Professional Military Incompetence, Part 4
Hello everybody!
The publishing of Part 1, Part 2, and Part 3 of this feature has prompted quite a lots of questions in return. I promise to address these in one of following parts: before I’m so far, permit me to continue with few additional thoughts and experiences - simply because this way everybody is going to read the same, and I need not repeating them in private messages, e-mails or similar fashion.
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About two weeks ago, a friend from Ukraine was (very) happy to get in touch and let me know about wonderful news. Essentially, he announced that the Ministry of Defence (MOD) in Kyiv has given up its control over the distribution of ‘first-person view’-drones (FPVs) between ZSU units. That’s great, he meant, because now there is going to be far less corruption within the MOD. Even more so, units that are the best in operating FPV are also going to get the ‘biggest piece of cake’. Quasi, there is now something like ‘free market economy’ in regards of FPV-distribution within the force, and those fighting the best and with highest skill, are going to get the most FPVs.
I don’t know why: I’m simply that way, but, my – prompt – reaction was: is the Ministry of Defence in Kyiv, is the government of Ukraine completely crazy?
…which made him very sad, of course. Unsurprisingly, I’ve had to explain (me thinks, that didn’t really help and he was quite ‘demoralised’ as a consequence: if so, he has my most sincere apology):
1.) The decision in question is a public admission by the government of Ukraine that it is losing control over its own corruption and incompetence. It’s not even trying to fight or correct them: it’s giving up, because it can’t. The government is so corrupt it can’t bring its own functions and members under control, and thus it’s letting the ZSU brigades sort out their supplies of FPVs on their own.
2.) Indeed, there is a ‘bonus’ effect now, at least from the government’s – and thus the MOD’s - point of view: now nobody can complain any more about the government’s wrongdoings, nobody can complain the government/MOD for corruption and incompetence, because it’s not them who are taking decisions about the distribution of the FPVs.
At this point - and I beg for your understanding - I can’t but wonder: what is then that government paid for, actually?
What is its purpose if it cannot control even itself?
3.) The result of this decision is easy to predict: henceforth, units that already have skilled commanders, that already have excellent ‘public relations’, that are already well-connected, and (reasonably and relatively) better funded, are going to receive a greater number of FPVs than units that are not.
4.) The government has decided (if it ever took care about the following issue), that combat performance does not matter anymore.
A big part of me would love not to blame anybody. Not even this hopelessly incompetent and endemically corrupt government in Kyiv. But, the calculation is so simple, can’t say: it’s plain obvious that, for example, units like the 3rd Assault (already well-supplied with FPVs), are now going to get even more of FPVs than, say, the 54th Mechanised.
(Should there be any doubts, be sincere to yourself: have you ever heard of the 54th?)
But wait. That’s still not all. Worst is still the following.
IF (a giant IF), the GenStab-U would be doing its job, things would be simple. That GenStab-U would send officers to the frontline and these would be collecting and analysing post-combat reports. That way, not only the GenStab-U but – through GenStab’s reporting – the MOD (and thus the government, too) would know, for example, over the time-period (for example) 1 January – 31 January 2025:
- Unit A has spent 537 FPVs to kill 114 Russians, while
- Unit B has spent 112 FPVs to kill 39 Russians.
…which in turn would teach the GenStab-U (and thus the MOD, i.e. the government) that – statistically -
unit A needs 4.7 FPVs to kill a single Russian, while
Unit B needs 2.8 FPVs to kill a single Russian.
Which in turn would lead to the conclusion that, although spending less FPVs, the Unit B is much more combat effective (nearly two times) than the Unit A. Which in turn would lead to the conclusions like that the FPV-pilots of the Unit A might need additional training in order to improve their efficiency. Or the Unit A might need additional electronic warfare support… or any other thinkable reasons, including those in Russian hands (like, for example, the Russian units opposing the Unit b being less skilled in dispersing and camouflaging than those opposing the Unit A)…
Frankly, as always: there could be 50+ different reasons for this discrepancy – each and every one having an effect upon the expenditure and thus the requirement for new FPVs by the units in question.
What’s more: such requirements are also likely to change on week-to-week basis, too…
Precisely that is why there is the GenStab-U: its job is to collect reports, analyse them, investigate and find out the cold facts. Because cold facts are crucial: only they are enabling drawing conclusions about reasons, and reasons are enabling making qualified decisions. Without this process, one is merely guessing.
