Syria, 30 November 2024: This is getting 'dramatic'

Hello everybody!

This is getting ‘dramatic’: essentially, there is a total collapse of the Assadist and IRGC formations in Idlib and Aleppo provinces of Syria (which in turn means: all of north-western Syria). Seemingly, they’re running away even from northern Hama, 100+ kilometres south/south-west of Aleppo.

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General

When questioned about ‘who’s in charge’, the insurgents stress that it’s ‘all of them together’, ‘under unified leadership’. They are emphasising that it is not important what faction liberated what place, but that they are all working together.

The aim of the operation is now to ‘liberate Syria and begin a new era’. I.e. in reality, for them on the ground, the ‘dominance’ of Hayat Tahrir ash-Sham - superimposed by different supporters of Assadism, the PKK/YPG/SDF-conglomerate, or even the IRGC etc. in the social media - is non-existent.

As for reasons of their success, insurgents are stressing months-long preparations of all involved units, and pursuance of ideals of the Syrian Revolution (don’t shoot the messenger if you don’t like this: I’m just quoting contacts).

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South

The Fatah Mobin OR is reporting that all of Idlib - including Ma’arat an-Nauman and Aljahman - is liberated. What’s more, there are reports about insurgents liberating Lataminah (the old insurgent stronghold and a battlefield from the period 2015-2017), and reaching Halfaya (SW of Lataminah) and Tabyat al-Imam, in the northern Hama Province (both Halfaya and Tabyat are something like 10-15km outside Hama). With this, they’re, de-facto, re-establishing old frontlines from summer 2015 (at the start of the Russian intervention).

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East

There are also dramatic developments in the Aleppo area: units of the Türkye-supported Fajr al-Hurrya OR have punched through Assadist frontlines south of al-Bab, and then launched a rapid advance into the eastern Aleppo province. They have reached the Aleppo-Raqqa Highway. They have kicked out a weak spearhead of the PKK/YPG/SDF-conglomerate and liberated the Kweres Airport and Air Base (capturing lots of heavy equipment and ammunition in the process), and they have kicked the PKK/YPG/SDF-force from Aleppo International/Nayrab AB, south of the city.

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To address few of your questions from earlier today:

Q: What does this mean for Ukraine?

A: While there is no doubt that there are ‘shared sympathies’ between insurgents and Ukraine, sadly, very little - except in terms of ‘morale support’. Up front, mind that this operation is run in opposite directions from the ‘Russian triangle’ (Hmeymim AB - Masyaf - Tartous). Thus, the Russian bases in the country are not immediately threatened and I doubt there is going to be something like ‘instant reaction’ from Moscow. That said, the VKS does have about 20 combat aircraft and about a dozen of helicopters in the country, and these are already involved in bombing not only insurgent strongholds in western Idlib, but have instigated yet another massacre when bombing Aleppo, earlier today.

That said, there’s no denial that nine years of Russian attempts to reform the Assadist armed forces have failed - and miserably at that. Yesterday and today, the ‘re-organised, re-trained, re-armed, and expanded’ Republican Guard of Bashar al-Assad and his brother Maher excelled foremost in being the fastest to flee from the battlefield. Combined with his dependence on Tehran for financial survival, this is likely to push Bashar back into IRGC’s hands (Maher was always the ‘crucial linchpin of the ‘Axis’ Beirut-Damascus-Tehran, while the Russians always did their best to separate Bashar from the IRGC).

Of course, considering its involvement in Ukraine, Moscow is likely to experience major problems when thinking about sending any kind of reinforcements to Syria. And even if, it’s unlikely to send ‘troops’, or even additional combat aircraft there.

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Q: How many insurgents are involved in this operation?

A: No clear idea. Nominally, the SNA, SNN, HTS etc. - combined - had up to 150,000 under arms. However, the last few years, many of these were serving ‘part-time only’, because they were busy taking care about their families.

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Q: What about Katayib Hezbollah?

A: Yes, the IRGC is likely to rush its Iraqi surrogates to the scene, in attempt to ‘save the Private Bashar’ (or what is left of its influence in Syria, following a catastrophe of this dimensions).

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Q: What is the status of the Syrian Arab Air Force?

A: That of a ‘flying militia’. Nominally, the service has retained its structure from 2018-2019. However, aircraft-wise, it’s nowadays heavily dependent on Aero L-39 light strikers (some 30 were still in service, earlier this year). The number of operational MiG-23MF/ML/MLDs, Su-22s, and Su-24s is down to ‘5-7 each’. With the loss of Nayrab AB and ‘The Works’ (sole overhauling facility for these types in Syria), this is likely to worsen in a matter of days (weeks at most). Finally, one year of Israeli air strikes on its ground-based air defences in the Damascus area has nearly halved the remaining air defence capabilities of the Assadist regime, too.

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Q: What is the US aim for PKK/YPG/SDF-conglomerate?

A: No idea, and I doubt even Biden and/or Trump have a clear idea in this regards. But, yes: the Pentagon/DIA ‘wing’ is busy trying to build-up a PKK-dominated Kurdish statelet in north-eastern Syria, but: the PKK/YPG/SDF-conglomerate is meanwhile rather overstretched (as obvious from renewed local insurgencies against it, and the resurgence of the IS in eastern Syria, too).

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Ah yes, and…

Q: What do you mean with ‘Palestinian-staffed Liwa al-Qods’ of the IRGC?

A: After the Naqba of 1947-1949, when Zionists ethnically cleansed Palestine and hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were forced to flee, successive Syrian governemnts considered the people in question for ‘our own’ - because, for thousands of years, Palestine was always a part of ash-Sham/Syria (so also during the times of the Ottoman Empire). Therefore, they did not keep them in ‘refugee camps’, but built entire cities for them, together with all the necessary infra-structure. Especially in the Aleppo area: essentially, all of New Aleppo was constructed for that purpose.

The IRGC understands itself as ‘the major supporter of the Palestinians’. Correspondingly, when it conquered the Aleppo area (2013-2018), it began strongly recruiting between the local Palestinians (essentially: children and grand-children of refugees from 1947-1949). Thus came into being the Liwa al-Qods: a division-sized formation controlled by the IRGC, and ‘fighting on the side of the Assad regime’, though actually, on behalf of the IRGC.

Here’s a photo of some of its combatants from 2016:

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For those with deeper interest into this conflict, please, kindly check my write-up about this war, posted about a year ago: Syria, Adventures of Clever & Smart.

Alternatively, there are books like Moscow’s Game of Poker, describing the geo-strategic and military developments of back in 2015-2018.