Q&A ...on Syria, on the Cancellation of US Military Aid for Ukraine, on Kursk, on Mirages and few other Topics... Part 1

Hello everybody!

Yes, it’s once again ‘those days’ where one - well: at least me - does not know where to look at first. Because so many things are happening at once.

So much so, I sincerely have no idea where to start with answering all of your questions - whether those delivered per e-mail or private message function here on Substack, or on the FB….

…perhaps I should observe, up front: nope, I do not have any other social media accounts? The few I’m using are far from ‘ideal’, but I grew fed up entering my private data in more than two-three ‘services’. And I’m at least 6 months behind in answering all your e-mails.

The usual DISCLAIMER: please mind that you’re reading the following blasphemies at your own discretion. It was not yet confirmed by clinical studies, but reports are indicating that the reading of this blog is causing feverish outbursts of upsetia, severe haterdia accompanied by headaches, acute moronia, cases of racistia resulting in sleepless nights, chauvinistia with big purulent pimples, trollia acuta accompanied by severe diarrhea, and few other, infectious social media diseases.

Because I’ve warned you, I do not feel responsible for any of that.

Medical advice: should you feel dizzy or unwell after reading the Sarcastosaur, don your white hood, grab a torch, and then ride across the expanses of the social media to spread fear and horror between those leftist snowflakes!

Just, please, don’t forget to first cut out openings for your eyes in that hood. One can never be sure, but: that might be of some advantage.

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Syria…

…lets tackle this one as first, because the number of related queries is increasing by a minute.

Because the IRGC and Hezbollah were ‘destroyed’ by Israel, the last week there was a meeting between General Hussein Akbar of the IRGC (former CO IRGC-QF in Syria and former Iranian Ambassador to Syria), General Amir Ali Hajizadeh (ex-CO IRGCASF), members of the SAVAK/MININT (Iranian intel service), General Assad al-Ali (former Assad regime), General Mohammed Khalouf, Brigadier General Adel Sarhan, Brigadier General Abdullah Manaf al-Hassan and Brigadier General Mohammed Sarmini.

Details about topics of that meeting are uncertain, but it transpires they’ve arranged an Assadist ‘uprising’ in parts of the Latakia province, and the IRGC (and thus Hezbollah) support for the same.

Correspondingly, since 3-4 Mawrch, the Assadists first seized two army bases (one in Astam, the other in Qardaha), and then began ambushing whatever random cars would pass by along the local roads - but especially the coastal highway. They shot up numerous cars - including several ambulances - from assault rifles. These attacks were accompanied by a PR-campaign in the social media (especially on the X, where else…), frequently including videos showing Assadist massacres of the Syrian Sunni Arabs in the Banias area of 2012, and claims that ‘al-Qaeda and Daesh’ (‘IS’) are massacring Alawites… Of course, ‘half the social media’ reacted with ‘logical conclusion’ that ‘there will never be lasting and stable peace in Syria’…

Two of vehicles ambushed and shot-up by Assadists on the coastal highway outside Tartous, on 6 or 7 March.

As a Sarcastosaur, I cannot but burst back: what does 'stable peace in Syria' mean and is there an uprising in all of the country, or only in a certain area?

When you get right down to it, there has been no ‘lasting and stable peace’ in Syria since the British (i.e. Commonwealth) troops conquered the area in late 1918. The first thing that happened back then was their mass arrests and massacres of Arab nationalists, followed by an Alawite uprising, then the establishment of the Syrian Arab Kingdom in reaction to which the French invaded the country and massacred over 40,000 - Arabs, Jews, Christians - in Damascus alone, after which there was another Alawite and then a Druze uprising... and so it went on for the next 100 years, yes, also ‘at best times’ of the Assad regime. If nothing else: Assadists and different of smuggling networks were at war with each other.

Therefore, sorry but: to expect the country to transform overnight into an 'oasis of peace'…sigh… that’s more than 'just naive'.

