Israel/Palestine, 13 October 2023: Peace through kinetic Solutions

Hello everybody!

In the light of experiences with ‘reactions’ to my assessments of the last few days, I feel forced to introduce ‘special rules’ for my blog. Up front: I’ll remain on the cool and factual side, and try to focus on geo-strategic- and military issues.

If you want open favouritism and journalism, please, be so kind and go to the mainstream media. Your favourite propaganda department – which ever it might be – is on the other side of the town (not only ‘not in this building’), from here; and if anybody considers my work for something like ‘pissing on his/her leg’: sorry to disappoint, fact is I’m relieving myself in my restroom only. Foremost: there are more than enough opportunities to deny the facts and reality, escape into the world of fantasies, express racism and intolerance, warmonger, or dump garbage - somewhere else. With other words: there will be no more warnings in regards of personal attacks, trolling, or proven inability to communicate. Just instant bans.

M117-armed F-16I of the IASF.

Authorities & Social Media

The X/Twitter seems to have removed hundreds of accounts ‘associated with terrorists’. Apparently, acting along the recently adopted EU law on digital services, the EU gave the social network 24 hours to remove ‘all illegal content and misinformation about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict’, or face extensive fines. It is likely that something similar is going to happen to a number of other social media platforms.

By side the fact that the EU did nothing of that kind in regards of thousands of Putin-fans or Assadists, or right-wing extremism that is gaining all over this continent, just for example, and that thus we’re once again experiencing the – meanwhile – short-sighted, ill-advised, though usual application of double standards by our glorious politicians. Point is that while this might appear as a ‘simple solution’, ‘popular’ and thus ‘opportune’ at the political levels, even in ‘improving public security’, except for deletion of massive volumes of useless nonsense, it is resulting in the loss of approach to the few sources of serious information regarding capabilities and intentions of specific organisations, too (yes, so also terrorism). It is also resulting in the right-wing extremists feeling confirmed: ‘we’ve told you so, all the time’ – even more so if their messages from recent weeks, months, and years, are now becoming ‘mainstream’ in the politics and the media.

File for the records…

Another concern is that this is another limitation for the ability of Palestinians that are not involved in terrorism, to be heard.

On 7 October this year, we’ve been demonstrated, in most obscene fashion, what are (at least) 18 (if not 100+) years of such behaviour causing: back in 2001-2021, we’ve seen where is such politics leading, too – in Afghanistan and in Iraq… resulting in the emergence of the Daesh.

Apparently, nobody learned anything at all from that.

(On the lighter side: have received a call from the PR-department of the top Austrian daily, yesterday, with the offer to have a subscription for six months at an attractive price. Have politely turned down, explaining that the paper in question is not even offering ‘journalism’ any more. The caller concluded he’s hearing ‘exactly the same from almost every customer’. Think, this is speaking volumes for what are our politics and the media doing, and what kind of ‘quality’ are they… producing.)

Iran Factor

In the public, there is still an endless stream of guessing about ‘Iran’s involvement’. Even by some of most serious sources. Most of such content is somewhere along the line (this is ‘very compressed version’), ‘Iran ordered this and now lost one of its two major allies’ (except for Hamas, the other would be Hezbollah). I’m calling it ‘guessing’ because, as far as I can say, it is nothing else.

Firstly, while there is no doubt that Tehran is one of primary supporters of Hamas – especially in regards of funding and arms – there is no evidence for Iran’s involvement in this attack. This was repeatedly confirmed by both Israeli and US officials.

Secondly, there is, as of yet, no evidence for something like wholesale destruction of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. On the contrary, there is plenty of evidence that the Israelis are ‘shooting around themselves like mad’. Thus, if the aim of this Israeli operation is something like ‘complete eradication of Hamas’, so far, it is a complete failure. Consequently, anybody claiming Hamas is already destroyed, or about to be destroyed, has no evidence to support such statements – which in turn, and from my point of view, is discrediting the qualification of the people in question to gauge the level of Iran’s involvement.