Problem: the GenStab-U would never do anything of that kind.
Because, in the ZSU, questioning outcomes of different battles would be equal to questioning the competence of ‘Gods’: of top commanders. Under the current conditions, where Glavcom (Syrsky) is in direct command of one sector of the battlefield, and the Commander of Ground Forces ZSU (Drapaty) is in direct command of another sector, nobody in the GenStab-U is as ‘crazy’ as to go risking his/her positions by ‘doing such things’ like questioning the two.
And this is not only valid for ‘right now’: this is the way things are done in the GenStab-U right since 24 February 2022 (and since before).
As a result, the GenStab-U is, systematically and persistently, NOT doing its job.
….and that with bewildering consequences.
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THE SYSTEM
These consequences are ranging from the ‘simple’ calculation (at the GenStab-U and the MOD) that because the unit A has spent 537 FPVs and killed 114 Russians – they are the heroes! Send them another 537! …oh…. and… how, the Unit B has spent only 112? They’re lazy cowards! Not fighting! ‘Logical conclusion’: it’s pointless to send more FPVs to the Unit B. The next time they’re going to get just 50…
You think things in Ukraine are not that way?
That’s cute – and very kind – from you. But wrong.
Actually: this is exactly the way the MOD and the GenStab-U are doing almost everything they do. It doesn’t matter if it’s FPVs, or artillery ammunitiion, or machine gun ammunition, or mortar ammunition, or replacement troops, or replacement barrels, or whatever other equipment or supplies…..
What’s worse: atop of this ‘decision-making-process’, there is constant meddling by Zelensky and Syrsky about what sectors and what units have priorities, and then the (higher-ranking) logistics-officers in the rear are regularly ‘herding’. They get the order to send 537 FPVs to the Unit A, but send only 400, while storing the rest. Because, it’s better to be safe than sorry, you know.
….and, because everybody there knows better: the MOD, especially the GenStab-U, and higher-ranking officers in the rear ‘know’ the best of all… while ‘those idiots that have left themselves be thrown into the trenches’ – ‘are clueless’.
And, now things are about to get even more chaotic, because it’s going to be on brigade commanders – or, and much more likely: their deputy commanders, or deputies for logistics – to make decisions of strategic proportions. Which is simply not their job: they’re neither qualified nor in a position to gauge about such affairs.
However, that’s the ‘system ZSU’.
What am I talking about?
EVERY ARMED FORCE ON THIS PLANET is a ‘system’. A system of it’s own, DISTINCTIVE WAY of conducting its business. Indeed, an armed force is an armed force precisely because of that distinctive way of conducting its business: it’s not an armed force because of its nationality, or its government, the public, the flag, or because the enemy is calling it that way, but because throughout its existence it has developed a specific culture – military doctrine – and its own way of doing things.
Only the ZSU has… well… lets see what has it got.
Sure, single of ZSU brigades have their own systems. For example, the 3rd Assault has its own system; the 12th NG Azov has it, the 92nd Assault and the 93rd Airborne have them, the 10th and 128th Mountain Assault Brigades have them… perhaps even the luckless 47th Mech has developed its own system by now (despite Glavcom’s and GenStab-U’s best efforts to prevent this)…but, the ZSU as the system of the armed forces of Ukraine, is non-existent.
The mass of the ZSU – which is: Syrsky, Drapaty, Hnatov etc., plus the Buddies in the GenStab-U, and, therefore, some 90% of brigade- and battalion commanders in the ZSU - is leaning upon the way the Soviet Army used to conduct its business, between 35 and 80 years ago.
Problem: this is neither the modern-day ‘Ukrainian style’ (meanwhile; it’s not even the Russian style any more) nor is it what the ZSU needs to effectively fight this war. It is not because it is entirely out of connection with every-day experiences on the battlefield.
Principal consequence is that the mass of the ZSU people is as demoralised as the mass of the Russians serving with the VSRF, right from the moment they join. Another consequence is that dozens of thousands of Ukrainians are refusing to join the service – refusing to volunteer, or at least to be drafted. In the case of Ukrainians this is so because they ‘know’ – read: they have the impression – that it’s entirely pointless to join, to serve, and to fight. It’s entirely pointless because the current, non-existent system is dysfunctional, those in charge are refusing to reform it, and thus, it’s also ‘logical’ that ‘whoever joins is going to get killed’ (or worse).
