Indian (and Pakistani) Military Etiquette

Hello everybody!

As those following me since a bit longer know, I’m a weirdo. And so, in my studies of contemporary warfare, I’m kind of obsessed with differentiating between three thingies I consider for ‘crucial aspects of armed conflicts’.

• First is the public perception. This is something like what 92-95% of people ‘following’ or ‘monitoring’ developments in one or another armed conflict care about: essentially, people in question are either completely ignoring, not really interested, or only interested in what the politicians say, what the media quotes from political statements and reports. That’s how such indoctrinations are coming into being like that Pakistan is ‘most-important non-NATO ally’, ‘a trustworthy, cordial and faithful ally of the West’, that India is (quote from one of readers) ‘deranged Muppets… friendly with Russia’, and similar. Hand on heart: this part is entirely irrelevant for me. At most I might pay attention about actual political decision-making in order to figure out the backgrounds and context of the conflict in question.

• Second is the military perception. This is something about which less than 2% of people care about; and if, then mostly ‘rather quietly’. Arguably, that’s something about which it’s extremely hard to get solid info about. In most of cases, researching this topic starts some 2, 5, 12 or more months after something happens and at least as often lasts a similar amount of years.

• Third is military realities. This is a set of thingies called ‘capabilities and intentions’ about which only another 1-2% of people seriously care - even if up to 20-30% of people are…erm… ‘skillfully’ and ‘elloquently’ discussing in the social media. The essence of ‘capabilities and intentions’ appears relatively simple: it is how is what armed force trained and organised, how is it indoctrinated, what kind of equipment is it operating, what is it intending to do in the Case A, B, C, D, E or else, and what is it actually doing. That’s what I’m focusing upon.

….and: no, I do not consider myself an ‘elitist’ because I’m thinking and acting this way. My point of view is that it’s simply so that some people focus on being medical doctors, or lawyers, or TV-presenters, or just working 9-5 in some office and then going home, or farming their land, taking care of their chicken or else. I happen to be spending most of my life with studying military realities of ongoging and recent wars.

Hope, you can follow this far. It would be nice if you can, because it would help understand a lot of the following.

***

As next, let me ease your worries, dear Ukrainains and Ukraine-fans: yes, the last two-three days, I am keeping an eye on the Ukrainian military intelligence and armed forces using attack-UAVs and long-range land-attack missiles to, literally, ‘drill’ a ‘corridor’ through the belt of Russian integrated air defence system (IADS) along the border between the Sumy and Kursk Oblasts. Yes, have noticed that a number of Russian early warning/surveillance radars and air defence systems (I’ll not write ‘scores’: my Russian readers might feel offended) were knocked out - which is making it ever more likely ‘something might happen’… for example, sometimes like tomorrow, perhaps during Pudding’s favourite parade on the Red Square… or somewhere else… who can say…

‘Russian landscape with a burning Buk M2 SAM-System’ (Unknown Ukrainian artist, early 2025).

But, until it’s so far, my other eye remains glued to the Indo-Pakistani Telenovela.

By all the tragedies every single armed conflict is causing, that one is - presently - ‘slightly more fun to watch’. Primarily thanks to the incompetence of some of top generals involved.

Completely understanding that might require keeping in mind the latter two aspects (or factors) of warfare I’ve mentioned at the start: those about military perceptions, and military realities.

***

You see, for decades already, there is something like ‘unwritten rule’… actually: perhaps it’s even written, in one or another of so many cease-fire agreements, but I simply do not know or do not recall this any more… whatever… the point is that there was at least ‘something like unwritten rule’ that the armed forces of India and Pakistan ‘can-’, are ‘sort of permitted to-’ shoot at each other over the ‘Line of Control’ (LOC) separating the India-controlled Jammu & Kashmir (IOJK) from Pakistan-controlled Jammu & Kashmir (POJK). ‘But’, please, they should both be so kind not to shoot at each other over the international border anywhere further south.

Similarly, when Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) deploys another of its proxies - one of about a dozen of quasi-Islamic jihadist terror gangs it is funding, organising, training, and commanding already for decades - into yet another terror attack in India, and whether that’s in New Delhi, in Mumbai, or in the IOJK, and kills scores of civilians and Indian police officers, then that’s ‘kind of OK’.