On orders from the government in Damascus, the re-established Syrian Arab Army hit back with full force - including a deployment of ground forces, supported by air strikes by Mil Mi-8 and Mi-25 helicopters (no: not all have been destroyed during that Israeli ‘super-successful neutralisation of heavy weaponry in Syria). Already as of 6 March, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported the death of 48 (including 16 Army troops and 28 Assadists), while the Director of Security for the Latakia province reported severe clashes with Assadists, especially in the Jableh area. The operation is presently going on.

A still from a video showing a Mi-25 of the (re-established) Syrian Arab Air Force, firing unguided rockets at Assadists that entrenched themselves inside the Bayad fortress, next to the Dalia village.

Bottom line: this 'uprising' is confined to a relatively limited area between Latakia, Jableh, Masyaf and Banias, and - membership-wise - to Assadist war-criminals that were already sought for by the new government in Damascus. I’ve got no idea what’s going to come out of that, except for the following: the IRGC is not ‘defeated’, nor has it ‘given up’ on Syria, but is going to do its utmost to de-stabilise the country. Just like Israel has, in the last few weeks, further ‘expanded’ - read: grabbed additional terrain inside Syria - its troop-presence in the Qunaitra-Kfar Arnabeh area. And just like the ‘SDF’, the local branch of the Kurdish PKK from Türkiye, didn’t disarm and gave up its hold upon one third of the country even after a corresponding order from nobody less than the PKK-leader Öcalan (held inprisoned in Türkiye for over a decade)…

This is so because Syria is much too important but for local powers do the same like the West has done since 2015, and simply ignore it…

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Cancellation of the US Military Aid & Intelligence Support to Ukraine

Many are asking about effects of the cancellation of the US military aid, and the cancellation of the provision of the US intelligence to Ukraine. Indeed, many are expecting Ukraine to ‘collapse’ within something like two and six months.

Firstly, let me remind you that Ukraine is fighting the Russian invasion without any kind of serious Western arms & ammo support all the time from 2014 to 2022. Arguably, it began receiving Western arms in 2017, and these proved handy (see Javelins, just for example). However, in grand total, and especially since 24 February 2022, Ukraine has never got what it really takes to defend itself from the invasion, not to talk about defeating Russia to stop the war. Neither in financial support, nor in term of ‘arms’. Indeed, even three years after the Russian all-out invasion of Ukraine, ‘the West’ (nowadays, that’s limited to Europe) is still in the process of seriously ramping up its arms & ammo production, so it can supply to Ukraine the ‘what it takes’.

Atop of that, the US Congress blocked all deliveries of arms and ammunition to Ukraine from October 2023, until May 2024.

With other words: Ukraine already fought the Russians ‘without US support’ - and didn’t collapse.

Secondly…Lately, the US military aid was making something like 35-40% of the military aid supplied to Ukraine by ‘the West’. That means: yes, the end of the US military support is going to cause serious troubles. It’s going to cause losses to Ukraine: losses to its armed forces (ZSU), losses to its civilian population, and losses to its economy and infrastructure.

But, it’s not going to cause a ‘collapse’ of Ukraine. I’ve explained the ‘why’ in one of features published earlier this week. The essence of the reason is: because the Ukrainians - not their government, not their generals - but millions of ‘everyday’ Ukrainians are not giving up. Because they continue fighting.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian economy is providing up to 30% of weaponry and ammunition used by the ZSU. It’s going to take time, but ‘Europe’ will have to ‘jump in’ and increase the volume of its support: at least now, it must become clear even to worst of zombie idiots, that Europe has no other option but to do so - and then by several magnitudes.

Regarding the US intelligence: I do not see the cancellation of the US intelligence support as a major problem for Ukraine. Arguably, at strategic level (see ‘warnings that Russia is going to invade’, from 2021-2022), the US intelligence services did a great job. However, ever since: not (with exception of the CIA’s and MI6’s warnings about the collapse of ‘the Western’ support for Ukraine, from the last summer… was discussed on this blog, too). And, no doubt: there is no other power on this planet with as extensive technical means of collecting intelligence as the USA. Alone the number of satellites and other means of electronic intelligence gathering in the US possession are easily outmatching everybody else - combined.

