Don's Weekly, 9 December 2024: Part 3

by Donald Hill

(…continued from Part 2…)

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Russia

The rate of Russian Ground Forces’ personnel and material losses continues to rise.

The rate at which Russian cars, trucks and fuel tanks are destroyed increased a lot over the last nine months. This does not include vehicles that no longer run due to a shortage of spare parts (see below). These vehicles are how Russia moves supplies to the front lines. Because of the drones, some Russian truck drivers don’t want to drive near the front lines and dump their cargo of food and ammo. There haven't been widespread reports of this behavior but it does highlight the danger that Russian drivers face.

Russian car sales are up 76% this year compared to 2023. Nine of the top ten models are Chinese, and Chinese sales increased from 43% of the market last year to 58% of the market this year. Chinese cars still represent only 4% of all cars in Russia. It can take up to six months to repair a car due to the shortage in spare parts. Some parts won’t fit the same model car that was produced in a different factory. Payment for the parts is difficult due to sanctions and can take as long as two months. There are plans to barter grain for spare parts. And 35% of the parts on the market are counterfeit. The availability and durability of parts for domestic models are also disrupted since they require the import of subcomponents. These issues impact the trucks and private cars used by the Russian military for logistics.

The signing bonuses for contract soldiers continues to rise. This reflects increasing difficulty in signing recruits and will contribute to inflation. Of course, the continuing flow of men to the army will contribute to the labor shortage in the economy. The labor shortage causes higher pay which leads to higher inflation rates.

Even with the signing bonuses being doubled, enlistments are down and may not match the casualty rate. Due to the rising bonus rate and uncertainty of how many were paid the older (lower) rate and the newer (higher) rate, the number of new recruits in the third quarter of 2024 could range from 40,000 to 83,000. The most likely range of new contracts is between 45,000 and 54,000. Meduza’s conservative calculations indicate that Russian losses could range from 54,000 to 67,500 irrecoverable losses (wounded unable to return to battle and dead) in mid-2024.

The number of Russian dead since 2022 is probably 120,000. They confirmed 57,000 dead from documentation and the 120,000 figure is data extrapolation. In one region, Meduza confirmed 1,585 dead and a regional politician said there were more than 3,000 dead. This report supports Meduza’s projections. The article also reports that 48,000 relatives of Russian soldiers contributed DNA to search for those labeled missing in action.

Zelensky says that 198,000 Russians have been killed and 550,000 wounded.

Drought and frost resulted in record losses to Russia’s winter crops. 8% is the normal rate of crop failure and this year it was 37% for wheat. There will be enough wheat for domestic consumption because Russia produces such a large amount of wheat but exports will be reduced to 11 million tons 2025 compared to 29 million tons in 2024. This could represent a loss of $4 billion. This will reduce Russian income and make it more difficult to provide food for some parts of the world. Because of these losses, many Russian farmers said they will switch to more profitable crops such as peas, lentils, or sunflowers. The projection for Russia’s wheat harvest in 2025 (both summer and winter) is similar to 2024. While there will still be enough wheat for domestic markets it will lead to greater shortages of wheat and higher costs on the global market in 2026.

Russia has 15% of the world’s coal reserves, 5% of its production and 18% of the global exports. Their 300-year-old coal industry is also on the verge of bankruptcy. In 2023, 33% of the companies operated as a loss but the industry as a whole still made $2.9 billion in profits. In 2024, 51.6% of the companies lost money and the industry lost $73 million. The war isn’t helping as Russia canceled $3.1 in aid to transport the coal (which is the only reason they made profits in 2023), and new export taxes cost the industry $770 million. Sanctions are a big factor, and some Asian nations are taking advantage of that by demanding big discounts before agreeing to buy. The Russian Energy Ministry said it was working on a bailout package for its coal industry. This will likely involve a state-sponsored closing of some mines and a restructuring of the remaining mines.