But, if India then ‘dares’ shooting into Pakistan, ‘that’s not OK’.

The funny element about this is that nobody is more obsessed with such rules - with the resulting ‘military etiquette’ - but the top brass of the Indian armed forces in New Delhi. Kind of, <strong Indian accent> ‘But, Sir: we can’t shoot at Pakistani Armed Forces. That would mean a war.’</end of strong Indian accent>

And so, when that top brass of the Indian Armed Forces then receives the order from Prime Minister Modi to ‘act along military requirements’ - theoretically, this means they have a free hand to act as they like - they act in a…erm… lets describe it in following fashion: they act in what they perceive as perfectly professional-, yet appears to us as ‘ultimatly incompetent’ fashion.

What am I talking about?

You see… as usually when it comes to such political orders like Modi’s, there’s always the ‘fine print’, somewhere down, at the bottom of the page. In this case, I guess that the same must’ve read that when retaliating for yet another ISI-instigated terror attack on India (something like 120th since 2008), the Armed Forces of India were not to retaliate against the Armed Forces of Pakistan (although the top brass of the same is making the core of the ISI), but to target terror-camps only.

Alternativelly - i.e., if this was not the case, if Modi did not impose any such limitations upon the Indian Armed Forces - then the top brass of the Indian Armed Forces are really top-notch-, schoolar example for military incompetents.

One way or the other, at least to me, the top brass of the Indian Armed Forces is ‘renowned’ for several very specific characteristics. Two of these are their insistences on a) traditions and b) procedures. In this regards, they’re as smooth as a mirror. I’ve mentioned one of procedures above: that’s that with the ‘military etiquette’. In regards of their traditions, they’re insistent on doing their utmost to avoid making any kind of mistakes (even when that measn they’re doing nothing at all), and the second is that they’re always ‘re-fighting the last war’. Correspondingly, and between others, one can’t expect the Indian Armed Forces to now (de-facto) start a new war by doing something new. Something that would surprise their arch enemy.

You’re not sure what’s on my mind?

No problem. Let me try it with one or another example, for your easier understanding.

If, in February 2019, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) proved perfectly capable of jamming radio communications of Indian Air Force (IAF), then by 2025 the top bass of the Indian Armed Forces is only going to take care to buy new (frequency-hopping and encrypted) radios for the IAF. But, they’ll not come to the idea to develop similar electronic warfare capabilities like the PAF had already back then, too. Similarly, if in February 2019, the PAF proved as having longer-ranged air-to-air missiles, then, six years later, the top bass of the Indian Armed Forces is only going to take care to arm IAF with similar-ranged air-to-air missiles, but not with longer-ranged air-to-air missiles.

…whether because one can’t be that unkind to the enemy, or it’s a tradition not to do that kind of things, or because the buerocracy in New Delhi is taking literal 20-35 years to bring one decision regarding any new acquisitions for the IAF… or for any of 3,859 other excuses that are going to come to minds of top Indian military- and political decision-makers… and the majority of 1,4 billion of Indian citizens, all sternously convinced that anybody expressing critique about such behaviour and traditions of the top brass of the Indian Armed Forces is either a ‘nest fouler’ (if an Indian), or a ‘racist’ (if non-Indian).

***

That’s something like ‘fundamental military perceptions’ for this conflict. Now, the question is how’s that ‘converted’ into military realities?

One might argue that a ‘normal-’ or ‘well-established procedure’ for an operation like the IAF run early on 7 May would be for the IAF to first clear the skies of the PAF (i.e. target and shot down Pakistani interceptors that are already airborne), then smash the Pakistani ground based air defences, before targeting terror camps (whether in the POJK, or in the POJK and in Pakistan).

But… you see, because Modi has ‘given a free hand’ to the Indian Armed Forces to retaliate for that terror attack massacring 26 civilians in the IOJK, and because they ‘can’t shoot at the Pakistani Armed Forces, because that would mean a war’, yet they are ah-so-very-much professional, too, the top brass of the Indian Armed Forces selected 9 terror-training camps in the POJK and in Pakistan as targets, and ordered attacks on these only.