However: as much as powerful, the US intelligence is limited to technical means of intelligence gathering. Following a number of affairs in which dozens (if not hundreds) of US informers around the world were caught by local authorities because of incredible mistakes in equipping them, the US services are severely limited in regards of so-called HUMINT (human sources of intelligence). Furthermore, the RUMINT I get to hear (RUMINT = rumours intelligence) is that what the US services were providing to Ukraine the last 12-16 months was ever poorer in quality. Often outright useless. On the contrary: RUMINT also has it that it was rather the other way around, that the Ukrainian intelligence provided to the US services was of far higher quality, and that the cooperation was suffering repeated setbacks because US services are ‘leaky’. Because so much of Ukrainian information was revealed - either in the public in the USA, or even to Russia.

…where, if I’m to ask, the quality of Ukrainian intelligence is still leaving a lot to desire, too: the services there seem still to be suffering from same doses of wishful thinking and exaggerations like the ZSU in general.

So, as a sort of a ‘bottom line’: my thinks, the cancellation of the US intelligence support is more likely to force the Ukrainians to become even more independent, and to professionalise. Exactly the way the Iranians did after the end of the US-Iranian alliance of 1978-1980. There is no other way out of the situation.

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What if the USA - i.e. Elon Musk - turn off the StarLink service for Ukraine?

Up front: this would be a major problem for the ZSU. No doubt about this.

Fact is, the functionality of automatic tactical management systems (ATMS’, also ‘C4ISR’ systems) in service with the ZSU like Delta (discussed by Benjamin, earlier this week), Kropiva is depending on the StarLink.

However, this would be by far not as severe blow as one might think. After all: mind that there is no StarLink service inside Russia and thus the ZSU is fighting in the Kursk Oblast without any kind of StarLink service already since the summer of the last year.

Also no doubt about the fact that presently there is no other service that could offer the similar quality in terms of the volume of information provided at the required speed. After three years of massive investments into the StarLink (by Ukraine and by partners, foremost including US- and European taxpayers, via their corrupt and incompetent governments), this is no surprise. Thus, if Musk turns off the StarLink for Ukraine, it would take at least until 2027, if not by 2030, for this to be completely replaced.

However, even more important is the factor greed: meanwhile, there are around 100,000 StarLink terminals in service in Ukraine. Some 60% of these are paid by Ukrainians at favourable rates, the rest by foreign partners. Mind that Musk is earning millions from this business. At the time he’s heavily indebted, while losing lucrative contracts (for example in Mexico), he’s not really in a position to say anything like, ‘OK, I do not need Ukraine any more’.

Last but not least: who knows what is Musk doing with all the intel he can, at least in theory, collect about Ukraine via the StarLink…

That said, I think it’s more than obvious: not only Ukraine, but entire Europe need their own - or, and better yet: a joint - service of (at least) similar capabilities. Now, more than ever before. And that’s urgent, too.

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Kursk…

At least since the Don’s Weekly, Part 1 of the last Monday, it should be obvious that because the Russians have liberated the villages of Sverdlikovo and nearby Lebedevka, about 10 days ago, they have secured an area from which they have the fire-control over the sole road (R200) from Ukraine to Sudzha. With this, they’ve created another ‘cauldron’, and then one very similar to the last stages of the Battle of Bakhmut, from around February to May 2023. Means: whatever ZSU troops are still holding out north-west, north, north-east, east, and south-east of Sudzha, are de-facto encircled and threatened with being cut off.

What shall one think about this situation?

The Ukrainian offensive into the Kursk Oblast of the Russian Federation was a ‘highly promising’ affair - under three conditions. Provided,

• A) the ZSU (Armed Forces of Ukraine) would have managed to rapidly capture Korenevo (thus preventing the Russians from establishing a major stronghold in the area but also forcing them to abandon the area south-east of Korenovo, south of the Seym River an all the way to Tetkino on the border), or

• B) the ZSU has managed to drive deeper in direction of Kursk (city) and then establish strongholds in the hills north of Rozgrebli and Bolshoe Soldatskoe, perhaps also seize Belitsa and Peshchanoe (so to secure crossings over the Psel River).

