Don's Weekly, 29 July 2024: Part 1

by Donald Hill

Hello everybody!

Because, between others, there are voices counting something like ‘average Russian advance tempo per week’, and we think it’s a bit different than that, this time, Donald has prepared something new:

Tracking the Fight

While combat is widespread throughout Ukraine, there are quiet sectors where territory hasn’t changed hands in many months, if ever, and there are sectors where either Russia or Ukraine is actively trying to advance. This map shows where each side is trying to advance and notes how many weeks they’ve been trying to advance in that sector. It also includes a rough approximation of the average number of meters they gained each week they were attacking.

When Ukraine’s 2023 Summer offensive started to wind down, Russia began to attack once again. They began with low level attacks in a couple of sectors in September, started an all-out attack in the Avdiivka sector of October and started attacking in other sectors in November. From December until May, Ukraine was short on artillery ammo and that had an impact on its defenses. In January, Russia advanced 2 km on a 7 km wide front towards Pischane and that started the slow unraveling of defenses in that sector.

In February, Ukraine had stopped the Russian advances to the north and south of Avdiivka, but in the absence of Ukrainian artillery, Russian infantry began conducting mass assaults directly into the city. Ukraine had to rely almost solely on drones, which are very effective against individual targets but they are not as effective as artillery is on mass targets. It’s possible that Avidiivka might have fallen eventually even if there was plenty of ammo, but it would have happened months later and Russia would have paid an even higher price.

After the fall of the city, Ukraine slowly withdrew to Orlivka to create distance from the dominating terrain of the coke plant and take advantage of the small river west of Orlivka, but plans to establish a defensive line there fell apart when Russia broke through to Ocheretyne and heavy Russian assaults have been pushing them back at a rate of a kilometer a week ever since, and always leading the push in the northwest corner of the salient.

Russia gained 6400 meters pushing toward Terny from December to March but couldn’t make any more progress after that. At the end of June, Ukraine pushed them back 1900 meters in a week and that sector has been static since then, with only small Russian skirmishing.

Likewise, Russia attacked the Robotyne perimeter from October to June, the only sector they attacked in Zaporizhzhia. The combat here is characterized by large bombardments and small ground assaults. They gained about 2500 meters, but once they secured the symbolic center of that small village they weren't able to advance for five weeks.

The advance from Bakhmut to Chasiv Yar was another large effort that cost Russia dearly, but to the south of the canal district, the defenses on the high ground overlooking Ivanivske suddenly collapsed. The 41st Brigade was pulled out of that sector and other units took over the defense of the compromised position, delaying its inevitable fall.

The 41st was moved to Toretsk, considered a quiet sector since the front line hadn’t changed since February 2023, and some of the sector hadn’t moved since 2015. Soon after being assigned to the sector, the Russians pushed them back 3.5 kilometers. Other units had to be brought in to stabilize the front.

Russia crossed the border into Kharkiv in May advancing 5 to 6.5 km in two weeks. Ukraine sent reinforcements and seized the initiative but their advance has been very slow.

Ukraine also conducted an assault in the Kreminna forest and managed to make a small amount of progress.

The map above thus reflects over 10 months of combat. Russian gains range from 400 meters in Bilohorivka to 20 km from Avdiivka. The rates of advance vary from 10 meters a week to a kilometer a week. This is no ‘maneuver warfare’: it is attrition warfare, and Russia lost so many armored vehicles in these ten months that they are now only used in small numbers outside of the sectors from Avdiivka to Vuhledar. In the southeast, Russia still uses - and loses - a lot of vehicles.

Russia is aware of its pending equipment shortages and increased the level of attacks when compared to before Ukraine’s 2023 offensive. The intent is to strain Ukraine’s army. In this regards, there is no doubt that the Russians are having some success. Ukrainian soldiers say that their men are tired and their units are undermanned. At the same time, Zelensky says they have 14 brigades that cannot be deployed because they don’t have enough equipment. It is peculiar to stand up new units when existing units need replacements.

Overall, this is now a race to see which army will break first, but: even with Ukraine’s self-inflicted wounds, Ukrainians are still in a much better position.

(….to be continued…)