…and Zelensky, Yermak, Syrsky, Drapaty etc. are all hell-or-bent on proving them right – through refusing to reform and re-train the armed forces and thus create a Ukrainian, ZSU system.
A ZSU doctrine.
Because they’re refusing to reform the ZSU, (Zelensky/Yermak +) Syrsky & Buddies are also refusing to create a spirit in the force where everybody who serves – every single soldier, no matter what position – knows he or she is the ZSU; a system where everybody who serves knows what is the ZSU’s mission, what are they fighting and working for, and what is their mission.
….where this is yet another absurdity resulting from the current Ukrainian non-system: the aim is, actually, crystal clear: to defeat the Russian to the level where the ZSU can recover all of Ukraine within borders from 1991.
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YES, THE FISH (ALWAYS) STINKS FROM THE HEAD
This is what should be the aim of the political leadership, and thus the aim of the military leadership. However, the Zelensky government has no focus – which, ‘automatically’, results in the Glavcom, GenStab-U and thus the entire ZSU having no focus. Instead, everybody there is sad to conclude that young Ukrainians are not keen to get drafted and killed – and that so much so, lately, they’ve introduced a number of incentives for those who might volunteer.
Sure, it’s not the job of the president and his government to reform the armed forces: actually, their sole job in this regards would be to find ‘the right general’ to do that. However, they are refusing to do even that: they rely on their ‘General of Fantastic News’ – Syrsky – because they can always be sure, 1000%, that he and his Buddies (GenStab-U) are following every of Zelensky/Yermak’s orders to the last dot and comma, and, apparently, without ever complaining or disagreeing.
And what are these orders? One day it’s, ‘attack in Kursk because the next Rammstein meeting is coming’; another day it’s ‘attack their refineries’; on third day it’s ‘attack their factories’; on the fifth day it’s ‘oh, we’ve forgotten to defend Velyka Novosilka’, and on the sixth it’s something else…
In this regards, there’s no difference between Zelensky and Syrsky. For Zelensky, one day it’s ‘everything is going to be Ukraine’ (i.e. we’re going to liberate all of the country), the next day it’s, ‘oh, we’ll have to make concessions, because XY said so and he’s so powerful’, another day it’s ‘we’re ready to negotiate’… Almost every day, the declared aims of war as stated by the top political leadership of the country are different.
Overall: no doubt, there are ‘lots of good intentions’, but: there’s no focus, no decisions, no accountability and thus no responsibility.
One of consequences is that the ZSU is fighting its own war (and then the way it cannot win), the SBU is fighting its own war (and then the way it doesn’t even know how to fight, not to talk fighting it the way it cannot win) and so on: almost every major security and/or military branch in Ukraine is fighting ‘in different direction’.
….all of this because, as explained above, the top political leadership is lacking the focus.
Because that top political leadership is lacking the focus, it’s especially the ZSU that’s lacking the focus, too: its top generals are not only incompetent yes-sayers, but if commanding, are all the time micromanaging through patching up the frontline.
Instead of doing their job, which would be: forging a ZSU system.
…where the situation is actually absurd, because it’s precisely the fact that they’re failing – abysmally – to forge that ‘ZSU system’, that’s forcing them to all the time patch up instead.
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DISOBEDIENCE
‘Devil is in the detail’, as they say. Right now, the ZSU’s officer corps is consisting of a disparate jumble of ex-Soviet officers, haphazardly trained reservists, and combat-experienced wartime volunteers.
Not only the top command level, but also the Soviet veterans and reservists trained since 1992 lack the professional training necessary to lead their units well. It doesn’t matter whether it’s large formations of small units: the mass of officers can’t lead, and can’t command.
Principal result from this: higher officers still acting along the ‘watered down, Soviet system’, and/or those lacking combat experience and/or not trained to act professionally, are regularly issuing orders that are making no sense to combat-experienced officers and other ranks. In turn, combat-experienced officers – especially well-established brigade-commanders – know the situation on the battlefield and regularly can’t understand what kind of nonsense is ‘somebody up there’ in the headquarters in Kyiv, 500-kilometres away ordering them to do. As a consequence, they’re regularly not following their orders, or applying their own interpretation of the same.
The political- and military leaderships are doing nothing in regards of improving the situation. For example through instilling the ideology of the force: they are not instilling a clear break away from the ‘Soviet past’. On the contrary: they’re insistent on retaining some sort of a ‘watered, Ukrainian version’ of the same.
