India-Pakistan, Additional Details, Part 1
Hello everybody!
For the end of a very long and busy day, here a ‘comprehensive update’ of (foremost) the feature ‘Illusions and Realities of Cross-Border Incidents, Part 2’. It’s simply so that ever more info is appearing, and thus it’s good to keep us updated.
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Retaliation
For details on the Indian strike on nine terror camps in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, please see the excellent briefing here (including a map of sites in question, post-strike satellite imagery etc.).
Couldn’t do it better, so no point in trying.
Because this obviously remains so important to the Pakistanis (and ‘fans’ abroad), even if it is denied by official New Delhi, visual evidence became available for the Indian Air Force (IAF) losing a total of 3-4 fighters. Definitely confirmed remains only one: a Rafale EH (single-seater), serial number BS001. This came down outside Bathinda (Punjab), 90km from the border to Pakistan, killing one and wounding nine civilians on the ground. Also confirmed are a Mirage 2000I (an upgraded Mirage 2000H; see pylon with a MICA air-to-air missile), and a MIG-29UPG (see K-36 ejection seat).
…and at least one PAF JF-17C:
Q: Why is official New Delhi not confirming these losses? Isn’t this damaging India’s credibility?
How about a counter-question: why is official Islamabad not confirming its own losses? Isn’t that damaging Pakistan’s credibility?
But OK, lets discuss this.
At the first look, yes, this is damaging India’s credibility. Apparently at least, India has started this affair (it didn’t, but Pakistan and most of the Western public thinks that way). Moreover, in a conflict as hotly debated, as loaded as this one, it is always the wrong decision to hide the truth. However, the full consequences of this decision can be understood only when one takes the ‘big picture’ into account. India’s aim was to strike at nine terror camps. This – the Pakistan-instigated terror - is the actual topic of this affair, and not how many jets has the IAF lost in the process. On the contrary, and exactly like in February 2019, Pakistan (and allies, foremost the PR China, but also in the ‘Arab World’, and then some of ‘the West’) attempted to lift the public narrative, draw all attention away from these terror camps (and Pakistan’s complicity in regards of state-sponsored terrorism), and re-focus on these 3-4 downed IAF fighters.
Official New Delhi decided not to fall into this trap, but to impose its own public narrative.
Moreover, one should keep in mind that the Operation Sindoor is – at least officially – still going on (yes, until this very day). Nobody is revealing tactical details to the opponent as long as a military operation is going on. Why? Because the Indians do not want to let the Pakistanis figure out what of their defensive actions were ‘working’ and what not.
Bottom line: whether you or me like this or not, is absolutely irrelevant. Considering the consequences of what was to follow, this was the right decision on the part of New Delhi.
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Shield
On 7 May, Pakistan launched its ‘retaliation’ strikes within frame of the Operation Buyan Marsoos (Arabic for ‘a structure made of lead’). Principal weapons released were ‘hundreds’ of attack UAVs and artillery rockets (primarily Fateh-1).
This is where I’ve experienced my first surprise in this affair. I knew about the IAF’s Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) - the integrated air defence system (IADS) protecting India - since the 1990s. I knew it’s ‘advanced’ and operational since (at least) the 1990s, covering the country’s entire airspace (which, in the case of a country of this size, is a major success on its own). However, whether due to being preoccupied with other issues, or because of underreporting – and although outlining it in my earlier reports - I was not aware just how sophisticated the IACCS meanwhile became. Moreover, I was not aware of how well are the air defences of the Indian Army integrated into the IACCS, nor all the advances India made in regards of combating UAVs (not even about such of latest short-range air defence systems like Samar, essentially including launchers for two R-73 air-to-air missiles coupled with fire-control- and surveillance radars). And so, ‘boom’, literally: turned out, Indians not only have highly-sophisticated anti-UAV defences, but also have these available in sufficient numbers to cover all their major military installations, their ground units deployed in the field, and all the major urban centres. Few examples:
Except for hundreds of smaller attack UAVs (see earlier reporting), Indian air defences - reportedly - shot down ‘several Bayraktar’ (Turkish-made UAVs, ‘famous’ from clashes in Libya and Syria, for example), and ‘one Anca’ reconnaissance UAV (also of Turkish origin).
Of course, well-known Indian SAM-systems, like IAF’s Akash, Barak-8, and Spyder, Indian Army’s ZSU-23-4s and other weaponry, as well as electronic countermeasures bore the brunt of Indian defence operations: RUMINT has it, combined, all of them, plus what I’ve listed above, were shooting down over 90% of incoming Pakistani UAVs and artillery rockets. No doubt, some of Pakistani weapons did come through and have caused damage and casualties. However, that was not enough: the fact that Pakistan has failed to cause any kind of serious damage is what neutralised much of that country’s deterrence.