With a stock of 20,000 locomotives, Russia is short 3,500 locomotives after buying 557 last year, but these new purchases often break down. They are going to buy 500 more next year. Over half the locomotive fleet is over 20 years old. Of the 15 goods categories that they track, 11 of them had fewer tonnage transported. Coal shipments account for 28% of all cargo and they fell by 6.2%. Ferrous metals fell by 9.9%, construction materials by 14.4%, cement by 4.7%, and grain by 3.3%. The average speed of trains is an indicator of efficiency, and it has been falling from a 2020 high of 41.6 kph to 36.5 kph in 2024. In addition to the shortage and breakdown of locomotives, personnel shortages are increasingly limiting and almost paralyzing the logistical work at the stations. They were short 3,000 drivers, but pay increases led to the recruitment of 1,000 in 45 days. Because of uncertainties in predicting when locomotives will be available, a lot of shipments were abandoned. For all the difficulties in the Russian economy, Russian railroads are in worse shape and is unable to transport everything the economy is producing. This creates a drag on the economy. Multiple sources say the situation will only get worse.

Russia’s former deputy energy minister said that war is the driving force for so many causes of inflation: Extreme military spending, labor shortage, production shortages not meeting demand, and no access to international markets and cheap foreign loans and technology. The Central Bank knows the root causes of inflation but is operating as if it is in a normal economy that can be regulated by monetary means, and the high interest rates eliminate investments and loans. Industrialists are lobbying for lower interest rates but then that would lead to hyperinflation. He says the only solution for either side is ending the war, but that is not on the table. Instead, Russia is spending its financial reserves to delay the inevitable. In February 2022 they had $89 billion reserves. By November 2024, it was reduced to $56 billion. Based on the budget deficits it will probably be reduced to $25-30 billion. Russia is running out of options. For discussion of manpower and other issues, here is the complete interview.

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Equipment

After testing it in Ukraine, Germany is sending 4,000 HX-2 drones. They have a range of 100 km, a speed of 220 kph, weight 12 kg, are resistant to EW and use AI to perform in limited communication situations. The price wasn’t revealed but it was designed for mass production to significantly lower costs.

PTM-3 Mine

Mines can play a huge part in stopping a vehicular or infantry assault. Trying to stop a Russian assault with drones alone depends on when the Russian assault is spotted, how many drone units are available, and how many drones they can put in the air at one time. Mines are a passive defensive method that will immobilize or destroy vehicles along likely avenues of approach and can be combined with drones to more effectively stop assaults. Once an assault is stopped, immobilized vehicles can be destroyed by drones. Ukraine is producing their own mines based off the PTM-3 and are deploying them remotely by drones and vehicles.

The PTM-3 mine is a rectangular HE anti-vehicle mine. A metallic vehicle will trigger the magnetic field and trigger a shaped charge blast on all four sides and on one end. Here are drones laying both PTM-3 and TM-62 mines, some of which are camouflaged. This is a Humvee with a remote mine emplacement system for PTM-3 mines. This video shows a BTR loading and remotely firing PTM-3 mines.

Magyar’s Birds, a drone unit, leads an effort that produces a mine based on the PTM-3. This is a map of one sector that was mined with drones. The video shows the manufacturing process (starting at the three minute mark) that includes recovering explosives from the battlefield. They currently build 20,000 mines a month and with funding they can scale it up to 30,000 mines per month.

A Ukrainian soldier modifies the mine to increase its explosive power prior to deploying it with a drone. A Russian effort to clear a PTM-3 minefield with TNT demolition blocks. In this video they use rifle fire and demolition charges. They have timers that can self-detonate after a set number of hours, and can have anti-handling devices, but the battery died on this mine and they were able to pull it apart.

Because any metal can set off the mines, the Russian sappers use branches to place the demolition blocks near the mines. A Ukrainian soldier didn’t recognize the mine a year ago and was lucky he didn’t trigger it with any metal he had on his body. At about the same time, a Russian solider examines a camouflaged PTM-3 mine. This may or may not have been a PTM-3 mine but it certainly approximates the power of the mine.