Consequence: disobedience is becoming the norm. Skilled brigade COs are fired, incompetent officers regularly appointed in their place ‘because they are following orders’. Liars are appreciated (even decorated with the ‘Hero of Ukraine’ medal/title), people speaking out against the resulting chaos not. The entire process is spreading chaos within the staff of brigade headquarters, causing major damage to their combat effectiveness…
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ANALYSIS & FACTS
The theoretical principal task of both the Glavcom and the GenStab-U is to analyse combat experiences (through collecting battlefield reports, cross-checking these, and then filling its own reports), and to constantly adapt and adjust the way it is training both the officers and the troops. Mind: even the Keystone Cops in Moscow – the Russian General Staff – is doing this. Just the GenStab-U not.
If you think this has consequences for the ZSU alone: wrong.
The consequence is that not only are the Glavcom and the GenStab-U guessing about what exactly is going on on what sector of the battlefield, but they – and the government in Kyiv, and their allies in ‘the West’ are guessing too. Instead of knowing.
As result, the ‘reports’ (if the same can be called that way) of the GenStab-U are either disparaged or grotesquely taken for granted (depends on the instance in question) – principally because nobody really knows whom they can trust; or – this is valid for ‘Western allies of Ukraine’ – it is ‘widely known’ that one ‘can’t trust the Ukrainians’ (for example, ‘because everybody knows they are corrupt’), and thus one ‘automatically’ distrusts them.
A particularly good example: in ‘the West’ of nowadays it is ‘widely accepted’ that the Russian Air Force (VKS) ‘did not fly and thus did not take part in the invasion of Ukraine in 2022’. It doesn’t matter how much evidence of the contrary you’ve seen in form of hundreds of videos and photos. The VKS was ‘not involved,’ you know. This is so because one of top Western think-tanks in ‘the West’, has listened to the GenStab-U’s officers reporting that, back in spring 2022. And because in our days – and as explained in the Part 1 – it is not only ‘en vogue’ but the norm to simply copy-paste such conclusions from the social media instead of running (‘time-consuming’) first research: this is meanwhile the ‘widely accepted truth, truth, and nothing but the truth, so God help me’, within circles of Experten…
Unsurprising result is something like this: until this very day, whenever – for example – Western strategists are war-gaming different scenarios of the war in Ukraine, the VKS is ‘not involved’.
…where ‘war-gaming’ is meanwhile the principal way of ‘loudly thinking’ about what shall, for example, Washington or Brussels advise Kyiv to do…
Alternatively, no war-gaming is done at all, and then the people who are even more poorly advised are concluding that the War in Ukraine is ‘unwinnable’ (for Ukraine and its ‘Western allies’), that ‘millions are killed’ (‘every day’), that billions actually spent in the USA have been ‘wasted’, and that ‘this must stop, no matter the cost of stopping’…
Further down the chain of command (in that ‘the West’), there are even more of wrong decisions – all still based on poor quality of reporting from Kyiv (i.e. from the GenStab-U). Is it then ‘surprising’ if, for example, yet another ZSU unit returns from months-long training in ‘the West’ without receiving even 2 minutes of training in operating and/or countering FPVs?
Of course it is not. If they are not properly advised how to train that ZSU units (by the GenStab-U), the ‘Western’ instructors have no reasons to train them in this or that way.
Even more so: because of poor quality of reporting by the GenStab-U, the Experten in ‘the West’ have concluded that the FPVs deployed in such huge numbers by both the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (VSRF) and the ZSU that they are dominating the battlefield, are ‘merely a cheap replacement for artillery ammunition’, which is a kind of problem ‘the West’ would never, ever experience, you know… Therefore, there is no need to teach anybody - any armed force - in ‘the West’ about such things and (except at the level of specific tactical units in the US armed forces), no need to equip, act and train correspondingly…
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UNDERESTIMATING THE OPPONENT
Another ‘classic’ effect of the military incompetence in Ukraine – within ranks of the ZSU – is to constantly declare the Russians for ‘stupid’. Indeed: ‘silly’, ‘ridiculous’, ‘crazy’ etc. Especially whenever the Russians – i.e. the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (VSRF) do ‘something new’, something unexpected, something surprising, this is first and promptly declared for ‘laughable’.
