I have an assumption regarding why most of mobilized recruits go to new brigades instead of exusting ones. It probably goes down to bureaucracy.
Let's say a brigade has a company of 100 soldiers that suffered casualties. Assuming 1:5 ratio, that could be 10 KIA and 50 wounded. Now, according to the company's personnel registry document, it only has 10 vacant positions, while 50 wounded keep occupying their respective positions in the personnel registry, even though they might actually be in hospital for a long time. So the company can expect to get only 10 new recruits to fill the ranks.
Note: that's just my assumption, and it would be nice if someone could verify it.
I suspect that there is more than a grain of truth in this. Many of the wounded will return, some quite quickly., but many will never return to an infantry unit, and the medical administration and military beauracracy will move slowly.
Replacements should be allocated against strength returns while a unit is in the line and significantly under strength as an over-strength situation will only be temporary, if it ever arises.
When you are mobilized, you go through a month of training, then there is what is called a “market” from different combat brigades, and the “buyers” come and ask what your profession is. If you're an engineer or a systems administrator, you're very likely to end up in the UAV or telecommunications service. After that you still have at least 1 more month of specialty training, for example an operator, UAV technician takes 2-3 months, so you also take aptitude exams. I don't understand why everyone complains about people being taken into new, newly created brigades. On the contrary, in my experience, they take people from existing brigades. There are brigades where it is better not to get into because of the command, so if you are mobilized, it is better to go straight to the military recruiting or call a friend to help you get a job in a normal combat brigade. There is one disadvantage, once in a combat brigade, a new recruit can immediately go to a very hot area, for example, to Pokrovskoye. Where an inexperienced person is very likely to be killed... It is luck whether you listen to your sergeant, old-timers, etc.....
I don't see Russians having any bureaucratic difficulty with reconstitution of their brigades, even multiple times (like the 155th).
To me, keeping the 72nd alive and going back for R&R and refilling with new recruits would be more "profitable" than let the brigade waste away to almost nothing. If the Ukrainian general staff removed them while they were still at 50% of combat capacity, then refill, it would attract more volunteers (I think) than building brand new brigades
All the fresh recruits receive a mandatory 1-month rifleman course training. Even the ones who are going to serve as nurses in a hospital. However, the quality of the course depends heavily on the training centre and the instructors leading the course. And on the willingness of the recruits to learn. For example, I saw a case when one of the apprentice platoons bought painball bullets and used them for tactical trainings, like assaulting or defending a trench, while the other didn't (they shouted "pew-pew" and threw pine cones instead of grenades).
Motivation is an issue, but there have been plenty of drafted individuals in other wars, unpopular war even, that managed training. Some units do an excellent job of training. That needs to be the national standard.
I'm guessing one could bribe and serve in a training centre instead of the frontline which makes up a good chunk of instructors and training center back-office.
That ship has sailed from Ukraine în 2023. People don't trust the Ukrainian state and they don't trust the Ukrainian army. There are no volunteers, only conscripts caught în the street.
Rich pepple don't go near the frontline. The soldier's wage is small and his family goes into poverty. The Ukrainian army has a big passion for keeping its brigades inside encirclement battles.
The new recruits are playing for survival not heroism. You can not teach them agression or stubbornes because the social contract is broken.
Your article presents the payment method as agreed with IMF în 2023.
That money 3000$ is paid only if the soldier stays 30 days în the first line of contact and if his commander fills the papers showing that the soldier never rotated. Most people can not do this month after month.
Basic pay is 400$ and it increases if the soldier goes to the first line 2 days out of 5-7 days. People în support units have small wages because they stay 1-5 km from the first line. They still are targeted by FPVs, artillery and drones.
So you agree that the MINIMAL private infantryman wage is the national average. Which is the opposite of "family goes into poverty".
And by the definition most people get way above the minimal army wage because most of the army is not far from the combat zone.