Precisely how many and what kind of aircraft were involved remains unknown. The Indians wouldn’t say. What is known is how many impacts were reported by the local Pakistanis. Summarised on a map, that’s looking like this:

Reportedly, SCALP air-launched land-attack missiles were deployed as first, followed by a number of ASM-250 HAMMERs; later on, it turned out the IAF has (at least attempted to) deployed Brahmos (or ‘BrahMos’) hypersonic land-attack missiles, too.

Principal targets was a number of Madrassas: religious schools (usually mosques) in which the ISI is indoctrinating jihadists of different of its proxies. The majority of weapons hit home (seems, two have missed), killing at least five of ISI’s top jihadists, plus scores of others.

That is the ‘actual essence’ of this entire affair.

Pakistan unleashed yet another terror attack upon India, India hit back upon the terror infrastructure of Pakistan. ‘Terror & Response’.

As explained yesterday, official Islamabad is becrying 26 (other sources say over 40), ‘primarily young women and women and children’; more than 45 were wounded. One is thus left to wonder how comes so many officers of the Pakistani Army (and, almost certainly: officers of the Pakistani Army detached to the ISI) have then attended a number of resulting funerals (and then: funerals for ISI’s top jihadists) - like the following one, yesterday?

That much is, more or less, ‘undisputed’.

***

…and, as sad as one can only get about all the innocent lives lost, it would’ve been so nice if it ended at that. It didn’t. For a number of reasons.

Meanwhile, the incompetence at the top in New Delhi is reaching such proportions that India has lost the control of the public narrative: instead of everybody discussing Pakistan’s breeding of jihadis all over the globe (at least from Nigeria to the Philippines), the talk is now about how many and what of IAF jets were shot down. Worst of all: both the official New Delhi, and much of the public of India then began also a sort of clamp-down on any Indians attempting to publish related figures and evidence, too.

And now, the debate is, de-facto, in Pakistan’s favour: raging about what happened already during-, and/or immediately after the IAF air strikes. NOT about the reasons for the air strike. That’s like when, for example, people are blaming Ukraine for invading Russia…

***

What went wrong?

Firstly, and as indicated above, and for reasons described above, the IAF didn’t start with hitting PAF interceptors that were already airborne, nor the Pakistani ground-based air defences. It limited itself to terror-camps only.

This left the PAF free to react - and it certainly reacted promptly. According to the super-secret CNN French intelligence, up to 125 fighter-interceptors of the two air forces were airborne and they then ‘fought the largest “dogfight” (sic) of our times’. Actually…

Well, as first: the IAF strike was no surprise. It was announced days in advance. Therefore, the PAF vigorously patrolled its airspace, ready for combat. Unless it’s the most unprofessional air force imaginable, the IAF must’ve known this when launching its fighter-bombers. Obviously, the majority of involved Indian jets successfully released their weapons and came away unscatched. But, at least one, more likely two, didn’t manage that.

The reason is that not only were PAF interceptors airborne, but also the aircraft of this type:

That’s a Saab 2000 airborne early warning and control system (AWACS). Essentially, a stretched variant of the (Swedish-made) Saab 340 Erieye, as recently delivered to Ukraine, equipped with an improved variant of the same (Ericsson-made) Erieye radar:

Now, to make things more interesting: over a decade ago, Ericsson sold Erieye radars to the People’s Republic of China, too - and the Chinese eventually installed it on their KJ-200 AWACS:

This fact might appear ‘unimportant’, even ‘off topic’, but wait: the Chinese have not only ‘further developed’ the Erieye, but also made it compatible with their PL-15 long-range air-to-air missiles - which, eventually, were sold to Pakistan, together with such interceptors like J-10C…

The PL-15E is the ‘long white, pointed missile under the inboard underwing pylon of this J-10C of the PAF.

…and JF-17Cs:

PL-15 under the left outboard pylon of a Pakistani JF-17C

Foremost, PL-15 not only has a max claimed range of 150-200km, but, it is capable of ‘cooperative targeting’. Means: while fired by a J-10C and/or JF-17C, it can be guided into the target by the Saab 2000 AWACS.