Much later on, and rather grudgingly, there follows the realisation… and then the admission that… well… ho-hum… ‘this’ or ‘that’ Russian manoeuvre, or tactical method, or operation… well… wasn’t stupid at all.
Sometimes, there is ‘even’ the conclusion that the operation in question was very smart, too.
Problem: within the ZSU, serious analysis of that ‘phenomena’ is run only at the level of brigade headquarters: not at the level of the GenStab-U, although that’s precisely the very reason for existence of that instance.
Correspondingly, every single brigade of the ZSU ‘has’ to learn its lessons on its own, instead of the entire force being well-informed, instead of experiences of all brigades being put to use already during the training of newly-mobilised troops (not to talk about newly-appointed officers).
With other words: if there is anything like ‘system ZSU’, then the one where the incompetence – be that the underestimation of the opponent, or incompetence in the way things are done at the level of strategic decision-making, in tactics, in every-day military life (and thus in combat operations, too) – is omni-present in both every-day military life, and in military sciences. It’s something that is lived – by members of the armed forces, and by the people advising them, no matter where.
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YOU FIGHT THE WAY YOU TRAIN
To make sure: if you think such incompetence is something like ‘reserved for state-controlled/owned organisations’, and then ‘in Ukraine, only’… sorry, then you’ve never worked, or at least never seriously analysed the work and function of major Western corporations. Because, the levels of institutional- and highly professional incompetence there, are outmatching everything else.
Therefore, yes: I do not only ‘hear’ voices complaining (often: bitterly) about my critique of incompetence at the top of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (ZSU), but I understand and take the people in question seriously. To make sure, and remove any doubts, yes, you’re right: there is lots of incompetence in, for example, NATO (and elsewhere), too.
The problem is: contrary to Ukraine, contrary to the ZSU, the ‘West’ – NATO-members in particular – has the luxury of being able to ignore their own arrogance, ignorance, and incompetence. They’re not directly involved in this war, and their people do not get killed by dozens, every day. Unlike Ukrainians, unlike the ZSU, the West is not facing a war of extermination, and thus feels no urgency to sort out all the incompetence. Nor has the opportunity to let the war sort out the incompetence. On the contrary: right now, multiple our governments, or at least specific political parties, are praised and re-elected for their incompetence.
Point is: whether in ‘every-day life’, in economy, in politics, or in the armed forces, you ‘fight the way you train’. Which means that if you’ve been trained well, you’re going to fight well, too. But, also the other way around. However, while I can understand if it’s meanwhile the norm for politicians to start their job without any kind of training at all… well, in an armed force at war, this must, finally, stop.
Otherwise, one is automatically ending at the Russian level.
Is that the example the Ukrainians - not to talk about ‘the West’ - want-, or should strive to follow?
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(…to be continued…)
Warning: This comment exceeds 160 characters. Only suitable for people who can read and fully comprehend written text exceeding 160 characters. Also, to all aspiring English grammar teachers reading this, I don't care if my comment structure doesn't suite your reading preferences. This is my comment, so my writing style preferences apply.
As a frontline military practitioner, I spent more than a decade in various conflicts in Africa serving various different masters. Looking back at my career when I was still a bigger idiot than I am now, I can only say that whatever my contributions were in any conflict spanning my whole career, and whatever the extent of personal losses and suffering I sustained during those phases of my life, I can confirm without any doubt that everything I ever did was for nothing other than testing and improving my own skills and experience mainly thanks to the idiocratic processes governing modern day politics. However, there are two major lessons I learnt from my military experience in Africa, namely:
* Lesson 1: When things continuously remain dysfunctional, it is being managed to remain dysfunctional; and
* Lesson 2: In Africa, never a good deed will remain unpunished.
So, looking at the situation in Ukraine, I speak from a perspective being experienced in working with Ukrainians, Russian-Ukrainians (yes boys and girls, this is actually a thing), and Russians. Now, just to be clear, I am still a supporter of the Ukrainian effort, although it does come with caveats, some of it well explained by Tom. That said, in my last comment on one of Tom's articles I stated that sometimes I tend to disagree with some of Tom's commentary. Just to clarify that point, I tend to agree with his military analysis which is mostly exceptionally accurate, but I also tend to disagree with some of his political analysis simply because we have different experiences in terms of translating political strategy into military strategy ('military incompetence' and 'political incompetence' terms snd conditions apply). In relation to the recent articles about Military Incompetence, in my experience it is something that started becoming an issue around the mid-1990's after the [supposed] end of the Cold War, and it was then when it started to become professionalized and institutionalized leading to the great dysfunctions we see now in most Western and Western aligned militaries. However, that is not my point of discussion in this comment. My subject of discussion is my experience with working with Ukraine during my career prior to the Russo-Ukraine War.