"People în support units have small wages "
A drone operator who I know is always stationed kilometers away from the front and he's getting 30k ($730) "combat bonus". Even medic and logistical units get it if they are working for a unit who's fighting, which is most of them.
Once again foreigners show they know jack shit about Ukraine.
Why am I even talking to you? You mind is full of shit after reading that "Big Serge". The amount of false information that you bare in your mind since the beginning of the war is probably humongous.
A guy with college or a freelancing construction worker can get double or triple.
All Ukrainian brigades are asking for donations to buy used SUVs or small diggers. That's because wages are spent almost completely on soldier and his family.
It is nice that you verify what I read. Old Communist habits die hard. Maybe you can mention Noahopinion for left wing politics and anti-Russia.
We had apprentice platoons divided by age, like a few "young" platoons, 35+ platoon and 45+ platoon. While older platoon members were usually more organized, they often lacked physical qualities and had health issues, so instructors went easier on them.
They have such a small cradle of well lead and trained brigades, so the situation with the 72nd will be more impactful than just a wipe out of one brigade. God knows what will be left of them when lines stabilize again there, it's inexplicable what they've done to those troops. And in the process the command also lost the best defensive position on the seam of the eastern and southern fronts.
Thanks for the update, depressing as it is. Again learning seems to be lacking. However, reading Stefan Korshaks analysis of this he has a sligthly different take on the GenStab-U. Very briefly he compares them to French general Joffre, and figthing a war of attrition. So the defense was succesful because so many Russian troops were destroyed. Any thoughts? See: https://open.substack.com/pub/stefankorshak/p/october-5-day-955-vuhledar-falls?r=1vx7jc&utm_medium=ios
Is Rusia exhausted after all these urban assaults în 2024? Sadly there is no sign of operational pause for the moment.
Is Ukraine accumulating reserves and concentrating troops by making short retreats? Again sadly no clear evidence.
So Vuhledar is not a positive battle for Ukraine în the near future of 3-6 months.
Vuhledar silver lining might be as a delay and sacrifice for Pokrovsk. The Russians diverted resources which could have secured better results. They are still wasting men and hardware against tough brigades în the south instead of pushing on Pokrovsk or Myrnohrad.
I am not sure if we should only evaluate an event on its future impact. For instance it is sometimes possible to achieve the same impact with less use of resources. Having said that I agree that the question is if the Russians are exchausted. No signs yet as you say. However I strongly believe we will not see much signs before they are exchausted. The question is when recruiting becomes too hard, when they have too little equipment to support their troops attacking,when the total toll is too high. But I dont think we will see results before spring. At best.
I am still thinking that the Ukrainian general staff abused the 72nd like disposable tissues.
In my opinion, they should've reinforced the 72nd with another brigade instead of letting the former hemorrhage for months at an accelerating rate.
And it's supposed that the Ukraine army is giving priority to keep the troops alive. If the current leadership is going to spend men like artillery shells, well but they aren't Joffre or Grant.
You're right, the Gen Stab U or Syrsky aren't Grant or Joffre because they don't have the resources those generals had to rely on. The longer this war goes on, the more similarities I see between both sides. Stories from the same book, one could say, where troops are seen as an expendable resource. If Ukraine is going to survive they have to be a lot, not just a little bit smarter than Russia. Allowing the 72nd to waste away like that has no upside.
I have an assumption regarding why most of mobilized recruits go to new brigades instead of exusting ones. It probably goes down to bureaucracy.
Let's say a brigade has a company of 100 soldiers that suffered casualties. Assuming 1:5 ratio, that could be 10 KIA and 50 wounded. Now, according to the company's personnel registry document, it only has 10 vacant positions, while 50 wounded keep occupying their respective positions in the personnel registry, even though they might actually be in hospital for a long time. So the company can expect to get only 10 new recruits to fill the ranks.
Note: that's just my assumption, and it would be nice if someone could verify it.
I suspect that there is more than a grain of truth in this. Many of the wounded will return, some quite quickly., but many will never return to an infantry unit, and the medical administration and military beauracracy will move slowly.