Thirdly, while Hezbollah in Lebanon might have been an ‘ally’ of Iran at earlier times, at least since 2011, it is ‘little else than an extension’, a ‘sub-unit’ of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps – Qods Force (IRGC-QF; that’s the ‘foreign operations department of the IRGC’). And the IRGC is ‘everything’ in Iran: positioned as ‘acting in the name of God’ and thus above the law, it’s controlling the government, and all aspects of economy and public life.

Thanks to the West letting Iran do what it likes in Syria and similar places, nowadays, Hezbollah is not only consisting of a mix of Iranian, Iraqi, Lebanese, Syrian, Afghan, even Pakistani nationals, or following exactly the same religious ideology like the IRGC/IRGC-QF (see: Twelver Shia), but is directly subordinated to the IRGC-QF, and thus to the very ‘Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution’ (see ‘Ayatollah’ Khamenei), in Tehran. This is so in religious, political, and operational sense and so much so, that meanwhile there is no difference between ‘Hezbollah/Lebanon’, ‘Hezbollah/Syria’, and ‘Hezbollah/Iraq’ – even if the former two and the latter one (‘Kataib Hezbollah’) are, at least officially, wearing different names.

(You know ‘what’s the time’ about IRGC/IRGC-QF’s designs and their way of thinking for this entire area, when the former founder of Hezbollah, Shi’a cleric Subhi at-Tufayli, is complaining ‘his’ organisation is now little else but serving hegemonic ambitions of Iran, while surviving ideologists of the IRGC have declared Syria for Iran’s 27^th province.)

Hamas is nothing of this.

It’s ideology is that of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (second most militant Sunni Islam sect, right after Wahhabism). Foremost: Tehran – i.e. the IRGC-QF – is exercising no operational control over it.

Hope, this might have satisfied your curiosity.

Combat Operations in the Gaza Strip

Since the morning of 10 October, the IDF seems to have forced Palestinian terrorists back within the Gaza Strip and to have re-sealed the fence. Subsequently, it declared a combat zone around 10-15km around the strip. Mobilisation of the Israeli armed forces is meanwhile complete: it should have included 360,00 reservists and brought the total of troops under arms to more than 500,000.

As far as I know, the Israel Air-Space Force (IASF) reported to have struck 429 targets in the Gaza Strip from 7 to 8 October; and 500 targets from 8 to 9 October…haven’t found any figures for the last few days, though. Similarly, trying to cross-check what exactly is the IASF bombing on basis of its own reports and maps… sorry, this is not making much sense to me….

The IASF is claiming to have dropped 6,000 bombs so far (more than during the Lebanon War of 2006), but a growing number of these is such old stuff like M117s (general purpose bombs calibre 375kg, designed back in the late 1940s).

As about precision of all these air strikes: yesterday, the IASF claimed attacks on Nuqba Force command centres, residences of senior Hamas naval operative (would be the Nuqba Force), a storage site for (unspecified) weapons…’ Haven’t heard about anybody from the Nuqba Force getting killed (Hamas is proudly reporting any of its ‘martyrs’, for years already). The rest…. Well, before I get arrested or banned from the internet for ‘terror propaganda’, or ‘anti-Semitism’, gauge from these photographs on your own:

Both Hamas and PIJ are still firing rockets at Israel - even overwhelming the Israeli air defences, time and again. Mostly at settlements north of the Gaza Strip (which, usually, means their longer-ranged weapons are either exhausted or knocked out). However, I’m not sure how many: apparently, the same figure - ‘over 5,000 rockets so far’ - has been repeated yesterday, as on the second day of this ‘round’.

Outlooks

As far as I can say, de-facto all analysts of this conflict are certain that Israel is going to launch a ground offensive into the Gaza Strip. They’re only not sure when.

I’m not making any kind of predictions, but because there are so many questions, lets try to guess a ‘what if’.