My initial experience with Ukrainians in military operations was in central Africa (not CAR, but refering to the region consisting of a cluster of countries still engaged in low-intensity warfare to this day, some still being at war since independence more than 6 decades ago), starting around the turn of the millenium. During those days Ukrainians in Africa were famous for only two things, namely:
* 1: Gun running (with occasional 'humanitarian aid' assistance); and
* 2: Best sources for good unadultered (as in not produced in Africa under questionable conditions containing lethal toxins) alcohol at very affordable prices.
During this same period I also had the fortune of working with Russian airborne forces. To summarize the differences between these two historical Soviet allies as a non-Soviet, the Ukrainians were highly skilled at avoiding direct engagement in any fights, which included the Mi-24 Hind crews who sometimes had to provide CAS, but always failed to arrive at the party on time. The Russians, on the other hand, were always dependable when it came to a fight, why the Russians until now are more favored in Africa simply due to their willingness to get down and dirty when needed to. From a corruption perspective, Russians were less corrupt than the Ukrainians (not saying Russians weren't corrupt, just that they were less corrupt under the same circumstances).
So, fast forward a few years after 2 years of jungle operations in central Africa, I moved on in life to do God's work in support of USF-I in Iraq. Interesting facts about that war was that just a few years prior to the US-led invasion, Ukraine secretly sold modernized air defense systems to a UN sanctioned Iraq against the wishes of the US government [Rep]. Also, prior to the US-led invasion, Russia shared much intelligence about Iraq with the US, even though Russian public media strategy 'opposed' the US-led invasion. Come 2005, the unit I was attached to was hastily deployed to an old [and nearly forgotten] Iraqi Army ammo depot located close to the town of Hatra, also conveniently located about 50 km from an abandoned Iraqi Air Force base located close to the town of Al Qayyarah. The purpose of this mission was to secure the [still stocked] ammo depot, and to take control of the abandoned air base until arrival of reinforcements. Why? Well, in the aftermath of the failed defense of Al Kut during 2004 by the Ukrainian contingent (as integrated under the control of Polish forces in support of MNC-I), someone in USF-I decided it would be a good idea to remove the Ukrainian contingent from frontline operations and rather reassign them to protection tasks in outlying areas. This specific ammo depot containing primarily artillery munitions was one of those locations 'of lesser immediate importance'. Problem is, when the Ukrainian unit commander saw what was inside the ammo shelters, 'For the love of money' by The O'Jays probably played in his mind. Shortly after this site was under Ukrainian control, MNC-I started tracking unauthorized civilian flights landing at the abandoned Iraqi Air Base, later to be confirmed to be part of the infamous Viktor B's global arms exports network. Also, around the same time, MNC-I faced greater frequency of IED attacks involving artillery munitions on the MSR leading to Mosul. So, short story is that the Ukrainians were quite good entrepreneurs selling off the ex Iraqi Army ammunition stocks to whoever was in the market for buying. Needless to say, this drastically fast tracked the Ukrainian withdrawal from Iraq, also creating much disgust and frustration amongst the US Coalition Forces.
So yes, in my opinion based on what I have witnessed and experienced in Ukraine until now, Ukrainian institutional corruption is currently Russia's greatest asset in its war against Ukraine. This is one of the reasons why the US gov [Rep] is not too keen on continuing military aid to Ukraine to avoid US arms becoming the stockpiles for future Viktor B 2.0 alikes from supplying US technology to its enemies, even if most of it is considered outdated compared to current US milspecs.
Bottomline: If a system remains corrupt without any effective change, it is managed to remain corrupt.
Concerning your scenario about Unit A and Unit B expending drones. This is idiocy Ukraine inherited from NATO. Here's essentially the same scenario, but in Afghanistan:
Region A had 100 IED and TIC incidents this month. Region B had 500. Therefore, we're "winning" in Region A and need to send more resources to Region B.
That's literally how they were trying to measure success in Afghanistan and I'm not even exaggerating.