The ‘peak’ of the Operation Buyan Marsoos and the IACCS’ defensive operations took place at 02.00hrs of 10 May, when Pakistan launched one ballistic missile (reportedly: Fateh-2). While many in India have claimed that this targeted New Delhi, it was intercepted by S-400s over Sirsa (sorry, can’t find the video showing the intercept), where there is also a well-known air base of the IAF (Sirsa AB was not damaged).
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Sword
Meanwhile, New Delhi made fundamental – and crucially important – switch in its strategy. Instead of ‘just targeting terror camps’, it did what is logical (and, me thinks, should have been done right from the start in cases of this kind): it went ‘all out’.
When I say ‘all out’, I do not mean that India began wildly shooting all over Pakistan, but: the Indian armed forces began methodically and systematically disabling the Pakistan’s ability to defend.
For ceases of this kind, modern-day military strategy is envisaging something like ‘seven or nine circles of targeting’. I’ll keep it short and simple: India first sought to disable Pakistan’s IADS, then degrade the PAF’s ability to operate closer to the international border (and the Line of Control/LoC in Kashmir), and then sought to hit carefully selected points on carefully selected military facilities in Pakistan.
This is where the highly praised, widely reported IADS of the Pakistan Air Force should have played a decisive role. But, it didn’t. Instead, this was rapidly degraded. I’m cautious and intentionally saying ‘degraded’ instead of ‘destroyed’, because exact level of destruction remains unclear. Moreover, experience from my studies of earlier conflicts is that destroying such systems is, usually, impossible. They are so much hardened, have so many assets, so much built-in redundancy, that one can disturb the work of different of their elements, or knock out some of these – sometimes on temporary basis, other times for longer periods of time – but: not all of them at once. (Alternatively, one can cause their software to crash, like this regularly happened to the Russians in Syria, because the software of their IADS tended to crash if one or another element of the system was ‘suddenly disconnected’). But, completely destroying them for longer period of time… that’s extremely hard.
… except one deploys a nuke, of course…
…or it’s the Pakistani IADS.
What do I mean?
It appears that the PAF was slow – or at least experiencing significant problems – with integration of all of its US-made radars with Chinese-made radars and SAMs, and other components. This is a massive task, requiring extensive work on related software, and that’s often taking years to complete. So much so, the majority of bigger air forces around the world has experienced (often: is still experiencing) ‘endless’ problems with their modern, computer-supported IADS’. Especially when, like the PAF, they have to buy all of such systems from abroad. (The worst example coming to my mind was a US-designed IADS for Saudi Arabia of the 1980s… this wasn’t fully operational even as of the mid-1990s.)
Moreover, several of PAF airmen serving in air defence units (especially those deployed in the Karachi area) have ‘excelled’ in revealing their (well-concealed) firing positions by posting photos of these in the social media - and then photos that enabled geo-location. Whether the Indians have used this OSINT is unclear, but sorry: such behaviour alone is not indicative of a professional armed service. Unsurprisingly, the Indian strikes have knocked out most of two battalions of HQ-9 and one battalion of HQ-16 (the latter was the one in Walton, Lahore, which I’ve misidentified as ‘HQ-9’), at least three AN/TPS-77 radars, and… well, nobody knows how many other Pakistani air defence systems.
Another example: the IAF is known to have knocked out a NG-MMCC trailer-based command centre of the PAF, developed in cooperation with Turkey, which served as a back-up for the HQ of the Pakistani IADS. This was smashed at the Nur Khan AB.
With other words: the Indians did not ‘blow away’, or ‘destroy’ the Pakistani IADS all at once, with a single blow, nor did they destroy it completely. Instead, they’ve degraded it methodically and systematically, bit-by-bit, and piece-by-piece, by a mix of UAV- and air strikes with lots of elctronic warfare, and consequently and patiently. That operation surely took some time to complete: probably the evening of 7 May, the following night, and much of 8 May.
BTW, for this purpose, and between others, India not only deployed the mass of its 160 Israeli-made Harop attack-UAVs, but also its own variant of the same, designated Agnikaa. With other words: they have enough re-loads for such operations - now and in the future, too. Once again: indigenous weapons are of crucial importance.
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(…to be continued…)
As usual, precise and to the point! I am still in denial over how well our IADS performed!
Thanks Tom, excellent explanation and details. The "software/tech support Indians":an American comedy term🙂🙂🙂 would make support of the different sourced AD weapons, sensors, ISR, support systems integration childs play of their IACCS.