Replacements should be allocated against strength returns while a unit is in the line and significantly under strength as an over-strength situation will only be temporary, if it ever arises.
When you are mobilized, you go through a month of training, then there is what is called a “market” from different combat brigades, and the “buyers” come and ask what your profession is. If you're an engineer or a systems administrator, you're very likely to end up in the UAV or telecommunications service. After that you still have at least 1 more month of specialty training, for example an operator, UAV technician takes 2-3 months, so you also take aptitude exams. I don't understand why everyone complains about people being taken into new, newly created brigades. On the contrary, in my experience, they take people from existing brigades. There are brigades where it is better not to get into because of the command, so if you are mobilized, it is better to go straight to the military recruiting or call a friend to help you get a job in a normal combat brigade. There is one disadvantage, once in a combat brigade, a new recruit can immediately go to a very hot area, for example, to Pokrovskoye. Where an inexperienced person is very likely to be killed... It is luck whether you listen to your sergeant, old-timers, etc.....
I don't see Russians having any bureaucratic difficulty with reconstitution of their brigades, even multiple times (like the 155th).
To me, keeping the 72nd alive and going back for R&R and refilling with new recruits would be more "profitable" than let the brigade waste away to almost nothing. If the Ukrainian general staff removed them while they were still at 50% of combat capacity, then refill, it would attract more volunteers (I think) than building brand new brigades
Well, i guess for russians it is simpler to refill because most of their infantry just dies and there are very few survivers.
Regarding untrained reinforcements.
All the fresh recruits receive a mandatory 1-month rifleman course training. Even the ones who are going to serve as nurses in a hospital. However, the quality of the course depends heavily on the training centre and the instructors leading the course. And on the willingness of the recruits to learn. For example, I saw a case when one of the apprentice platoons bought painball bullets and used them for tactical trainings, like assaulting or defending a trench, while the other didn't (they shouted "pew-pew" and threw pine cones instead of grenades).
Motivation is an issue, but there have been plenty of drafted individuals in other wars, unpopular war even, that managed training. Some units do an excellent job of training. That needs to be the national standard.
I'm guessing one could bribe and serve in a training centre instead of the frontline which makes up a good chunk of instructors and training center back-office.
New Zealand trained 3,000 Ukrainian recruits, apparently well, then pivoted to a "train the trainers" model.
This may have been the same for other training providers. It seems this approach may not have been as effective as hoped.
But you can see how even an effective NCO would find 50+ year olds more difficult to train than the younger ones.
The mindset at 50 is different than 20, for sure. I'm convinced that with a firm structure in place better results would be seen.
That ship has sailed from Ukraine în 2023. People don't trust the Ukrainian state and they don't trust the Ukrainian army. There are no volunteers, only conscripts caught în the street.
Rich pepple don't go near the frontline. The soldier's wage is small and his family goes into poverty. The Ukrainian army has a big passion for keeping its brigades inside encirclement battles.
The new recruits are playing for survival not heroism. You can not teach them agression or stubbornes because the social contract is broken.
I see you're a reader of known Russian propaganda channel so I won't spend my time arguing.
I'll just correct the comment about the soldier's wage because others might thing it's true.
If it's a combat role during a battle a private infantryman can earn up to 5 times the national average which is very good money. So up to $3k.
Source: a dozen of soldiers I know who spent their money on expensive gear and things like gaming laptops
More concrete numbers about who earns how much can be found here: https://finance.ua/ua/goodtoknow/zarplaty-vijskovyh-2023
Your article presents the payment method as agreed with IMF în 2023.
That money 3000$ is paid only if the soldier stays 30 days în the first line of contact and if his commander fills the papers showing that the soldier never rotated. Most people can not do this month after month.
Basic pay is 400$ and it increases if the soldier goes to the first line 2 days out of 5-7 days. People în support units have small wages because they stay 1-5 km from the first line. They still are targeted by FPVs, artillery and drones.