1.)    Through combination of several different of ‘latest’ Israeli assessments I was able to find online the last few days, as of around 6 October, the armed opposition inside the Gaza Strip was composed of something like:

-          40,000 Hamas

-          15,000 PIJ

-          10,000 terrorists in other armed groups.

Hamas military wing – which is enjoying wide freedom of decision-making and thus in operations – is named Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades (CO is Mohammed Deif). Colloquially: ‘Qassam Brigades’. This is consisting of six units named ‘brigades’, which seem to be organised on territorial basis, and an ‘elite’ outfit: the latter is the Nuqba Force (there’s no ‘k’ in Arabic), trained in ambushes, raids, infiltration, but also armed with anti-tank guided missiles and sniper rifles.

Except for rockets (one of numerous detailed studies of these can be found here) and drones (of which the later remain relatively few in numbers), heaviest armament is consisting of Russian-made 9M133 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan) and 9M113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel) anti-tank guided missiles, and North Korean version of the Russian 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot). It is operating MANPADs like 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7B), 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse), and – reportedly – few 9K38 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch). Otherwise, it is primarily a light infantry force, supported by relatively few snipers, heavy machine guns and mortars.

The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is a direct-off-shot of the Muslim Brotherhood, but slightly stronger-influenced by Tehran than Hamas. PIJ’s military wing is named al-Qods Brigades (also ‘Saraya’), and armed in similar fashion like Hamas, but significantly smaller in numbers.

Other terrorist organisations in the Gaza Strip are including the Daesh (IS/ISIS/ISIL/IGIL; in form of the Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade, which is at odds with Hamas); Jund Ansar Allah and Tawhid Wal-Jihad fi Filistin, and Popular Resistance Committees (affiliated with Hezbollah) of which I haven’t heard in years. All are lightly armed (see assault rifles, machine guns, some explosives).

2.)    Yes, the IASF is claiming massive volumes of hits on selected targets in the Gaza Strip, and these to have ‘killed hundreds of terrorists’, but: so far, there was very little of that to see. AFAIK, only two of something like ‘higher Hezbollah officials’ and few members of their families have been killed. For an operation said to be ‘designed to eradicate Hamas’ (feel free to insert whatever ‘correcter’ expression for ‘eradicate’ you might know, or find more suitable), I do not find this particularly promising.

Through its current ‘tactics’, the IASF is on the best way of creating lots of unpredictable hideouts for Palestinian terrorists inside the Gaza Strip.

Another M117 on an F-16I, here with the name of an IDF officer killed by Hamas on 7 October.

3.)    Gauging by the performance of IDF’s ground troops during the terror attack on 7 October, I’m not really sure if Israelis really want to go fighting a big operation with their armed forces in their current condition. For example, combat operations during that attack have revealed that the troops in regular units (mass are draftees) are not trained to think and act independently, without specific orders of their commanders. This in turn means that except in special forces formations, there is not enough flexibility to constantly adapt to such a complex operational environment like ‘urban combat’ (where this is relative considering the extent of the damage meanwhile caused to the built-up areas of the Gaza by six days of Israeli aerial bombardment: ‘Moonscape’ would be better analogy). Is the IDF capable of solving such, fundamental problems in a matter of days?

No idea: mind, I’m no specialist in Israeli armed forces. If at all, I would describe myself as good at what used to be termed as ‘OPFOR’, back in the 1980s - but is happily misinterpreted into ‘terrorist buddy’ by all the possible primitives since around 2001…

4.)    Gauging by what meanwhile appear to be ‘standard procedures’ for such operations – whether in Israel, in Syria, in Afghanistan or Iraq, one must expect the Israelis to warn the population of a certain area, give it an ultimatum the leave the same within so-and-so many hours/days, and then declare the area for a ‘fire-free zone’ – irrespectively of whether the civilians inside knew of the warning and/or had the chance and the means to leave. And then everybody inside the area in question is going to be declared for ‘free game’. We’ve seen the Russians doing that in Syria of 2015-2017; we’ve seen the Americans doing this in Syria of the same period….I’m not even going to mention all the earlier examples (they’re going into dozens): after the last six days, I do not see any reasons why would the Israelis act any other way.

