage colour of orange-sand and blue-green (often washed out into beige and different shades of green) as standardised and in use by The Works at the Nayrab AB at least since 1970.