‘Problem’ (for the IAF): detecting such attacks is extremely problematic. Sure, the radar homing and warning systems installed on IAF fighter-bombers - including the very advanced Spectre system on IAF’s Rafales - were detecting emissions from the Saab 2000. But, these emissions do not ‘automatically’ mean that they are under attack. Usually, the ‘best’ warning of an attack by active- or semi-active radar homing missiles comes from the radar of the launching fighter jet. However, in the case of cooperative targeting, there is no such warning whatsoever. Or if, then only once weapons like PL-15E switch to their terminal flight phase, and activate their on-board radars.

Means: the involved IAF fighter-pilots were ‘double-suprised’. Firstly because the Pakistanis have opened fire into the Indian airspace, and then because they did so without any kind of electronic warning.

It’s unknown how many PL-15Es - perhaps some other air-to-air missiles, like AIM-120C-5/7 fired by PAF F-16s? - have the Pakistanis released. But, it’s likely that their number went into ‘something like a dozen’. Certain is that at least two of these crashed well inside India (reportedly: some 100km east of the border), as obvious from this guidance section found by Indian Army troops:

From that point of view, the Indians were lucky not to lose at least as many jets.

Indeed, the official New Delhi was quick in reporting that ‘all pilots involved were accounted and safely back to base’. But, ‘all pilots’ does not mean ‘all aircraft’, too.

By now, it’s certain that the Pakistanis have shot down one Rafale EH (single-seater) of the IAF: serial number SB001. It crashed into a field outside Bathinda, killing one civilian and wounding nine others, on the ground…

Yes, that’s no fake, and no ‘photo from September 2024’: IAF lost no Rafale in September 2024 (but a MiG-29, in a training accident). Besides, the type of this jet was confirmed by the wreckage of its M88 engines, which came down nearby.

The loss of this Rafale came as quite some surprise for many: so much so, the mass of Indians is flatly refusing ‘to believe’, and declaring the related evidence for ‘fake’. However, considering the French were so kind to sell Rafales to Qatar, and in Qatar these are regularly flown by Pakistani pilots (because the diminutive Qatar Emiri Air Force was prmitted to buy itself dozens of F-15EQs, Rafales, and EF-2000 Typhoons, so its Emir can have political influence in ‘The West’… while his flying service is hopelessly short on pilots and other personnel that this is staffed by Americans, French, British… and Pakistanis)… well, no surprise if all their secrets are well known.

…not only to Pakistan, but to the People’s Republic of China, too…

At that point, one cannot but congratulate - for the wisedom and farsight - to the Dassault/Rafale International…

***

Another Indian jet - apparently one of Su-30MKIs - might have been shot down further north: it came down inside India and the locals say, ‘two crewmembers were picked by the Army’. That’s presently still not ‘100% confirmed’ (at least not for me).

In turn, the escorting IAF interceptors - reportedly - opened fire with their medium-range air-to-air missiles, and RUMINT has it have shot down one JF-17C, and one F-16 or another JF-17. Word is, at least one came down over India, and its pilot was captured, but if so: official New Delhi is (still) zip-lip about this affair.

***

Now, as mentioned yesterday, in grand total, the Pakistanis rushed to claim 5 IAF jets as shot down, including 3 Rafales, 1 Su-30MKI, and 1 MiG-29… What went a notch underreported was the find of the wreckage of two Brahmos (or BrahMos) hypersonic land-attack missiles:

Brahmos is a big, heavy, hypersonic (Mach 3+ capable) land-attack missile, deployable from Su-30MKI fighter-bombers of the IAF, only. It’s so big and heavy, that a single Su-30MKI can carry only one (usually under the centreline hardpoint, in between of engine intakes).

Now, what’s visible on the two photos above is said to be the ‘boosters’ from two different Brahmos: essentially, a booster is a can full of rocket fuel, used to accelerate a missile to its cruise speed. So, if these would be boosters, it would mean ‘the two missiles were fired, everything was OK’… However, the ‘pipes’ in question are some 5-6 metres long (at least). The entire Brahmos is about 8 metres long. It would be surprising if the booster is making 75% of the weapon - even more so if usually available diagrams of Brahmos are, actually, speaking quite clear language in that regards:

…which is making it more likely that these two Brahmos were, actually, jettisonned by Su-30MKis that were carrying them.