5.)    Gauging by IDF’s operations under similar circumstances over the last, say, ’40 or so’ years, if it launches a ground attack, one must expect it to split the Gaza Strip into multiple sectors, then advance down selected routes before encircling/cordoning off/besieging smaller areas, subjecting these to massive volumes of firepower, and then, cautiously assaulting and mopping up, one after the other. This is the typical tactical procedure for such operations, and the only thing to add is that we’ve seen this at least since Israeli operations in southern Lebanon of the mid-1970s. Whether back then, or nowadays, we must expect the IDF to ‘search for peace through kinetic solutions’. See: the Israelis to bomb, shell and blow away any kind of obstacles or opposition in their way, regardless of consequences. I see no reason to expect they are going to act any other way now.

6.)    What can be expected from Hamas, PIJ, and other terrorist organisations in the Gaza Strip: to fight back, ‘to the last drop of blood’. They’re have already de-centralised their organisation an scattered their units into small groups and are now sitting in their hideouts and waiting for the Israelis to make their next move. Generally, extremist or not, one can expect - whether ‘Palestinians’ or ‘Arabs’ - to fight for Palestine until the last one is around. Anybody thinking something else is, from my point of view, naive.

7.)    Is Iran going to get involved? Gauging by developments so far, only if Israel – openly, and in big style - attacks the Hezbollah/IRGC-QF conglomerate in Lebanon-Syria. Otherwise, ‘Iran’s’ involvement is going to remain extremely limited (see: limited to symbolic actions, like sporadic mortaring or occasional ‘rocket or two’ into northern Israel). Indeed, Israeli air strikes on ‘Hezbollah/IRGC-bases’ in the Damascus area, from yesterday early morning, have prompted only minor reactions from that corner.

8.)    Can the USA help Israel by striking the Hezbollah/IRGC-conglomerate in Lebanon and Syria? The first thing coming to my mind whenever I hear such a question is, ‘good luck with trying’.
But OK. Let say…. if Washington…correction: if Tel Aviv is keen on causing a major war, it’s certainly going to ‘influence’ Washington into doing something of that kind. Sure, Washington is going to faithfully follow any such ‘advice’ (not to say ‘order’). However, in such case, the deployment of two aircraft carriers to the Eastern Mediterranean (and a squadron of Fairchild A-10 Thunderbolt II fighter-bombers) is far too little: thanks to Western ignorance, and despite on/off Israeli bombardment, the Hezbollah/IRGC-conglomerate has had 12 years to build-up, expand, and fortify their infrastructure in Lebanon and Syria. Foremost: while Israel and USA can cause lots of material damage, kill lots of Hezbollah/IRGC-operatives, they would experience massive problems in coordination if trying to deploy their forces in a joint operation – because the Israelis would try to assume direct command the US armed forces, just for example. Moreover, the USA and Israel cannot decisively defeat Iran any more (in sense of pushing the IRGC-QF back to within Iran’s borders and destroying its influence all over Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq). That chance passed some 20 years ago (actually, already earlier, but that’s another story) - for always the same reason: because nobody offered the people joining the Hezbollah/IRGC-conglomerate any kind of alternatives.

Finally, please mind: one can’t kill ideas – especially not through violence, intolerance, persistent injustice, and complete denial of outlooks. Otherwise, there would be no – especially no growing and ever-more-extreme - resistance to Western imperialism in/and the control of the Middle East already since sometimes between the spring and the autumn of 1920.

….with other words: yes, after 105 years, our ‘Western Civilisation’ has ‘advanced’ so much, it made such giant leaps forward that in regards of the Middle East, our politics can best be summarised with this photograph of the Royal Air Force’s fighter-bombers exercising ‘air policing’ of Iraq of the 1920s….