Don's Weekly, 7 April 2025: Part 3 (Equipment)

by Donald Hill

(…continued from Part 2…)

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Equipment

The number of Russian drones attacking Ukrainian cities continues to rise. The Ukrainian interception rate remains high. It was 98% in February 2025 - but, meanwhile, no less than 42% of these are being defeated by electronic warfare.

Ukrainian drones are sometimes captured and a Russian video says they infect Russian systems with malware. Variants on the cyber engineering include burning out the USB port, preventing reprogramming and reuse. Reimaging hard drives is sometimes prevented. In another variant, captured Ukrainian drones that are repurposed to use against Ukraine are sometimes hijacked by Ukraine and used to find the Russian operators. These cyber protections reduce the usefulness of capturing Ukrainian drones to study or re-use.

Ukrainian soldiers report that their home-made Bohdana howitzer is very accurate after 7-8,000 shots, even compared to Western artillery, in part because of the slow wear of the barrel that preserves the rifling. Because it was built in Ukraine, maintenance and repair of the gun is faster than donated guns. Any spare parts are available in 24 hours and any vehicles are repaired within 48 hours. At the same time, there are also production sites outside Ukraine which means they can quickly increase the number of guns they build, which is currently at 20 guns per month. Cheaper than their western counterparts, it is simple to use and each electrical and hydraulic system is duplicated by a mechanical system.

With other words: this is a good example for effects of timely [and wise] decisions from back in 2022; had the same been done in the case of about a dozen of other weapons systems… there would be a similar effect like there is in regards of artillery now: with hindsight, the mass of artillery pieces delivered by ‘the West’ over the last three years are going to end serving as ‘transfer-times-weapons’. Weapons of temporary importance because they’ve served the purpose of enabling Ukrainians to convert from what was left from the USSR to modern systems of own design.

Rather tragically, nothing similar happened in regards of air defences… Because of the shortage of air defense weapons, Ukraine is using missiles and systems that weren’t designed to work together.

Top left: A Buk-M1 surface-to-air missile system with 9M38 missiles that were designed for it. Bottom left and right: Buk-M1 with RIM-7 Sea Sparrow missiles. Top right: 9K33 Osa armed with R-73 missiles instead of the standard 9M33 interceptor missiles.

When Ukraine first received Bradleys in 2023 they only repaired minor damage and shipped vehicles with major damage out of the country to be repaired. They now repair all but the most severe damage and can fix engines, electrical systems and weapons. They value the 300 Bradleys they have because of its armor, reliability and the ample supply of spare parts. They repaired 12 Bradleys in 2023, 60 in 2024, and 20 in January and February of 2025.

Ukraine also produces spare parts for the simpler M113 and conducts major repairs on them. They are not on par with the CV-90s or Bradleys but they are functional in a supporting role. Some have been modified to allow the track commander to fire the machine gun while the hatch is closed.

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The 14th UAV Regiment

There are several units in the Ukrainian army that evolved into lethal and innovative combat units under the leadership of businessmen with no military experience. The 14th Separate Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Regiment is one such unit.

At the beginning of the full scale Russian invasion, the 3rd Regiment of the Special Operations Forces conducted traditional missions, such as counter-sniper, infantry support and anti-saboteur operations. Six months later, they realized that a drone could conduct reconnaissance missions without endangering anyone on foot, so they started looking for innovative solutions.

Fidel and Casper were two soldiers in the 3rd SOF that volunteered in 2014. Before the war, Fidel had been a businessman that took control over failing businesses and turned them around. They came across crates of abandoned foreign-made kamikaze drones with a range of 100-120 km. They were told the drones were “crap that didn’t fly”, but they started studying the problem and even went abroad for training. When they returned, they used those drones to carry out two missions successfully.

In August 2022, Fidel had the chance to meet Zaluzhny and told him that if they were given a battalion they could create a deep-strike program. In 48 hours, they drew up a list of the staff needed, a list of people they wanted to recruit and an outline of an operations plan. Zaluzhny approved it and by September, Fidel was the commander of the first deep-strike battalion.

Innovation by all members was encouraged and they learned as they went, struggling to fly just five drones a night while jeeps pulling the rubber bands to launch the drones would get stuck in the mud. They improved with each mission and after flying missions against targets over 100 km away, Fidel and the general staff decided to experiment with drones attacking the front lines in December 2022.

Prior to launch, crews with red lights on their helmets check the warhead, engine and other components and apply a special antifreeze solution to prevent icing.

Small units and drone enthusiasts had been using FPV drones in early 2022 but the strike battalion would be permanent specialists that would be equipped and operate systematically. Soon after they were established, strike companies showed up in regular brigades. Some of these evolved into regiments.

Fidel’s team was elevated to the General Staff in 2023 and the Central Directorate of Unmanned Systems was created in the fall. They became the interface between the senior leaders that trained in the Soviet system and the development and operations of world’s best combat drones.

The 14th Regiment was also fully established at this time. It has four components: tactical (20+ km), operational (50-100 km), strategic (1000+ km), and ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance). Where they once struggled to launch five drones a night, they now launch hundreds of drones or more for a single mission. They are involved in 30-40% of the deep strikes with increasing complexity and in coordination with the Security Service of Ukraine and the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine.

When launching Liutyi long-range drones, a car follows it down the runway for hundreds of meters while the operator in the passenger seat controls the acceleration and takeoff. Once the drone is airborne, the car races back to launch the next drone.

80-90% of drones they use are developed and produced in Ukraine and - performance-wise - they are superior to foreign drones. Since the battlefield environment is constantly changing, local production enables developers to quickly make changes based on feedback from the operators and quickly send the new models to the soldiers, both those engaging on the front line and hundreds of kilometers behind them.

Ukraine is increasing the numbers of drones they are producing. That, combined with improved designs and evolving operations, will continue to degrade the Russian army and industry on a daily basis.