• C) Alternatively, it was suitable for running a ‘Wildschweinjagd’ I’ve described the last year: an operation aimed at causing additional massive losses to the VSRF (Armed Forces of the Russian Federation).

Arguably, the 225th Assault Battalion ZSU was rushed on Korenevo (on the second day of the offensive), and has really driven for 40km to enter the town, early on. However, although heavily supported by FPVs, that single motorised battalion was not enough to fight at least two Russian mechanised regiments supported by attack helicopters. From that point onwards, the issue became the fact that there was only that one road (R200) to Sudzha, and from Sudzha to Korenevo: this was not enough to keep all the involved ZSU units properly supplied. As a consequence, Ukrainians were limited in regards of how many troops they could deploy inside the bulge, and these troops were limited (by their ammunition, fuel, and supplies) to running raids behind the Russian lines on on/off basis. Arguably, they’ve (repeatedly) managed to do so all the way up to the highway connecting Rylsk with Kursk, but they could not permanently hold any large swats of the Russian territory. Moreover, when the Glavcom (General Syrsky) then began replacing ‘the best’ of the ZSU by poorly equipped - and -trained Territorial Defence units, the Russians exploited the opportunity, and, back in September, launched their counteroffensive that regained nearly 50% of the lost territory.

Arguably, from the Ukrainian point of view, that was still ‘Wildschweinjagd’, because they’ve mauled at least two brigades of the Russian Naval Infantry, plus (and more importantly), two regiments of the VDV - and that just in the process of ‘one’ Russian counteroffensive back in September. Then add repeated mauling of several other units, plus the North Koreans ever since. However, afterwards, there was no point in trying to continue holding out inside Russia any more. Still, for political reasons, the ZSU had to remain there. And now, and still for political reasons, it will have to find a way how to either a) kick the Russians out of the Sverdlikovo-Lebedevka area (unlikely), or withdraw remaining troops completely out of the Sudzha bulge…

Hope, I need not explaining how unlikely is Zelensky to permit something of that kind - especially considering the current conditions on the international scene.

With other words: this is now ‘another end of the Battle of Bakhmut’. A situation de-facto certain to cause major losses to the ZSU.

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Mirages…

…in comparison to the affair described above, the following migth appear ‘unimportant’. Actually, it is, and thus I would like to address a number of questions that appeared in reaction to my feature ‘Mirage…’

1.) Correct designation of the version delivered to Ukraine is ‘Mirage 2000-5F’.

Yes. And I’m of the kind who - much to my shame - tends to forget ‘names’ in a matter of seconds after somebody being introduced to me. No surprise, I’m all the time forgetting such ‘unusual’ designations like ‘2000-5F’: for me, it would’ve been more logical to designate that one ‘2000X’ or whatever (i.e. ‘not’ as the F sub-variant of the sub-variant 5 of the Mirage 2000…). But then, as said: the French have their own ways of designating variants and sub-variants of their combat aircraft.

2.) Have Ukrainian Mirage 2000s been deployed in combat?

Didn’t know it at the time of writing my feature but, yes, meanwhile the PSU has officially confirmed that its Mirages have flown their first combat sorties. For example, the two stills below appear to be showing a successful deployment of a Matra R.550 Magic Mk. II short-range, infra-red homing air-to-air missile against a Russian Kh-101 cruise missile (at least I doubt the MICA is as ‘smokey’ as obvious from these two stills):

The kill in question was probably scored during the Russian large-scale missile/UAV-strike on Ukraine early on 6 March. Notable is the ‘high off-boresight’ angle at which this kill was scored: essentially, the Mirage flew ‘line abreast’ of the targeted Russian missile, and the weapon ‘still’ homed for a direct hit.

The last night, there was another, similar strike: the PSU claimed a total of 79 UAVs and 1 Kh-101 shot down. Two Mirages were airborne, and they have scored additional kills.

(…to be continued..)