Don's Weekly, 5 November 2024: Part 1

by Donald Hill

Hello everybody!
A day later than usually, and at an unusual time of the day, here the Don’s wrap-up of the last week of the war in Ukraine.

Please mind that the next-week’s Weekly is near-certain to follow on Tuesday, 12 November.

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The Big Picture

There are many factors that directly impact a war and one of those factors that is easy to understand is territory gained or lost, represented by lines on a map. Russia has made slow, steady progress in several sectors over the last year and the speed of their progress has dramatically increased in the last month. It is difficult to predict how long Russia will be able to maintain this rate of progress. The weather, Russian resources and Ukraine’s ability to establish a stable defensive line are some of the factors that will determine that, but Russian progression will slow down at some point.

There are other ongoing concerns not quite as visible as a line on a map that contributed to the Russian advance. Puzzling decisions by the Ukrainian high command include creating new brigades while proven brigades on the front line are starved of replacements. There is no logic that can justify why some recruits are trained to a high standard and others are sent to the front with no training. And, contrary to all NATO studies based on the war, Ukraine still has not established an army based on the division, which would increase the survivability and sustainment of the brigades and battalions assigned to the division. Instead, Ukraine continues to rely on the brigade as the prime maneuver unit, and even then it is common practice to detach battalions from different brigades and scatter them across the front. This further degrades unit cohesion and the benefits it brings.

Another reason for Russian progress is that they are simply sending more men and equipment into the attack. They end up with territorial gains but they are suffering sustained losses matching the highest rates they’ve experienced in the war. Russia is still recruiting 25-30,000 men each month, but its rate of loss is between 36-45,000 killed and wounded each month.

Russia recruited over 150,000 prisoners by last March. Its prison population dropped from 420,000 to 266,000, and many of the prisons closed. That is a diminished source of recruits. Estimates of North Korean troops in Russia range from 10,000 (US), to 12,000 (Ukraine) to 19,000 (South Korea). They will all be used as fodder for the meat grinder, and they will certainly have some level of impact that will benefit Russia, just as the prisoners did. (Russia is paying the North Koreans $2000 each month compared to a minimum of $2500 each month for a Russian soldier). There’s no guarantee that more won’t be sent, but even if the highest estimate of North Korean soldiers is true, that figure represents only two weeks of Russian losses at most.

The recruitment of so many men, plus the emigration of a million people, means there are very few people available for job openings. The Russian army is paying increasingly high bonuses to attract recruits, employers have to pay higher salaries to compete with the army for people, and the Russian government is spending more money on the war effort. This caused high inflationary pressure and Russia’s central bank raised its interest rate to 21%, the highest rate in its history. That rate is likely to be increased in December.

While the Russian government can function with those interest rates, private businesses are no longer taking out loans because they cannot make profits of 22% or higher and new investments would only result in higher losses. Russia’s GDP grew about 3.6% this year because of government military spending but the IMF expects that to abruptly slow down next year.

Russia continues to lose equipment faster than it’s producing. 2/3 of their vehicles are being refurbished for storage and they will be gone in a little more than a year. They’re producing a couple hundred new tanks and a thousand new infantry transports each year. Those provide speed and armor to help Russian infantry survive the advance into Ukrainian positions, but when they become scarce, Russian infantry will continue to advance, they’ll just suffer higher casualties. When Russia runs out of artillery, though, their ability to degrade Ukrainian defenses will be greatly reduced.

The gradual reduction of Russian artillery is partly offset by Russian glide bombs, a problem for which there is no answer yet. Tactical drones will remain a significant weapon for both armies throughout the war, and Ukrainian strategic drones are a bigger threat to Russia than Russian strategic drones are to Ukraine, but Russian missiles remain a threat to Ukrainian cities and high value tactical targets. Their production has slowly increased and Ukraine can only intercept a very small amount of them.

The biggest single threat to Ukraine is manpower. This is why it’s so important to preserve it with standardized training, well-built defenses designed by competent military personnel, and the adoption of the division as Ukraine’s basic maneuver formation. Ukraine controls all of these possibilities.

In the meantime, Western ammo production is slowly rising. The US is producing 60,000 shells a month and in another 15 months it should be producing 100,000 shells a month. Europe’s shell production already exceeds US shell production.

As unfortunate and avoidable as the recent loss of territory has been, the path for a Ukrainian victory is still wide. Poor decisions by Ukraine narrows the path. Russian losses and the state of their economy broadens the path. There is plenty of room for frustration, but there is no need for despair.

War is a battle of wills. The choice is to fight or not to fight. We know how Ukrainians are being treated in the occupied territories. Choosing not to fight means more of the same, and another war with Russia at some point in the future. So the only choice is to fight, support Ukraine and hold their leadership accountable.

There is additional hope, though. We know corporations protect their investments so this recent conversation between a foreign visitor and a Ukrainian taxi driver is another indicator.

“I tell you, the war will end soon,” said the taxi driver. “Hmm, how do you know?” asked the passenger. “Well, think about it,” said the driver, “McDonald’s is opening three new cafes in Lviv. Surely, they know something!”

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Kursk

There was a lot of combat in this sector but the front lines were stable.

A pair of videos that show footage of Ukrainian attacks on Russian positions, featuring smoke grenades, TOW missiles and some footage from the viewpoint of the attacking vehicles. A Russian MRAP is destroyed by a drone.

One of eight bombs dropped on Darino in one day. Further south, 2500 meters into Ukraine, Russia dropped three more bombs.

A Russian airstrike and cluster bomb attack by artillery 5 km southeast from Kremyanoe.

South of Kalinov, three Russian BTRs drop off infantry in front of some woods. Despite seeming to have fire superiority, the infantry appear to move away from the woods. The video ends before the action is resolved.

A BTR fires on Ukrainian positions in the woods.

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Kharkiv

Ukraine still controls the woods west of Zhuraviyovka just inside the Russian border. Russia still bombards it with rockets on a regular basis.

Russia dropped a large bomb on southern Vovchansk. A view of the city from the ground.

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(…to be continued…)