So you agree that the MINIMAL private infantryman wage is the national average. Which is the opposite of "family goes into poverty".
And by the definition most people get way above the minimal army wage because most of the army is not far from the combat zone.
"People în support units have small wages "
A drone operator who I know is always stationed kilometers away from the front and he's getting 30k ($730) "combat bonus". Even medic and logistical units get it if they are working for a unit who's fighting, which is most of them.
Once again foreigners show they know jack shit about Ukraine.
Why am I even talking to you? You mind is full of shit after reading that "Big Serge". The amount of false information that you bare in your mind since the beginning of the war is probably humongous.
Ukrainian average wage is small by any standard.
A guy with college or a freelancing construction worker can get double or triple.
All Ukrainian brigades are asking for donations to buy used SUVs or small diggers. That's because wages are spent almost completely on soldier and his family.
It is nice that you verify what I read. Old Communist habits die hard. Maybe you can mention Noahopinion for left wing politics and anti-Russia.
We had apprentice platoons divided by age, like a few "young" platoons, 35+ platoon and 45+ platoon. While older platoon members were usually more organized, they often lacked physical qualities and had health issues, so instructors went easier on them.
They have such a small cradle of well lead and trained brigades, so the situation with the 72nd will be more impactful than just a wipe out of one brigade. God knows what will be left of them when lines stabilize again there, it's inexplicable what they've done to those troops. And in the process the command also lost the best defensive position on the seam of the eastern and southern fronts.
Ignorant question: who/what is you refer to as "Genstab-U"?
Generalstab Ukraine - Ukrainian high command
The 72nd had a rough time 🙁.
As i say a lot, I hope some good lessons can be learnt and at least some of the mistakes corrected, especially regards training and sustainability.
Thanks for the update, depressing as it is. Again learning seems to be lacking. However, reading Stefan Korshaks analysis of this he has a sligthly different take on the GenStab-U. Very briefly he compares them to French general Joffre, and figthing a war of attrition. So the defense was succesful because so many Russian troops were destroyed. Any thoughts? See: https://open.substack.com/pub/stefankorshak/p/october-5-day-955-vuhledar-falls?r=1vx7jc&utm_medium=ios
One should judge an event by its future impact.
Is Rusia exhausted after all these urban assaults în 2024? Sadly there is no sign of operational pause for the moment.
Is Ukraine accumulating reserves and concentrating troops by making short retreats? Again sadly no clear evidence.
So Vuhledar is not a positive battle for Ukraine în the near future of 3-6 months.
Vuhledar silver lining might be as a delay and sacrifice for Pokrovsk. The Russians diverted resources which could have secured better results. They are still wasting men and hardware against tough brigades în the south instead of pushing on Pokrovsk or Myrnohrad.
I am not sure if we should only evaluate an event on its future impact. For instance it is sometimes possible to achieve the same impact with less use of resources. Having said that I agree that the question is if the Russians are exchausted. No signs yet as you say. However I strongly believe we will not see much signs before they are exchausted. The question is when recruiting becomes too hard, when they have too little equipment to support their troops attacking,when the total toll is too high. But I dont think we will see results before spring. At best.
I am still thinking that the Ukrainian general staff abused the 72nd like disposable tissues.
In my opinion, they should've reinforced the 72nd with another brigade instead of letting the former hemorrhage for months at an accelerating rate.
And it's supposed that the Ukraine army is giving priority to keep the troops alive. If the current leadership is going to spend men like artillery shells, well but they aren't Joffre or Grant.
You're right, the Gen Stab U or Syrsky aren't Grant or Joffre because they don't have the resources those generals had to rely on. The longer this war goes on, the more similarities I see between both sides. Stories from the same book, one could say, where troops are seen as an expendable resource. If Ukraine is going to survive they have to be a lot, not just a little bit smarter than Russia. Allowing the 72nd to waste away like that has no upside.
Thanks for this informative report Don