(…continued from Part 4…)
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Equipment
Over the last 12 months in the Pokrovsk sector, Russia lost 539 tanks and 1,830 vehicles. Since the start of the invasion on Ukraine in late February 2022, the Russians also 3,000 tanks and 30% of self-propelled artillery and rocket launchers. All of their stockpiles will be empty by 2026, meaning they won’t be able to refurbish vehicles. and they’re only producing 149 T90 tanks this year. They’re also slowly running out of aircraft, producing perhaps 14 Su-57s this year, but Iskander missiles production has significantly increased.
Every time a North Korean shipment of ammo arrives, combat intensifies 8-9 days later for about two weeks. Russia is heavily reliant on North Korean ammo but it’s not certain if North Korea can increase production, and it’s not known how much of their ammo reserve they’re willing to ship to Russia.
Russia’s own internal analysis states that if they don’t end the war in the near future, they will not be able to be a superpower for 30 years and will be limited to being a regional power.
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Bloomberg claims that 30% of the three million artillery shells used by Russia are produced in Russia. North Korea provides 60% and Iran supplies 10%.
A South Korean lawmaker quoted the defense ministry and said that North Korea could have shipped up to 9.4 million 152 mm shells to Russia. It’s running its factories at full capacity but the output of the major factories is limited since they were built underground to increase survivability. They are estimated to have enough ammo for three months of war.
Trends in drone warfare: Russian FPV drone operators engage at higher speeds. They might achieve surprise but they also miss a lot. Ukrainian FPV operators engage at slower speeds and often circle to find the best opportunity to attack. Drones flying at night are increasing in numbers. Bombers are becoming more common that FPV drones, and the bombs themselves are larger and deadlier.
Developed by the Wild Hornets, the Sting drone has a speed of 160 kph and can operate at altitudes of up to 3000 meters. Currently, they are flown towards the target by an operator but they are working on an AI targeting system that would lock on to the target in the last stage of the interception. It takes time for a radio signal to travel from the camera of the Sting drone to the operator, and another delay for the operator’s control commands to travel back to the drone. This can make (relatively) high speed intercepts difficult. An AI system would not have to worry about signal latency (delays). It costs about $5,000 compared to a $50,000 Shahed drone, and it is much cheaper than any surface to air missile.
Most FPV drones have traditionally had a range of 10-15 km. A Ukrainian drone was found 30 km from the front line. Among Stefan Korshak’s many topics in his latest post, he makes a point Ukrainian private industry is innovating drone technology at a much faster pace than the Ukrainian government, or any other democratic government could. In the “Russia” section is a report on how the oligarchy stifles innovation. These innovations will not win the war by themselves but a 30 km range endangers Russian air defense systems that have a 50 km range and increases the already high risk to Russian artillery. Ukraine is also using AI for terminal guidance which helps defeat jamming and reduces the chances of missing due to delayed radio signals between the drone and the operator. The Wild Hornets are one of the companies that are providing Ukraine with a technological advantage over Russia in this field.
The Sting drone is the fourth type of drone created by the Wild Hornets, an organization that has only existed for a year and a half. They also have the FPV drone that has a 1.5-3 kg warhead, depending on the range to the target. Some models are now using AI once the target is locked, which helps defeat short-ranged jammers that a vehicle or infantryman might have. There is also the Queen Hornet large bomber with a 30 km range, 5 kg payload and a life expectancy of 10-30 missions before components wear out. And then there are the interceptors that chase down Russian reconnaissance drones with their high capacity batteries.
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Trench Design and Explosive Blasts
Some Andrew Perpetua numbers: They’ve recorded 54,798 Ukrainian drone attacks and 33, 447 Russian drone attacks. These are just the attacks that are published and that his team has viewed. Of the 54,798 Ukrainian attacks, 21,243 have been drone attacks on Russian infantry. About 1/3 of those attacks result in a kill. His data also shows that:
● Infantry in a bunker are the least likely to be killed.
● Infantry in the open is more likely to be killed than infantry in a bunker.
● Infantry in a trench without overhead cover is more likely to be killed than infantry in the open.
A blast in the open passes outwards and continues until it dissipates.
A blast in a trench (or in between two tall buildings) will pass outwards until it hits a barrier. Then it bounces off the barrier until it hits another barrier. This continues until dissipation and is demonstrated in this Mythbusters TV show video. Within six meters, a blast inside a straight trench has a pressure wave that’s ten times stronger than a blast on open ground.
In the full Mythbusters episode they tested blast waves in open ground, a straight trench, a trench with sharp corners and a trench with rounded corners.
If a drone actually exploded inside a bunker it would be even worse than a trench because of the overhead containment. In a trench, the pressure waves bounce back and forth in the horizontal axis while the waves in the vertical axis either pass through one time straight up or bounce once off the ground before passing straight up. If there is a roof to contain the blast, the waves would bounce between the ground and the roof just like they bounce from wall to wall.
No matter how well it is constructed, a straight-line trench will amplify the pressure wave of a blast. If the straight-line trench is connected to the door of the bunker, part of that amplified wave will travel into the bunker. A trench with rounded (soft) corners will absorb a lot of energy. If a trench has sharp corners then it will absorb even more. The best trench is one that has short segments, sharp corners and overhead cover. If the munition fully penetrated the overhead cover, the effects of the blast would still be bad in the short segments but it wouldn’t travel as far.
Just for amusement, a 'blast' from the past (British War Office tests available on the web) on overhead cover on trenches and other field entrenchments -
"WO 291/602 The practicability of overhead cover
Two types of overhead cover were considered. "Type A" uses raised overhead cover over the whole
trench. "Type B" has a flat covered part, and so is harder to observe, but means that men must leave
the overhead cover area to use their weapons.
On light soil (most soils, especially clays, give more protection for a given thickness), if 100 casualties
would be caused by 25-pdr airburst on trenches without overhead cover, the following casualties are
predicted:
Cover Men manning weapons Crouching in cover
Type A Type B (either type)
6-inch logs with:
No earth 12 100 10
1 ft earth 2 100 2
Corrugated iron or light timber, with:
6" earth 65 100 60
1 ft earth 22 100 17
2 ft earth 12 100 10
"Both in Russia and Italy the Germans have used semi-mobile "pill-boxes" partly sunk in the ground and protected with 30 to 150mm armour plate. These accommodate 2 men and would be invulnerable to anything but a direct hit from a shell or bomb."
One presumes information of this type (updated of course) is taught to officers and soldiers in most Western Armies.
Apparently Ukrainian troops are not taught this sort of information, or choose in all too many castes to ignore it...
Thanks Don, and Tom for the intro.
In many of your updates and OSINT analyses, I see that Russia will run out of tanks or self-propelled artillery or just the barrels or something else in several months or 1-2 years in shortest. Yet, at least as they draw their stocks, there should be a marked deterioration of the quality (as the best comes first) but has such a deterioration been observed? There was lots of talk about Russian pulling T-55s but that a year or more so ago. Now it looks that most of the tanks are T-90s. Or maybe T-62s. Yet, not much worse than what was used in the beginning.
Anyway, it looks that least the casualties of Russia are risign and that’s probably the only unsustainable trend but even Tom is no longer optimistic for it…