Why?

Because both missiles came down to the ground still with their protective nose-caps on them. These are semi-circular constructions, covering the intake, and are jettisoned only after the missile is released. This fact is obvious from - for example - this photo:

To make sure that’s the protective nose-cap of a Brahmos, see here a Brahmos missile as photographed during one of earlier test-releases from an Su-30MKI of the IAF:

…as can be seen (to the left), the cap is still in place even when the missile is released: it’s jettisoned milliseconds later, when the powerful ramjet activates (the booster of the Brahmos is so powerful, one can’t activate it directly on missile launch, otherwise the launching aircraft would be damaged… or worse).

Mind: one is jettisoning ordnance only when under an imminent and clear threat - like an incoming enemy air-to-air missile, just for example. That, in turn, would explain at least some of Pakistani claims (see: they’ve fired PL-15s at incoming Su-30MKIs, forcing them to jettison Brahmos; in turn, radar echoes of falling missiles might have convinced the Pakistanis they’ve shot down the Su-30MKIs in question).

What’s particularly interesting: the wreckage of the two Brahmos was found outside the place named Bhanuda Bidawatan, south-EAST of the Sirsa AB, where the Su-30MKI-equipped No. 15 Squadron is based - and about 150km EAST of the border to Pakistan…

Bottom line: this looks like if somebody took off from the Sirsa AB (or the Bikaner AB?), then got surprised by PL-15s while still turning in direction of Pakistan…

…and that is a reason more to ask a lots of questions about the ‘quality’ of IAF’s planning for this operation - and thus about the competence of its top brass.

***

Yet another reason to ask such questions is what happened after.

‘Not only’ that the PAF ‘violated’ that ‘agreement’ about ‘no shooting over the international border’ when opening fire at incoming and/or retreating IAF jets. But, In retaliation’ for the IAF strikes on terror camps, the last night (from 7 to 8 May), official Pakistan announced that it has attacked Indian air- and military bases in Awantipura, Srinagar, Jammu, Pathankot, Amritsar, Kapurthala, Jalandhar, Ludhiana, Adampur, Bhatinda, Chandigarh, Nal, Phalodi, Uttarlai, and Bhuj.

So far, haven’t found any kind of ‘evidence’ for some sort of damage on any of local military installations. Indeed, even the type of weapons deployed is unknown and I was ‘almost certain’ this was yet another Pakistani lie, until this morning (8 May) - the Indians ‘retaliated’ in form of attacks on (drums)… Pakistani air defences.

OK, OK… actually, they deployed the majority of their 150+ Israel-made Harop attack-UAVs, acquired since 2019, to strike the Pakistan Army HQ in Rawalpindi, plus HQ XXX Corps Pakistan Army in Gujranwala, and then (from north to south), air defence positions in Attar, Sialkot, Chakwal, Lahore, Bahawalpur, Miano, Chhar, and Karachi.

Sure, the Pakistanis claimed to have shot down 12 incoming Harops, but I think it’s obvious that was ‘not enough’. Unsurprisingly, the Indians claimed a complete destruction of a (Chinese-made) HQ-9 SAM-site in Lahore, just for example, plus few other SAM-sites and early warning radars (I’m still collecting related info).

Chinese-made HQ-9, something like ‘Chinese pendant to S-400’.

That said, for anybody with a little bit of clue about modern air warfare, conclusion is on hand: whether due to the incompetence of its political masters, or due to the incompetence of its top brass, the IAF ended up doing its job ‘upside down’. It first targeted terror-camps, then attacked Pakistani ground-based air defences… no surprise it had to pay price for that.

***

So, that was the ‘stand’ in this regards as of this noon-to-afternoon. Like every decent telenovela, the sequel is to follow.

…if not already this night, then at least whenever there is still somebody sane enough left in Islamabad - to figure out that the Indians have turned off the country’s water tap (see: Modi’s decision to put the Hindus Wate Treaty on hold). Arguably, Indians might get in trouble just while trying to find out what to do with all the water on hand, and Pakistan is unlikely to feel the consequences of that act before some 6-9 months from now… but, well: one should never say never.