The AIM-120 (regardless of of B or C5/C7/C8) together with a tactical link (usually Link16) is a marvellous asset.
Such an aircraft can approach a target at very low altitude, hiding in valleys, ground clutter or similar. It can then launch its AMRAAM without turning on its radar at all, firing against target coordinates which it has rece…
The AIM-120 (regardless of of B or C5/C7/C8) together with a tactical link (usually Link16) is a marvellous asset.
Such an aircraft can approach a target at very low altitude, hiding in valleys, ground clutter or similar. It can then launch its AMRAAM without turning on its radar at all, firing against target coordinates which it has received over the Link16. (Also called third party targeting)
In the best of conditions the firing aircraft may not even be detected at all, if it can quickly get down ”on the deck” again and escape.
The missile will later turn on its seeker and disclose its presence, but then it’s hopefully too late for the target.
It calls for careful coordination and timing, but an ambush could be arranged where several quiet aircraft can attack a target simultanously from several directions.
Firing from very low altitude decreases the range of the missile considerably, however, due to the high density of the air, and because the missile will have to climb up to the target if this is at higher altitude.
The targeting, i.e. detecting, following, calculating the target position and vector, and sending this information on the Link16 can be done by other figthers, AWACS or even ground radars.
Such scenarios can be planned and practised beforehand, in simulation centers abroad, USA or NATO contries that have them.
Possibilites are endless, obviously Ukraine is good at this kind of intelligent fighting.
Yes, but I don’t think it’s necessary for the firing aircraft to turn on its radar after firing its AMRAAM(s). It can remain radio/radar silent and turn away immediately.
By popping up briefly and fire the missile slightly upwards it will help the missile with regards to range, just as it would if teleasing
>> So, if the PSU really has the IBCS BN Gateway, and then gets the Link 16, its F-16s could receive the same ‘picture’ like the Ukrainian air defence network and that ‘in real time’.
In turn, this means that the Ukrainian F-16s could also operate without revealing their presence through radio transmissions or through powering up their own radars.
Why is this important?
Because the Russians have a very comprehensive system of electronic support measures (ESM) deployed in and around Ukraine...
You mention; ”an F-16 on a counter-air mission will have to stay up there for a while longer: it will have to activate its radar, acquire the target and fire the missile, before returning back to the low altitude.”
The F-16 would still need to use it's radar in track while scan mode for the first leg if it wanted to get any considerable range out of the AIM-120. Firing the AIM-120 "mad dog" off the rail at the generally area of the target would further greatly reduce the range since there would be no in-flight course correction of the missile, until it's own seeker went active (as long as the aircraft also didn't change course a bit, and is now out of the gimbal limits of the missiles internal radar). You would have to reasonably get within just a few kilometers of the aircraft you were firing at for this to be effective, maybe 10-15km max, with a giraffe attack firing from low alt at a high target at 35,000 feet.
2 problems with the link 16. Say you are fying at treetop level to sneak up to do a giraffe attack with a aim-120. Your assests feeding you that info are also effected by terrain blocking your aircraft from their transmission, unless all of these assest and jets are using SATCOM (that isn't being jammed) , then your own aircraft is likely going to have a broken up picture going in, making this kinda attack, while not impossible, extremely high risk. With low chance of success.
The other thing is that in the sophisticated EW environment it's quite likely that link 16 transmission would at least be detected by Russian forces, and even if disrupting or interpreting these encrypted communications would be difficult, it would make detecting the aircraft trying to penetrate 50km into the Russian lines (glide bomb jets are usually launching at around 60km behind Russian lines) , easier.
The AIM-120 (regardless of of B or C5/C7/C8) together with a tactical link (usually Link16) is a marvellous asset.
Such an aircraft can approach a target at very low altitude, hiding in valleys, ground clutter or similar. It can then launch its AMRAAM without turning on its radar at all, firing against target coordinates which it has received over the Link16. (Also called third party targeting)
In the best of conditions the firing aircraft may not even be detected at all, if it can quickly get down ”on the deck” again and escape.
The missile will later turn on its seeker and disclose its presence, but then it’s hopefully too late for the target.
It calls for careful coordination and timing, but an ambush could be arranged where several quiet aircraft can attack a target simultanously from several directions.
Firing from very low altitude decreases the range of the missile considerably, however, due to the high density of the air, and because the missile will have to climb up to the target if this is at higher altitude.
The targeting, i.e. detecting, following, calculating the target position and vector, and sending this information on the Link16 can be done by other figthers, AWACS or even ground radars.
Such scenarios can be planned and practised beforehand, in simulation centers abroad, USA or NATO contries that have them.
Possibilites are endless, obviously Ukraine is good at this kind of intelligent fighting.
Yup, have described the 'principles' of that method of operation here: https://substack.com/home/post/p-147193301
Yes, but I don’t think it’s necessary for the firing aircraft to turn on its radar after firing its AMRAAM(s). It can remain radio/radar silent and turn away immediately.
By popping up briefly and fire the missile slightly upwards it will help the missile with regards to range, just as it would if teleasing
… releasing JDAMs or PAVEWAYs.
....from the same feature...
>> So, if the PSU really has the IBCS BN Gateway, and then gets the Link 16, its F-16s could receive the same ‘picture’ like the Ukrainian air defence network and that ‘in real time’.
In turn, this means that the Ukrainian F-16s could also operate without revealing their presence through radio transmissions or through powering up their own radars.
Why is this important?
Because the Russians have a very comprehensive system of electronic support measures (ESM) deployed in and around Ukraine...
You mention; ”an F-16 on a counter-air mission will have to stay up there for a while longer: it will have to activate its radar, acquire the target and fire the missile, before returning back to the low altitude.”
I don’t think it will have to activate its radar.
The F-16 would still need to use it's radar in track while scan mode for the first leg if it wanted to get any considerable range out of the AIM-120. Firing the AIM-120 "mad dog" off the rail at the generally area of the target would further greatly reduce the range since there would be no in-flight course correction of the missile, until it's own seeker went active (as long as the aircraft also didn't change course a bit, and is now out of the gimbal limits of the missiles internal radar). You would have to reasonably get within just a few kilometers of the aircraft you were firing at for this to be effective, maybe 10-15km max, with a giraffe attack firing from low alt at a high target at 35,000 feet.
2 problems with the link 16. Say you are fying at treetop level to sneak up to do a giraffe attack with a aim-120. Your assests feeding you that info are also effected by terrain blocking your aircraft from their transmission, unless all of these assest and jets are using SATCOM (that isn't being jammed) , then your own aircraft is likely going to have a broken up picture going in, making this kinda attack, while not impossible, extremely high risk. With low chance of success.
The other thing is that in the sophisticated EW environment it's quite likely that link 16 transmission would at least be detected by Russian forces, and even if disrupting or interpreting these encrypted communications would be difficult, it would make detecting the aircraft trying to penetrate 50km into the Russian lines (glide bomb jets are usually launching at around 60km behind Russian lines) , easier.
Maybe that explains why it took that long to appear